NOOR AHMAD vs THE STATE
This criminal petition concerns an application for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, who is a co-accused in a case registered under Sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was named in the F.I.R. with a specific role attributed to him, was entitled to bail despite the argument that his vicarious liability could only be determined after recording evidence. The Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to the concession of bail at this stage. The ratio of the decision is that where an accused is named in the F.I.R. with a specific role, and the police have found the accused guilty and submitted an incomplete challan, the case does not fall within the scope of 'further inquiry' for the purpose of bail. The key principle laid down is that the determination of vicarious liability and the assessment of guilt based on the police investigation and the specific allegations in the F.I.R. preclude the grant of bail when the accused is not entitled to it on merits.
- Whether an accused named in the F.I.R. with a specific role is entitled to bail before the recording of evidence?
- Does the submission of an incomplete challan by the police affect the court's consideration of a bail application?
- Can the question of vicarious liability be determined in favor of an accused at the bail stage when the accused is named in the F.I.R.?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
The petitioner is a co-accused in case F.I.R. No.250 of 1999; dated 20-6-1999 registered under sections 302/324 read with section 34, P.P.C., with Police Station, Gaggo Tehsil Burewala, District Vehari. Subsequently on 23-6-1999 offence under section 302, P.P.C. Was also added as Muhammad Usman one of the injured died.
2. According to the complainant, the petitioner alongwith his two brothers namely Mansoor Ahmad and Riaz Ahmad injured Ghulam Farooq and Muhammad Usman who died subsequently.
3. The motive was stated to be the divorce by Ghulam Farooq injured to the sister of the accused/petitioner and also their reluctance in allowing them to meet their minor nephew Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din.
4. For the petitioner, it is inter alia stated that no direct injury has been attributed by him upon the person of the deceased or any of the P.W. And that the question of vicarious liability could not be determined without recording of evidence. Therefore, according to the learned counsel the case of the petitioner is that of further inquiry.
5. Learned counsel for the complainant as well as that of the State, however, oppose the prayer for the grant of bail. Learned counsel for the State submits that incomplete challan in his case has already been submitted and that concession of bail to the petitioner is likely to jeopardise the arrest of the accused Mansoor Ahmed who is a fugitive from law for the last almost a year.
6. Learned counsel for the complainant in support of his submission that the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case is not entitled to the concession of bail, relies upon in re: Sohail Hameed v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1993 FSC 44; Mst. Barkat Bibi v. Gulzar and another 1979 SCM R 65; re: Hakim A.I and 3 others v. The State 1979 SCM R 114 and re: Chiragh Din and others v. The State PLD 1967 SC 340.
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties I am not persuaded to allow the prayer. The petitioner is not only named in the F.I.R. But a specific role has also been attributed to him. The question if he made vicariously liable cannot favourably be determined at this stage. The petitioner having been found guilty by the police and incomplete challan having already been submitted against him no case for concession of bail is made out at this stage. The submissions made for the complainant find support from the reported judgments, relied upon at the bar except for the one reported as Sohail Hameed (supra). The facts and the principle laid down therein being clearly distinguishable, the prosecution cannot derive any strength therefrom.
8. For what has been stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed.
H.B.T./N-86/L