PROVINCE OF SINDH through Secretary Education; Government of Sindh, Karachi and 3 others vs Miss SAIMA BANO and others

' SYED DEEDAR HUSSAIN SHAH, J.----Through this common judgment, we intend to dispose of the above civil petitions for leave to appeal, which have arisen out of a consolidated judgment dated 29-3-2002, passed by the Sindh Service Tribunal, Karachi, (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in Appeals Nos.123 to 134 of 1999.

2. Brie/fly stated the facts of the case are that the respondents were appointed as Primary School Teacher of S.D.E.O. Males/Females, Hyderabad, in September, 1998. After necessary medical check- up, they were issued posting orders. The Government of Sindh, Education Department, Karachi, vide Letter No,SO(C-I) Edu. E & A-735/97, dated 28-11-1998, directed the Director Primary Education, Hyderabad, to terminate the services of the respondents as they were appointed during ban period in violation of Government instructions. In pursuance thereof, the sub-Divisional Education Officer, Male/Female, Tando Allahyar, by separate orders dated 3-12-1998, terminated their services. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents filed departmental appeals addressed to the Director Primary Education, Hyderabad, and District Education Officer (Male/Female), Hyderabad, on 18-12- 1998, under postal certificate, which were dismissed, being time-barred vide separate orders dated 20-3-1999.

3. Feeling dissatisfied, the respondents filed service appeals, and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the Tribunal vide impugned judgment dated 29-3-2002, remanded the matters to the Director Primary Schools, Hyderabad Region/respondent No,2, for passing fresh orders after considering the first departmental appeals submitted by the respondents. Hence, this petition.

4. Mr. Suleman Habibullah, learned Additional Advocate-General, inter alia, contended that the termination orders of the respondents were issued by the Competent Authority, which did not require interference by the Tribunal; and that the appeals filed by the respondents before the Tribunal were time-barred.

5. We have considered the arguments of the learned Additional Advocate-General and carefully examined the record. Admittedly, the respondents' departmental appeals were dispatched under postal certificate dated 18-12-1998 and the other submitted by them in February 1999. The authenticity and genuineness of the postal certificate before the Tribunal. It is also borne out from the record that the departmental authority, i,e,, Director, Primary Education, Hyderabad, did not consider the appeals at all or the same were riot placed before him for the reasons bests known to the quarters concerned. The orders passed by the Director Primary Education were not speaking order. Moreover, the respondents were not even afforded a chance of personal hearing before passing of the termination orders, which were void, ab initio, and the respondents were condemned unheard, which is clear violation of natural rules and the law laid down by this Court.

The Tribunal rightly allowed the appeals filed by the 'respondents setting aside the termination orders. It would be pertinent to reproduce here the relevant paragraph of the impugned judgment, which reads as under:- " . . . . . . Accordingly, the impugned order(s) dated 20-3-1999 passed by respondent No,2 is/are hereby set aside and the matters is/are remanded to him for passing fresh orders after considering the first departmental appeals submitted by the appellant(s) through post on 18-12- 1998 and also to afford personal hearing to the appellant(s) and then pass speaking order, purely in accordance with law- on merits, within 90 (ninety) days from the date of receipt of this judgment."

6. The impugned judgment is well-reasoned and based on the law laid down by this Court. There is no misreading or non-reading of the material available on the record. Moreover, question of general public importance is also not involved in this matter. Resultantly, all the petitions are dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

7. The Tribunal had granted 90 days' time to petitioner No,2 to decide the matter from the date of the receipt of its judgment. Since the petitioners have challenged the impugned judgment before this Court, and the time given by the Tribunal has already expired, we, therefore, direct that the competent Authority shall decide the matters within 30 (thirty) days from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment of this Court.

Petition dismissed.