MUNIR vs THE STATE
This petition concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner, Munir, in a criminal case registered in 1994 for offences under sections 395, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and 10/11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the significant delay in the trial, the fact that he was not initially nominated in the F.I.R., and the belated nature of his implication by the complainant and the alleged abductee. The Court held that the petitioner’s case fell within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as his role appeared secondary and the allegations were made years after the occurrence. The Court granted bail, establishing the principle that when a case warrants further inquiry into guilt, bail is a matter of right rather than grace. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the commencement of a trial does not act as an insurmountable barrier to granting bail if the accused demonstrates a case for further inquiry, as the right to liberty prevails over considerations of trial propriety.
- Does the commencement of a trial prohibit the granting of post-arrest bail when a case for further inquiry is established?
- Is bail a matter of right or grace when a case falls within the scope of further inquiry into the guilt of an accused?
- Can an accused person be granted bail if they were not initially nominated in the F.I.R. and were implicated only after a significant delay?
- Section 395, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 10, Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979
- Section 11, Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979
- Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
' Through this petition Munir petitioner has sought post-arrest bail in case F.I.R. No,464 registered at Police Station Sadai, Chiniot, District Jhang on 5-10-1994 for offences under sections 395, P.P.C. And 10/11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979.
2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the record it has been noticed that the F.I.R. In this case had been lodged with a delay of nine days and even in that belated F.I.R. The present petitioner had not been nominated as one of the perpetrator of the offences in question. The occurrence in this case had allegedly taken place way back in the year 1994 and the petitioner's name had surfaced in this case for the first time through a supplementary statement made by Muzaffar Tarar complainant on 23-9-1997 wherein he had stated that two co- accused of the present petitioner had confessed their guilt before him and had also simultaneously implicated the present petitioner in the alleged offences. On the basis of the said supplementary statement of the complainant the present petitioner had been arrested by the local police on "4-9-1997. Still later the alleged abductee namely Mst. Sughran Bibi made a statement before a Magistrate under section 164, Cr.P.C. On 18-2-2001 wherein she implicated the present petitioner alongwith his co-accused in the alleged offences. A reading of the said statement made oy the alleged abductee shows that the petitioner was not the principal accused in the whole episode and his involvement, according to the alleged abductee, was secondary in nature.
3. This Court has indeed been shocked to learn that the case in hand pertains to the year 1994, the name of the petitioner had surfaced in this case for the first time in the year 1997, the petitioner had been arrested in connection with this case in the year 1997, the -alleged abductee had appeared before the police and the Magistrate in the rear 2001 and still the trial of the petitioner has not been concluded and despite two directions having been issued by this Court through dependent bail applications submitted by the present petitioner earlier the petitioner's trial has unfortunately seen no significant progress.
4. The facts of this case show that initially the petitioner was not nominated in the F.I.R. And he had been implicated in this case for the first time after about three years of the occurrence. Such implication was on the basis of some statements made by co-accused of the present petitioner before complainant. The direct implication of the petitioner became available in this case after about seven years of the alleged occurrence through the statement made by the alleged abductee under section 164, Cr.P.C. As already observed above the said statement of the alleged abductee shows that the role of the petitioner is secondary in nature to that attributed to Zafar Iqbal co-accused. The alleged abductee had been living with the co-accused for about seven years after he alleged abduction and luring such stay she had also given birth to some children.
She had apparently raised no protest at any stage during this while. In that backdrop the allegations levelled by the alleged abductee against the present petitioner at such a belated stage do make the case against the petitioner to be one of further inquiry into his guilt.
5. At this stage the learned counsel for the State has informed that the trial of the petitioner has commenced and, therefore, it may not be appropriate to release the petitioner on bail at such a stage. I have. However, remained unable to subscribe to this submission of the learned counsel for the State. It has already been observed above that the case against the petitioner calls for the further inquiry into his guilt within the purview of subsection (2) of section 497, Cr.P.C. It is settled law that in a case calling for further inquiry into the guilt of an accused person bail is to be granted to such an accused person as of right and not by way of grace or concession. Bail is sometimes refused to an accused person on the consideration of commencement a trial but consideration is based purely upon propriety. It goes without saying that whenever a question of propriety is confronted with a question of right the latte must prevail. Even otherwise it had been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Muhammad Ismail v. Muhammad Rafiq and another (PLD 1989 SC 585) that commencement of a trial poses no insurmountable hurdle in the way of bail where an accused person succeeds in making out a case of further inquiry into his guilt.
6. For what has been discussed above this petition is allowed and the petitioner is admitted to bail subject to furnishing bail bond in the sum of Rs,1,00,000 (Rupees one hundred thousand only) with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial. Court.
Cited by 1 case
- WAZIR MUHAMMAD vs The STATE 2015 YLR 2461