Mst. MUMLIKAT BEGUM vs MALIK NASRULLAH
This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against the judgments of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's pre-emption suits on the ground of failure to deposit one-third of the pre-emption money within the prescribed period. The core legal question concerns the interpretation and application of Section 24 of the NWFP Pre-emption Act 1987 regarding the deposit of pre-emption money and the handling of applications for deposit or extension of time by the trial court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court and trial court failed to appreciate that the pre-emptor had filed an application for the deposit of the pre-emption money on the last date (4.6.2001), which rendered her earlier application for extension redundant. The Court ruled that a party should not suffer due to an act or omission of the court, and that the pre-emptor's bona fides should have been tested by allowing her second application to deposit the amount. Consequently, the appeals were accepted and the judgments dismissing the suits were set aside.
- Whether a pre-emptor's application to deposit pre-emption money renders a prior application for extension of time redundant?
- Can a litigant be made to suffer due to the failure of the trial court to properly act upon an application for the deposit of pre-emption money?
- Whether the trial court is justified in dismissing a pre-emption suit without deciding an application for deposit of the pre-emption amount filed within time?
- Section 24, NWFP Pre-emption Act 1987
Sardar Muhammad Raza Khan, J.--Facts being identical, both the petitions shall be decided through this single judgment.
2. Leave to appeal is sought against the judgments dated 27.9.2002 passed by a learned Judge in Chambers of Peshawar High Court in Civil Revisions Nos, 49 & 50 of 2002, whereby the two pre- emption suits of Mst. Mumlikat Begum were dismissed on the ground that she had failed to deposit 1/3rd of pre-emption money within the period prescribed by the Court. Earlier, the suits were dismissed on 6.9.2001 by the trial Court but on appeal, vide order dated 15.2.2002 the pre-emptor was allowed to deposit pre-emption amount. The learned High Court agreed with the trial Court holding that neither the pre-emptor was entitled to seek extension nor the Court was empowered to extend the same.
3. The suits were instituted on 5.5.2001 when the pre-emptor was directed to deposit 1/3rd of the pre-emption amount within 30 days. The last date of deposit thus happened to be 4.6.2001. On the same date the pre-emptor filed an application for extension of time. It was placed on file with notice to the opposite party. On the same day i,e, 4.6.2001 pre-emptor moved another application for permission to deposit pre-emption amount. On this application the trial Judge passed the following order:-- Ultimately, the suits were dismissed for non-compliance of Court's order.
4. From the perusal of record and the circumstances narrated above, we are constrained to observe that the trial Court has not comprehend the problem in its true perspective and in the light of Section 24 of NWFP Pre-emption Act 1987, as amended up-to-date. A simple thing failed to be understood that no doubt the pre-emptor sought extension of time on 4.6.2001 but, may be by realizing the consequences, she again applied on the same date for the deposit of pre-emption amount. The Court had no reason or logic to keep that application pending till the decision of former application for extension because the former had become totally redundant when the pre- emptor expressed her willingness to deposit the pre-emption money there and then on 4.6.2001.
The lack of application of mind by the trial Court has made the pre-emptor to suffer but at the hands only of the trial Court. Obviously no one could be condemned by an act of Court.
5. Learned High Court no doubt has appreciated the legal implications involved under Section 24 of the Act but has totally ignored to appreciate that the pre-emptor had filed application for deposit of preemption money on 4.6.2001. Had the trial Court allowed the same, the preemptor would have deposited the amount. Her bona fides or mala fides could have been checked only and only if she had failed to make deposit on 4.6.2001 on the basis of her second application.
6. Consequently, the petitions, after conversion into appeals, are hereby accepted. The impugned judgments dated 27.9.2002 are set aside, and those dated 15.1.2002 of the learned Additional District Judge-II are restored.