ABDUL QAYYUM vs MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and 5 others

' Through instant Criminal Appeal No.10 of 2003 Abdul Qayyum, appellant has challenged the judgment dated 20-12-2002 of Mrs. Sofia Waqar Khattak, learned Judicial Magistrate, D.I. Khan whereby she acquitted Muhammad Ramzan, Ghulam Hussain, Muhammad Sadiq, Hashim and Ghulam Qasim (respondents), in case F.I.R. No.23 dated 16-4-1997 registered at Police Station, Daraban Kalan, D.I. Khan for offences under sections 447/427/148/149, P.P.C., by extending them the benefit of doubt.

2. The respondents are accused of having on unknown date and time sharing their common intention caused mischief by installing their door in the property of late Faqir Haji Said Gul, father of the appellant.

3. The respondents faced trial in the Court of Mrs. Sofia Waqar Khattak, learned Judicial- Magistrate, D.I. Khan where prosecution produced four P.Ws. In order to prove its case. The respondents were also examined under section 342, Cr.P.C. Wherein they denied the allegations and professed innocence. They neither appeared as their own witnesses on Oath as required under section 340(2), Cr.P.C. Nor produced any defence evidence. The learned trial Court after hearing arguments of counsel for the parties, acquitted the respondents by extending them the benefit of doubt as noted supra.

4. Mr. Muhammad Wahid Anjum, Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, on the strength of authority reported as Gul Raza v. The State and 4 others (PLD 2004 Pesh. 219), mainly contended that the impugned judgment is not in consonance with the provisions of section 367, Cr.P.C. Which contemplates that every judgment shall contain the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. He also reiterated that sufficient material in the shape ofstatements of Muhammad Ibrahim, Patwari (P.W.1) and Ajab Gul (P.W.3) was available on the file which fully implicated the respondents with the guilt but the learned trial Magistrate in total disregard to prosecution evidence, extended benefit of doubt to the respondents and acquitted them of the charge in a mechanical manner without application of mind. He contended that the impugned judgment is perverse, arbitrary and ridiculous and thus cannot be allowed to remain intact. Lastly, he prayed for remand of the case for fresh adjudication to meet the ends of justice.

5. Mr. Farooq Akhtar, Advocate for the State assisted by Mr. Abdullah Khan Gandapur, Advocate representing the respondents,on the other hand, fully supported the impugned judgment and contended that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, learned trial Magistrate had valid reasons to acquit the respondents by extending benefit of doubt in their favour and no legitimate exception can be taken to it. To substantiate the pleas, reliance was placed on PCr.LJ 2004 Peshawar 1068 and PCr.LJ 2004 Lahore 1151.

6. I have extensively heard learned counsel for the parties and have scrutinized the record with their valuable assistance.

7. Standards of assessing evidence in appeal against acquittal are quite different from those laid down for appeal against conviction. There is a marked difference between appraisement of evidence in the appeal against conviction and in the appeal against acquittal. In the appeal against conviction appraisal of evidence is done strictly and in the appeal against acquittal, the same rigid method of appraisement is not to be applied as there is already finding of acquittal given by the trial Court after proper analysis on record. In the acquittal appeal interference is made only when it appears that there has been gross misreading of the evidence which amounts to miscarriage of justice. The ordinary scope of appeal against acquittal of accused-respondents is considerably narrow and limited, as held in Muhammad Usman and 2 others v. The State (1992 SCMR 498) and The State v. Muhammad Sharif and others (1995 SCMR 635).

8. To start with, I would observe that no date, month or year of the occurrence has been mentioned by the complainant in his report which points towards mala fide on the part of complainant. When the complainant himself is not sure about the exact date of occurrence, how could the P.Ws.

Produced by the complainant, could tell about the same. Moreover, P.Ws. Produced by the complainant are interested witnesses. P.W. Ajab Gul is nephew of the complainant whereas P.W.

Abdul Qayyum is his son. Furthermore, the complainant has thrown a wide net to implicate all the male members of one family. Respondent Ghulam Hussain is father whereas respondents Sadiq and Ramzan are his sons and similarly, respondents Hashim and Qasim are his nephews and also his son-in-laws. It is unbelievable that respondents had installed doors in the property owned by the complainant and he is unaware of the same. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that case of the complainant is totally false and unbelievable and the respondents have rightly been acquitted of the charges by extending benefit of doubt. The conclusion drawn by the learned trial Magistrate is neither arbitrary, fanciful nor artificial in nature.

The judgment of acquittal is well reasoned and hardly calls for interference by this Court in its appellate jurisdiction. The appeal being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed.

9. The judgment cited at the bar by the learned counsel for the appellant when considered in the light of material on record, speaks of the different situation and being distinguishable in its facts and features has no relevance to the instant case. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.