EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, IRRIGATION SUMANDRI, RANGE FAISLABD vs KAMEER

ORDER

' ZIA MAHMOOD MIRZA (CHAIRMAN).---This appeal filed by the Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Sumandari Range, is directed against order of the Single Member, Lahore Bench, dated 18-10-1999 whereby the respondent's petition under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 challenging his retirement was accepted. The appeal appears to have been filed after the expiry of the limitation period. It is, therefore, accompanied by an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay.

2. The order of the Single Member impugned in this appeal was passed on 18-10-1999. The appellant applied for certified copy thereof on 26-10-1999, which was delivered to him on the same day and he filed the present appeal on 7-12-1999, which was patently time-barred. The plea taken by the appellant in his application for condonation of delay is that the case was fixed before the learned Single Member on 18-10-1999 when it was adjourned to 26-10-1999. The appellant appeared before the learned Member on 26-10-1999 and he was informed that the case had already been finally decided on the previous date i,e, 18-10-1999. It is further alleged in the condonation application that the appellant immediately filed application for certified copy of the order on 26-10-1999. He was told that he would be given copy of the order after some days as the file was yet to be traced. The clerk of the appellant's counsel had been visiting the office for obtaining the copy which was delivered on 12-11-1999 but the date of delivery was mentioned therein as 26-10-1999. It has been further alleged in the application for condonation that after obtaining the copy of the order, departmental authorities sent the file to the concerned Special Public Prosecutor "and this period took more days than it was essential to be filed within the prescribed limitation period and the limitation extended to two days within departmental process and fulfilling essential procedural conditions, which required to be condoned for 2 days".

3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. None of the pleas taken by the appellant in his application for condonation of delay has convinced us. In reply to our query, learned coursel has stated that the appellant was represented by some other Advocate before the Single Member.

We have asked him as to why the affidavit of the said counsel has not been placed on the present record, to support the plea that the case before the learned Member was adjourned from 18-10- 1999 to 26-10-1999. He submitted that this has not been done as it would have resulted in further delay in filing the appeal. The explanation given by the learned counsel has not impressed us. The impugned order is shown to have been announced on 18-10-1999. No satisfactory material has been placed on record to show that the impugned order was not announced on 18-10-1999 and the case in question was in fact adjourned to 26-10-1999 as alleged by the appellant. The appellant has not even cared to procure the affidavit of the counsel who was representing him before the learned Single Member. Similarly, the allegation that the certified-copy of the impugned order was delivered to the appellant on 12-11-1999, but the date of delivery was wrongly mentioned as 26-10- 1999, therein, is also preposterous. If what the appellant has alleged had been true, he would or should have immediately got the so-called error rectified or made some complaint in that behalf to the Deputy Registrar of this Commission or the learned Member working at this Bench. Learned counsel for the appellant admits that no such step was ever taken by the appellant. As regards the plea of time taken in procedural formalities for filing of the appeal, suffice it to observe that the plea taken is quite vague and devoid of necessary details. For instance, it has not been stated in the condonation application as to when was the file sent to concerned Special Public Prosecutor nor has it been explained as to how many days were taken in fulfilling the procedural formalities for filing the appeal. In the absence of these details, the vague plea taken by the appellant cannot be accepted. Needless to observe that condoning delay on such a ground would amount to putting premium on the negligence on the part of Government functionaries, who have to be treated like any other litigant. Even otherwise, the plea of delay having occurred on account of procedural formalities of the departmental authorities, has never been accepted by the Courts as a valid and reasonable ground for condoning the delay.

4. Apart from what has been said above, the learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to satisfy us as to why after obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order, allegedly delivered on 12-11-1999, the appellant took 25 days in filing' the appeal. We have also examined the three cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant viz. (1) PLD 1961 Karachi 722, (2) PLD 1975 Lah.

707 and (3) PLD 1986 Quetta 107, and find that none of these cases has any bearing on the present case.

5. For the reasons aforementioned, we find no substance in the pleas/grounds taken by the appellant for condonation of delay. The application for condonation of delay is accordingly rejected with the result that the appeal is dismissed as time-barred.