MUHAMMAD SAEED vs Mst. SARATUL FATIMA AND ANOTHER

ORDER

' SHAFI-UR-REHMAN, J.-This Intra-Court appeal under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance is directed against an order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing in limine the constitutional petition of the appellant challenging an order of the Rent Controller calling upon him to deposit arrears of rent and future rent during the pendency of the ejectment application filed against him without even deciding the preliminary issue on the existence of relationship of tenant and landlord between the appellant and respondent No, I. The main reason given was that the order under challenge was interlocutory and was bound to culminate in a final order which, in turn, was appealable. The appellant had only to wait till the stage of appeal was reached. The case-law on the subject was also reviewed.

2. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that as the very assumption of jurisdiction by the Rent Controller and the competence of the proceedings before him was under serious challenge, such an onerous order could not be passed without deciding these questions. Besides, the appellant has no statutory alternative remedy. He should not be forced to a situation where he commits a technical default, is visited with an order of eviction and gets a right of appeal in the hierarchy. It is, according to the learned counsel, an eminently fit case for being entertained and dealt with in the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.

3. The Legislature manifested its intent unequivocally by prescribing two broad categories of all orders passed under the W. P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) by making the more determinative orders constituting the smaller category appealable and all others forming the larger category non-appealable. The scheme of such a categorization, the limits and the rationale thereof has been fully considered in Mian Manzar Bashir v. M. A. Asghar (0. It, therefore, follows that what the Legislature held to be an interlocutory order not by itself fit to be appealable, should not by such a device be held fit enough to attract the more important, and at a higher level, the constitutional jurisdiction. Any contention, or practice to the contrary, would defeat and deflect the legislative intent, which has been disapproved in Mumtaz Hussain Bhutta v. Chief Administrator Auquf etc. (2)

4. There is yet another aspect of the case. The constitutional jurisdiction is invoked and made available in cases of imminent, grave and tangihl threats to valuable personal and property rights and that too subject, inter alia, to the condition that the legal remedy, if at all any available in the circumstances, is not efficacious or adequate. In this case, an order which by itself caused no tangible damage to the appellant, and is incapable of causing any, I was challenged. In order to pose a real threat to him it has to be substituted by another order and the moment it so happens, a right of appeal would accrue to the appellant which right is certainly more extensive and beneficial being available in the same hierarchy and on both questions of law as well as of facts.

Thus the case of the petitioner was not a fit one to be entertained in constitutional jurisdiction.

' There is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed in limine.

(1) PLD 1978 SC 185

(2) 1976 SCM R 450