AM ANUEL MASIH vs THE STATE
This petition is directed against the judgment dated 14-11-2001 passed by the Lahore High Court, whereby the appeal of the respondents convicts was accepted, their conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code was set aside, and they were acquitted of the charges. The petition before the Supreme Court was barred by 55 days. The sole ground urged for condonation of delay was that the petitioner, being the complainant, did not receive any notice from the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the lack of notice to the complainant cannot be considered a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, particularly against a judgment of acquittal. Furthermore, upon examining the merits, the Court found that the impugned judgment was based on a correct appraisal of evidence satisfying the principles for safe administration of criminal justice. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed, and the main petition was dismissed as barred by time.
- Whether lack of notice to a complainant from the High Court constitutes a sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing a petition against acquittal?
- Can a petition filed with a delay of 55 days against a judgment of acquittal be entertained without sufficient cause for condonation?
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an acquittal judgment based on a correct appraisal of evidence?
- Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
' MUNIR A. SHEIKH, J.---This petition is directed against the judgment, dated 14-11-2001 passed by a Division Bench of Lahore High Court. Lahore whereby appeal filed by respondents Nos.2 and 3 convicts has been accepted. Their conviction under section 302(b), P.P.C. Set aside and they have been acquitted of the charges.
2. This petition is barred by 55 days. The only ground urged for condonation of delay is that the petitioner who was the complainant of the case on whose behalf F.I.R. Was registered did not receive any notice from the High Court. We are afraid if it can be considered to be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay particularly against the IA judgment of acquittal.
3. Even otherwise we have satisfied ourselves that the impugned judgment is based on correct appraisal of evidence which satisfy the principles laid down by the superior Courts for safe administration of criminal justice.
4. No case has been made out for condonation of delay. Application made by the petitioner for condonation of delay is dismissed. Resultantly, the main petition is also dismissed as barred by time and .