GHULAM FARID AND Another vs Mian FAROOQ NAZIR AND ANOTHER

ORDER

This writ petition arises out of a finding of Mr. Muhammad Aslam Bhatti Rent Controller Lahore dated 7.12-1978 on a preliminary issue in a case filed under the provisions of the W. P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959.

2. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the land was first rented out by respondent No. 1 to one Muhammad Ashiq who set up a re-rolling mill on it. The petitioners purchased the re- rolling mill from Muhammad Ashiq and attorned in favour of respondent No. 1. In these circumstances it was urged before the Rent Controller that the property having been given for the purpose of setting up a re-rolling mill (a factory), 4 it is not covered by the definition of 'rented land' within the meaning o Ordinance of 1959 and as such the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction t hear the application for ejectment. The learned Rent Controller held that since it was the land which was rented out for the purpose of a factory and not the factory, it was a case of leasing out property for the purpose of trade or business or for earning a livelihood. He placed reliance upon Noor Muhammad Khan v. Haji Muhammad Ali Khan PLD 1973 SC 218 in which land was rented out for the purpose of constructing a cinema house and it was held that the land fell within the definition of either 'building' or 'rented land'.

3. I have heard the learned counsel at length on the interpretation of expressions 'business or trade' since a rented land is land which has been let out principally for business or trade. If once it is held that setting up a manufacturing plant is not covered by the expressions 'business or trade B I have no doubt that the petitioners must succeed but I find that setting up a manufacturing plant is a process of trade or business. A similar question came up for consideration in the Municipality of Chopda v. Motilal Manekchand AIR 1958 Bom. 487. It was held that undoubtedly in its primary sense the word 'trade' means exchange of goods for goods or goods for money. But in a secondary sense is includes any business carried on with a -view to profit whether manual or mercantile as distinguished from the liberal arts or learned profession. Pursuit of a skilled employment with a view to earn profit, such an employment not being in the nature of a learned profession or agriculture, must be regarded as engaging in trade. A skilled occupation which involves the application of manufacturing processes to a commodity submitted to the person carrying on the occupation must, therefore, be regarded as trade.

4. In Suba v. Siraj Din PLD 1977 Lah. 1263 connotation of the words 'trade or business' was considered and reference was made to the above-mentioned Indian case also. It was held that the word 'business' has a wider connotation than the word 'trade' and any activity whether of trade or business is commercial in nature provided it is practised as a means of earning livelihood. In the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Wilson (1877) 3 Ex. D 108, it was held that business of a telegraph company was trade within the meaning of 57 Geo. 3, C. 25, S. I. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn., Vol. 4, p. 3057 it is observed that "'trade' may have a larger meaning so as to include manufactures". According to Webster's New International Dictionary, 1950 Edn., "trade applies to any of the mechanical employments or handicrafts except those connected with agriculture". In Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary the word 'factory' means a manufactory.

The word 'factory' originates from the word 'factor' which means a doer or transactor of business for another, one who buys and sells goods for others, on commission.

5. In these circumstances I have no manner of doubt left that the setting up of a factory must be deemed to be covered by the expression 'business or trade' since the object of manufacturing is the conversion of commodity or commodities into another finished commodity for the purpose of sale. Goods are manufactured in a factory for sale. In these circumstances the finding of the learned Rent Controller was amply justified.

6. Moreover from the authorities shown to me by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as from one other case it is clear that before a factory is considered to be ousted from the ambit of the Ordinance of 1959, it must be let out as a factory. Messrs Rehman Cotton Factory v. Messrs Nichimen Co. Ltd. PLD 1970 Lah. 455is to the same effect.

7. In Messrs Rehman Cotton Factory v. Messrs Nichimen Co. Ltd. PLD 1976 SC 781 it was held that the Act excluded from its operation what was property known as a factory equipped with machinery requisite for a particular manufacturing process. In essence in all such cases, the lease is for the use of the machinery which is permanently fixed in certain defined premises and not of the premises simpliciter.

8. This petition is, therefore, without force and is dismissed in limine.