Messrs NAFEES SHAUKAT vs Haji NOOR MUHAMMAD
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sindh, which had restored a trial court's decree passed under Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question is whether the trial court acted correctly in decreeing the suit under Order VIII, Rule 10, C.P.C., when the petitioner's counsel had sought an adjournment due to prior engagements, and whether such penal provisions require strict construction. The Supreme Court, noting conflicting precedents regarding the mandatory or discretionary nature of pronouncing judgment under this rule, observed that the provision entails penal consequences and should be construed strictly. The Court held that the petition raises a question of public importance regarding the interpretation and implementation of Order VIII, Rule 10, C.P.C., particularly whether the court is bound to strike off a defense or pronounce judgment in every instance of default. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted to further examine the scope of the trial court's discretion and the requirements for invoking such penal measures.
- Does Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandate the pronouncement of judgment or striking off the defense in every case of default?
- Should penal provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be construed strictly in favor of the party facing the penalty?
- Is the pronouncement of judgment under Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 a matter of judicial discretion requiring compelling reasons?
- Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Order XXXIX Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Order XXXIX Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Section 148, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Order VIII Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Order VIII Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
ORDER
1. ' MAMOON KAZI, J.---The respondent filed suit No, 1080/90 for declaration, permanent injunction and specific performance in respect of a shop situated at Karachi Airport, Karachi. The petitioner wanted to contest the suit and she also filed an application under 0.VII, Rule, 11, C.P.C. For rejection of the plaint. A counter-affidavit was also filed on her behalf to resist an application filed on behalf of the respondent under O.XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. An application was also filed by the petitioner's Advocate under section 148, C.P.C. Seeking extension of time for filing written statement.
2. The case was then adjourned to 13-3-1991. As the Presiding Officer had remained .Absent on the said date, the case was again adjourned to 7-3-1991. On the said date, the Advocate for the petitioner was busy in the High Court and, therefore, he sent an application for adjournment.
3. However, an application under 0.VIII, Rule 10, C.P.C. Was filed on behalf of the respondent, which was allowed and the respondent's suit was decreed, vide order, dated 7-3-1991. The petitioner filed appeal before the District Judge, Karachi East, which was allowed, vide order, dated 11-5-1991 and the case was remanded to the learned Civil Judge for a fresh disposal but the respondent filed Civil Revision Application No, 222 of 1991 in the High Court of Sindh which has been allowed by the learned Judge in Chambers and the order of the trial Court has been restored.
4. Mr. Shahenshah Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Sardar Sakhawatuddin v. Muhammad Iqbal 1987 SCM R 1365, wherein it has peen observed that since rule 10 of 0.V111 entails penal consequences such provision requires to be strictly construed and whenever a reasonable doubt arises as to its interpretation or implementation, it shall have to be resolved in favour of the victim of its application. It has been argued by the learned counsel that like R.12, R.10 also creates a liability and it is not mandatory for the Court to pronounce judgment or strike off defence and the matter being in the discretion of the Court, penalty should not be imposed without compelling reasons. Our attention has also been invited to Jamal v. Rai Nadeem Ullah Khan 1991 SCM R 1551, wherein leave has been granted to consider whether filing of a written statement was required by the Court, or it was a routine matter without any specific or special direction by the trial Court under 0.VIIL R.1. Mr. Muzaffarul Haq, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has referred to a judgment in the case of Messrs Jholey Lal Cotton Factory v. Tanweer Ahmad 1989 CLC 625 earlier delivered by one of us (Mamoon Kazi, J.) in the High Court of Sindh, whereby revision against an order of the trial Court passed under the said provisions was dismissed and the order, was upheld. We are, therefore, of the view that the petition raises a question of public importance which requires to be considered by this Court.
5. Leave is, therefore, granted.