MEHTAB KHAN vs MUHAMMAD LATIF and others
This matter concerns revision petitions filed against an order of the District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Kotli, which granted bail to the accused-respondents following a compromise between the accused and the legal heirs of the deceased in a criminal case involving charges under sections 302, 324, 147, 148, 149, and 109 of the Azad Penal Code and the Arms Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the complainant, who alleged injuries, had the legal standing to challenge a compromise deed entered into between the accused and the heirs of the deceased, particularly when the complainant was not the party injured by the specific accused involved in the compromise. The Court held that the complainant lacked the legal standing to challenge the compromise deed, noting that the specific injury attributed to the complainant was caused by an accused not party to the current revision petitions. Consequently, the Court dismissed the revision petitions, upholding the trial court's discretion in granting bail. The key principle established is that a complainant cannot challenge a compromise deed between the accused and the heirs of the deceased if the complainant was not the victim of the specific acts covered by that compromise.
- Does a complainant have the legal standing to challenge a compromise deed entered into between the accused and the heirs of the deceased?
- Can a trial court grant bail based on a compromise between the accused and the heirs of the deceased in a murder case?
- Is a compromise deed valid if the complainant, who was injured by a different accused, does not consent to it?
- Section 302, Azad Penal Code
- Section 324, Azad Penal Code
- Section 147, Azad Penal Code
- Section 148, Azad Penal Code
- Section 149, Azad Penal Code
- Section 109, Azad Penal Code
- Section 242, Code of Criminal Procedure
- Arms Ordinance
ORDER
' The above-titled revision petitions arise out of the same order, therefore, I propose to dispose of these by this single judgment.
2. The facts of the case briefly stated are that a challan under sections 302, 324, 147, 148, 149, 109, A.P.C. And 13/20/65, Arms Ordinance, was presented before District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Kotli on 27-1-1997. The statements of the accused-respondents were recorded on 24-3-1997 under section 242 of Cr.P.C. The guilt was denied by the respondents-accused and case was fixed for the prosecution evidence. Meanwhile, on 29-8-1998 the heirs of the deceased moved an application that they have entered into a compromise with the respondents. The requisite statements were recorded by the trial Court on 29-8-1998. The respondents moved two applications for bail before District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Kotli on 29-8-1998 and prayed that a compromise has been made between the heirs of the deceased and the accused-respondents. Therefore, the bail may be allowed in their favour. Consequently, the concession of bail was extended in favour of the accused-respondents on 31-8-1998. Feeling aggrieved by this order, the revision petitions have been presented before me which are subject-matter of this order.
3. Sardar Shahid Ajmal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that the respondents- accused have entered into compromise with the heirs of the deceased but they did not take care about the complainant although the complainant was also injured by the respondents, therefore, the order of compromise as well as the impugned order are defective which cannot be upheld. He also argued that the compromise was made for the offence under section 302 of A.P.C. And not for the offence under section 324 of A.P.C. He also pointed out that the offence under section 324, A.P.C.
Is non-bailable offence. He finally submitted that the impugned order may be recalled.
4. In reply, Chaudhry Muhammad Yousaf, the learned counsel for the respondents, vehemently argued that the offence of murder has been compromised between the parties and the heirs of the deceased have admitted the position. The competent Court has executed the compromise deed and the impugned order was passed under legal authority which does not need any interference, submitted by the learned counsel. He also contended that there is no allegation of any injury attributed to the respondents upon the persOn of the complainant, therefore, the complainant is not legally entitled to challenge the compromise deed.
5. In the light of the arguments addressed at the Bar, I have considered the compromise deed, relevant record and arrived at the conclusion that the respondents have not been attributed an injury inflicted upon the person of the complainant. The perusal of the record transpires that one of the accused Willayat was attributed a fire-arm injury to the complainant, who is not before the Court. A The complainant is not empowered to challenge the compromise deed, made between the heirs of the deceased and the respondents. At the most he could challenge the compromise deed to his own extent against accused Willayat but the said accused was not arrayed a party in both the revision petitions.
6. It will be relevant to note here that the injured P.Ws. Have also not challenged the compromise deed, therefore, it will be presumed that in a way they have accepted the compromise deed.
Almighty Allah has ordained in his Holy book:-- {{URDU TEXT}} (Surah Al-Hijra, Verse No,10). Thus, acting upon the Holy Verse, it is better to mitigate than to litigate.
All of us should try to bring back peace and tranquillity in the society, which is the need of hour.
7. According to the facts and circumstances of the case, I see no cogent reason to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Court below, which was exercised in a judicial fashion.
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that the revision petitions have no merits which are hereby dismissed.