GOVERNMENT OF SINDH through the Advocate General Sindh vs MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN and 6 others

ORDER

' MAMOON KAZI, J.---The respondents were appointed Assistant Sub Inspectors in 1995. They were sent for training to Police Training Centre, Saeedabad and after they had successfully completed their training, they were posted at different police stations. However, before the respondents could complete their initial probation period they were discharged from service under Rule 12.8 incorporated in the Police Rules, 1934. The respondents filed their respective departmental appeals and subsequently they filed their appeals before the Tribunal.

2. The respondents were ordered to be reinstated in service by the Tribunal as it found that no show-cause notice had been served upon the respondents before termination of their services by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and neither any departmental inquiry had been held in their case nor any opportunity of personal hearing had been provided to the respondents. The orders whereby their services were terminated, were also found to be nonspeaking orders and the entire action was found to be in violation of the terms contained in section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, introduced in the said Act vide Act XI of 1997. The said section lays down that where power is conferred on any authority, it shall be exercised reasonably, fairly and justly and such authority would be required to state reasons for making any order or issuing any direction while exercising such power.

3. Mr. Ainuddin, learned Additional Advocate-General has argued that the respondents were discharged within the period of their probation as they were found to be unsuitable for service and such action was warranted under rule 12.8 of the Police Rules, 1934. It was further contended that no appeal was competent against such action. The appeals filed by respondents Muhammad Hussain and Abdul Majeed before the Tribunal, according to him, were also premature as the said respondents failed to wait for ninety days as required by section 4 (a) of the Service Tribunals Act, before filing their appeals before the Tribunal.

4. We, however, find no force in any of the said contentions. Rule 12.8 under which action has been purportedly taken, provides as follows:-- "12.8. Inspectors, Sargents, sub-inspectors and assistant sub-inspectors who are directly appointed will be considered to be on probation for three years and are liable to be discharged at any time within the period of their probation if they fail to pass the prescribed examinations, including the riding test, or are guilty of grave misconduct or are deemed for sufficient reason, to be unsuitable for service in the Police. A probationary inspector shall be discharged by the Inspector-General, and all other upper subordinates by Range Deputy Inspector-General, Assistant Inspector-General, Government Railways Police, and Assistant Inspector-General, Provincial Additional Police (designated as Commandant, Provincial Additional Police). No appeal lies against an order of discharge.

(2) The pay admissible to a probationary inspector, Sargent, sub-inspector or assistant sub- inspector is shown in Appendix 10.64, Table A."

The said rule no doubt indicates that officers referred to in the said rule are to be considered as probationers during the first three years of their appointment and they can be discharged from service during such period for any of the reasons mentioned in the said rule and no appeal would lie against an order of discharge. But evidently this is not a case of simplicity discharge. Reports sent by Superintendent of Police to the Deputy Inspector-General indicate that serious allegations of inefficiency were attributed to the respondents. If such allegations entailed their removal from service, the respondents were entitled to a show-cause notice and an opportunity to defend themselves against the proposed action. Furthermore, no doubt rule 12.8 lays down that the officer against whom action is taken under the said rule shall not have any right of appeal, but the respondents being civil servants, they are, governed by provisions of the Civil Servants Act, 1973.

The right of departmental appeal being provided to the civil servants under the relevant rules, the provisions of rule 12.8 cannot prevail over the same. Therefore, interference with the order of the Tribunal on the point is not warranted under the law.

5. So far as the question of limitation taken by the learned Additional Advocate-General in the case of respondents Muhammad Hussain and Abdul Majeed is concerned, even if we agree with him that the appeals respectively filed by the respondents before the Tribunal were premature, but if similar action taken by the competent Authority is found to be untenable in the case of other respondents, relief cannot be declined to respondents Muhammad Hussain and Abdul Majeed on this technical ground.

6. The upshot of the discussion is that the order passed by the Service Tribunal does not appear to be open to exception under the circumstances of the case. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that interference with the judgment of the Tribunal is not warranted.

7. In the result, the petitions are dismissed and leave is refused.