HAMID ALI BAIG vs THE STATE And 2 Other
This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which challenged the registration of a criminal case against the petitioner for illegal storage of kerosene oil. The petitioner contended that the First Information Report (F.I.R.) failed to disclose an offence under Martial Law Regulation No. 30, arguing that the alleged violation was merely a breach of fiscal law rather than a criminal offence. The core legal question was whether the High Court should interfere with the registration of a criminal case and the subsequent investigation at an intermediary stage. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the writ petition was rightly dismissed because the investigation had been completed and a formal challan submitted to the Summary Military Court. The Court established the principle that where a case has reached the trial stage before a competent forum, the accused should raise their legal objections, including the validity of the charges, before that trial court rather than seeking premature intervention through writ jurisdiction.
- Can a High Court interfere with the registration of a criminal case or investigation at an intermediary stage?
- Should an accused challenge the validity of an F.I.R. through a writ petition when the case has already proceeded to the trial stage?
- Is a writ petition competent when the investigation is complete and a challan has been submitted to a trial court?
- Martial Law Regulation No. 30
ORDER
1. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-This petition for leave to appeal arises out of the order dated 28-5-1978 of the Lahore High Court dismissing, in limine, Writ Petition No. 2710 of 1978.
2. On receiving a report that oil was illegally stored in New Timber Market, Lahore, respondent No. 3, in the company, amongst others, of respondent No. 2, a local Magistrate, vent to the premises and discovered an underground oil storage tank containing kerosene oil and several drums full of oil in the courtyard. No licence for carrying on this trade, as required by law, could be produced by Khalid Baig, who was present at the premises. The first information report was, accordingly, registered under M. L. R. 30 at the instance of respondent No. 1. A writ petition was filed by the petitioner in the High Court challenging the registration of the case against him, on the ground that the F. I. R. Disclosed no offence against him and that the agency duly licensed was in the name of his brother Younas Baig and that he had nothing to do with the storage of kerosene oil. With the writ petition the licence was not attached, but a receipt for payment of some fee was enclosed. It is in the name of one Bashir son of Buta, and the petitioner shifted, his stand from being an agent to a partner, namely Bashir.
3. The learned Judge in the High Court took notice of these inconsistencies and contradictions and dismissed the writ petition. It was held that the report was lodged by a Magistrate, the accused had already been arrested and during the investigation the analysis of the kerosene oil had yet to take place and there was no justification for interference with the investigation or registration of the case at this intermediary stage.
4. The petitioner bas now moved this Court for grant of special leave to appeal.
5. In support of this petition the ground taken before the High Court, namely, that the first information report disclosed no offence under M. L. R. 30 has been reiterated. It is submitted that the petitioner has, by not keeping a licence for the petroleum trade merely violated a fiscal law and his prosecution under M. L. R. 30 is not warranted.
6. We observe that the case is at an intermediary stage. The investigation has, by now, been completed and the formal challan been submitted, and the case is now complete for trial by a Summary Military Court. The points raised by the petitioner can, therefore, appropriately be raised before the military Court, which is now seized of the matter. The petitioner's writ petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court on the ground that it was not competent at that stage. We also find no force in this petition, which is, accordingly, hereby dismissed.