Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• Syed MUHAMMAD ALAM SHAH Versus PROVINCE OF SINDH through Chief Secretary2026 PLD 17 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-06
  writ jurisdictionjudicial overreachpublic interest litigationlachessustainable developmentinfrastructure projectlocus standi
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This petition challenged the alignment of a flyover within the Ghotki-Kandhkot Bridge Project, with the petitioner alleging technical design flaws and improper land acquisition procedures. The core legal question was whether the High Court, under its writ jurisdiction, could interfere with the executive's policy decisions regarding the design and execution of a major infrastructure project. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate bona fide intentions, had concealed previous litigation, and that the petition was barred by laches, having been filed years after the project's commencement. The Court emphasized that development schemes fall within the exclusive domain of the executive, and judicial review is limited to instances where fundamental rights are violated or the law is transgressed. The Court affirmed that courts must avoid judicial overreach and respect the separation of powers, particularly regarding technical policy decisions. Furthermore, the Court clarified that "pro bono publico" litigation cannot be used as a tool to obstruct public interest projects or settle personal grievances, reinforcing the necessity of clean hands in invoking constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere in the design and alignment of a government infrastructure project under its writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a petitioner have standing to challenge a development project if they fail to disclose prior litigation regarding the same subject matter?
  • Is a challenge to a long-standing development project barred by the doctrine of laches?
  • What constitutes 'sustainable development' within the context of infrastructure projects in Pakistan?
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• STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (PAKISTAN) LIMITED Versus YAWAR FARUQUI2026 PLD 167 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-22
  banking suitdamages in tortjurisdiction of banking courtcredit card disputeunilateral auto-debitdefaulters listfinancial obligations
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a judgment passed in a banking suit whereby the plaintiff was awarded recovery of a wrongly auto-debited amount along with mark-up, as well as damages for mental stress, agony, and defamation resulting from being placed on the CIB defaulters list. The core legal questions involved whether a Banking Court possesses jurisdiction under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to award tortious damages for personal injury and mental agony, and whether a bank can unilaterally reopen a resolved credit card dispute and auto-debit a customer's account years later without due process. The court held that while the Banking Court is competent to adjudicate financial obligations and wrongful debits relating to a finance facility, it lacks jurisdiction under its special jurisdiction to award damages premised on tortious claims or personal injury, which must instead be agitated before a civil court. Consequently, the award for damages was set-aside, while the recovery of the wrongly debited amount with mark-up was upheld. The key principle laid down is that a Banking Court cannot award damages for non-contractual torts or personal injuries, and banks must follow due process rather than unilaterally seizing funds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Banking Court have the jurisdiction under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to award damages for tortious acts and personal injury?
  • Can a financial institution unilaterally reopen a closed credit card dispute and auto-debit a customer's account years later without notice or due process?
  • Is a suit for damages arising from the exchange of confidential credit information barred under Section 93-C of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962?
  • Can a party be permitted to raise new grounds regarding limitation and defamation for the first time during appellate arguments without pleading them at trial?
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• GHULAM ABBAS DEHRAJ Versus State2026 PLD 160 · Sindh High Court · 2025-07-11
  transfer of criminal caseapprehension of biasfair trialcompromisecriminal revisionjudicial discretion
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This criminal revision petition challenged an order passed by the Sessions Judge transferring a criminal case from the court of the 2nd Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate to the 1st Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate. The core legal question was whether a criminal case can be transferred from one trial court to another solely on the basis of a judicial officer suggesting a compromise or on vague, unsupported apprehensions of bias. The Sindh High Court held that a trial judge's persistent suggestions to parties to settle a matter or enter into a compromise do not constitute bias or prejudice, and that mere assertions or unfounded apprehensions of an adverse judicial order are insufficient grounds for transferring a case. The key principle laid down is that transfer of a case requires a reasonable apprehension of bias supported by cogent, contemporaneous evidence, and a Sessions Judge cannot routinely transfer a case merely because the trial judge offered a 'No Objection' upon being accused of bias.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judicial officer's suggestion to parties to enter into a compromise constitute a valid ground for transferring a criminal case?
  • Can a Sessions Judge transfer a criminal case merely because the trial court judge has offered a 'No Objection' to the transfer request?
  • Is a criminal revision maintainable against an order passed by a Sessions Judge on a criminal transfer application?
  • Does a mere apprehension of an adverse judicial order justify the transfer of a case from the trial court?
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• TARIQ SHAFI Versus MUHAMMAD KAMRAN AFTAB2026 PLD 158 · Sindh High Court · 2025-08-12
  summary suitleave to defenddefective summonsprescribed formlimitation periodrecovery suitservice of summons
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This high court appeal arose from the trial court's dismissal of the appellant's application for leave to defend a summary suit for recovery of Rs. 20,00,000/- based on negotiable instruments, on the grounds of being time-barred. The core legal question was whether service of summons not in the prescribed form under Schedule I, Appendix B of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and without an accompanying copy of the plaint constitutes valid service for computing the ten-day limitation period under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court set aside the trial court's order, holding that proper service requires strict compliance with statutory form and delivery of the plaint copy. The Court established that handing over a plaint copy in an unrelated criminal proceeding does not constitute valid service in a summary suit. Leave to defend was granted conditionally upon the decretal amount already deposited with the Nazir.

  Questions settled

  • Does service of summons in a summary suit without attaching a copy of the plaint constitute valid service for computing the limitation period under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of C.P.C.?
  • Whether providing a copy of the plaint to the defendant during criminal court proceedings amounts to valid statutory service in a civil summary suit?
  • Can an application for leave to defend a summary suit be dismissed as time-barred if the summons served was not in the prescribed form under Appendix B, Schedule I of C.P.C.?
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• Mst. FATIMA PARVEEN Versus MUHAMMAD YOUNUS2026 PLD 140 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-28Read full judgment →
• CARGILL BV Versus KHALID JAVAID AND BROTHERS2026 PLD 130 · Sindh High Court · 2025-12-19
  foreign arbitral awardenforcement of foreign awardarbitration agreementNew York Conventioncompetence-competenceminimum interferencecommercial arbitration
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns applications for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards rendered by the Refined Sugar Association of London, filed under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2011. The core legal questions were whether the arbitral tribunal possessed the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes and whether the court could examine the merits of the foreign awards during enforcement proceedings. The Court held that the tribunal was competent to rule on its own jurisdiction under the governing law, and the respondents failed to challenge these findings within the limitation period. Consequently, the Court allowed the applications, recognizing the awards as binding and enforceable as decrees. The Court affirmed that under the 2011 Act and the New York Convention, domestic courts must exercise minimum interference in international commercial arbitration, are precluded from re-examining the merits of a foreign award on points of fact or law, and may only refuse enforcement based on the specific grounds enumerated in Article V of the Convention.

  Questions settled

  • Can a domestic court re-examine the merits of a foreign arbitral award on points of fact or law during enforcement proceedings?
  • Does an arbitral tribunal have the authority to rule on its own substantive jurisdiction?
  • Under what specific grounds can a court refuse the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award?
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• Syed SADIQ Versus State2026 PLD 13 · Sindh High Court · 2025-02-27Read full judgment →
• NUNCHI MARINE PTE LTD. Versus CNERGYICO PK LIMITED (formerly Byco Petroleum)2026 PLD 115 · Sindh High Court · 2025-09-12
  foreign arbitral awardrecognition and enforcementpublic policyright to fair trialNew York Conventioninternational commercial arbitrationpro-enforcement bias
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involved an application for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award rendered by the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 read with the New York Convention, 1958. The core legal question was whether the respondent was denied a fair trial or due process under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan, rendering the enforcement of the award contrary to public policy under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. The Sindh High Court held that the respondent failed to establish that it was unable to present its case, noting that the respondent's conduct demonstrated intentional delay and avoidance of arbitration proceedings despite being given adequate notice and opportunities. The court laid down the principle that national courts must exercise minimal interference in international commercial arbitration, maintaining a pro-enforcement bias, and that a party cannot claim protection under the right to a fair trial when it deliberately chooses not to defend itself or fails to substantiate claims of financial impossibility.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an international arbitral award can be refused enforcement on the ground of public policy when the respondent intentionally avoided participation in the arbitration proceedings?
  • Does the right to a fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan protect a party that has been duly notified but chooses to back out or fail to defend itself without justification?
  • What is the scope of judicial review by national courts when considering the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention and the Act of 2011?
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• SIDAT HYDER MORSHED ASSOCIATES (PVT.) LTD. Versus TRADE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF PAKISTAN2026 PLD 103 · Sindh High Court · 2025-05-30
  contractual recoverydoctrine of estoppelacquiescencesecond appealburden of proofreasonable time for performanceconcurrent findings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arose from a suit for recovery of outstanding contractual payments, which was dismissed by the lower courts due to the appellant's failure to produce a formal satisfaction certificate from the respondent. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to payment in the absence of such a certificate, given the respondent's prolonged silence and failure to express dissatisfaction or terminate the contract. The High Court held that the respondent’s conduct, characterized by silence and failure to object to submitted invoices, constituted acquiescence. Applying the doctrine of estoppel under Article 114 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, the Court ruled that the respondent could not deny payment after allowing the appellant to believe the work was satisfactory. Furthermore, the Court invoked Section 46 of the Contract Act 1872, determining that performance must be completed within a reasonable time, which the respondent failed to challenge. Consequently, the Court set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts, finding they misread the evidence, and decreed the suit in favor of the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party's silence and failure to object to invoices constitute acquiescence under the law of contract?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal if the lower courts misread the evidence?
  • When no specific time is stipulated for the performance of a contractual obligation, what determines the reasonable time for such performance?
  • Does the doctrine of estoppel prevent a party from withholding payment based on a missing satisfaction certificate if that party previously accepted work without such documentation?
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• WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Versus KADIR BAKHSH2026 PLD 1 · Sindh High Court · 2024-12-06
  special damagesgeneral damagesburden of prooftort lawdamages for delayconstruction costsevidence of losssecond appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal challenges a decree awarding damages to the respondent for the delayed construction of a hospital caused by the presence of high-tension electricity wires over his property. The core legal question concerns whether the respondent sufficiently proved his claim for special damages, specifically the increased cost of construction and medical equipment prices between 2003 and 2007. The Court held that the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proof required for special damages. While the respondent established the existence of the wires, he failed to provide evidence of actual out-of-pocket expenses, specific construction costs incurred, or proof of actual purchases of medical equipment. The Court emphasized that special damages must be specifically pleaded and proven with evidence of actual loss, whereas general damages are governed by the rule of thumb. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments regarding these special damages, ruling that damages cannot be awarded based on hypothesis or presumption without proof of actual financial injury. The appeal was allowed, and the suit for special damages was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What is the distinction between general damages and special damages in tort law?
  • Does a plaintiff claiming special damages for increased construction costs need to prove actual out-of-pocket expenses?
  • Can a court award special damages based on hypothetical price differences without evidence of actual expenditure?
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• MUQARRAB KHAN Versus Haji GULI SHAH2026 PLD 7 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-10-19
  civil revisionagreement to selldeclaration of titlespecific performancemoulding of reliefsubsequent mutationnotice of contract
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby the plaintiff's suit for declaration and permanent injunction, based on an unregistered sale deed, was decreed against a subsequent revenue mutation in favor of the defendants. The core legal question was whether a suit for declaration of title could be maintained or decreed on the basis of an agreement to sell, and whether an unregistered deed takes precedence over a subsequent attested mutation. The Peshawar High Court held that while a suit for declaration of title cannot be maintained solely on the basis of an agreement to sell, courts have the power to mould the relief by converting the suit for declaration into one for specific performance of contract when the agreement is duly proved and the suit is within limitation. The Court further laid down that a prior unregistered agreement to sell prevails over a subsequent title mutation where the subsequent transferee had notice of the prior contract under Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for declaration of title be decreed on the basis of an agreement to sell?
  • Whether a court can convert a suit for declaration into one for specific performance?
  • Does an unregistered agreement to sell prevail over a subsequent attested mutation in revenue records?
  • When can specific performance of a contract be enforced against a person claiming under a subsequent title?
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• KHAZANA SUGAR MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power, Islamabad2026 PLD 60 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-04-17
  constitutional petitionelectricity surchargeNEPRA Actexcessive delegationseparation of powersreading downlegislative validationCouncil of Common Intereststariff determinationultra vires
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment addresses constitutional petitions challenging the legality of surcharges levied on electricity consumers under the Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 (NEPRA Act). The petitioners contested the constitutional validity of Section 31(5) (now omitted) and Section 31(8) of the NEPRA Act, arguing excessive delegation of legislative power to the Federal Government and non-compliance with Article 154 of the Constitution regarding the Council of Common Interests (CCI). The court held that Section 31(5) was validly enacted and subsequently validated by Section 51 of the NEPRA Act, curing any initial procedural infirmities. It further ruled that the Federal Government's power to levy surcharges does not require prior recourse to the CCI, as surcharges are considered part of the tariff (a fee) and not a tax, and CCI's mandate is for general policy, not day-to-day tariff setting. However, the court found that Clause (a) of subsection (8) of Section 31 granted excessive discretion and, applying the doctrine of "reading down," restricted its application to public sector projects directly related to electricity generation, transmission, and distribution, deeming any surcharge beyond this scope ultra vires the NEPRA Act.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory provision introduced through a Finance Act be constitutionally invalid if subsequently validated by a specific Act?
  • Does the Federal Government's imposition of electricity surcharges require prior recourse to the Council of Common Interests under Article 154 of the Constitution?
  • Does the delegation of power to the Federal Government to impose surcharges under Section 31(8) of the NEPRA Act constitute excessive delegation of legislative function?
  • Can the phrase "public sector project of public importance" in Section 31(8)(a) of the NEPRA Act be judicially restricted to projects within the electricity sector through the doctrine of "reading down"?
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• RUSTAM KHAN Versus Mst. PATHANI through Legal Heirs2026 PLD 53 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-06-12
  parda nasheengift mutationburden of proofcivil revisiondelivery of possessionfraudulent transferdoctrine of sinker
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil revision petition challenged concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which decreed a suit for the cancellation of a gift mutation. The respondent, an elderly parda nasheen lady, alleged the mutation was fraudulent. The core legal question concerned the validity of the gift and the burden of proof regarding the transaction. The Court held that the concurrent findings were correct, dismissing the petition. It established that a valid gift requires three independent ingredients: declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession, none of which were proven. The Court emphasized that mere attestation of a mutation does not constitute proof of a gift. Furthermore, regarding transactions involving parda nasheen women, the beneficiary bears a heavy burden to prove that the lady acted with free consent, understood the transaction's consequences, and received independent advice. Because the initial gift was invalid, the Court applied the doctrine of sinker, ruling that subsequent transfers, even those claiming protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, were legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere attestation of a gift mutation constitute sufficient proof of a valid gift?
  • What are the mandatory requirements for proving a valid oral gift under Pakistani law?
  • What is the burden of proof on a beneficiary when a transaction involves an elderly parda nasheen lady?
  • Can a transferee claim protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, if the underlying gift mutation is found to be illegal?
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• Professor Dr. NIAMAT ULLAH Versus IZAZ KHAN2026 PLD 49 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-04-01
  medical negligenceconsumer protectionjurisdictionhealthcare commissionmedical malpracticestatutory immunity
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This appeal challenges an order of the Consumer Protection Court, Peshawar, which maintained a complaint alleging medical negligence and unethical conduct against a medical practitioner. The core legal question was whether the Consumer Protection Court possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate claims involving medical malpractice or negligence by healthcare service providers, or if such matters fall exclusively under the purview of the Healthcare Commission. The Court held that the Consumer Protection Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain complaints regarding medical malpractice or negligence. Relying on the statutory framework of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission Act, 2015, the Court determined that the Healthcare Commission is the sole competent forum for investigating allegations of maladministration or malpractice by healthcare service providers. Furthermore, the Court noted that Section 19 of the Act provides immunity against legal proceedings related to private healthcare services, except under the Act itself. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the complaint before the Consumer Protection Court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, establishing that specialized healthcare regulatory bodies have exclusive authority over medical negligence claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Consumer Protection Court have the jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints regarding medical malpractice or negligence?
  • Is the Healthcare Commission the exclusive forum for investigating allegations of maladministration by healthcare service providers?
  • Does Section 19 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission Act, 2015 provide immunity against legal proceedings outside the Act for private healthcare establishments?
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• SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES LTD. through General Manager, Peshawar Versus Dr. CHANGAIZ HAKIM KHAN2026 PLD 43 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-05-30
  dismissal of suitproduction of evidenceprocedural lawadjournmentscivil appealpenal provisions
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal challenges the judgment and order of the Additional District Judge-I, Nowshera, whereby the appellant-company's right to produce evidence was struck off and its recovery suit was dismissed under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question centered on whether the trial court was justified in invoking the penal provisions of Order XVII, Rule 3 C.P.C. to dismiss the suit after granting multiple opportunities to the plaintiff to produce evidence over several years. The Peshawar High Court held that the appellant showed a high degree of negligence and failed to produce evidence despite numerous notices and final opportunities, thereby attracting the penal consequences of the law. The court laid down the principle that trial courts must strictly enforce procedural laws regarding the production of evidence, and the practice of granting endless adjournments must be discontinued in line with apex court jurisprudence upholding the dismissal of suits for non-prosecution of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is justified in striking off the right to produce evidence and dismissing a suit under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 upon a party's repeated failure to produce evidence?
  • Does failure to produce evidence after being granted sufficient time and repeated final opportunities attract the penal consequences of Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Should appellate courts interfere with the trial court's strict enforcement of procedural timelines for producing evidence in the absence of perversity or arbitrariness?
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• FAZAL MUHAMMAD KHAN Versus State2026 PLD 40 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-01-11
  contempt of courtunconditional apologyscandalizing the courtjudicial dignitypublic apologythreats to judiciary
  AI summary & questions settled

