MUHAMMAD LATIF and others vs THE STATE
This matter arises from a criminal petition for post-arrest bail filed by Muhammad Latif and another, facing charges under Sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in connection with F.I.R. No. 304 of 1998 registered at Police Station Sambrial, District Sialkot, for the murder of Naseer Ahmad. The core legal question concerns whether post-arrest bail should be granted to the accused who raised a plea of alibi accepted by an initial investigating officer, despite a subsequent investigating officer finding them guilty based on ocular testimony. The Lahore High Court dismissed the bail petition, holding that the petitioners are nominated in the F.I.R. with specific roles, a prima facie case exists against them, and conflicting conclusions by successive investigating officers do not negate the ocular account at the bail stage. The court laid down the principle that divergent findings during police investigation do not override consistent eyewitness accounts implicating the accused in an offence falling within the prohibitory clause.
- Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when conflicting opinions are rendered by successive investigating officers regarding a plea of alibi?
- Does the nomination of accused persons in the F.I.R. with a specific role of firing establish a prima facie case disentitling them to bail?
- Whether absence of recovery of weapon of offence from the accused is a sufficient ground for grant of bail in a murder case?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
' A case under sections 302/34, P.P.C., was registered against the petitioners and others at Police Station, Sambrial District, Sialkot vide F.I.R. No,304 of 1998, dated 16-10-1998 for an occurrence in which Naseer Ahmad was done to death with firing. The report about the occurrence was lodged by Mst. Jamila Bibi a sister of the deceased. Both the petitioners had fired at the deceased which resulted into his death. The 3rd accused Muhammad Afzal absconded after the occurrence and has not so far been arrested. He also participated in the occurrence by making fire at the deceased after the latter had fallen on the ground after receiving fire of the petitioners.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioners has canvassed the bail on the ground that both the petitioners had come from a different place which was at the distance of about 90 to 100 kilometres from the place of occurrence and, therefore, it cannot be said that they were actually present at the time of murder. In this connection, it was contended that both the petitioners took up the plea of alibi before the police, which was accepted by one of the Investigating Officers, but subsequent Investigating Officer believed the eye-witnesses who linked both the petitioners with the murder of the deceased by clearly deposing that they were present on the spot and had committed the occurrence. Ultimately both of them were challaned to face the trial.
3. Lastly it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that no recovery was effected from the petitioners, which was another factor, which would speak for their innocence.
4. The learned counsel for the state has opposed the bail petition on the ground that both the petitioners are clearly named in the F.I.R., and both of them fired at the deceased which ultimately proved fatal. The mere fact that one of the Investigating Officer had accepted the plea of alibi of both the petitioners at one stage after taking into account the version of the 3rd party, which was not actually the eye-witness would not exonerate the petitioners particularly when the subsequent Investigating Officer clearly linked both the petitioners as they had killed the deceased by making fire at him according to the ocular account of occurrence collected by the Investigating Agency.
Both of them have been found guilty and sent up to the Court concerned for trial.
5. I have considered the foregoing facts and find that both the petitioners are named in the F.I.R., and a specific role to each of them has been assigned for causing murder of the deceased. The mere fact that at one stage of investigation, their plea of alibi was accepted but later on believing the ocular account of occurrence, the subsequent Investigating Officer found them real culprits and had sent up their case for trial would make out a prima facie case against them worth of judicial test. In such a situation, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioners were guilty of an offence falling within the prohibitory clause. There being no extenuating ground in their favour, the bail petition is dismissed.