Dhuman vs Muhammad Rafique And Other
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the ownership of land originally held by the petitioner as a limited owner under customary law. The core legal question was whether Section 2-A of the West Punjab Muslim Personal (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, rendered a prior declaratory decree in favor of a reversioner void, thereby validating a sale made by the limited owner. The petitioner argued that the transaction was a past and closed transaction because the reversionary decree had been given effect by revenue officials. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the customary decree became void by operation of Section 2-A. The Court reasoned that because the original limited owner was still alive, the reversionary decree had not been executed for possession, and thus, the proviso to Section 2-A did not apply. The Court affirmed that the petitioner became the absolute owner of the land, rendering the reversionary decree inexecutable and the sale absolute.
- Does Section 2-A of the West Punjab Muslim Personal (Shariat) Application Act 1948 render a customary declaratory decree in favor of a reversioner void?
- Can a reversionary decree be considered executed while the original limited owner is still alive?
- Does the proviso to Section 2-A of the West Punjab Muslim Personal (Shariat) Application Act 1948 apply to a case where the limited owner is still alive?
- Section 2-A, West Punjab Muslim Personal (Shariat) Application Act 1948
KARAMAT NAZIR BHANDARI, J.- The land in dispute was originally held by petitioner-Dhuman as limited owner under the customary law. On 15.6.1961, the petitioner sold the land to one Mirza son of Taja who sold it to one Khanu on the same date. Khanu is the predecessor of respondents Nos. 1 to
3. The sale was challenged on the ground of absence of legal necessity by Mirza son Juma, brother of the petitioner. He was successful in obtaining the decree to the effect that the sale by petitioner will not affect the right of the reversioner. Respondents Nos. 1 to 3, herein brought a suit for declaration that the plaintiffs had become absolute owners in possession of land as successors of Khanu. In this connection, plaintiffs also sought annulment of the mutations entered by the revenue officials, in favour of defendants/successors of Mirza. The suit was contested and was dismissed by the Trial Court on 7.6.1994. Plaintiff's appeal before the Additional District Judge, Mandi Bahauddin was also dismissed on 28.7.1999. The decree was further challenged in the Lahore High Court by way of revision (C.R. No. 1456/99) which was allowed vide judgment dated 6.2.2003 and the suit was decreed. The High Court held that by operation pf Section 2-A added in Act No. IX of 1948 (West Punjab Muslim Personal (Shariat) Application Act, 1948) the petitioner became absolute owner of the land and the reversionary decree in favour of Mirza, brother of the petitioner became void and in/executable. According to the High Court, the sale made by the petitioner became absolute.
2. In this Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal, the above view of the High Court is attacked by submitting that Section 2-A is not applicable to the facts of the present case as the transaction became passed and closed in as much as the reversionary decree in favour of Mirza was given effect to by the revenue officials and the successors of Mirza were holding the land in pursuance to the said decree. Learned counsel for the respondents-caveators (plaintiffs), has controverted the above submission by pointing out that Dhuman, the original owner is still alive and in fact is before this Court as petitioner and, therefore, the customary decree in favour of reversion cannot be said to have been executed. He further points out that the reversioner has to sue for possession on the basis of declaratory decree, after the death of limited owner, in this case, the present petitioner.
3. The view taken by the High Court is correct. The customary decree in favour of Mirza, brother of the petitioner became void by operation of Section 2-A. It is incorrect to contend that the said decree was executed in favour of Mirza/his successors. The decree could have endured for the purpose of getting possession after the demise of Dhuman, the original limited owner i. e. The petitioner before us. As he is alive, no occasion arose for getting possession by enforcing the decree. Proviso to Section 2-A, therefore, does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case.
4. As the judgment of the High Court is sound, this Petition is hereby dismissed and leave is declined.