MIRZA KHAN vs ALLAH DIYAYA
This matter arises from an eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlord against the petitioner-tenant who ran a hotel in the demised premises. The Rent Controller struck off the petitioner's defence for twice defaulting on the deposit of tentative rent and ordered eviction, which was upheld in appeal by the District Court and subsequently by the High Court. In the Supreme Court, the petitioner raised contentions regarding the property being evacuee property, that a building let for running a hotel falls outside the definition of 'building' under the rent restriction law, and that the default in depositing rent was merely inadvertent rather than wilful. The Supreme Court held that the property was not evacuee, that premises let for running a hotel fall within the definition of a building under the relevant rent ordinance, and that the concurrent findings regarding default in rent deposit were supported by evidence. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, with a brief extension of time granted to vacate.
- Whether a building let for the purpose of running a hotel falls within the definition of a building under Section 2(a) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959?
- Does default in the deposit of tentative rent warrant the striking off of a tenant's defence under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959?
- Section 2(a), West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959
- Section 13(6), West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959
ORDER
1. DORAB PATEL, J.-The petitioner is the lessee of a house owned by the respondent and he runs a hotel in this house. In the events that happened the respondent filed an eviction application against the petitioner for eviction, As the petitioner contested his eviction, the' Rent Controller, Quetta passed the usual crier for the deposit of the tentative rent, after the petitioner had filed his written statement. But as' the petitioner twice' committed default in the deposit of monthly rent, the respondent filed an application for striking off the petitioner's defence. Although the Petitioner contested this application, it was allowed and eviction was ordered by the Rent Controller.
2. The petitioner challenged his eviction in an appeal in the District Court, Quetta. But as this appeal was dismissed, the petitioner filed a second appeal in the Sind & Baluchistan High Court which was heard, in the events that happened, by the Baluchistan High Court. However, during the pendency of the appeal, the petitioner raised, for the first time, a new plea. This plea was that the property in dispute was evacuee property because it had been mortgaged in favour of a Hindu who was an evacuee. This plea assumed that the mortgage had not been redeemed, but as the ugh Court held that the mortgage had been redeemed, and that the property had never been treated as evacuee before 1st of January, 1959 it dismissed the petitioner's second appeal. Hence this petition for leave.
3. Not only had the respondent redeemed the mortgage the objection that the property was evacuee appears to have been taken after the repeal of the evacuee laws, therefore, Mr. Jarad Rizvi very rightly conceded that he could not press the petition on the ground that the property in dispute was evacuee. He only advanced two other submissions which we would now examine.
4. According to learned counsel, the respondent's house had been leased to the petitioner for the purpose of running a hotel, therefore, the further submission was that the house had ceased to be a building within the meaning of section 2(e') of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance V1 of 1959 (hereafter called the said Ordinance).
5. Section 2(a) reads : "Building" means any building or part of a building let for any purpose, whether being actually used for that purpose or not, including any land, godowns, outhouses, together with furniture let therewith but does not include a room in a "Sarai", hotel, hostel or boarding house."
6. We see no ambiguity whatever about ibis provision. As only rooms let; by a hotel, hostel, Sarai have been excluded from the definition of a building, it would follow that hotels, serais, etc., would fall within the definition of a building and would, therefore, fall within the purview of the said Ordinance.
7. This was also a view taken by Anwarul Haq. J. (as he then was) in Shuja-ud-Din Qureshi v. Mst.
8. Husan Ara Begum, etc. (PLD 1964 Lah.292), and we respectfully agree with it.
9. Learned counsel's only other submission was that the failure to deposit rent on the petitioner's part was inadvertent, therefore, it did not amount to willful default within the meaning of subsection (6) of section 13 of the said Ordinance. We are not able to accept this submission. As it is clear from District Court's order that there was evidence is support of the concurrent findings of the Courts that the petitioner had committed default in complying with the order for the deposit of tentative rent. Accordingly, this submission is also without merit.
10. Mr. Jamil Rizvi then stated that the petitioner should be given some time to vacate the demised premises as he was running hotel. The request is reasonable and we direct vast provided ire petitioner continues to deposit the monthly rent he shall handover the vacant possession of the demised premises to the respondent by 28th February, 1978.
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