MUHAMMAD IRSHAD vs PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS, KARACHI through Chairman
This is an appeal directed against the order dated 30-10-1997 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, whereby the appellant's service appeal was dismissed in limine on the ground that the newly incorporated Section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 by Act No. XVII of 1997 was not retrospective. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the view taken by the Tribunal regarding the non-retrospectivity of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 was in consonance with the prior judgments of the Supreme Court. Relying on its earlier precedents, including Muhammad Afzal v. KESC and Ghulam Mustafa Khairati v. Federation of Pakistan, the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's view was unsustainable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision on merits within six months. The key principle laid down is that Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 applies retrospectively in accordance with the established jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
- Whether Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 is retrospective in nature?
- Can the Federal Service Tribunal dismiss an appeal in limine on the grounds that Section 2-A is not retrospective?
- Section 2-A, Service Tribunals Act 1973
ORDER
1. ' AJMAL MIAN, C.J.---This is an appeal against the order dated 30-10-1997 passed by the learned Federal Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in Appeal No,681 (K) of 1997 filed by the appellant, declining the same in limine on the ground that newly incorporated section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 by Act No,XVII of 1997, was not retrospective. Leave to appeal was granted to consider as to whether the view found favour with the Tribunal is in consonance with the judgment of this Court rendered in Civil Appeal No, 1513 of 1998 (Muhammad Afzal v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation through its Managing Director, Karachi).
2. ' We have heard the appeallant who is present in person. None is present for the respondent.
3. In view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Muhammad Afzal v. KESC, Karachi (Civil Appeal No, 1513 of 1998), which was followed inter alia in the case of Ghulam Muhstafa Khairati v.
4. Federation of Pakistan and another (1998 SCM R 1603), the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned order set aside and the case remanded to the Tribunal with the direction to hear the appeal afresh after notice to the parties and decide the same on merits within a period of six months. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.