MUHAMMAD YAQUB vs PAKISTAN PETROLEUM LTD. and anothers

1. ' SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, C.J.---The appellant was dismissed from service on 21-11-199.1. After serving grievance notice on respondent No,1, the appellant filed grievance petition before Labour Court No .V at Karachi which remained pending before that Court until 1997. While the above petition was pending adjudication before Labour Court No,V, Karachi, section 2-A was added in Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act'). The appellant, on 1-10-1997, moved an application before the Labour Court for withdrawal of this grievance petition with reservation of his right to file a service appeal in view of the amendment in the Act. The Labour Court declared the petition filed by the appellant under section 25-A of the LR.O as abated on 1-1- 1998. Against the order of abatement passed by the Labour Court, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal which was dismissed as abated on 28-9-1998, Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the learned Service Tribunal on 17-10-1998, The learned Tribunal dismissed the appeal as time-barred holding that either the appellant should have approached within 90 days of 10-6-1997 when section 2-A was added in the Act or within a maximum period of 90 days of the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Muhammad Afzal v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (1999 SCM R 92) which is dated 31-3-1998. Since the appeal was not preferred within 90 days of the two dates mentioned in the impugned judgment, the Hon'ble Tribunal came to the conclusion that no ground was made out for condonation of delay.

2. ' The observations made by the learned Tribunal are no doubt weighty and normally in view of these observations; there would have been no case for condonation of delay. However, we find that the judgment referred above was reported in January 1999 Issue of Supreme Court Monthly Review

(SCMR) and as such the learned Tribunal should have taken lenient view on account of prevailing confusion with regard to availability of the remedy to an aggrieved person, who was employed in an organization or corporation controlled by the Government. We, accordingly, set aside the order of the learned Tribunal and remand the case with the observations that the Tribunal may reconsider the application for condonation of delay in light of these observations.