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  This is an application under the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 seeking contempt proceedings against respondent No. 1, Aimal Wali Khan, for obstructing judicial proceedings and making a public speech containing malicious remarks and life threats against the Chief Justice of the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question was whether the contempt proceedings could be disposed of in light of the unconditional apology tendered by the respondent. The Court held that although the utterances scandalized the judiciary and attracted penal consequences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and the Elections Act, 2017, the contempt proceedings could be dropped in view of the respondent's heartfelt written and public apology, coupled with the tradition of judicial magnanimity. The key principle laid down is that while threats and scandalous remarks against the judiciary ordinarily warrant strict penal action, courts may exercise magnanimity and accept an unqualified public and written apology to uphold the dignity of the institution while relieving the contemnor.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contempt proceedings can be disposed of upon submission of a written and public unconditional apology by the contemnor?
  • Does a public speech hurling life threats and malicious remarks against the head of the provincial judiciary attract provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Whether making scandalous statements against a judge entails disqualification from public office under the Elections Act, 2017?
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• MUHAMMAD AFZAL Versus NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB) through Chairman, Islamabad2026 PLD 32 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-07-29
  freezing orderbona fide purchaserNational Accountability Ordinance 1999property rightsvoid transfercaveat emptorconstitutional jurisdictionaccountability court
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners challenged an Accountability Court's freezing order and a subsequent judgment cancelling a sale mutation of property acquired from an accused person. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, could interfere with these orders where the petitioners claimed to be bona fide purchasers without knowledge of the freezing order. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the transfer of property already subject to a freezing order is void under Section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Court determined that the petitioners' plea of lack of knowledge was factually unsubstantiated and legally insufficient to override the statutory prohibition. It reaffirmed that Section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, which invalidates transfers of frozen property, is not in conflict with the fundamental right to property under Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, as it constitutes a reasonable restriction in the public interest. The Court further emphasized that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to property transactions involving accused persons, and the petitioners failed to avail themselves of the statutory remedy to file claims or objections.

  Questions settled

  • Does the purchase of property already subject to a freezing order under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, constitute a void transaction?
  • Is Section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, in conflict with the fundamental right to property guaranteed under Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can a third-party purchaser of frozen property claim lack of knowledge of the freezing order to validate a transaction prohibited under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere with a freezing order in its constitutional jurisdiction when the petitioner failed to exhaust statutory remedies for filing claims or objections?
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• Lady Doctor GETMAN ALLA alias ALIYA WAHAB Versus State2026 PLD 23 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-02-28
  quashing of FIRmedical negligencehealthcare commissionspecial law versus general lawqatl-bis-sababconstitutional petitionalternative remedy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, filed by a lady doctor seeking the quashing of an FIR registered against her under Section 322 of the Pakistan Penal Code for qatl-bis-sabab following the death of a patient during childbirth at a private hospital. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings and the registration of an FIR for alleged medical negligence can be initiated directly before the police, bypassing the specialized regulatory framework and forum established under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission Act, 2015. The Peshawar High Court held that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission Act, 2015 is a special enactment with an overriding effect that bars direct criminal proceedings and suits against healthcare establishments and service providers regarding the provision of healthcare services, requiring complaints to be filed and investigated first through the Health Care Commission. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR, holding that where a statute creates a right and prescribes a specific manner of enforcement, that remedy must be exclusively pursued.

  Questions settled

  • Whether criminal proceedings for medical negligence can be initiated directly through an FIR without exhausting the remedy provided under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission Act, 2015?
  • Does the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission Act, 2015 possess an overriding effect over general criminal laws regarding matters of healthcare service provision?
  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to quash an FIR where proceedings are conducted in violation of a specialized statute?
  • Does the availability of an alternate remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure strictly bar the entertainment of a constitutional petition against an illegal criminal proceeding?
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• GHC INTERNATIONAL PVT. LTD (ENGINEERS AND CONTRACTORS), PESHAWAR Versus TARIQ SAEED2026 PLD 164 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-07-03
  set-offlegal set-offequitable set-offpecuniary jurisdictionreturn of plaintwritten statementcounter-claimcivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

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  The petitioner instituted a civil suit for declaration and recovery of Rs. 24,000,000/- plus damages before the trial court, which possessed pecuniary jurisdiction up to fifty million rupees. Upon notice, the respondent filed a written statement raising a plea of set-off amounting to Rs. 95,905,889/-. The trial court held the suit maintainable, but the revisional court accepted the respondent's revision petition, setting aside the trial court's order and directing the return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the ground that the combined value exceeded pecuniary limits. The Peshawar High Court examined the scope of legal and equitable set-off under Order VIII Rule 6 and Order XX Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court held that while a plea of set-off must not exceed the pecuniary limits of the court and a court cannot entertain an excessive set-off, a plaintiff's properly instituted plaint cannot be returned solely because the defendant raised an excessive set-off claim in the written statement. The High Court set aside the orders of both lower fora, ruling that the appropriate course is to relegate the defendant to a separate suit for the excessive set-off claim while allowing the original suit to proceed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plea of set-off exceeding the pecuniary limits of the trial court warrants the return of the plaintiff's plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • What is the distinction between a legal set-off and an equitable set-off under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Can a defendant's plea of set-off oust the pecuniary jurisdiction of a trial court established on the value of the plaintiff's original claim?
  • What is the appropriate judicial course when a defendant raises a plea of set-off that exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court?
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• Mst. LUQMAN BIBI Versus State2026 PLD 154 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-05-21
  proclaimed offenderattachment of propertyrestoration of propertylimitation periodcriminal revisiondue processCode of Criminal Procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal revision arose from the dismissal of an application for the restoration of property attached under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioners, legal heirs of a deceased proclaimed offender, challenged the lower courts' findings that their application was time-barred under Section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions concerned the commencement of the limitation period and whether the two-year bar applies uniformly to both voluntary appearances and arrests. The Peshawar High Court held that the attachment process is incomplete without complying with the procedural requirements of Section 88(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically the taking of physical possession or appointment of a receiver. Consequently, the Court ruled that the limitation period under Section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 only commences upon the actual, physical attachment of the property. The Court further affirmed that the two-year limitation applies equally to both voluntary appearances and arrests. As the property was never physically attached, the limitation period had not expired, and the Court ordered the property's release.

  Questions settled

  • Does the two-year limitation period for the restoration of attached property under Section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 commence from the date of the attachment order or from the date of actual physical attachment?
  • Does the two-year limitation period prescribed in Section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply equally to cases where the accused appears voluntarily and cases where the accused is apprehended?
  • Is a mere entry in the revenue record sufficient to constitute a valid attachment of immovable property under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• WAHID ULLAH Versus State2026 PLD 150 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-05-27
  criminal appealmurderisqat-i-hamlmiscarriagede novo trialcharge framingmedical evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life sentence of the appellant for the murder of his wife, Mst. Salma Bibi, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution and trial court erred by failing to charge the accused with causing isqat-i-haml (miscarriage) under Section 338-A, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, despite medical evidence confirming the deceased was approximately eight weeks pregnant at the time of the incident. The Court held that causing isqat-i-haml is a distinct and independent offence from murder under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and cannot be merged into the murder charge. The Court established that where medical evidence confirms pregnancy, the trial court is legally obligated to frame a charge for isqat-i-haml alongside the murder charge. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case for a de novo trial, directing the trial court to frame proper charges under both Section 302 and Section 338-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a pregnant woman during a murder necessitate a separate charge for isqat-i-haml under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the offence of isqat-i-haml be merged into a charge of murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a trial court required to frame a charge for isqat-i-haml when medical evidence confirms the deceased was pregnant at the time of death?
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• Haji ZAHIR SHAH Versus PASSENGER SALES2026 PLD 145 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-05-06
  civil revisionspecial damagesgeneral damagesburden of proofwrongful detentiontortevidentiary threshold
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil revision petition challenged concurrent judgments from the lower courts that dismissed the petitioner's suit for Rs. 10 million in damages. The petitioner alleged wrongful detention and subsequent reputational and commercial harm. The core legal question was whether the petitioner sufficiently substantiated his claims for special and general damages through evidence. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof required to establish his entitlement to compensation. The Court found no illegality, material irregularity, or misreading of evidence in the lower courts' concurrent findings. The judgment reaffirmed the principle that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved through cogent, reliable, and concrete evidence. Furthermore, while general damages for mental agony or defamation are assessed via the 'rule of thumb' within the court's discretion, they still require credible proof of suffering. The Court emphasized that it cannot award compensation based merely on uncorroborated allegations, regardless of how strongly they are asserted, and upheld the dismissal of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary burden on a plaintiff claiming both special and general damages?
  • Can a court award damages based solely on uncorroborated allegations of mental agony and financial loss?
  • What is the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding concurrent findings of fact?
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• AZIZ-UR-REHMAN Versus ANWAR HAYAT2026 PLD 140 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-01-23
  usufructuary mortgageredemption of mortgagepreliminary decreefinal decreelimitationright to redeemmortgagor
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a revision petition challenging the dismissal of an application for the rejection of a petition for a final decree in a suit involving a usufructuary mortgage. The core legal question was whether the right of a mortgagor to redeem a usufructuary mortgage is extinguished by the expiry of the time fixed for payment in a preliminary decree, and whether such a claim is barred by the Limitation Act. The Court held that in the case of a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagee is not entitled to apply for a final decree, and the mortgagor's right to redeem subsists until a final decree is passed that explicitly debars such right. The Court further held that the failure to make payment within the time fixed by a preliminary decree does not automatically extinguish the right of redemption in usufructuary mortgages, nor does the Limitation Act bar the mortgagor from applying for a final decree, as the right to redeem remains intact until legally extinguished.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to pay the decretal amount within the time fixed by a preliminary decree in a usufructuary mortgage extinguish the mortgagor's right to redeem?
  • Is a mortgagee entitled to apply for a final decree in the case of a usufructuary mortgage?
  • Can a second suit for redemption be filed if the property was not redeemed after a previous decree for redemption?
  • Does the limitation period under Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 bar a mortgagor from applying for a final decree in a usufructuary mortgage?
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• TAUQIR AHMED Versus PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, PESHAWAR2026 PLD 13 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-04-15
  review petitionsecurity depositaccess to justicefundamental rightsvires of rulesHigh Court Rules and Ordersconstitutional jurisdictionmaintainability of petitionfrivolous litigationjudicial comity
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition challenged the vires of Rule 10(2), Chapter-1(a), Volume-V of the Peshawar High Court Rules and Orders, which mandates a Rs. 10,000 cash security for review petitions, arguing it violated fundamental rights to access to justice and fair trial. The Court held that review is not an inherent right but a discretionary relief, and the security deposit does not curtail fundamental rights, serving as a deterrent against frivolous litigation and compensating the successful party. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the Court affirmed that the High Court, when exercising rule-making powers under Article 202 of the Constitution, is not amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 199. The 'but for' test was applied, concluding that such rule-making functions are protected by Article 199(5). Consequently, the petition was dismissed as non-maintainable and without merit.

