GOVERNMENT OF SINDH thorugh Member (RS&EP), Board of Revenue, Sindh
The petitioners, Government of Sindh through Member Board of Revenue, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh dated 14-12-2001 passed in constitutional petitions, which had set aside departmental orders regarding the recovery of stamp duty on mark-up agreements. The core legal questions involved whether simultaneous transactions of sale and re-purchase amount to conveyance deeds under the Stamp Act 1899, whether there was any deviation from the Stamp Act 1899 and Shariah Act 1991, and whether such departmental recovery orders could be challenged under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court pursuant to Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court considered the arguments and noted that the interpretation of statutes and a question of public importance were involved. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and ordered the operation of the impugned judgment of the High Court to be suspended until the hearing of the appeals. The key principle laid down is that where interpretation of statutes and questions of public importance regarding fiscal statutes and writ jurisdiction arise, leave to appeal is appropriately granted.
- Whether transactions of sale and re-purchase simultaneously recorded in the same documents amount to conveyance?
- Whether mark-up agreements constitute Conveyance Deeds under the Stamp Act 1899?
- Whether departmental orders regarding the recovery of stamp duty can be challenged in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Stamp Act 1899
- Shariah Act 1991
- Article 199, Constitution of Pakistan 1973
' SYED DEEDAR HUSSAIN SHAH, J.---Petitioners seek leave to appeal against the judgment, dated 14- 12-2001, of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, passed in Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-318, 374-D and 351 of 1997.
2. Mr. Suleman Habibullah, learned Additional Advocate-General, appearing on behalf of the petitioners raised the following points:-
(a) Whether the transactions of the sale and re-purchase are being simultaneously recorded in the same documents which amount to conveyance and could not be treated as agreement?
(b) Whether there is no deviation from the provisions contained in the Stamp Act, 1899 and Shariah Act, 1991, while passing the order by petitioner No,1?
(c) Whether the mark-up agreements are in fact Conveyance Deeds under the Stamp Act, 1899 and whether hierarchy of the Government/Departmental Authority rightly passed orders in respect of recovery of Stamp Duty, and whether such order can be challenged by the companies in writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution?
' Learned Addl. A.-G. Also referred to the observations made by the High Court in para. 25 of the impugned judgment, which reads as under:-- ' "In view of the above discussion it is apparent that the alleged Mark-up Agreement is not a conveyance deed as urged by the respondents, but is photocopy of a document which at best can be regarded as an acknowledgement or confirmation of a past transaction and is not liable to Stamp Duty as a conveyance. Having reached this conclusion, it is not necessary to discuss the other contentions advanced by the learned counsel."
3. On the other hand, Mr. M. Naeem, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the respondents opposed the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners and supported the impugned judgment.
4. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record carefully. As the interpretation of the statutes is required and also the question of public importance is involved in these matters, therefore, leave to appeal is granted.
' Operation of the impugned judgment of the High Court is suspended till the hearing of the appeals.