WALI MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR vs GOVERNMENT OF SINDH and others
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Sindh Service Tribunal, Karachi, which dismissed his service appeal as time-barred. The core legal question was whether an appeal dismissed by the Service Tribunal on the ground of limitation warrants interference by the Supreme Court when the delay was caused by pursuing misconceived remedies such as review petitions and successive unprescribed appeals. The Supreme Court held that ignorance of law is no excuse, that pursuing remedies not provided under the relevant law does not furnish a reasonable justification for condoning inordinate delay, and that the dismissal of an appeal on limitation by the Service Tribunal without touching the merits does not render the order legally infirm. The key principle laid down is that the pursuit of unprescribed remedies does not extend the period of limitation, and the Supreme Court will not interfere with a Service Tribunal order properly dismissing an appeal as time-barred.
- Whether ignorance of the limitation period prescribed in section 4 of the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973 constitutes a sufficient ground for condonation of delay?
- Does the pursuit of unprescribed remedies such as reviews and second appeals extend the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
- Whether the dismissal of a service appeal by the Service Tribunal on the ground of limitation without touching upon the merits renders the order legally infirm?
- Section 4, Sindh Service Tribunals Act 1973
ORDER
' JAVED IQBAL, J.---The petitioner seeks leave to appeal against order, dated 22-5-2000 passed by learned Sindh Service Tribunal, Karachi, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed being, hopelessly, time-barred.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the services of petitioner were terminated by means of order dated 1-7-1998 against which a departmental appeal was filed on 9-7-1998 which was dismissed vide order, dated 6-2-1999. The petitioner after dismissal of his departmental appeal filed a review petition on 6-2-1999, which met the same fate vide order, dated 27-2-1999. Being aggrieved the petitioner once again preferred an appeal before Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister, Government of Sindh, on 12-8-1999 which was rejected vide order, dated 27-10-1999. The petitioner finally approached the Sindh Service Tribunal and filed an appeal on 19-11-1999, which was rejected by the learned Sindh Service Tribunal being time-barred.
3. The petitioner argued that appeal could not be filed in time before Sindh Service Tribunal as he was not aware regarding the period stipulated in section 4 of the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
4. We have carefully examined the contention as agitated by the petitioner in the light of provisions as contained in section 4 of the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973, and minutely perused the impugned order. We are not persuaded to agree with the petitioner that he was unaware about the time limit, as ignorance of law is no excuse. Admittedly there is no provision for review, second appeal or third appeal which were filed by the petitioner. It transpires from the record that the petitioner had resorted to other ways and means which were neither prescribed under the relevant law nor available to him which resulted in an inordinate delay of nine months, which has not been condoned by the learned Sindh Service Tribunal and rightly so, as no reasonable justification was available for it. It is worth mentioning that decision of Sindh Service Tribunal arrived at with full application of mind and appreciation of facts of the case does not suffer from any infirmity justifying interference by this Court. In this regard reference can be made to 1996 SCM R 280. It is well-settled by now that "the fact that Service Tribunal had dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation without touching upon the merits of the case, would not render the order under appeal legally infirm, so as to warrant interference by Supreme Court". (PLD 1990 SC 692).
5. In the light of foregoing discussion we are not inclined to grant leave and, accordingly, the petition being devoid of merit is dismissed.