  Questions settled

  • Is a review of a High Court judgment an inherent right?
  • Can a High Court rule requiring a security deposit for review petitions be challenged as violative of fundamental rights?
  • Is a petition challenging rules made by the High Court under Article 202 of the Constitution maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does the exclusion of the High Court from the definition of 'person' in Article 199(5) of the Constitution apply to its rule-making powers?
  • Is the distinction between judicial and non-judicial powers relevant for determining the maintainability of a petition against a High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution?
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• GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA Versus AHLIAN JABAN DARGAI2026 PLD 129 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-02-10
  pecuniary jurisdictionvaluation of suitrejection of plaintjudicial determination of valuecivil procedurewrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged concurrent findings of two lower courts that dismissed an application for the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the initial valuation of the suit exceeded its pecuniary limits, and that the trial court could not legally reduce this valuation upon the plaintiffs' application. The Court examined whether a trial court possesses the authority to judicially determine and correct the valuation of a suit for court fee and jurisdictional purposes. Relying on established precedent, the Court held that a trial court has the inherent competence to inquire into and correct the valuation of a suit. It affirmed that once a court judicially determines the correct value, that determination supersedes the plaintiff's initial valuation for all purposes, including jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the trial court acted within its legal authority in adjusting the valuation to bring the suit within its pecuniary jurisdiction, and dismissed the petition, finding no jurisdictional defect in the lower courts' orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court have the authority to correct or alter the valuation of a suit for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction?
  • Does the judicial determination of a suit's value by a trial court supersede the valuation initially provided by the plaintiff?
  • Can a trial court proceed with a suit if it initially appears to be outside its pecuniary jurisdiction but is later corrected by the court?
  • Is the distinction between 'non-disclosure of cause of action' and 'lack of cause of action' relevant for the purpose of rejecting a plaint under Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• PESCO Versus Dr. KASHMALA ORAKZAI2026 PLD 125 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-02-24
  revision petitioncondonation of delaysufficient causerestoration of suitjudicial discretionnon-prosecutionlimitation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 challenged an appellate order that restored a civil suit previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question concerned whether the appellate court properly exercised its judicial discretion in condoning a 22-day delay in filing the restoration application, where the plaintiff cited severe illness (cancer) as the "sufficient cause." The High Court held that the appellate court acted well within its jurisdiction. The court affirmed that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 vests courts with broad discretion to condone delays upon demonstrating sufficient cause, distinct from the mandatory dismissal requirements for suits under Section 3 of the same Act. It further held that the determination of "sufficient cause" is a question of fact, and appellate or revisional courts should not interfere with such discretion unless there is patent illegality or material irregularity. Finding no jurisdictional defect or illegality in the lower court's reasoning, the High Court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the restoration of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 grant courts discretion to condone delay in filing an application for restoration of a suit?
  • Is the determination of 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay a question of fact within the jurisdiction of the trial court?
  • Under what circumstances should a High Court interfere with the exercise of discretion regarding the condonation of delay by a lower court?
  • Does the mandatory nature of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 apply to applications for restoration of a suit in the same manner as it applies to the institution of a suit?
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• MUNEEBA ZAHID (MINOR) through Muhammad Zahid Versus GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Chief Secretary, Peshawar2026 PLD 113 · Peshawar High Court · 2025-07-02
  constitutional petitionjudicial restraintpublic health policythalassemia preventionseparation of powerslegislative wisdomultra vires
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged Section 3 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Preventive Health Act, 2009, which mandates premarital testing for thalassemia and hepatitis C but does not invalidate marriages based on test results. The petitioner, a minor thalassemia patient, contended that this provision renders the Act ineffective in preventing the transmission of these diseases and requested the court to declare it ultra vires. The core legal question was whether the judiciary possesses the authority to invalidate legislation based on perceived policy ineffectiveness or lack of empirical success. The Peshawar High Court declined to declare the provision ultra vires, holding that judicial review is limited to ensuring constitutional and legal compliance rather than supervising legislative wisdom or policy efficacy. The court affirmed the principle of judicial restraint, emphasizing that policy design, including public health frameworks, remains within the exclusive domain of the legislature. While acknowledging the structural inconsistency identified by the petitioner, the court ruled that it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the legislature, recommending instead a multi-stakeholder approach for future legislative reform.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court declare a statutory provision ultra vires solely on the ground that it is ineffective in achieving its stated policy objectives?
  • Does the power of judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 extend to supervising the wisdom or efficacy of legislative policy?
  • Is the judiciary empowered to compel the legislature to amend a law to improve its public health outcomes?
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• MIAN ARSHAD Versus State2026 PLD 1 · Peshawar High Court · 2024-04-30
  criminal appealrapechild abusesentence enhancementjudgment writingremandmandatory provisionsdeath penaltylife imprisonmentpublic servant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenged a conviction under Sections 376, 377-B, 506, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 53, KP Child Protection and Welfare Act 2010, where the appellant was sentenced to 14 years rigorous imprisonment for rape and child abuse. The core legal question concerned the trial court's failure to comply with Section 367, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically by not awarding separate sentences for distinct offences and not providing reasons for not imposing the death penalty or life imprisonment, despite the victim being a minor and the accused a public servant, which are aggravating factors under Section 376(3) and (4), Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Peshawar High Court set aside the impugned judgment, holding that it violated the mandatory provisions of Section 367, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The case was remanded to the trial court for re-writing the judgment in strict accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 367, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle established is the mandatory nature of Section 367, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly the requirement to state reasons for not imposing the death sentence when an offence is punishable by death.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court judgment valid if it fails to award separate sentences for distinct offences?
  • Is it mandatory for a trial court to provide reasons for not imposing the death sentence when an offence is punishable by death?
  • Can a judgment be set aside and a case remanded for re-writing if it violates the mandatory provisions of Section 367, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does Section 367, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, require a judgment to specify the offence and the section of law under which the accused is convicted and sentenced?
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• COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, LARGE TAXPAYERS UNIT, LAHORE Versus COCA COLA EXPORT CORPORATION2026 PLD 90 · Lahore High Court · 2025-09-17
  income taxtax creditsales taxstatutory interpretationfiscal statuteregistered personexportstax yearharmonious constructionwhole text canon
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Income Tax Reference Application, filed under Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, sought the Lahore High Court's opinion on whether the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue erred in allowing a tax credit under Section 65A of the Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the 90% sales threshold for tax credit eligibility should include export sales or only local sales to registered persons. The Revenue argued for strict interpretation, including all sales, while the taxpayer contended that "sales" in Section 65A referred only to local sales to registered persons, excluding exports. The Court held that the term "sales" in Section 65A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, must be construed in line with the overall scheme of the Ordinance, meaning it refers exclusively to local supplies made to registered or liable-to-be-registered persons, not exports. The Court emphasized harmonious construction of statutes, the "whole text canon," and the principle that any ambiguity in fiscal statutes should favor the taxpayer. Consequently, the Tribunal's decision to allow the tax credit was upheld, and the Reference Application was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 90% sales threshold for tax credit under Section 65A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, include export sales?
  • How should the term "sales" in Section 65A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, be interpreted in the context of the overall statutory scheme?
  • When interpreting a fiscal statute, if two constructions are possible, which interpretation should be preferred?
  • Are persons not liable to be registered under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, included for the purpose of calculating the 90% threshold under Section 65A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL REHMAN FARYAD Versus GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB through Home Secretary2026 PLD 84 · Lahore High Court · 2025-07-18
  Police Character CertificateAcquittalFundamental RightsHuman DignityCriminal RecordConstitutional PetitionPresumption of Innocence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged the refusal of the Home Secretary, Government of the Punjab, to issue a Police Character Certificate excluding details of a criminal case in which the petitioner had been acquitted. The core legal question was whether the state can continue to reflect an FIR in a character certificate after a court of competent jurisdiction has acquitted the accused. The Lahore High Court held that the petition should be allowed. The Court ruled that once an acquittal order attains finality, the presumption of innocence is fully restored, and the individual must be considered absolved of all allegations. Consequently, including details of an acquitted FIR in a character certificate is legally unjustified, stigmatizing, and violates the fundamental right to human dignity under Article 14 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. While law enforcement may maintain internal digital records for administrative purposes, public-facing documents must accurately reflect the individual's current legal status as free from criminal liability.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Police Character Certificate include details of an FIR for which the applicant has been acquitted?
  • Does the inclusion of an acquitted criminal case in a character certificate violate the right to human dignity under Article 14 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Is the state permitted to maintain internal digital records of FIRs for acquitted persons while excluding them from public-facing character certificates?
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• SHAHID HUSSAIN Versus ABDUL JABBAR TASSADUQ2026 PLD 75 · Lahore High Court · 2024-10-22
  recovery suitpromissory noteorder of remandpre-remand evidencehandwriting expertclosing of evidenceburden of proof
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The present Regular First Appeal challenged a judgment and decree dismissing the appellant's recovery suit filed under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 based on a promissory note. The core legal questions involved whether the trial court failed to consider pre-remand evidence and whether the trial court applied correct law while closing the appellant's right to produce evidence. The Lahore High Court held that an order of remand under Order XLI Rule 23 of the Code does not discard pre-remand evidence, which remains part of the record subject to just exceptions, but found that the appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proving the execution of the promissory note after expert evidence from the Punjab Forensic Science Agency concluded the signatures were not those of the respondent. Furthermore, the trial court was justified in closing the appellant's evidence under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code due to continuous delays and reluctance. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court order of remand under Order XLI Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 discards pre-remand evidence recorded during the original trial?
  • Does a trial court act lawfully in closing a plaintiff's right to adduce evidence under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 upon repeated adjournments and reluctance to record a statement?
  • What is the legal effect of a remand order on the revival of a suit and its prior interlocutory proceedings and evidence?
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• AHMED AMIN Versus DISTRICT JUDGE, ATTOCK2026 PLD 7 · Lahore High Court · 2025-06-02
  family court appealdismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of appealinherent powersconstitutional petitionalternate remedyFamily Courts Act 1964
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 challenged an appellate order dismissing an appeal under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether an appellate court hearing a family appeal has the power to dismiss it for default and subsequently restore it, and whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against such dismissal when an alternate remedy exists. The Lahore High Court held that an appellate court dealing with an appeal under Section 14 of the Act has the inherent power to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution and to restore the same upon showing sufficient cause by the appellant. The Court established the principle that despite the exclusion of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 under Section 17 of the Family Courts Act 1964, courts can draw analogy from available legal procedures and inherent powers to secure the ends of justice, and because an alternate, efficacious remedy of seeking restoration exists before the appellate court, a constitutional petition under Article 199 is not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 has the power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution?
  • Can an appellate court restore a family appeal dismissed in default upon showing sufficient cause by the appellant?
  • Does the exclusion of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 under Section 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 preclude a Family Court or appellate court from exercising inherent powers to secure the ends of justice?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 maintainable against the dismissal of a family appeal for default when an application for restoration can be filed before the appellate court?
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• SAFEER HUSSAIN Versus CAPITAL CITY POLICE OFFICER, LAHORE2026 PLD 69 · Lahore High Court · 2025-02-25
  dishonoured chequefinancial institutionquashing of FIRBanking Court jurisdictionNon-Banking Finance CompanyInvestment Finance Servicesspecial law vs general law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition challenged an FIR registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding a dishonoured cheque issued to a Non-Banking Finance Company (NBFC). The core legal question was whether the NBFC, as a financial institution, was required to initiate proceedings under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 rather than the general criminal law. The Court held that the NBFC, licensed to provide Investment Finance Services, qualifies as a "financial institution" under Section 2(a) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001. Consequently, because the cheque was issued for the repayment of finance, the matter falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Banking Court under Section 20(4) of the Ordinance. The Court established that the special provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 override the general provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding dishonoured cheques in financial transactions. Accordingly, the FIR was quashed, with the complainant granted liberty to pursue the matter through a formal complaint before the competent Banking Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Non-Banking Finance Company licensed to provide Investment Finance Services qualify as a financial institution under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • Can a financial institution initiate criminal proceedings for a dishonoured cheque under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 provide an exclusive procedure for the prosecution of dishonoured cheques issued for the repayment of finance?
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• SALAMAT ALI Versus SABOHI NAZ2026 PLD 601 · Lahore High Court · 2025-05-05
  recovery suitsummary suitdishonour of chequephoto accountadverse inferenceburden of proofbest evidence rule
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This regular first appeal challenged a trial court decree in a suit for recovery of Rs. 25,00,000 filed under Order XXXVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, based on a cheque. The core legal questions were whether the plaintiff successfully proved the loan transaction and whether a cheque returned due to 'photo account' status—requiring the account holder's personal appearance—constitutes a legally actionable 'dishonour.' The High Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove the loan transaction, noting the absence of critical witnesses and the failure to establish the financial basis of the claim. Crucially, the Court determined that a cheque returned because it was a 'photo account' instrument, rather than for insufficient funds, does not meet the legal definition of dishonour. Furthermore, the Court applied an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 due to the plaintiff’s failure to produce material witnesses. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the suit was dismissed, emphasizing that the burden of proof in civil recovery suits remains strictly on the plaintiff.

  Questions settled

  • Does a cheque returned due to 'photo account' status, requiring personal appearance, constitute a legal 'dishonour' of the instrument?
  • Does the failure to produce material witnesses in a civil suit trigger an adverse presumption under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to a decree in a summary suit for recovery if they fail to prove the underlying loan transaction through concrete and trustworthy evidence?
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• MUHAMMAD UMAIR FAROOQI Versus The FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Muhammad Atif Qureshi2026 PLD 593 · Lahore High Court · 2025-11-27
  Intra-Court AppealmaintainabilityFederal Ombudsmanrepresentation to the Presidentstatutory barappellate jurisdictionconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Intra-Court Appeal under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 challenged a judgment passed by a Single Judge in a writ petition. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the appeal based on the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, which bars an Intra-Court Appeal if the law applicable to the original proceedings provides for at least one appeal, revision, or review. The core legal question was whether a representation to the President under section 14 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 functions as an appeal, revision, or review, thereby attracting the statutory bar. The court held that a representation under section 14 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 is an independent remedial forum functioning in substance as an appellate or revisional process that concludes the factual controversy. Consequently, the statutory bar applies, and the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. The key principle laid down is that the substance of a statutory remedy, rather than its nomenclature, determines whether it constitutes an appeal, revision, or review for the purpose of ousting the jurisdiction of a Division Bench under section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a representation to the President under section 14 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 constitutes an appeal or revision for the purpose of the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
  • Does the review jurisdiction under section 13 of the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 equate to an appellate or revisional forum?
  • What is the scope of interference by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction over factual findings recorded by fact-finding forums under the Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013?
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• MUHAMMAD KHALID WASEEM Versus GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB through Secretary Co-operative, Punjab2026 PLD 580 · Lahore High Court · 2025-01-14
  cooperative societiesanti-corruption establishmentjurisdictionpublic servantnab referencecriminal procedurepenal provisions
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged a reference sent by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab to the Director General, Anti-Corruption Establishment following the transfer of a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) case for proceedings under the Co-operative Societies Act 1925. The core legal question concerned the jurisdiction of the Anti-Corruption Establishment to inquire into and investigate offences under the Co-operative Societies Act 1925, and whether cooperative society officers, though deemed public servants under section 65B, fall within the purview of anti-corruption laws. The Lahore High Court held that offences under the Co-operative Societies Act 1925 are not included in the schedules of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1958 or the West Pakistan Anti-Corruption Establishment Ordinance 1961, and thus the Anti-Corruption Establishment lacks jurisdiction to investigate them. The Court laid down that offences under the Co-operative Societies Act 1925 are triable by a Magistrate 1st Class pursuant to section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, or are subject to the penalty mechanisms of the Act, and that the Registrar must proceed in accordance with the law rather than transmitting such matters to the Anti-Corruption Establishment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Anti-Corruption Establishment have the jurisdiction to inquire into or investigate offences under the Co-operative Societies Act 1925?
  • Which court has the jurisdiction to try offences punishable under the Co-operative Societies Act 1925 when no specific court is mentioned in the statute?
  • Are officers and members of cooperative societies considered public servants under the schedule of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1958?
  • What is the distinction between offences under the Co-operative Societies Act 1925 that are liable to a penalty imposed by the Registrar versus those that are punishable by a court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. SARWAT SETHI Versus Mst. KHALIDA PARVEEN2026 PLD 575 · Lahore High Court · 2025-10-20
  ex parte decreewithdrawal of applicationauthority of counselvakalatnamaimplied authority of advocaterecovery suitappeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from an order dismissing the appellant's application for the restoration of an application seeking to set aside an ex parte decree passed in a recovery suit. The core legal question concerns whether an Advocate possesses the implied authority to withdraw an application or compromise a proceeding on behalf of a client when no express restriction is placed in the vakalatnama, and whether such withdrawal binds the client. The Lahore High Court held that an Advocate acting under a duly executed vakalatnama without restrictions has the implied and inherent authority to take steps, including withdrawal or abandonment of claims, which are binding on the client unless expressly limited or countermanded. The court emphasized that allegations of unauthorized withdrawal against counsel must be substantiated by making the counsel a party, producing them as a witness, or initiating disciplinary proceedings before the bar council. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the counsel's action was well within his delegated authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Advocate possess the implied authority to withdraw an application or compromise a matter on behalf of a client in the absence of express restrictions in the vakalatnama?
  • Are the actions and statements of a counsel in the conduct of a suit binding upon the client?
  • What is the evidentiary requirement when a litigant alleges that their counsel acted without authority in withdrawing a court proceeding?
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• COL. (R) DR. RIFFAT SAEED Versus Professor ZAHEER ADNAN2026 PLD 568 · Lahore High Court · 2026-01-27
  guardian ad litemunsound mindmental infirmityOrder XXXII Rule 15 CPCMental Health Ordinance 2001sine die adjournmentconstitutional petitionremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged the lower courts' orders dismissing the petitioner's application under Order XXXII Rules 3 and 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and adjourning the suit sine die until a guardian was appointed under the Mental Health Ordinance 2001. The core legal question was whether a civil court can conduct an inquiry and appoint a guardian ad litem under Order XXXII Rule 15 CPC without a prior formal adjudication or guardian appointment under the Mental Health Ordinance 2001. The High Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter, holding that a guardian ad litem under Order XXXII CPC serves a limited, procedural role to represent a party in litigation, which is distinct from the broader care and property management scope under the Mental Health Ordinance 2001. The court affirmed that civil courts are fully empowered and obligated to conduct their own inquiry under Order XXXII Rule 15 CPC to determine mental infirmity and appoint a suit guardian, without requiring prior proceedings under special mental health laws.

