Pakistan Case Law
1970 SCMR 76

MUHAMMAD SHARIF KHAN AND 4 Others vs BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST

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Citation1970 SCMR 76
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 18 of 1969 Writ Petition No. 472-
Date1969-07-11
Judge(s)Hamoodur Rahman, C. J. and Muhammad Yaqub Ali
ResultPetition dismissed
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was submitted with a delay of 133 days. The core legal question was whether the negligence or failure of a legal counsel to inform their client about the status or outcome of a case constitutes sufficient grounds to condone a significant delay in filing an appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the limitation period commences from the date of the impugned order, not from the date the client receives information from their counsel. The Court established that a litigant cannot absolve themselves of responsibility by blaming their counsel for procedural delays. It is the duty of the client to remain diligent, maintain contact with their legal representative, and monitor the progress of their case. The Court emphasized that a valuable right accrues to the opposing party upon the lapse of the limitation period, and such rights cannot be undermined by the client's failure to exercise proper oversight over their legal affairs.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Does the failure of a lawyer to inform a client of a court decision constitute sufficient grounds to condone a delay in filing an appeal?
  • When does the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave to appeal commence?
  • Is a litigant absolved of responsibility for procedural delays caused by their counsel's negligence?
limitationcondonation of delayspecial leave to appealcounsel negligencelitigant responsibilityprocedural delay

ORDER

1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-This petition is barred by 133 days and the only explanation for this delay that has been given in the petition for condonation is that the learned counsel engaged to appear in the Writ Petition in the High Court did not give to the petitioners any intimation of either the date of the hearing fixed or of the result of the case, till the 18th November 1968.

2. It was only after this that the petitioner came to Lahore, applied for copies and ultimately filed a petition for special leave to appeal on the 11January 1969.

3. It is contended that if limitation is reckoned from the 18th November 1968, the petition will be in time. But this cannot be done. Limitation begins to run from the date of disposal of the writ petition on the 2nd July 1968. The petitioners cannot absolve themselves of their own responsibilities by throwing the blame on their learned counsel for the delay. Even assuming that their counsel was at fault, it is the petitioners who are to suffer and not the other side to whom a valuable right has accrued by the lapse of time.

4. We are not prepared to accept that a client's responsibility ceases after he has briefed a counsel to appear on his behalf. It is his duty to keep in touch with his counsel and to find out the progress of his matter. If he cannot go personally, it is hiss duty to make proper arrangements for timely information to be conveyed to him by either the counsel or his clerk.

5. The petitioners have not stated if they took any such steps. th

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