JAHANZEB KHAN vs MUHAMMAD IQBAL
This petition challenged a Peshawar High Court order dismissing a pre-emption suit due to the plaintiff's failure to deposit one-third of the pre-emption money within the time fixed by the Trial Court. The core legal question was whether the Trial Court possessed the discretion to extend the time limit for depositing the pre-emption money under the amended Section 24 of the NWFP Pre-emption Act, 1987. The Supreme Court held that while the amended law grants the Court discretion to fix the initial time for the deposit, it imposes a mandatory obligation to dismiss the suit if the plaintiff fails to comply with that fixed period. The Court found the Trial Court's extension of time was unjustified, particularly as it was granted on vague grounds without supporting evidence. The principle laid down is that under the amended Section 24, the failure to deposit the required pre-emption money within the court-fixed timeframe necessitates the dismissal of the suit, and courts must exercise their discretion rationally and fairly rather than arbitrarily.
- Does the power to fix the time for depositing pre-emption money under Section 24 of the NWFP Pre-emption Act 1987 include the power to extend that time?
- What is the consequence under the amended Section 24 of the NWFP Pre-emption Act 1987 if a plaintiff fails to deposit the required pre-emption money within the time fixed by the Court?
- Is a court's discretion to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money absolute or subject to the mandatory dismissal provisions of the NWFP Pre-emption Act 1987?
- Section 24(1), NWFP Pre-emption Act 1987
- Section 24(2), NWFP Pre-emption Act 1987
- NWFP Act X of 1992
SH. IJAZ NISAR, J.- This petition is directed against the order dated 14.12.1998 passed by the Peshawar High Court, in Civil Revision No. 104 of 1996.
2. The facts in brief are that Janahzeb Khan petitioner herein had filed a pre-emption suit in respect of the suit property against Muhammad Iqbal, respondent herein. On 21.12.1995 the learned Trial Court directed Jehanzeb Khan to deposit 1/3 of the pre-emption money before 13.2.1996. He failed to comply with the order and instead moved an application for extension of the. The learned Trial Court extended the time.
3. Feeling aggrieved, Muhammad Iqbal filed an appeal in the District Court. The learned Additional District Judge, Haripur by judgment dated 28.7.1997 dismissed the appeal anu upheld the order of the learned Trial Court. Muhammad Iqbal then filed a writ petition in the High Court which was accepted on 14. l2.1998 and the orders of the Courts below were set aside and the pre-emption suit filed by Jehanzeb Khan was dismissed.
4. It is, contended by the learned counsel for Jehanzeb Khan, petitioner, that the power to fix the the for deposit under Section 24(1) of the NWFP Pre-emption Act, 1987, as amended by the NWFP Act X of 1992, includes the power to extend the the for such deposit also, and as such the learned Trial Court was legally competent to extend the the for the deposit of 1/3 of the sale price.
5. We have considered the ground which weighed with the learned Trial Court in extending the the and are of the opinion that it was vague and was not accompanied by any medical certificate or an affidavit of Jehanzeb Khan. Even if, these short-comings have not been there still the High Court could not have legally extended the the limit because the law is very clear and sub-section (2) of section 24 of Pre-emption Act, 1987 as amended in 1992 makes it obligatory tor the Court to dismiss the suit on the failure of the plaintiff to deposit 1/3 of the sale price within the period fixed by the Court.
6. Before amendment of Section 24 by Act X of 1992, the Court had the power to extend the period not beyond 30 days of filing of the suit but under the amended section 24, there is no statutory limit within which the deposit has to be made and matter has been left to the discretion of the Court to fix the within which the deposit has to be made and its failure must result in the dismissal of the suit.
7. It is a settled rule of interpretation that law is to be interpreted and applied rationally, justly, fairly and not arbitrarily thus no benefit can be claimed by the petitioner by invoking the formal provisions of section 24 of the Act. In this view of the matter, the order of the learned High Court in dismissing the suit for the failure of the petitioner to deposit 1/3 of the sale price within the period fixed by the Trial Court is unexceptionable and does not call for any interference. In consequence the petition is dismissed.