  Questions settled

  • Is a formal declaration or appointment of a guardian under the Mental Health Ordinance 2001 a prerequisite for a civil court to appoint a guardian ad litem under Order XXXII Rule 15 CPC?
  • Does a civil court have the jurisdiction under Order XXXII Rule 15 CPC to independently inquire into a party's mental infirmity to appoint a next friend or guardian for the suit?
  • How does the scope of appointing a guardian ad litem under Order XXXII CPC differ from appointing a guardian under the Mental Health Ordinance 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• LESCO through Chief Executive Officer, Lahore Versus EXPORIENT KNITTERS (PVT.) LTD.2026 PLD 547 · Lahore High Court · 2025-04-30
  electricity actnepra actprovincial office of inspectionstatutory limitationimplied repealspecial lawconstitutional petitionmetering and billing disputes
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment by the Lahore High Court addresses whether the statutory limitation of 90 days under section 26(6) of the Electricity Act, 1910, for deciding applications regarding electricity meters and billing disputes continues to remain in force following the promulgation of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997. The core legal question revolves around whether the enactment of the NEPRA Act and the establishment of Provincial Offices of Inspection under section 38 thereof impliedly repealed the 90-day limitation period previously applicable to Electric Inspectors. The Full Bench held that following the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, electricity became an exclusive federal subject, and matters previously handled by Electric Inspectors under the Electricity Act are now dealt with by the Provincial Offices of Inspection under section 38 of the NEPRA Act. The Court ruled that the omission of a 90-day upper cap in the NEPRA Act is a deliberate legislative choice, and being a later, more comprehensive special enactment containing an overriding clause (section 45), the NEPRA Act prevails over the Electricity Act to the extent of any inconsistency, thereby rendering the 90-day limitation inapplicable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory limitation of 90 days under section 26(6) of the Electricity Act, 1910 continue to apply to decisions rendered by the Provincial Office of Inspection under section 38 of the NEPRA Act, 1997?
  • Whether the provisions of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 impliedly repeal the conflicting provisions of the Electricity Act, 1910 regarding timelines for deciding electricity disputes?
  • Does section 38 of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 carry any statutory limitation period of 90 days for the determination of metering and billing disputes?
  Read full judgment →
• GHARIBWAL CEMENT LIMITED Versus The PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Secretary, Mines and Minerals Department2026 PLD 54 · Lahore High Court · 2025-07-04
  delegated legislationultra viresmining concessionmarkup on royaltyfiscal statute interpretationunjust enrichmentproperty rights
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition and connected matters challenged orders passed by the Secretary Mines and Minerals, Government of the Punjab, upholding demands for the payment of markup under sub-rule (2) of rule 68 and sub-rule (3) of rule 73 of the Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002, on allegedly outstanding royalties and rentals. The core legal question was whether the rule-making authority exceeded its powers under the primary enactment, the Regulation of Mines and Oil-fields and Minerals Development (Government Control) Act, 1948, by imposing such a markup without statutory authorization. The Lahore High Court held that delegated legislation cannot expand the scope of a parent statute or impose pecuniary burdens, penalties, or additional obligations not contemplated by the primary enactment, and that fiscal statutes must be strictly construed. The court concluded that the power to determine rates and conditions under the 1948 Act does not include the power to levy markup, making the impugned rules ultra vires the parent statute and violative of property rights under Article 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Consequently, the challenged sub-rules were struck down as illegal and without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rule-making authority under the Regulation of Mines and Oil-fields and Minerals Development (Government Control) Act, 1948 has the power to impose a markup on unpaid royalties and rentals through rules?
  • Can delegated legislation introduce substantive obligations, penalties, or pecuniary burdens not authorized by the parent statute?
  • Does the power to determine rates of royalties and rentals under the 1948 Act include the incidental or ancillary power to levy a daily percentage markup on delayed payments?
  • Whether the imposition of a markup via rules lacking statutory backing constitutes an unpermitted deprivation of property rights under Article 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Versus SHEIKH RASHEED AHMED2026 PLD 528 · Lahore High Court · 2026-03-12
  Anti-Terrorism Act 1997Section 28-Aimpounding of passportfreedom of movementjudicial estoppelconstitutional jurisdictionAnti-Terrorism Courtreasonable restriction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Intra Court Appeal challenged a Single Judge's order granting an accused, facing trial under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, permission to travel abroad for religious purposes. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, could override the statutory impounding of a passport under Section 28-A of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and whether a concession by a government law officer could create an estoppel against this statutory mandate. The Court held that the power to regulate the passport of an accused under Section 28-A rests exclusively with the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) seized of the matter. It ruled that the High Court cannot substitute its discretion for the trial court’s statutory authority, nor can a law officer’s unauthorized concession override a clear statutory command. The judgment established that Section 28-A constitutes a reasonable restriction on the freedom of movement under Article 15 of the Constitution, and that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass specific statutory remedies provided by the legislature for the administration of criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the authority to grant permission to travel abroad to an accused whose passport is deemed impounded under Section 28-A of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Can a concession made by a law officer before a court override a clear statutory mandate?
  • Is the restriction on the movement of an accused under Section 28-A of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, a reasonable restriction under Article 15 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the doctrine of judicial estoppel apply to a statement made by a law officer that is contrary to a subsisting statutory or judicial command?
  Read full judgment →
• ZUBAIDA BIBI Versus DISTRICT POLICE OFFICER, VEHARI2026 PLD 514 · Lahore High Court · 2025-05-21
  custodial deathpolice encountertorture and custodial death actfederal investigation agencyhabeas corpusfundamental rights
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, read with Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, sought the recovery of the petitioner's son and nephew who were allegedly taken away by police officials, resulting in the death of the son and injuries to the nephew during an alleged police encounter. The core legal questions involved the interpretation and applicability of the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act, 2022, regarding exclusive investigation by the Federal Investigation Agency and the definition of custody during police operations. The Lahore High Court held that the Act applies to deaths and injuries occurring during search, arrest, and seizure proceedings, bringing the matter within the ambit of custodial death and torture, and that the Federal Investigation Agency possesses exclusive jurisdiction and suo motu powers to investigate such matters. The court directed the transfer of the police files to the Federal Investigation Agency for investigation under the supervision of the National Commission for Human Rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act, 2022 apply to deaths or injuries occurring during police encounters and arrest proceedings?
  • Does the Federal Investigation Agency have exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offences under the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act, 2022?
  • Does the Federal Investigation Agency have suo motu powers to inquire into and investigate crimes under the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act, 2022 without a formal complaint?
  • How does the overriding effect of the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act, 2022 interact with prior enactments like the Anti-rape (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021?
  Read full judgment →
• VISHAL AHMAD SHAKIR Versus Mian MUHAMMAD SHAHBAZ SHARIF2026 PLD 511 · Lahore High Court · 2026-03-24
  criminal revisionlocus standiappeal against acquittalSpecial Judge CentralFederal Investigation AgencyPakistan Criminal Law Amendment Actmaintainability of revisionbenefit of doubt
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal revision petition was filed under Section 10(1) of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1958 read with Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by a private individual (an advocate) challenging the trial court's judgment dated 12.10.2022, whereby respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were acquitted of charges arising out of an FIR registered at the instance of the FIA Anti-Corruption Circle. The core legal questions pertained to whether an unrelated private individual has locus standi to challenge an acquittal in a case not initiated at his behest, and whether a criminal revision lies against an acquittal order passed by a Special Judge. The Lahore High Court sustained the office objection and dismissed the revision petition as non-maintainable. The Court held that the petitioner lacked locus standi as the law was not set into motion at his instance. Furthermore, under Section 10(2) of the Act of 1958, an acquittal by a Special Judge can only be appealed by a Public Prosecutor upon the Federal Government's direction; under Section 439(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, where an appeal lies and none is filed, no revision can be entertained.

  Questions settled

  • Does a private individual who is not the complainant or informant have locus standi to challenge an order of acquittal through a criminal revision petition?
  • Can an order of acquittal passed by a Special Judge under the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1958 be challenged by a person other than the Public Prosecutor acting under the direction of the Federal Government?
  • Whether a criminal revision under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is maintainable when a statutory remedy of appeal is provided by law but has not been pursued?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM ABBAS Versus MUHAMMAD IJAZ2026 PLD 501 · Lahore High Court · 2025-09-24
  proclaimed offenderattachment of propertyjoint propertyauction of propertyfundamental rightsright to propertycriminal procedurepartition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition, filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenged the orders of a Judicial Magistrate and an Additional Sessions Judge authorizing the auction of an undivided joint property in toto to procure the attendance of an absconding co-accused. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate possesses the jurisdiction to auction a joint property without first partitioning the specific share of the absconding accused. The Court held that the auction of undivided joint property, without prior partition, infringes upon the fundamental rights of the other co-sharers. The Court emphasized that attachment under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is intended to procure the attendance of an accused, not to penalize innocent co-owners or deprive them of their property. The ratio established is that an executing court cannot order the sale of property beyond the extent necessary for the satisfaction of the objective, and that auctioning undivided joint property without demarcation constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the right to hold property under Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate order the auction of an undivided joint property in toto to procure the attendance of an absconding co-accused without first partitioning the property?
  • Does the attachment of property under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 authorize the sale of a co-sharer's interest in an undivided joint khata?
  • Is an order for the auction of property by a Magistrate valid if it infringes upon the property rights of innocent co-owners under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does a Magistrate become functus officio after dismissing an application for the auction of attached property?
  Read full judgment →
• ZUBAIDA KHANAM Versus State2026 PLD 493 · Lahore High Court · 2025-11-20Read full judgment →
• Malik MUHAMMAD IRSHAD FAIZ Versus KHADIM HUSSAIN2026 PLD 488 · Lahore High Court · 2025-11-18
  list of witnessesprocedural lapsecivil revisiondiscretionary powerrecovery suitsummoning witnessesevidentiary gaps
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil revision arises from the dismissal of two applications filed by the petitioner in a recovery suit. The petitioner initially failed to submit a list of witnesses within the seven-day period mandated by Order XVI, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, following the settlement of issues. A subsequent application for extension was dismissed by the trial court due to a lack of sufficient cause and the petitioner's failure to adhere to procedural timelines. The petitioner later filed a second application seeking to summon bank officials, attempting to invoke the court's power under Order XVI, Rule 14, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court dismissed the revision, holding that Order XVI, Rule 14 is a discretionary power vested in the court to summon strangers for effective adjudication, not a mechanism for litigants to cure procedural lapses or fill evidentiary gaps after failing to comply with mandatory filing deadlines. The court emphasized that procedural discipline must be maintained and that parties cannot use discretionary provisions to circumvent the consequences of their own negligence in timely disclosing evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party invoke Order XVI, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to cure a failure to submit a witness list within the statutory time limit?
  • Is the power of the Court under Order XVI, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 a right that can be demanded by a litigant?
  • Does the failure to submit a list of witnesses within seven days of the settlement of issues preclude a party from later seeking to summon witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SOBAN Versus GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN2026 PLD 480 · Lahore High Court · 2026-02-18
  off-loadingdue processemigrationfundamental rightsadministrative discretionright to travelnatural justice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners challenged their off-loading from an international flight, contending that the action was arbitrary, lacked transparency, and violated their fundamental rights. The core legal question was whether the respondents' power to off-load passengers suspected of intending to seek employment abroad under the guise of visit visas could be exercised without providing written reasons or adhering to due process. The Court held that while the authorities possess the statutory power under the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, to regulate emigration and prevent illegal migration, such administrative discretion is not unfettered. The Court determined that the failure to provide written reasons for the off-loading violated the principles of natural justice and the constitutional guarantee of due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The Court established the principle that henceforth, in every case of off-loading, the competent officer must record brief, specific reasons in writing and provide a copy to the concerned passenger. Consequently, the petitions were disposed of, allowing the petitioners to travel if they meet all legal and financial requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power to off-load a passenger at an airport constitute an unfettered administrative discretion?
  • Is the failure to provide written reasons for off-loading a violation of the constitutional right to due process?
  • Does the freedom of movement under Article 15 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, include the right to travel abroad?
  • Are authorities required to provide a written, reasoned order when preventing a citizen from traveling abroad?
  Read full judgment →
• QAISER alias AAUN Versus State2026 PLD 47 · Lahore High Court · 2024-10-08
  control of narcotic substancesstatement of accusedsection 342 Cr.P.C.chain of custodyfair trialcriminal appealacquittal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question revolves around whether the failure of the trial court to confront the accused with crucial incriminating evidence, specifically the chain of safe custody, during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 vitiates the conviction. The Lahore High Court held that recording the statement of the accused under Section 342 is a mandatory safeguard ensuring a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, and material circumstances not put to the accused cannot be used to sustain a conviction. Since the appellant was not confronted with the details regarding the safe custody and transmission of the narcotic sample to the forensic laboratory, the prosecution's case collapsed. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant of the charge, laying down the principle that omitting to put incriminating evidence regarding the chain of custody to the accused during his examination under Section 342 is a fatal procedural flaw resulting in acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to confront an accused with incriminating evidence during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 vitiates the conviction?
  • Is establishing an unbroken chain of safe custody mandatory in cases under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Can unmentioned incriminating circumstances and chain of custody details be relied upon for securing a conviction if omitted from the examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• State Versus JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE SECTION-302026 PLD 465 · Lahore High Court · 2026-03-24
  discharge of accusedphysical remandSpecial Judge Anti-Corruptionillegal gratificationjurisdiction of magistratescheduled offencesconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The instant constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by the State challenging the order of a Judicial Magistrate whereby the accused, alleged to have accepted illegal gratification as a private person acting alongside a revenue official, was discharged from a corruption case during the physical remand stage. The core legal question was whether a Duty/Judicial Magistrate lacking trial jurisdiction can discharge an accused instead of forwarding him to the competent court when declining further physical remand under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and whether an offence under Section 162 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is exclusively triable by a Special Judge despite being committed by a private person. The Lahore High Court held that an offence under Section 162, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is a scheduled offense under the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958, triable exclusively by a Special Judge, and that a Magistrate lacking trial jurisdiction cannot discharge an accused but must forward them to the appropriate forum under Section 167, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The impugned discharge order was set aside and the matter remanded for a fresh decision on the physical remand application.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Duty or Judicial Magistrate lacking trial jurisdiction can discharge an accused person under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 instead of forwarding him to the court having jurisdiction?
  • Does an offence under Section 162 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the schedule of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 and thus become exclusively triable by a Special Judge when committed by a private person?
  • What are the legal powers and limitations of a Magistrate during the physical remand stage when investigating a corruption matter?
  • Whether an order of discharge passed by a Magistrate during the administrative phase of an investigation is deemed an administrative or judicial order?
  Read full judgment →
• ABBAS ALI Versus COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS Barrister Usman G. Rashid Cheema , Nadeem Mahmood Mian2026 PLD 457 · Lahore High Court · 2026-04-09
  constitutional petitioncustoms seizureconfiscation of goldproprietary rightsright to propertycustody of seized goodsstatutory disposal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, was filed seeking the recovery of confiscated gold jewellery and foreign currency from the customs authorities. The core legal question was whether a petitioner is entitled to the restoration of seized property in its refined or altered form or its current value, or if the department can unilaterally substitute the property with its historical monetary value assessed at the time of melting or transfer to the State Bank. The Lahore High Court held that the alteration or melting of seized property while in official custody does not extinguish the proprietary rights of the owner, and in the absence of a lawful sale or auction conducted under the governing statute, the department cannot unilaterally substitute the property with an arbitrary historical valuation. The court laid down the principle that the State acts merely as a custodian of seized goods, and where such property has not been lawfully sold, the owner is entitled to the restoration of the property or its refined form, and arbitrary valuation by the authorities without a lawful disposal process is a violation of proprietary rights protected under Article 24 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether alteration or melting of seized property in official custody extinguishes the proprietary rights of its owner?
  • Can the customs department unilaterally substitute seized property with its historical monetary value without a lawful sale conducted under the statute?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to the restoration of refined gold bars when the statutory procedure for public auction or lawful sale was not strictly followed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. SHEHNAZ BIBI Versus MAGISTRATE 1ST CLASS, SAHIWAL2026 PLD 436 · Lahore High Court · 2025-04-29
  exhumationrelocation of gravescriminal procedureIslamic jurisprudencefundamental rightsconstitutional petitionhuman dignitygraveyard visitation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The Petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenging an order of a Magistrate who dismissed her application seeking permission to exhume and relocate the remains of her two deceased sons to a different graveyard. The Petitioner argued that ongoing hostility with rivals in the area of the current burial site caused severe hardship in visiting the graves. The Lahore High Court examined statutory provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding disinterment, as well as extensive scholarly and religious opinions from Islamic jurisprudence (Hanafi and Shia schools) regarding the relocation of graves. The Court held that under Section 176(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, exhumation is legally permissible strictly for determining the cause of death in cases of suspected unnatural death, and not for alleviating personal or emotional hardship. Furthermore, the Court held that under Islamic law and Hanafi jurisprudence governing the deceased, relocation of a grave is impermissible except in clearly defined exceptional circumstances, and the inability to visit a grave due to personal enmity does not justify exhumation. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate has the jurisdiction under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to order the exhumation and relocation of a body for reasons other than determining the cause of death?
  • Does the inability of family members to visit a grave due to personal enmity or security concerns constitute a valid ground under Islamic law for relocating a deceased person's remains?
  • Does the refusal to permit the relocation of a grave infringe upon any fundamental rights under the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • What are the permissible exceptions under Islamic jurisprudence and Hanafi law for the exhumation and shifting of a buried body?
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• MUSHARRAF RASOOL CYAN Versus LAWRENCE COLLEGE'S PRESIDENT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS/GOVERNOR OF PUNJAB, LAHORE2026 PLD 413 · Lahore High Court · 2026-02-03
  writ petitionBoard of Governorsremoval of membersright of hearingdue processjudicial estoppeleducational institution governancetenure of members
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by petitioners challenging notifications issued by the Higher Education Department, Government of the Punjab, whereby they were removed as members of the Board of Governors of Lawrence College Murree without notice or due process. The core legal questions centered on whether members appointed under the Punjab Educational Institutions (Reconstitution) Act 2021 could be de-notified prior to their fixed three-year tenure under Section 4(2) without being afforded a prior opportunity of hearing as mandated by Section 7(3) of the Act and Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution, and whether government undertakings given during proceedings create a binding obligation. The Lahore High Court partly allowed the petitions, holding that the removal of board members without statutory hearing was unsustainable in law. Applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the Court held that the department could not resile from assurances given by its official head, and directed the respondents to complete formalities to reinstate the petitioners to the Board of Governors.

