HAYATULLAH JAN and others vs JAN ALAM and others

' Gulli Jan, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner instituted a suit for pre-emption in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Lakki, which was dismissed vide his judgment and decree, dated 5-12-1994 and appeal there against was also dismissed by the learned District Judge, Lakki vide his judgment and decree dated 31-10-1996. On a revision filed by the petitioners the case was remanded to the learned District Judge, Lakki for decision afresh who after hearing the parties again dismissed the appeal of the petitioners vide his judgment and decree dated 26-10-1999 which have been impugned herein by both the parties through Civil Revisions Nos.10 and 23 of 2000 which are disposed of through this single judgment.

2. The gist of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the preponderance of the evidence on the record shows that the plaintiff made 'Talb-i-Muwathibat on 20-8-1991 When he came to know about the sale; that the infetence drawn by the learned District Judge that he came to know about the sale on 9-8-1991 is not deducible from the evidence on the record, therefore, the finding of the learned Appellate Court is based on misreading and non-reading of evidence and that since latest pronouncements of the Supreme Court have considerably reduced the rigours in the enforcement of the right of pre-emption a pre-emptor cannot be non-suited on the basis of technicalities.

3. On the contrary the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the predecessor-in- interest of the petitioners failed to make 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' on 9-8-1991 when he came to know about the sale; that even Talb-i-Ishhad' was not fulfilled in accordance with the requirements of section 13 of the Pre-emption Act, 1987 as registered envelopes returned undelivered contained photographs and that the finding of fact recorded by the Appellate Court, which is a final Court of fact cannot be upset merely because this Court on reappraisal of evidence comes to a different conclusion.

4. I have gone through the record and anxiously considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties.

5. The argument that the inference drawn by the learned District Judge that the plaintiff came to know about the sale on 9-8-1991 is not deducible from the record is not correct when seen in proper order and sequence of narration given by the P.W. Though on reappraisal of evidence another view as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioners can also be taken, but, I am afraid, this Court cannot II substitute that in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction.

6. There is no cavil with the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the latest pronouncements of the Honourable Supreme Court which have reduced rigours in the enforcement of right of pre-emption, a pre-emptor cannot be knocked down on the basis of technicalities but there is nothing in any of the aforesaid pronouncements indicating that compliance with the requirements of section 13 of the Pre-emption Act is a technicality and that its non-observance will not be fatal to his suit.

7. The record further reveals that the notices dispatched to the vendees contained in the registered envelopes being photo at were not proved in accordance with the requirements of Articles 74, 79 and 153 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, Order 10 of 1984 as none of the witnesses testified to their correctness by affirming their signatures or thumb-impressions thereon and similarly none of the witnesses deposed that the same were photographed from the original.

8. Even otherwise there is nothing in the findings of the learned Appellate Court showing absence or excess of jurisdiction so as to call for interference therewith under section 115 of the C.P.C.

' As a sequel to what is discussed above, Civil Revision No,10 being without merit is dismissed.

Similarly as no jurisdictional error in the impugned judgments has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents who was representing petitioners in Civil Revision No,23 of 2000, it is also dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.