THE STATE vs SARDAR and anothers

' ZAFAR PASHA CHAUDHRY, J.--- This appeal has been filed by the State against the judgment, dated 30-4-1980 passed by Mian Jahangir Perviz, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kasur whereby Sardar and Muhammad Rafique respondents were acquitted of the charge under section 302/34, P.P.C.

2. The prosecution case in brief is that on 16-8-1976 at about noon time respondent Sardar and Rafique both armed with Chhuris opened attack on Noor Din and inflicted injuries on his chest and back who succumbed to the injuries at the spot. The motive was stated to be that Mst. Rani had been engaged with specific consent of Mst. Phaman and Noor Din her relations but the respondents were not happy over the marriage and they in fact wanted the hand of Mst. Rani. Out of this grievance, murder had been committed.

3. The learned trial Judge after holding the trial came to the conclusion that prosecution failed to establish motive for mounting an assault and also the witnesses who claimed to be present at the time of incident and had witnessed the occurrence, were not present over there, therefore, the learned trial Judge by extending the benefit of doubt ordered their acquittal. The learned trial Judge in para. No,34 of the judgment described the reasons in detail, as a result of which he came to the conclusion that the presence of witnesses at the time of occurrence was not acceptable. In para.33 of the judgment, the learned trial Judge although made a reference that there were serious discrepancies and contradictions within the statements made by the witnesses but did not consider it necessary to discuss or highlight the same as the very presence of the eye-witnesses at the time of occurrence was not accepted.

4. The learned A.A.-G. In support of State appeal has very vigorously argued that the prosecution has successfully established the guilt of the accused persons and the fact that Mst. Rani who according to the learned trial Judge was held to have been already married prior to the occurrence and as such there was no motive with the accused respondents to have committed the murder, is not of much substance. According to her the eye-witnesses account furnished by the witnesses is tnistworthy 'and confidence-inspiring. She however, conceded that occurrence in this case took place in the year 1976 i,e, about 25 years back and it would be rather unjust to remand the accused persons back to jail. She argued that the compensation may be provided to the heirs of the deceased. The argument of the learned A.A.-G. Cannot be acceded to, for the reasons that if we find that order of acquittal is not sustainable then mere award of compensation would not be a legal punishment. The main consideration is that findings recorded by the learned trial Judge vis-a-vis non-presence of the P.Ws. At the time of occurrence is of vital importance.

After going through the reasons recorded in the judgment and especially in para. No,34, we are of the view that adequate justifications have been furnished by the learned trial Judge in support of order of acquittal. Needless to observe that an order of acquittal is not ordinarily interfered with unless the same is found to be arbitrary or perverse. No such ingredient could be noted or pointed out by the learned counsel. The occurrence took place in the year 1076 i,e, 25 years back and in order to convert order of acquittal into conviction, we have to be extra cautious to determine guilt or innocence of accused persons. Keeping this principle in our mind, we find that order of acquittal in favor of the accused-respondents cannot be held to be arbitrary or perverse. Mere fact that another view could possibly be taken by itself is not sufficient to convert the order of acquittal into conviction. We, therefore, are not persuaded to accept the appeal. Dismissed.