  Questions settled

  • Can a member of a Board of Governors under the Punjab Educational Institutions (Reconstitution) Act 2021 be removed before completing their three-year tenure without affording an opportunity of hearing?
  • Does the failure to provide a right of audience prior to de-notifying a statutory board member violate Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does an undertaking given before a court by a departmental Secretary bind the government under the doctrine of judicial estoppel?
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• Syed IMTIAZ HUSSAIN (Deceased) Versus MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN2026 PLD 404 · Lahore High Court · 2025-09-08
  civil revisionpartition suitmaintainability of appealdecree sheetlimitation periodact of courtco-owners
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil revision application arises from a suit for separate possession through partition, which was preliminarily decreed by consent and subsequently finalized by the trial court. The respondents appealed the final judgment, but the appeal faced objections regarding maintainability and limitation because the decree sheet had not been prepared at the time of filing, due to a delay in the supply of requisite stamp paper by the applicants. The core legal question was whether an appeal filed without an accompanying decree sheet is maintainable and time-barred when the absence of the decree is attributable to the court or the opposite party's omission, and whether the time for limitation begins before the decree sheet's preparation. The Lahore High Court held that an appeal lies against the decree and not merely the judgment, but when a decree sheet has not been prepared by the trial court, the time for filing an appeal does not begin to run, and a litigant cannot be penalized for the omission of the court or ministerial staff, invoking the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. The court dismissed the revision application, affirming the appellate court's approach.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal is maintainable without appending a copy of the decree sheet when the decree has not been prepared by the trial court?
  • Does the limitation period for filing an appeal against a final judgment begin to run before the formal preparation of the decree sheet?
  • Can a party be penalized or suffer prejudice due to an omission or delay by the court or its ministerial staff in preparing a decree?
  • Whether an appellate court is competent to mould the relief when a decree sheet is prepared during the pendency of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• VISHAL AHMAD SHAKIR Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN2026 PLD 395 · Lahore High Court · 2025-09-10
  media trialfundamental rightsright to fair trialhuman dignityself-incriminationconstitutional petitionpublic interest litigationcustodial rights
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition, filed as Public Interest Litigation, addressed the practice of media outlets conducting interviews and exposing individuals while in police custody. The core legal question concerned whether such 'media trials' infringe upon the fundamental rights of the accused and how to balance the freedom of speech with the right to a fair trial. The Court held that exposing under-custody accused persons to media, including broadcasting confessional statements, violates their fundamental rights, specifically the right to dignity, privacy, a fair trial, and protection against self-incrimination. The Court ruled that such practices are impermissible and constitute misconduct by law enforcement personnel. The key principle laid down is that the right to freedom of speech under Article 19 of the Constitution is not absolute; it must yield to higher constitutional imperatives, including the right to a fair trial and human dignity, when these rights are in direct conflict. Consequently, the Court issued mandatory directions prohibiting law enforcement agencies from facilitating such media access and mandated regulatory oversight to prevent future violations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the media exposure of an under-custody accused violate their fundamental rights?
  • Is the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 absolute when it conflicts with the right to a fair trial?
  • What are the legal consequences for law enforcement officials who facilitate media interviews of individuals in custody?
  • Does the constitutional protection of dignity and privacy extend to individuals who are temporarily detained or stopped by law enforcement at checkpoints?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL REHMAN Versus State2026 PLD 388 · Lahore High Court · 2025-05-30
  criminal revisionblocking CNICpassport confiscationwitness attendancejurisdictionNADRA
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal revision petition under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 assailed an order of the trial court directing the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) to block the Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), passport, and bank accounts of the petitioner (the complainant) due to his repeated non-appearance as a witness. The High Court examined whether a trial court possesses the jurisdiction to order the blocking or cancellation of a citizen's CNIC, passport, or bank accounts to compel attendance. The Court held that the term 'blocking' is absent from the relevant statutes. Under Section 18 of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance 2000 and Section 8 of the Passports Act 1974, the authority to cancel, impound, or confiscate cards and passports is strictly vested in the Federal Government or its authorized officers under specific statutory conditions, which do not extend to a trial court compelling witness attendance. Consequently, the trial court's order was set aside as being without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal trial court have the jurisdiction to order the blocking, cancellation, or confiscation of a witness's Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC)?
  • Can a trial court direct the blocking or impounding of a citizen's passport under the Passports Act 1974 to compel their appearance as a witness?
  • Does the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) possess the legal authority to direct banking institutions to block the accounts of their customers?
  Read full judgment →
• NASEEB MASIH Versus PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN2026 PLD 386 · Lahore High Court · 2025-10-21
  minority quotajudicial appointmentsHigh Court judgesJudicial Commission of Pakistanconstitutional petitionmerit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition seeking directions to fix a 5 percent quota for minority communities in the appointment of judges to the superior judiciary, relying on a Supreme Court precedent and Rule 6 of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether a 5 percent employment quota applies to the judicial service and whether such a quota can be mandated for the appointment of High Court judges. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the judicial service cannot be equated with traditional government employment or the general establishment, and that fixing a specific quota would compromise the constitutional mechanism and merit-based procedure for judicial appointments. The court laid down the principle that the appointment of High Court judges is strictly governed by the constitutional procedure under Article 175-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, wherein merit applies equally to all candidates while diversity in terms of gender, region, and religion is duly considered under the applicable rules without imposing a rigid numerical quota.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a 5 percent employment quota for minorities can be fixed for the appointment of judges to the superior judiciary?
  • Does the judicial service fall under the purview of traditional government establishment services to warrant a fixed quota?
  • How does the Judicial Commission of Pakistan ensure diversity in terms of gender, region, and religion during the nomination of High Court judges?
  Read full judgment →
• MOMAN KHAN Versus The PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Senior Member Board of Revenue Punjab, Lahore2026 PLD 382 · Lahore High Court · 2025-09-10
  graveyardwaqf propertyfundamental rightsdignified burialadministrative orderencroachmentdiscriminatory restriction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged an administrative order issued by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (General), Dera Ghazi Khan, which restricted burial rights in a local graveyard to residents of Taunsa Sharif, mandating that non-residents purchase land for burial. The core legal question was whether the administration could impose such discriminatory restrictions on the burial of deceased persons based on residency status. The Lahore High Court held that the impugned order was arbitrary, inequitable, and infringed upon the fundamental right to a dignified burial. The Court emphasized that Islamic principles do not differentiate between individuals based on residency or status regarding religious rites. Furthermore, the Court determined that the graveyard, being waqf property, is dedicated for public use and cannot be subjected to sale or exclusive, discriminatory access restrictions. The Court set aside the administrative order and directed the District Administration to retrieve encroached graveyard land from illegal occupants rather than obstructing the burial of the deceased. This judgment reinforces the principle that burial grounds are sacred, public trusts, and administrative authorities must facilitate, not hinder, the performance of religious burial rites.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative authority restrict burial rights in a public graveyard based on the residency status of the deceased?
  • Does a graveyard used for burial from time immemorial constitute waqf property?
  • Is it lawful for the administration to permit the sale or purchase of land within a designated public graveyard?
  • Does the state have a duty to retrieve encroached land from a public graveyard?
  Read full judgment →
• OIL MARKETING ASSOCIATION OF PAKISTAN Versus OIL COMPANIES ADVISORY COUNCIL2026 PLD 374 · Lahore High Court · 2026-01-29
  territorial jurisdictiontrade organizationmaintainabilitystatutory appealdominant object testIslamabad High CourtFederal Cabinet order
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This First Appeal from Order challenged an order-in-appeal passed by the Committee of the Federal Cabinet setting aside the Regulator's decision to reject an application for registration as a trade organization. The primary question addressed by the court was whether the Lahore High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction to entertain an appeal under Section 21(4) of the Trade Organizations Act, 2013 against an order passed by a federal authority at Islamabad. The court held that the appeal was not maintainable before the Lahore High Court for want of territorial jurisdiction, ruling that the dominant object test and the situs of the proceedings dictate that challenges to acts and orders of federal authorities emanating from Islamabad must be brought before the Islamabad High Court. The court established the principle that where a federal statute provides an appeal to 'the High Court' without specifying the particular High Court, territorial jurisdiction is determined by the place where the impugned order was passed and where the dominant and integral cause of action arose, thereby precluding forum shopping and the splitting of jurisdictional nexus.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Lahore High Court have territorial jurisdiction to hear an appeal under Section 21(4) of the Trade Organizations Act, 2013 against an order passed by the Federal Cabinet at Islamabad?
  • How is the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court determined when a federal statute provides a right of appeal to 'the High Court' without specifying a particular forum?
  • Can a High Court assume territorial jurisdiction over an order of a federal authority merely because one of the parties or its members carry on business within its provincial boundaries?
  • What is the effect of a judgment of the Supreme Court setting aside a precedent upon which a party relies for establishing territorial jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL SALAM Versus H.B.F.C. LIMITED Mirza Muhammad Nadeem Asif , Rai Mazhar Hussain Kharal and Jamshed Iqbal Khakwani2026 PLD 367 · Lahore High Court · 2025-06-05
  certified copyconditional interim ordersuspension of decreeBanking Courtadministrative actionWednesbury unreasonablenessexecution proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns an application seeking a direction to the office of the court to issue a certified copy of an interim injunctive order suspending the operation of a judgment and decree of a Banking Court, which the office had refused because a conditional requirement of depositing a portion of the decretal amount and surety within sixty days had not yet been complied with. The core legal question was whether the office of the court can withhold the issuance of a certified copy of a conditional interim order on the ground that the condition precedent has not yet been fulfilled, despite the order being operative with immediate effect for the stipulated grace period. The court held that the order became operative immediately from the date of its passing, and the office was not justified in refusing the certified copy during the valid operative window. The key principle laid down is that the office of the court cannot withhold certified copies of an operative conditional interim order on the presumption of non-compliance, though it may append an appropriate endorsement noting the current status of compliance if deemed necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Can the office of the court refuse to issue a certified copy of a conditional interim order on the ground that the condition has not yet been complied with?
  • Whether an interim order suspending a decree subject to a condition becomes operative immediately upon its issuance or only after the fulfillment of the condition?
  • What is the remedy when the office of the court unjustifiably withholds the issuance of a certified copy of a judicial order in a pending appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• FOUNDATION UNIVERSITY Versus MINISTRY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS2026 PLD 355 · Lahore High Court · 2026-02-20
  zakat deductioncharitable institutionbody corporatesahib-e-nisabstatutory exemptionconstitutional petitionnational saving certificates
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by Foundation University challenging an impugned letter issued by the Ministry of Religious Affairs holding the university liable to pay zakat on investments made in National Saving Certificates. The core legal question was whether the petitioner university, a chartered university recognized by the Higher Education Commission and sponsored by Fauji Foundation, qualifies as a charitable institution or body exempt from the deduction and payment of zakat under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the university is an autonomous body corporate established under its parent statute rather than wholly owned by the Federal Government, and does not fall within any express statutory exemption from zakat liability under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980. The key legal principles laid down are that tax and zakat exemptions must be construed strictly, that registration or charitable sponsorship alone does not confer blanket statutory exemption without an express provision, and that an institution operating on a revenue-generating model remains subject to compulsory zakat deduction on its qualifying assets unless explicitly excluded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a chartered university established under a specific statutory ordinance qualifies as a charitable institution exempt from the payment of zakat under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980?
  • Does the sponsorship of a statutory university by a trust established under the Charitable Endowment Act, 1890 automatically confer immunity from zakat liability on its investments?
  • What is the legal effect of a corporate charter and independent juristic personality on the tax and zakat obligations of an educational institution in Pakistan?
  • Does a body corporate operating on a revenue-generating fee structure fall within the definition of sahib-e-nisab under the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980?
  Read full judgment →
• JAMEEL AHMAD Versus State2026 PLD 343 · Lahore High Court · 2025-11-14
  quashing of FIReffectiveness of Talaqrevocation of divorcesection 7 MFLOmarital subsistencerape allegationsection 376 PPC90 days period
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by the petitioner seeking the quashing of an FIR registered against him under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant alleged that the petitioner divorced her on 14.10.2024 and subsequently raped her at gunpoint three days later on 17.10.2024. The petitioner argued that although he issued a written divorce deed and gave notice to the Chairman of the Union Council under Section 7(1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, he revoked the Talaq within the statutory 90-day window under Section 7(3). The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR. It held that under Section 7(3) of the MFLO 1961, a Talaq does not take legal effect until ninety days elapse after notice to the Chairman. During this period, the husband retains the right to revoke the divorce, and the marital bond subsists. Consequently, the essential ingredients of rape under Section 376 PPC were not made out.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pronouncement of Talaq immediately sever the marital bond prior to the expiration of 90 days under Section 7(3) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • Can a husband validly revoke a Talaq within ninety days of sending notice to the Union Council Chairman without a formal intimation requirement?
  • Can a husband be prosecuted for rape under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 where the marital bond legally subsisted at the time of the occurrence?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ Versus MAQBOOL AHMAD2026 PLD 338 · Lahore High Court · 2025-12-05
  civil revisionre-hearingmaintainabilitysuccessive applicationssufficient causedismissal on meritsinherent powers
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The applicant filed an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking the re-hearing of a previously dismissed Civil Revision. The applicant contended that the court had dismissed the revision without providing a full opportunity for arguments. The core legal question was whether a court can entertain an application for re-hearing of a case already decided on its merits, particularly when the applicant is merely dissatisfied with the outcome, and whether successive applications on the same subject matter are maintainable. The Court held that the application was not maintainable. It observed that the record demonstrated the Civil Revision had been decided on its merits in the presence of counsel, and the applicant failed to prove they were prevented by sufficient cause from being heard. The Court established the principle that re-hearing cannot be ordered merely due to a litigant's dissatisfaction with a judgment, and that successive applications on the same subject matter are barred, as a party must raise all available grounds in the first instance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court order the re-hearing of a case merely because a litigant is dissatisfied with the outcome?
  • Is a successive application for re-hearing maintainable after an earlier application on the same subject matter has been dismissed?
  • Does the inherent power of the court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow for the re-opening of a case decided on its merits without proof of sufficient cause for non-hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Sayed ARSHAD SHAH Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE2026 PLD 332 · Lahore High Court · 2025-11-28
  custody of minorwelfare of minorguardianshipintelligent preferencefoster parentsvoice of the childHizanat
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition challenges the orders of the lower courts granting custody of a 13-year-old minor to his biological parents, who had voluntarily handed him over to the petitioners (foster parents) at infancy. The core legal question concerns the determination of the minor's welfare under Section 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, specifically regarding the weight to be accorded to the minor's intelligent preference and the stability of his long-term living environment versus the biological parents' natural rights. The Court held that while biological parents generally hold a preferential right to custody, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the minor. Given the minor's age, his clear and unequivocal desire to remain with the foster parents, the lack of evidence suggesting the minor was not being raised in a congenial environment, and the potential emotional distress of uprooting him from his established family, the Court set aside the lower courts' orders. The key principle laid down is that the 'voice of the child' must be seriously considered and understood to act in their best interest, and courts must not ignore such preferences without compelling reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Does the biological parent's right to custody supersede the welfare of the minor when the minor has been raised by foster parents for a significant period?
  • To what extent must a court consider the 'intelligent preference' of a minor in custody disputes under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
  • Can a court set aside a custody order if the lower court failed to provide reasons for disregarding the minor's expressed preference?
  Read full judgment →
• MUBASHAR ALI Versus TAHIR ISLAM2026 PLD 328 · Lahore High Court · 2025-11-11
  specific performancecomputation of timefunctus officioGeneral Clauses Actlimitation periodclosed holidays
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil revision arises from a dispute over the timely deposit of consideration money in a suit for specific performance. The trial court had decreed the suit subject to the deposit of a specified sum within two months. The core legal question was whether the deposit made by the respondent was within the prescribed time, considering the exclusion of the date of the order and intervening holidays. The revision-petitioner argued the time had lapsed, rendering the court functus officio. The Court held that the deposit was timely, affirming the appellate court's decision. Relying on Section 9 of the General Clauses Act 1897, the Court established that the day on which an order is passed must be excluded when computing a period of time fixed in a decree. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that if the last day of a prescribed period falls on a closed holiday, the act may be performed on the next opening day, applying principles analogous to Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908 and Section 10 of the General Clauses Act 1897.

