FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Finance vs GULSHAN SPINNING
This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had allowed constitutional petitions concerning the denial of price subsidy on cotton to the respondent-mills. The core legal question involved whether the petitioners could withhold the price subsidy on the ground that claims were not lodged with the State Bank of Pakistan within the prescribed time, and whether the time-barred petitions filed by the Federation of Pakistan deserved condonation of delay. The Supreme Court held that the petitions for leave to appeal were barred by 116 days and that the general explanation that delays occur within government departments does not constitute a sufficient ground to explain each day's delay, particularly when the application for certified copies was made after the period of limitation had already expired. The key principle laid down is that a party, including the Government, seeking condonation of delay must provide a satisfactory explanation for each day's delay and cannot rely on institutional delays or departmental routine as a matter of course.
- Whether general administrative delays within government departments constitute sufficient ground for the condonation of delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
- Is a party seeking condonation of delay required to explain each day's delay?
- Whether a petition filed after the expiry of the period of limitation without a satisfactory explanation for the delay is liable to be dismissed?
- Order XXXIII Rule 6, Supreme Court Rules 1980
- Article 185(3), Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973
ORDER
' CH. MUHAMMAD ARIF, J.-Through this common order we intend to dispose of the above petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh, whereby Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-647 and 648 of 1989 were allowed in the following terms:- "5. From the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, we are inclined to the view that the respondents are legally bound to honour their solemn commitment and they cannot escape their obligation to grant price subsidy to the petitioner for the reason that the petitioners' claims were not lodged with the State Bank of Pakistan within the prescribed time on the date of issuance of circular. It is difficult to ascribe to this argument of the learned counsel for the respondent for the reason that the original policy did not bind the petitioner to furnish the requisite particulars of purchase, value of total number of bales, total credit provided by the bank and amount of cotton subsidy to the State Bank the same day by 12.00 mid night on the date of circular.
Indeed the circular issued by respondent No,2 required the commercial banks to furnish such particulars to the State Bank within the shortest time prescribed in the circular and in case the commercial banks did not perform their obligation the petitioner cannot be made to suffer for that reason. Even otherwise, the time frame permitted for furnishing of all particulars of purchase of cotton, its quality, weight number of bales, value of total purchase and the credit facility provided by the bank unreasonably short and inadequate to permit transmission to the State Bank of Pakistan the same day. Only requirement relevant for the purpose of entitlement to price subsidy which can be spelt out from the policy declaration of the respondent seems to be that the cotton must have been, delivered at the mills which factum is not disputed by the respondents.
6. There appears to be an amount of considerable force in the statement of the learned counsel for the petitioner when he states that the respondents cannot be permitted to destroy legal right of the petitioner with retrospective effect. He is right in agitating that for the cotton purchased on or before the date of circular withdrawing subsidy petitioner is entitled to the price subsidy which cannot be withheld and denied by any canon of law. Indeed no proposition to the contrary has been raised on behalf of the respondents."
' The result was that the respondent-Mills were disallowed the subsidy on cotton at the rate of Rs,80 per maund.
2. We have heard Mr Akhlaq Ahmed Siddiqui, learned Advocate-onRecord for the petitioner and have also been taken through the precedents cited by him i.e, Muhammad Farooq Imam v. Claims Commissioner (PLD 1964 SC 585), Pakistan Post Office v. Settlement Commissioner and others (1987 SCM R 1119), and Sardar Abdul Hafeez Khan v. Sardar Muhammad Khan Loni (NLR 1995 SCJ 185)
(sic) wherein reference was made to Muhammad Ismail v. Abdul Rashid (1983 SCM R 168), to support his plea that even if there is a case for resolving the question of limitation against a litigant-similarly placed as the Federation of Pakistan in these petitions-the case/matter can be considered on merits and if it is held that the impugned order is corum non judice or beyond the powers of the authorities concerned, the grant of relief, even in time-barred petition/s can be allowed.
3. We are not inclined to consider the question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in that what stares the petitioner in the face is that these petitions are barred by 116 days. The judgment impugned through these petitions was passed on 27-11-1998. According to their own showing, the Government applied for certified copies of the order on 5-5-1999 which were made available to them on 6-5-1999. Admittedly, these petitions were filed on 22-5-1999 and, therefore, beyond time. A perusal of the applications under Order XXXIII, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 seeking condonation of delay shows that the petitioners explain the delay saying: "that after obtaining copy of judgment/order from the Copying Branch of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi, the office of the petitioner sent the copy of judgment for advice to the Ministry of Law and Justice at Islamabad and therefore, it consumed sometime." Mr. Akhlaq Ahmed Siddiqui, learned counsel for the petitioners, was of the view that it is a matter of common practice that cases get delayed in verious departments of the Government and that for that reason alone, in an appropriate case where, according to him, the initial order suffers from inherent defects, the Government should not be denied their right to make challenge to such order/judgment under clause (3) of Article 185 of the Constitution. We have already observed that the petitioner-Government have to first cross the hurdle in their way of explaining each day's delay. The general allegation that cases get delayed in 'Government Departments' is of little help to the Federation of Pakistan. It is an admitted position that when the applications were made by the petitioner for obtaining certified copies of the impugned judgment, the petitions had alread become barred by time. No effort whatsoever has been made by the petitioner to explain the obvious delays in resorting to the instant petition under Article 185 (3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
4. Resultantly, the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed as barred by time. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.