EHSAN ELAHI AND OTHERS vs The STATE
This matter concerns a review petition filed by the petitioners against the Supreme Court of Pakistan's judgment dated 31st May 1977, which had dismissed their Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 1976. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to a review of the previous judgment based on alleged errors patent on the face of the record regarding the appreciation of evidence. Specifically, the petitioners argued that the majority opinion failed to consider alternative hypotheses beneficial to the accused and that the conviction of one petitioner, Nur Hussain, lacked sufficient corroboration after other evidence was rejected. The Court held that the arguments presented did not constitute an error patent on the face of the record, as they merely sought a re-evaluation of the material already considered. The Court reaffirmed that a review petition cannot be used to re-argue the merits of a case or challenge the factual conclusions reached by the original bench. Consequently, the Court found the contentions devoid of substance and dismissed the petition, maintaining the original conviction.
- Can a review petition be used to re-argue the merits of a case already decided by the Supreme Court?
- What constitutes an error patent on the face of the record sufficient to justify a review of a criminal judgment?
- Is the existence of a dissenting opinion in a judgment sufficient grounds to grant a review petition based on reasonable doubt?
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, J.-The petitioners seek review of this Court's judgment dated 31st of May, 1977, by which Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 1976 was dismissed.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to a paragraph of the majority opinion which is at page 29 of the paper book to contend that in concluding that Roshan Din and the deceased Abdul Sattar would have passed by the shop of the petitioners was not the only hypothesis as in the dissenting opinion a view beneficial to the petitioners was taken and, therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt. But we fail to see as to how this argument can be regarded as an error patent on the face of the record to justify the reversal of the conclusion which emanated from the consideration of the material on record.
3. Accordingly, this contention which is devoid of any principle has no substance.
4. It was next contended that having rejected the ocular evidence, the yiiig declaration, and the evidence of Roshan Din, in some respects, corroboration was necessary in respect of the participation of the petitioners. In this connection he contended that as none was available against Nur Hussain his case was on a different footing and, therefore, he was entitled to the benefit of doubt. According to the prosecution, Nur Hussain was armed with a Rambi and injuries Nos. 13 and 16 on the deceased are those which were caused with it. Therefore, this could seemingly provide a corroboration of his participation in the crime. This contention also suffers from the same defect as the first as it fails to point to an error patent on the face of the record.
5. Accordingly, this petition has no merit and is dismissed.