  Questions settled

  • Does the computation of a time period fixed in a decree for the deposit of money exclude the date on which the order was passed?
  • Can an act required to be performed by a court order be validly performed on the next working day if the last day of the prescribed period falls on a closed holiday?
  • Does Section 9 of the General Clauses Act 1897 apply to the computation of time fixed in a court decree?
  Read full judgment →
• SAIMA BATOOL Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE2026 PLD 320 · Lahore High Court · 2024-04-30
  specific performancerefund of depositact of the court harms no oneunjust enrichmentrestitutionconstitutional petitionrejection of plaint
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a widow, filed a suit for specific performance of a contract regarding a commercial property against the respondent. During the proceedings, the Trial Court directed her to deposit the balance sale consideration. She deposited an amount of Rs.22,910,000/- through a challan. Subsequently, her plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 due to non-payment of court fee and the remaining consideration. Her subsequent applications for the refund of the deposited amount were dismissed by the lower courts on technical grounds that the deposit was not reflected in the order sheets. The petitioner approached the Lahore High Court through a constitutional petition. The High Court held that a litigant cannot suffer for the mistake, omission, or inaction of the court, invoking the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'. Furthermore, the Court applied the doctrine of unjust enrichment and the principle of restitution, noting neither the state nor the respondent had any claim to the funds. The constitutional petition was allowed, setting aside the impugned orders and directing the Trial Court to facilitate the refund.

  Questions settled

  • Can a litigant be made to suffer for the mistake or omission of the court?
  • Whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment and restitution applies when a court retains funds deposited by a party whose suit has been dismissed?
  • Is a party entitled to the refund of a deposit made pursuant to court direction when neither the opposing party nor the State has any lawful claim over the amount?
  Read full judgment →
• UMER SHEHZAD Versus OMBUDSPERSON (MOHTASIB) PUNJAB2026 PLD 303 · Lahore High Court · 2025-10-15
  workplace harassmentombudsperson jurisdictionadministrative inquirydisciplinary proceedingsabuse of authoritypreponderance of probabilitiesparallel proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged the order of the Governor of the Punjab affirming the Ombudsperson’s decision, which found the petitioner guilty of workplace harassment and imposed the penalty of removal from service. The core legal questions concerned the jurisdictional scope of the "workplace" under the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, the permissibility of parallel disciplinary and criminal proceedings, and the applicability of strict procedural and evidentiary rules to the Ombudsperson’s inquiries. The Court held that the petition was meritless, affirming the Ombudsperson's findings. It ruled that the definition of "workplace" is expansive, encompassing situations linked to official authority even outside physical office premises. The Court further established that disciplinary proceedings under the Act are distinct from criminal trials, allowing for concurrent operation. Additionally, it held that the Ombudsperson is not bound by the technical rules of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, but must adhere to natural justice, with the standard of proof being the preponderance of probabilities. Finally, procedural requirements like complaint verification were deemed directory rather than mandatory.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'workplace' under the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010 extend to incidents occurring outside physical office premises?
  • Can disciplinary proceedings under the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010 proceed concurrently with a pending criminal trial on the same facts?
  • Is the Ombudsperson bound by the strict rules of evidence and procedure applicable to civil or criminal courts?
  • Does the failure to verify a complaint in accordance with Rule 5 of the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Rules 2013 render the complaint a nullity?
  Read full judgment →
• NC ENTERTAINMENT (PVT.) LTD. Versus CENTRAL BOARD OF FILM CENSORS (CBFC)2026 PLD 28 · Lahore High Court · 2025-09-25Read full judgment →
• FAHAD AKRAM BHATTI Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN2026 PLD 262 · Lahore High Court · 2025-10-02Read full judgment →
• Mian WAQAR UD DIN Versus UNITED INDUSTRIES LIMITED2026 PLD 226 · Lahore High Court · 2025-12-24
  minority shareholder oppressionextraordinary general meetingannual general meetingaudit of financial statementsduties of directorsspecial resolutionCompanies Act 2017
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition under the Companies Act, 2017 raised various grievances by a minority shareholder of United Industries Limited concerning alleged mismanagement, oppressive conduct, and failure to hold annual general meetings or conduct timely audits. The core legal questions involved whether financial statements for past periods could be approved and auditors appointed through an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) rather than an annual general meeting (AGM), and whether past defaults by directors in holding AGMs required ratification via a special resolution under Section 204(8) of the Act. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that an EGM is legally competent to transact business normally reserved for an AGM when AGMs have not been timely held, and that Section 204(8) applies to individual director culpability and breach of duty rather than collective board defaults or company-level omissions. The court laid down that companies are not barred from using EGMs to approve past financial statements and appoint auditors under exceptional circumstances of deadlock, and that alternate statutory remedies under Section 136 must be pursued within prescribed limitation periods.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an extraordinary general meeting can validly consider and approve financial statements and appoint auditors when annual general meetings have not been held on time?
  • Does a failure by the board of directors to hold an annual general meeting constitute a breach of duty by an individual director requiring ratification through a special resolution under Section 204(8) of the Companies Act, 2017?
  • Can a minority shareholder challenge the proceedings of a general meeting under the Companies Act, 2017 without availing the specific remedy and adhering to the limitation period provided under Section 136?
  • Whether collective board omissions and company-level defaults can be equated with personal defaults of individual directors under Section 204 of the Companies Act, 2017?
  Read full judgment →
• SHAHROZ Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE2026 PLD 206 · Lahore High Court · 2026-02-23
  Christian divorcejudicial separationdissolution of marriagecrueltydesertionconstitutional petitionfundamental rightsfreedom of religion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenged concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing a Christian husband's petition for judicial separation and dissolution of marriage under the Christian Divorce Act, 1869. The core legal questions involved whether the lower courts properly evaluated the evidence regarding cruelty and adultery in compliance with the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and whether the admitted state of separation amounted to desertion under the Act. The Lahore High Court held that the lower courts decided the matter on technicalities and failed to properly examine alternative statutory grounds such as cruelty and desertion or adhere to evidentiary discipline. The Court set aside the impugned judgments, ruled that matrimonial causes concerning minority communities must be adjudicated with procedural rigor and respect for constitutional protections under Articles 4, 10-A, and 20 of the Constitution, and remanded the matter to the trial court for fresh adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for dissolution of marriage under the Christian Divorce Act, 1869 can be dismissed solely for failing to implead an adulterer when alternative grounds such as cruelty and desertion are pleaded?
  • Do lower courts fail to exercise lawful jurisdiction when they omit to frame issues and record findings on alternative statutory grounds like desertion in Christian matrimonial causes?
  • Whether the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom under Article 20 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 extends to protecting faith-based personal law matters such as Christian matrimonial separation?
  • Does the casual dismissal of minority matrimonial disputes on technical grounds violate the right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• RIASAT ALI Versus MUHAMMAD SHARIF2026 PLD 200 · Lahore High Court · 2025-11-12
  defamation suitjurisdiction of additional district judgedistrict courtmalicious prosecutionplace of suingconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the Additional District Judge, Lahore, which dismissed preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of a defamation suit filed under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002. The petitioners argued that only a District Judge possesses the jurisdiction to hear such a suit, that the plaint should have been returned for filing in Sahiwal where the parties reside and the cause of action arose, and that the Additional District Judge lacked competence. The core legal questions involved the interpretation of 'District Court' versus 'District Judge' under Section 13 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, read with Section 6(2) of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, and the application of forum selection principles under Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court held that an Additional District Judge, when assigned functions by the District Judge, exercises the same powers as a District Judge, and that the plaintiff has the option under Section 19 CPC to institute a suit where the wrong occurred or where the defendant resides. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Additional District Judge is competent to try cases under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002?
  • Does the term 'District Court' under Section 13 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 exclude an Additional District Judge from hearing defamation suits?
  • Can a defamation suit for compensation be instituted at the option of the plaintiff where the wrong was done or where the defendant resides under Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• SHAHID JAVED Versus GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad2026 PLD 195 · Lahore High Court · 2025-06-04
  Passport Control Listfreedom of movementright to travel abroadbailfundamental rightsexecutive discretioncriminal case
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner challenged an order maintaining the retention of his name on the Passport Control List (PCL) and dismissing his review application. The core legal question was whether the mere registration of a criminal case or unverified apprehensions of flight risk empower authorities to place or retain a citizen's name on the PCL, particularly when the citizen has been admitted to bail by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Lahore High Court held that mere involvement in a criminal case, or unsubstantiated fears that an accused may evade trial, do not justify restricting international travel when the accused is on bail, as such executive action without objective criteria and procedural fairness violates fundamental rights. The court ruled that the right to freedom of movement and liberty to travel abroad, guaranteed under the Constitution, cannot be curtailed through unstructured executive discretion and misrepresentation of facts, and that the mechanisms available under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 are sufficient to secure the presence of an under-trial accused on bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere registration of a criminal case empower authorities to place a citizen's name on the Passport Control List?
  • Can a citizen's name be retained on the Passport Control List when the citizen has been admitted to bail by a competent court?
  • Does the inclusion of a citizen's name on the Passport Control List without notice and objective criteria violate fundamental constitutional rights?
  • Are unsubstantiated fears of flight risk a valid ground for restricting international travel during an ongoing trial?
  Read full judgment →
• QASIM ALI Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN Muqtadar Akhtar Shabbir and Subhan Ali , Tahir Mahmood Ahmad Khokhar2026 PLD 190 · Lahore High Court · 2025-10-01
  prize bondsultra viressubordinate legislationlimitation periodpublic debtintra court appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges an order passed by the learned Judge-in-Chambers which dismissed a constitution petition seeking to declare Rule 15 of the Prize Bond Rules 1999 as ultra vires sections 23 and 24 of the Public Debt Act 1944. The core legal question revolved around whether prescribing a six-year limitation period for claiming prize money under the subordinate rules is inconsistent with or violative of the parent statute. The court held that Rule 15 of the Prize Bond Rules 1999 is intra vires, finding no inconsistency between the parent Act and the rules, and noting that the statute itself empowers the government to prescribe rules and forms for government securities. The key principles laid down are that subordinate legislation must be consistent with the parent statute, meaning the provisions of both must be able to stand together, and that a cut-off period for claiming prize money prevents indefinite state liability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Rule 15 of the Prize Bond Rules 1999 is ultra vires the Public Debt Act 1944?
  • What is the test of consistency between a parent statute and subordinate legislation?
  • Can the federal government prescribe a limitation period for claiming prize money under the Public Debt Act 1944?
  Read full judgment →
• AZHAR IJAZ KHAWAJA Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE2026 PLD 181 · Lahore High Court · 2025-10-27
  Family Court jurisdictionparental maintenanceinterim maintenancestriking off defencestatutory interpretationwrit jurisdictionIslamic law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged the dismissal of an appeal by the Additional District Judge, which affirmed a Family Court's decree for interim maintenance filed by a mother against her sons. The core legal questions were whether a parent can institute a maintenance suit before a Family Court and whether the penal consequences of Section 17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964, apply to such proceedings. The Court held that Family Courts possess jurisdiction to entertain maintenance claims by parents against children, as the term "Maintenance" in the Schedule to the Act is not restricted to wives or children. However, the Court ruled that the summary penal mechanism of Section 17-A, which allows for the striking off of a defense for non-payment of interim maintenance, is explicitly limited to wives and children and cannot be extended to parental maintenance suits. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication, establishing that while parental maintenance is justiciable before Family Courts, the stringent penal provisions of Section 17-A are inapplicable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Family Court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for maintenance filed by a parent against their children?
  • Are the penal consequences under Section 17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964, applicable to maintenance suits filed by parents?
  • Can a Family Court grant interim maintenance to a parent during the pendency of a maintenance suit?
  Read full judgment →
• PHIPSONS COMPANY (PVT.) LIMITED Versus ZAHID MOYEEN2026 PLD 172 · Lahore High Court · 2024-07-11
  leave to contestcomputation of limitation periodmutwalli as landlordunregistered lease agreementmonthly tenancyejectment petitionperpetual lease
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged the orders of the rent forums allowing an ejectment petition against the petitioner tenant. The core legal questions involved the computation of the ten-day limitation period for filing a leave to contest application under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, the competency of a Mutwalli of a trust to file an ejectment petition as a landlord, and the legal effect of an unregistered lease agreement purportedly creating a perpetual or 99-year lease. The Lahore High Court held that under section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, the first day of appearance must be excluded when calculating the ten-day period, rendering the leave to contest application timely. However, on merits, the Court ruled that the Mutwalli fell within the definition of a landlord under section 2(d) of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, and that an unregistered lease agreement exceeding one year operates only as a month-to-month lease under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and sections 17(d) and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. Consequently, no triable issue was made out on merits, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the first day of appearance is to be excluded when computing the ten-day period of limitation for filing an application for leave to contest under section 22(2) of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009?
  • Whether a Mutwalli of a trust is competent to file an ejectment petition as a landlord under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009?
  • What is the legal status and effect of an unregistered lease agreement purportedly creating a lease for a term exceeding one year?
  • Does an unregistered lease agreement require compulsory registration under the Registration Act, 1908, despite the provisions of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009?
  Read full judgment →
• AYESHA IFTIKHAR Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad2026 PLD 17 · Lahore High Court · 2025-05-22
  Controller General of Accountsseparation of powersbinding precedentjudicial reviewexecution of judgmentscivil servantsconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition, along with connected matters, centers on the interpretation and enforcement of Section 6 of the Controller General of Accounts (Appointment, Functions and Powers) Ordinance, 2001, concerning the administrative control and terms and conditions of service of employees in departmentalized accounting organizations, specifically the Pakistan Post Office Department. The core legal question is whether the executive branch can circumvent or reinterpret a final, binding judicial pronouncement of the High Court through administrative minutes and cabinet recommendations under the Rules of Business, 1973. The Lahore High Court held that the interpretation rendered in the earlier binding precedent of Fazal-e-Haq holds the field, and the executive branch possesses no authority to sit in judgment over, ignore, or reinterpret a final judgment of a constitutional court. The court reiterated the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers, asserting that the judiciary holds the exclusive domain to interpret laws and that final judgments must be implemented in letter and spirit. Consequently, the impugned minutes and notification were set aside and the petition was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the executive branch can reinterpret or ignore a final judgment of a High Court through administrative minutes or cabinet decisions?
  • Does the Controller General of Accounts hold exclusive administrative control and authority over all departmentalized accounting organizations under Section 6 of the Controller General of Accounts (Appointment, Functions and Powers) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is a prior judgment of equal numeric strength of the High Court on a question of law binding on subsequent Benches?
  • What are the constitutional limits on executive interference with final judicial pronouncements under the principle of separation of powers?
  Read full judgment →
• JAMSHED KHAN Versus AKBAR KHAN2026 PLD 146 · Lahore High Court · 2025-06-18
  Regular Second Appealinheritance mutationbar of jurisdictionlimitationacquiescencesettlement lawscustomary law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, arose from a suit for declaration and cancellation of an inheritance mutation sanctioned in 1952 under the settlement laws. The plaintiffs, claiming as legal heirs of a female relative (Mst. Ghafooran Bibi) who was excluded from the mutation, filed the suit in 2009, approximately 57 years after the mutation and 21 years after her death. The core legal questions were whether the inheritance was governed by Customary Law or the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948; whether the Civil Court's jurisdiction was barred under Section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958; and whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Lahore High Court held that although the inheritance was governed by Shariat, the Civil Court's jurisdiction was barred as the mutation was sanctioned by Settlement Authorities under special laws. Furthermore, the Court held that the suit was barred by limitation, waiver, and acquiescence, as the predecessor had knowledge of the mutation but did not challenge it during her lifetime, and her heirs delayed filing for 21 years after her death.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repeal of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957 remove the bar on the jurisdiction of Civil Courts regarding orders passed during its operation?
  • Can a claim of inheritance be barred by limitation, waiver, and acquiescence if the predecessor-in-interest failed to challenge the mutation during her lifetime?
  • Is the jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred under Section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 in matters of inheritance mutations sanctioned by Settlement Authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• SHAUKAT KHANUM MEMORIAL TRUST Versus The PROVINCE OF PUNJAB2026 PLD 122 · Lahore High Court · 2025-10-29
  price regulationhealthcare servicesdiagnostic laboratoriessubordinate legislationstatutory interpretationtrans-provincial entitiesprofit margin capconstitutional obligation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This consolidated writ petition challenges the Punjab Healthcare Commission (Pricing of Healthcare Services) Regulations, 2023, along with related notifications and frameworks, primarily on the grounds of being ultra vires the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010. The core legal questions involve whether the Punjab Healthcare Commission possesses the statutory authority under the Act of 2010 to regulate and fix prices of healthcare services—specifically for diagnostic laboratories—whether the regulations violate statutory consultation requirements with the Technical Advisory Committee, and whether the province has jurisdiction over trans-provincial entities. The Lahore High Court held that the Punjab Healthcare Commission is duly empowered under Section 40(2)(m) of the Act of 2010 to regulate and control prices of healthcare services, including diagnostic centers, and that healthcare services constitute an integral facet of the right to life. The Court established that price regulation is a valid exercise of subordinate legislation to ensure quality and prevent exploitation, dismissing all connected petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Punjab Healthcare Commission has the lawful authority under the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 to regulate and fix prices of healthcare services provided by diagnostic centers and laboratories?
  • Does the preamble of the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 restrict the substantive power of the Commission to formulate price control regulations under Section 40(2)(m)?
  • Is prior consultation with the Technical Advisory Committee a mandatory prerequisite for the promulgation of regulations by the Punjab Healthcare Commission under the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010?
  • Does a provincial government have the jurisdiction to regulate the pricing of healthcare services provided by a trans-provincial entity operating within its territorial boundaries?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULAIMAN KHAN Versus GUARDIAN JUDGE-II, LAHORE2026 PLD 107 · Lahore High Court · 2025-07-18
  child custodyhabitual residenceHague Conventionterritorial jurisdictionbest interest of the childforeign nationalsFamily Courts Act
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition concerns a custody dispute between parents of German nationality regarding their two minor children currently residing in Pakistan. The core legal question was whether Pakistani Guardian Courts possess jurisdiction to entertain a custody petition under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, when the minors and parents are foreign nationals and the children's habitual residence is contested. The High Court set aside the lower courts' dismissal of the petition, holding that nationality is irrelevant to the court's jurisdiction in custody matters. The court ruled that jurisdiction is determined by the presence of the parties or the cause of action within the court's territorial limits, not by citizenship. Furthermore, the court clarified that the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, provides the procedural framework for custody matters, overriding the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, regarding forum. The judgment establishes that courts must prioritize the welfare and best interest of the child, guided by international obligations like the UNCRC, rather than focusing on the parents' nationality.

  Questions settled

  • Does the nationality or citizenship of parents and minors affect the jurisdiction of a Pakistani Family Court to adjudicate a custody dispute?
  • Does the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, have an overriding effect over the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, regarding the forum for custody matters?
  • Can a foreign national invoke the jurisdiction of Pakistani courts to resolve a custody dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AHMAD Versus DISTRICT JUDGE, PAKPATTAN2026 PLD 101 · Lahore High Court · 2025-05-09
  quackeryPunjab Healthcare Commissionunauthorized allopathic practicestrict liabilitydelegation of powersconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged a judgment upholding the imposition of a fine on the petitioner by the Punjab Healthcare Commission for practicing quackery by performing unauthorized allopathic practice at a medical store. The core legal questions involved whether the inspection mechanisms under the Punjab Healthcare Commission Regulations, 2016 conflict with Section 22 of the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010, and whether committees constituted under the regulations are competent to impose fines. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the inspection procedures under the regulations and the parent statute are mutually exclusive and consistent, and that the Commission can validly delegate its functions, including the imposition of fines, to hearing committees as its alter-ego. The key principles laid down are that regulatory wrongdoings of quackery constitute strict liability offenses, that enforcement regulations effectively supplement the parent statute without contradiction, and that the Commission may lawfully exercise its powers through authorized committees.

  Questions settled

  • Are the inspection mechanisms provided under the Punjab Healthcare Commission Regulations, 2016 inconsistent with Section 22 of the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010?
  • Does the Punjab Healthcare Commission have the authority to delegate the power of imposing fines to committees formed under its regulations?
  • Is practicing quackery without a license considered a strict liability offense under the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. TALAL KHURSHID BHATTI Versus The PUNJAB HEALTHCARE COMMISSION2026 PLD 1 · Lahore High Court · 2025-09-24
  constitutional petitionmedical negligencelimitation periodtime-barred complaintcondonation of delayPunjab Healthcare Commission
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenged an order passed by the Punjab Healthcare Commission which dismissed the petitioner's medical negligence complaint against a doctor as being barred by time. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's complaint filed before the Punjab Healthcare Commission was within the statutory limitation period of sixty days from the date of knowledge of the cause of action under Section 23(2) of the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010. The Lahore High Court held that the complaint was hopelessly time-barred, as the cause of action accrued on the dates of the surgeries or, at latest, upon receipt of subsequent medical opinions, and the petitioner failed to establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The court laid down that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and a complainant must demonstrate sufficient reasons preventing timely filing within the stipulated limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a complaint filed before the Punjab Healthcare Commission beyond the statutory period of sixty days from the date of knowledge of the cause of action is barred by limitation?
  • Can subsequent medical opinions obtained by a complainant serve as a valid basis to extend or recompute the limitation period under the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010?
  • Is condonation of delay in filing a complaint before the Punjab Healthcare Commission a matter of right for an aggrieved person?
  Read full judgment →
• CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (CDA) Versus HABIB RAFIQUE (PRIVATE) LIMITED2026 PLD 85 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-06-23
  Arbitration Act 1940Arbitral awardRule of courtJudicial scrutinyLimitation periodPatent illegalityJurisdictional error
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges an order of the Trial Court which made an arbitration award a rule of court, dismissing the appellant's objections solely on the ground of limitation. The core legal question is whether a court is relieved of its duty to scrutinize an arbitral award when objections are time-barred. The Court held that the Trial Court’s approach was legally erroneous. Under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, a court performs a judicial, not ministerial, function when making an award a rule of court. The court is mandatorily required to examine the award to ensure it is not a nullity, prima facie illegal, or suffering from patent defects, regardless of whether objections were filed or are time-barred. The court cannot act as a mere post office or remain dormant. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter for a fresh decision, emphasizing that the trial court must conduct an independent judicial review of the award's validity, limited to patent illegality or jurisdictional error, without reappraising evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have a mandatory duty to examine an arbitration award for legality even when objections are time-barred?
  • Is the function of a court in making an arbitration award a rule of court ministerial or judicial?
  • Can a court set aside an arbitration award suo motu if it is found to be a nullity or prima facie illegal?
  • Does the failure to file timely objections under the Arbitration Act 1940 absolve the court from scrutinizing the award?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza SALMAN BABAR BEG Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Establishment Division2026 PLD 72 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-11-03
  double jeopardydisciplinary proceedingsworkplace harassmentservice mattersconstitutional jurisdictionmaintainabilitycivil servantArticle 212
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a civil servant, challenged a show-cause notice issued under the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020, following allegations of sexual harassment. The core legal questions were whether simultaneous proceedings under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 and the E&D Rules constitute double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution, and whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain such a challenge given Article 212. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that disciplinary proceedings and harassment complaints operate in distinct jurisdictions with different standards of proof and objectives. The Court affirmed that disciplinary proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, thus Article 13 is inapplicable. Furthermore, it held that even where fundamental rights are invoked, service matters involving terms and conditions of employment must be agitated before the Federal Service Tribunal, rendering the constitutional petition non-maintainable under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Does the initiation of simultaneous proceedings under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 and the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020 constitute double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a civil servant challenge a show-cause notice issued under the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020 before the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the acquittal of a civil servant in proceedings under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 bar the continuation of disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD UZAIR ANWAR Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad2026 PLD 63 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-10-28
  bank account freezingultra viressubordinate legislationNCCIAPrevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016Anti-Money Laundering Act 2010constitutional petitionintra court appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves Intra Court Appeals challenging a judgment that upheld the freezing of the appellants' bank accounts by the National Cyber Crime Investigating Agency (NCCIA). The core legal question is whether the NCCIA possesses the statutory authority to freeze bank accounts based solely on its own source reports without adhering to the procedural safeguards mandated by law. The Court held that the NCCIA lacks the power to freeze bank accounts under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016. It determined that Rule 5 of the National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (Function) Rules, 2025, which purported to grant such power, was ultra vires as it exceeded the rule-making authority delegated by the parent Act. The Court emphasized that subordinate legislation cannot conflict with or expand the scope of the parent statute. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment, declaring the freezing of accounts unlawful, and held that any such action must strictly follow the procedures prescribed under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, requiring judicial intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Cyber Crime Investigating Agency possess the statutory authority to freeze bank accounts under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016?
  • Can subordinate legislation, such as the National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (Function) Rules 2025, grant powers to an agency that are not delegated by the parent statute?
  • Is the freezing of bank accounts by the National Cyber Crime Investigating Agency based solely on a source report legally sustainable without judicial intervention?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. SAMINA NAZ Versus TARIQ USMAN2026 PLD 57 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-10-28
  specific performancegift deedlife interestIslamic lawadmissions in pleadingssecondary evidenceinheritance
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns consolidated appeals regarding the ownership of a residential property following the death of the original owner, Iftikhar, and his widow, Durr-e-Shahwaar. The core legal question was whether a gift of property made by Iftikhar to Durr-e-Shahwaar, which included a condition limiting the gift to her lifetime, constituted a valid absolute gift under Islamic law, and whether the appellant, an heir of the donor’s first marriage, had standing to challenge the subsequent sale of the property. The Court held that under Islamic law, a gift subject to a condition derogating from the completeness of the grant renders the condition void, while the gift itself takes effect as an absolute transfer. Consequently, the property became the exclusive estate of the widow, devolving upon her heirs rather than the appellant. The Court affirmed that admissions in pleadings are conclusive and that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the sale. The key principle laid down is that a life-interest condition attached to a gift is void, and the gift operates as an absolute transfer of the corpus in perpetuity.

  Questions settled

  • Does a condition limiting a gift to the lifetime of the donee render the entire gift void under Islamic law?
  • Are admissions made in pleadings conclusive against the party making them?
  • Can secondary evidence of a document be admitted when its existence is admitted in the pleadings of the opposing party?
  • Does a gift with a life-interest condition take effect as an absolute gift?
  Read full judgment →
• MASTAN WALI KHAN Versus PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN/CHAIRMAN, GILGIT-BALTISTAN COUNCIL2026 PLD 51 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-07-29
  territorial jurisdictionGilgit-Baltistanwrit of quo warrantoChief Election Commissionerconstitutional petitionlocalized jurisdictionHigh Court jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged the re-appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner of Gilgit-Baltistan, alleging procedural irregularities and a lack of meaningful consultation by the federal government. The petitioner sought writs of quo warranto and certiorari to declare the appointment void. The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court. The core legal question was whether the Islamabad High Court possesses the territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, to adjudicate matters concerning the appointment and functions of the Chief Election Commissioner of Gilgit-Baltistan. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction, determining that the cause of action, the office, and the functions of the appointee were exclusively rooted in the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan. Relying on the doctrine of localized jurisdiction, the Court ruled that it cannot exercise supervisory authority over legal frameworks established exclusively for Gilgit-Baltistan. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, with the petitioner granted liberty to approach the competent forum.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Islamabad High Court have territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner of Gilgit-Baltistan?
  • Does the doctrine of localized jurisdiction preclude a High Court from entertaining a petition where the cause of action arises entirely outside its territorial limits?
  • Can a High Court exercise supervisory authority over functionaries and legal frameworks established exclusively for the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQ Versus BASHIR AHMED2026 PLD 47 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-07-18
  civil revisionlimitation periodcomposite suitlibelmalicious prosecutiondamagesdefamationcause of action
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  Through this civil revision petition, the petitioner challenged an order passed by the Trial Court which held that the respondents' suit for damages for defamation was within time. The core legal question concerned the determination of limitation in a composite suit involving multiple causes of action, specifically claims relating to libel and malicious prosecution under the Limitation Act, 1908. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the civil revision, holding that in composite suits containing distinct and separable causes of action, the court must apply the relevant limitation period individually to each specific claim rather than mechanically applying a single period to the entire suit. The Court laid down the principle that where claims for compensation for malicious prosecution and libel are combined, the limitation for each claim is to be assessed separately from its respective starting point, ensuring that substantive rights are not denied through the misapplication of limitation rules.

  Questions settled

  • How is limitation computed in a composite suit involving multiple distinct causes of action subject to different limitation periods?
  • Does a claim for compensation for libel and a claim for malicious prosecution attract different starting points for limitation under the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Whether a court is required to assess limitation individually for each separable claim in a suit seeking multiple reliefs?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. AHSANUDDIN, ADVOCATE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN, RAWALPINDI Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad2026 PLD 39 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-02-10
  locus standiconstitutional petitionsecurity of retired judgesintra court appealcontempt of courtjustice of peacefundamental rights
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This consolidated judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses multiple Intra Court Appeals and writ petitions challenging orders concerning the provision of enhanced security and official vehicles to a former Chief Justice of Pakistan, as well as related matters involving the dismissal of a criminal petition under Section 22-A/B, Cr.P.C. and a contempt application. The core legal questions involved the locus standi of third parties to seek security and privileges on behalf of a retired constitutional judge, the extent of statutory entitlements under relevant service and pension laws, and the existence of any enforceable constitutional or statutory right. The Court held that petitioners lacked locus standi to agitate grievances on behalf of another individual who had not claimed any such protection himself, and that security entitlements are strictly governed by the applicable rules, notably the Supreme Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges) Order, 1997. The Court laid down the principle that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 requires an aggrieved person to establish a personal, existing, and justiciable statutory or constitutional right, and that official benefits and security beyond statutory provisions cannot be claimed without proof of specific and imminent threats.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a third party or member of the legal fraternity has the locus standi to file a constitutional petition seeking security and official privileges for a retired judge who has not himself claimed them?
  • What are the statutory entitlements regarding security for a retired judge of the Supreme Court under the Supreme Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges) Order, 1997?
  • Can a High Court issue a writ under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan in the absence of a violation of a personal and individual legal right?
  • Whether an Ex-officio Justice of Peace is bound to direct the registration of a criminal case under Section 22-A/B, Cr.P.C. when the application discloses no cognizable offence or personal grievance?
  Read full judgment →
• ARHAM ABBAS Versus State2026 PLD 35 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-07-30
  post-arrest bailaddition of offencesbail cancellationunlawful detentionjail authoritiesdue processjuvenile justicecyber crime
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed before the Islamabad High Court seeking post-arrest bail or release in relation to Section 21 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, which was subsequently incorporated into the FIR after the petitioner had already been granted post-arrest bail by the Court concerning other offences. The core legal question was whether jail authorities or the police can legally refuse to release an accused person who holds a valid bail order solely on the ground that a new offence has been added during investigation, without obtaining a judicial order for the cancellation of bail. The Court held that once bail is granted by a competent court, it cannot be rendered ineffective or overridden by administrative or police action, and an accused cannot be re-arrested or detained for newly added offences without the prosecution first seeking cancellation of bail through due judicial process. The Court laid down the principle that executive and jail authorities possess no independent power to disregard judicial orders, and any continued detention without formal judicial sanction or bail cancellation violates the constitutional right to liberty and due process.

  Questions settled

  • Can jail authorities refuse to release an accused who holds a valid post-arrest bail order solely because a new offence has been added to the case?
  • Is it permissible for police or jail authorities to re-arrest or detain an accused for a newly added offence without first obtaining an order for the cancellation of bail from a competent court?
  • What is the proper legal course for the prosecution when a new offence is incorporated into the case after bail has already been granted to the accused?
  • Does the subsequent addition of an offence during investigation automatically render an existing judicial bail order ineffective?
  Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN ELECTRONIC MEDIA REGULATORY AUTHORITY through Chairman PEMRA, Islamabad Versus SHOUKAT ALI2026 PLD 20 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-05-19
  PEMRAsecurity clearanceultra viresdelegated legislationlicensing regimenational securityelectronic mediastatutory interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This case concerns the validity of Rule 9(5) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009, which mandates that the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) obtain security clearance for license applicants. The Islamabad High Court previously declared this rule ultra vires, arguing it exceeded the scope of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002. In the instant Intra-Court Appeals, the Court examined whether this requirement conflicts with the Ordinance. The Court held that the rule is intra vires, reasoning that the Authority is empowered under Section 39 of the Ordinance to make rules to carry out the Ordinance's purposes. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that licensing is subject to terms and conditions, and security clearance is a vital, implicit component of the Authority's mandate to ensure national security and prevent foreign-funded entities from influencing public opinion, as prohibited by Section 25 of the Ordinance. The Court concluded that the rule-making power is broad enough to encompass security screening, and the impugned judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Is Rule 9(5) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009, ultra vires the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002, regarding the requirement for security clearance?
  • Does the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority have the power to impose security clearance as a condition for granting a broadcasting license?
  • Can a subordinate rule be upheld as intra vires if it facilitates the enforcement of prohibitions contained in the parent statute, even if the specific mechanism is not explicitly mentioned in the parent Act?
  Read full judgment →
• TOUCHSTONE COMMUNICATION PRIVATE LIMITED Versus FARRUKH ASLAM2026 PLD 189 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-11-28
  foreign arbitral awardrecognition and enforcementNew York Conventionrectification of register of membersshare transferCompanies Actstandard of reviewpublic policy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The instant enforcement petition was filed seeking the implementation of a foreign arbitral award and a subsequent mutual settlement agreement directing the surrender and transfer of respondent No. 1's shareholding in a private limited company in favor of the petitioner's parent company. The core legal questions involved the mechanism for enforcing a foreign arbitral award in Pakistan, the interaction between the Companies Act, 2017 and the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011, and the procedure for rectifying a company's register of members pursuant to a foreign arbitral award. The Islamabad High Court held that a foreign arbitral award cannot be independently recognized or enforced by the Registrar of Companies or under the Companies Act without prior recognition and enforcement by a High Court under the 2011 Act. The Court laid down that upon recognition under the 2011 Act, a foreign award is enforceable as a judgment of a Pakistani court, and the High Court acts with a narrow standard of review strictly circumscribed by Article V of the New York Convention, subsequently enabling the rectification of the company's register of members and company records through judicial directives without requiring fresh transfer forms.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Registrar of Companies independently recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award without prior intervention and sanction of a High Court?
  • What is the scope of review of a High Court when considering an application for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011?
  • Whether the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under Article V of the New York Convention include an erroneous decision in law or in fact by the Arbitral Tribunal?
  • Does a court-ordered rectification of the register of members require compliance with ordinary share transfer formalities under the Companies Act, 2017?
  Read full judgment →
• CHINA MOBILE PAKISTAN LIMITED Versus COMPETITION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN2026 PLD 169 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-09-29
  competition lawdeceptive marketing practicesjurisdictiontelecom sectorconstitutional petitionshow cause noticeregulatory authorityconcurrent jurisdictionalternative statutory remedy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These writ petitions challenge show cause notices and enquiry notices issued by the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) under the Competition Act, 2010, regarding alleged deceptive marketing practices and anti-competitive behavior in the telecommunication sector. The primary legal question centers on whether the CCP has jurisdiction to inquire into deceptive practices in the telecom sector, or if the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) holds exclusive jurisdiction under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, alongside the issue of whether a show cause notice is amenable to constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Islamabad High Court held that the CCP possesses cross-sectoral jurisdiction to investigate anti-competitive conduct and deceptive marketing, operating concurrently with the PTA, and that regulatory bodies fall within the definition of "undertakings" subject to the Competition Act. Furthermore, the court held that the issuance of a show cause notice does not constitute an adverse final order and constitutional petitions filed against preliminary notices are premature when adequate statutory remedies of appeal are available. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Competition Commission of Pakistan possesses jurisdiction under the Competition Act, 2010 to inquire into alleged deceptive marketing practices in the telecom sector, or whether the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority has exclusive jurisdiction?
  • Whether the issuance of show cause notices and enquiry notices by the Competition Commission of Pakistan constitutes an adverse order amenable to constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does a regulatory authority like the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority fall within the definition of an "undertaking" subject to the scrutiny of the Competition Commission of Pakistan under the Competition Act, 2010?
  • Does the availability of statutory remedies render constitutional petitions filed against the issuance of initial show cause notices premature and not maintainable?
  Read full judgment →
• YAHIA MUSTAFA Versus MUJEEB ELAHI2026 PLD 164 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-02-27
  inheritanceMuslim Family Laws Ordinancepredeceased sonSection 4 MFLOIslamic injunctionsFederal Shariat Courtsuccessiongrandchildren inheritance
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This Regular First Appeal challenged a trial court judgment denying the successors-in-interest of a predeceased son (Munir Elahi) the right to inherit from the propositus (Maqbool Elahi). The core legal question was whether Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, remains applicable despite being declared contrary to Islamic injunctions by the Federal Shariat Court, and whether such entitlement extends to the widow of the predeceased son. The Court held that, pursuant to the proviso to Article 203D(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the Federal Shariat Court's judgment is suspended pending appeal before the Supreme Court; thus, Section 4 remains valid law. Consequently, the grandchildren of the propositus are entitled to inherit the share their father would have received. However, the Court clarified that Section 4 applies strictly to "children" of the predeceased person, thereby excluding the widow of the predeceased son from inheritance. The appeal was partially allowed, modifying the decree to include the grandchildren while excluding the widow.

  Questions settled

  • Does the proviso to Article 203D(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 suspend the operation of a Federal Shariat Court judgment declaring a law un-Islamic pending appeal?
  • Are the children of a predeceased son entitled to inherit from the propositus under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • Does Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 entitle the widow of a predeceased son to inherit from the propositus?
  Read full judgment →
• SAIF NADEEM ELECTRO (PVT.) LTD. Versus FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD2026 PLD 155 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-05-13
  malicious civil proceedingsgeneral damagesspecial damagesmalicious prosecutiontort of malicepublic functionary liabilityburden of proof
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges the trial court's dismissal of a suit for recovery of damages amounting to Rs. 3335 million, filed by the appellants against customs and tax authorities for alleged harassment and malicious civil proceedings. The core legal question concerns whether the appellants established the essential elements required to claim damages for malicious civil proceedings and whether they provided sufficient evidence of financial loss. The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial court's decision. The court held that to succeed in such a claim, a plaintiff must strictly prove malice, the absence of reasonable or probable cause, and actual, measurable damages. The court clarified that the mere termination of legal proceedings in a plaintiff's favor does not automatically entitle them to damages. Furthermore, special damages require concrete, factual evidence, and speculative claims are insufficient. While public functionaries are protected when acting in good faith, this immunity does not extend to acts lacking bona fides. Ultimately, the appellants failed to substantiate their claims with credible evidence, leading to the dismissal of their appeal.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential elements required to establish a claim for damages arising from malicious civil proceedings?
  • Does the termination of legal proceedings in a plaintiff's favor automatically entitle them to damages for malicious prosecution?
  • Is a public functionary immune from legal action for acts performed in the course of official duty?
  • What is the standard of proof required to establish special damages in a civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IQBAL Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad2026 PLD 15 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-02-19
  Passport Control ListFreedom of movementDue processFederal Government authorityPassports Rules 2021Fundamental rightsAdministrative law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged the placement of the petitioner’s name on the Passport Control List (PCL) by the Federal Investigation Agency, which prevented him from traveling abroad for employment. The core legal question was whether the executive authorities could unilaterally blacklist a citizen without the requisite approval of the Federal Government as mandated by the Passports Rules, 2021. The Court held that the inclusion of the petitioner's name on the PCL was unlawful, as there was no evidence of Federal Government approval, which is a prerequisite for such restrictions. Relying on the principle that powers conferred upon the Federal Government must be exercised by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the Court ruled that the administrative action violated the petitioner's fundamental rights to liberty and freedom of movement under the Constitution. The Court established that when the law mandates a specific procedure for administrative action, it must be strictly followed. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the respondents were directed to remove the petitioner's name from the PCL immediately, ensuring his right to travel on a valid visa.

  Questions settled

  • Does the placement of a citizen's name on the Passport Control List without Federal Government approval violate the Passports Rules, 2021?
  • Can a subordinate agency unilaterally restrict a citizen's right to travel without following the statutory procedure for PCL placement?
  • Does the constitutional right to freedom of movement prohibit the arbitrary inclusion of a person on the Passport Control List?
  Read full judgment →
• AMIR MUHAMMAD Versus State2026 PLD 135 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-12-12
  territorial jurisdictioncriminal breach of trustCode of Criminal ProcedureSpecial Judge CentralPakistan Criminal Law Amendment Actplace of occurrenceSection 179 CrPC
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their applications seeking the transfer of criminal cases from the Senior Special Judge Central, Islamabad, to a court of competent jurisdiction in Balochistan. The core legal question was whether the Islamabad court possessed territorial jurisdiction to try offences under the Pakistan Penal Code and other laws when the alleged criminal acts occurred in Balochistan, despite the Federal Investigation Agency having nationwide investigative jurisdiction and the centralized printing of identification documents occurring in Islamabad. The Court held that the Senior Special Judge Central, Islamabad, lacked territorial jurisdiction. It ruled that the mere fact that the investigation agency is empowered to investigate nationwide does not confer trial jurisdiction upon a Special Judge whose authority is limited by statute to specific territorial limits. The Court clarified that under Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the 'consequence' conferring jurisdiction must be an essential ingredient of the offence itself, not merely a collateral result like the printing of documents. Consequently, the case was ordered to be returned for submission to the appropriate court in Balochistan.

  Questions settled

  • Does the nationwide investigative jurisdiction of the Federal Investigation Agency confer territorial trial jurisdiction upon a Special Judge located in Islamabad for offences committed elsewhere?
  • Can the centralized printing of identification documents in Islamabad be considered a 'consequence' of an offence under Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, sufficient to vest territorial jurisdiction in an Islamabad court?
  • Is the offence of criminal breach of trust by a public servant triable in a jurisdiction where the property was neither received nor retained, but merely processed?
  • Does the use of the word 'ordinarily' in Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, allow for trial in a jurisdiction where no essential ingredient of the offence occurred?
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• CENTER FOR RULE OF LAW ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN2026 PLD 129 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-11-11
  fundamental rightsminority rightsdiscriminatory advertisementsright to dignitypublic employmentequality before lawconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition challenged the practice of publishing job advertisements for sanitary workers and sweepers that restricted eligibility to specific religious minorities, particularly the Christian community. The core legal question was whether such advertisements, which effectively stereotype and marginalize minorities, violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan. The Court held that restricting public or private employment based on religious affiliation is unconstitutional, discriminatory, and demeaning. It ruled that such practices infringe upon the fundamental right to dignity and equality before the law. The Court affirmed that the right to dignity is absolute and non-negotiable, and that public employment policies must be inclusive and non-discriminatory. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, directing federal and provincial authorities to issue circulars banning discriminatory recruitment advertisements. Furthermore, the Court ordered the Ministry of Law to initiate legislative efforts to strengthen the protection of minority rights and directed all respondents to ensure compliance with these constitutional mandates, emphasizing that no segment of society should be singled out for employment based on religious grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does restricting job advertisements for sanitary workers to specific religious minorities violate the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Is the right to dignity under the Constitution of Pakistan an absolute and non-negotiable right?
  • Can public or private sector entities lawfully predicate employment eligibility on religious affiliation?
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• ELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN, through Secretary Versus PAKISTAN INFORMATION COMMISSION, ISLAMABAD2026 PLD 118 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-10-16
  right to informationconstitutional bodiespublic body definitionjurisdiction of Pakistan Information CommissionArticle 19Ainstitutional autonomytransparency and accountability
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns writ petitions challenging orders issued by the Pakistan Information Commission (PIC) against the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the President's Secretariat, directing the disclosure of information under the Right of Access to Information Act, 2017. The core legal question is whether constitutional bodies, such as the ECP and the Office of the President, fall within the definition of a 'public body' under the Act and whether the PIC possesses the jurisdiction to issue binding directives to them. The Court held that the Act applies only to executive and statutory bodies, not to institutions created directly by the Constitution. Consequently, the PIC lacks the statutory jurisdiction to exercise coercive powers over these constitutional entities. However, the Court affirmed that constitutional bodies remain bound by the fundamental right to information under Article 19A of the Constitution. The key principle laid down is that while constitutional bodies are outside the statutory reach of the Right of Access to Information Act, 2017, they are under a direct constitutional obligation to establish their own regulatory frameworks to ensure transparency and accountability.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Right of Access to Information Act, 2017 apply to constitutional bodies like the Election Commission of Pakistan and the Office of the President?
  • Does the Pakistan Information Commission have the jurisdiction to issue binding orders to constitutional bodies?
  • Are constitutional bodies exempt from the transparency requirements of Article 19A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Is the Right of Access to Information Act, 2017 applicable to institutions that are not creatures of statute but derive their existence directly from the Constitution?
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• RAZIA KHATOON Versus Dr. ARIFA MANZOOR2026 PLD 105 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-10-28
  medical negligenceconsumer court jurisdictionspecial law vs general lawIslamabad Healthcare Regulatory Authoritymedical malpracticestatutory interpretationhealthcare regulation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges an order of the Consumer Court dismissing a complaint of medical negligence filed by the Appellant against a medical practitioner. The core legal question was whether the Consumer Court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate medical negligence claims following the enactment of the Islamabad Healthcare Regulation Act, 2018. The Court held that the Consumer Court lacks jurisdiction in such matters, affirming that the Islamabad Healthcare Regulatory Authority (IHRA) is the exclusive forum for investigating and adjudicating complaints regarding medical negligence, malpractice, and maladministration. The Court reasoned that the IHRA Act, 2018, is a specialized, subsequent legislation that provides a comprehensive regulatory framework, including expert-driven inquiry mechanisms, which prevails over the general provisions of the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995. The principle laid down is that where a special law specifically governs a field like healthcare regulation, it overrides general consumer protection statutes, and aggrieved parties must pursue remedies through the dedicated regulatory body rather than the Consumer Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Consumer Court have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging medical negligence after the enactment of the Islamabad Healthcare Regulation Act, 2018?
  • Does the Islamabad Healthcare Regulation Act, 2018, override the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act, 1995, in matters concerning medical negligence?
  • Is the Islamabad Healthcare Regulatory Authority the exclusive forum for investigating and adjudicating complaints regarding medical negligence and maladministration?
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• NADIR MUKHTIAR Versus DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION AND PASSPORT, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD2026 PLD 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2025-01-27
  Passport Control Listfundamental rightsright to traveldue processshow-cause noticepassports actdeportation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner challenged the placement of his name on the Passport Control List (PCL) and the restriction preventing him from traveling to Oman despite holding a valid passport and work visa. The core legal questions involved whether a citizen's name can be placed on the PCL without notice and a hearing, whether deportation automatically warrants mechanical PCL placement, and whether an Assistant Director holds the authority for such placement. The Islamabad High Court held that placing a citizen's name on the PCL without issuing a show-cause notice, providing an opportunity of being heard, and passing a reasoned order under the relevant statutory framework violates natural justice and fundamental rights. The court ruled that a reasoned penal order declaring a passport liable to be impounded, confiscated, canceled, or inactivated must strictly precede PCL placement. The petition was consequently allowed, declaring the respondents' actions without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether name of a citizen can be placed on the PCL suspending his right to international travel without issuing him a notice and affording him an opportunity to be heard?
  • Whether the name of a citizen who has been deported from a foreign country can be mechanically placed on the PCL for a period of five years in terms of Rule 22(2)(c) of the Passports Rules, 2021?
  • Whether an Assistant Director administering the PCL within the Directorate of Immigration and Passport is vested with the authority to place the name of a citizen on PCL?
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