Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- MESSRS WURTTEMBERGISCHE PARFUMERIE GMBH vs THE ASSISTANT1986 PLD Karachi 371 · Sindh High Court · 1986-04-15Read full judgment →
- MESSRS WORLD WIDE TRADING CO. vs SANYO ELECTIC TRADING CO. LTD. AND ANOTHERS1986 PLD Karachi 234 · Sindh High Court · 1986-02-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involved an application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, filed by the plaintiff to suspend the operation of notices terminating its exclusive agency and distributorship agreements and to restrain the defendants from giving effect to them or appointing alternative agents. The core legal questions concerned whether the arrangement constituted an agency coupled with an interest under Section 202 of the Contract Act 1872, whether the agency was revocable, and whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie case for the grant of an interim injunction. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiff was primarily a sole purchaser rather than an agent under Section 182 of the Contract Act 1872, that the contract was not an agency coupled with an interest, and that the balance of convenience and potential damages rendered interim relief inappropriate. The court laid down that mere exclusive purchasing rights and commercial investments do not constitute an agency coupled with an interest under Section 202, and that interlocutory injunctions will not be granted to maintain commercial supply contracts where damages provide an adequate remedy.
Questions settled- Whether an exclusive distributorship agreement where the distributor purchases goods for resale constitutes an agency under Section 182 of the Contract Act 1872?
- Under what circumstances can an agency be classified as an agency coupled with an interest under Section 202 of the Contract Act 1872?
- Can a temporary injunction be granted to restrain the unilateral termination of a commercial agency or distributorship contract that is revocable under its terms?
- Whether the provisions of the Contract Act 1872 relating to the law of agency are exhaustive of all commercial arrangements?
- Messrs Waseem Traders vs Government Of PakistanPTCL 1986 CL. 76 · Sindh High Court · 1984-05-08Read full judgment →
- MESSRS UNIVERSAL MINING CORPORATION vs JOINT DIRECTOR, LICENSING1986 PLD Quetta 176 · Balochistan High Court · 1986-03-12Read full judgment →
- MESSRS UNITED BANK LTD.s vs MESSRS MUJAHID TRANSPORT AND 5 OTHERS1986 PLD Karachi 107 · Sindh High Court · 1985-11-17Read full judgment →
- Messrs UNITED BANK Ltd. vs THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, JAMIA MASJID FALAH, GIZRI, KARACHI and another1986 MLD 294 · Sindh High Court · 1985-05-03Read full judgment →
- MESSRS UNITED BANK LTD. vs PRESIDENT, BAZM-E-SALAT AND ANOTHER1986 PLD Katachi 464 · Sindh High Court · 1986-06-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This suit concerns the recovery of money by a bank based on a promissory note and a letter of guarantee executed by the defendants. The defendants contested the suit, arguing it was time-barred, that the promissory note was a forgery due to unauthorized completion of blank spaces, and that the guarantee was invalid. The core legal questions were whether the plaintiff could complete an inchoate promissory note after the death of an executant, whether such completion was within a reasonable time, and whether the guarantee remained enforceable. The court held that the suit was within time. It ruled that under Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, the holder of an inchoate instrument has statutory authority to complete it within a reasonable time, which was satisfied here. Furthermore, the court affirmed that a time-barred debt can constitute valid consideration for a new promise under Section 25 of the Contract Act 1872. The court concluded that the defendants were jointly and severally liable for the debt, rejecting the defense of material alteration and uncertainty.
Questions settled- Does the death of an executant invalidate the authority of the holder to complete an inchoate promissory note under Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881?
- What constitutes a reasonable time for completing an inchoate negotiable instrument?
- Can a time-barred debt serve as valid consideration for a new promise under Section 25 of the Contract Act 1872?
- Does the filling in of blank spaces in a promissory note by the creditor constitute a material alteration that vitiates the instrument?
- Messrs UNITED BANK Ltd. vs Messrs BOMBAY FRONTIER OLD TYRE Co. and another1986 MLD 1613 · Sindh High Court · 1986-01-12Read full judgment →
- Messrs UNITED BANK Ltd. vs Messrs ALI VEHICLES and 2 others1986 MLD 1424 · Sindh High Court · 1986-01-06Read full judgment →
- Messrs TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN Ltd. vs Messrs HAJI HASHAM1986 MLD 54 · Sindh High Court · 1985-08-20Read full judgment →
- Messrs THE MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK Ltd. vs Messrs EASTERN PLYWOOD1986 MLD 1339 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Messrs TAJ MAHAL HOTELS Ltd. vs KARACHI WATER AND SEWERAGE BOARD1986 MLD 1277 · Sindh High Court · 1985-12-07Read full judgment →
- MESSRS SUFI SOAP FACTORY vs THE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX1986 SCMR 885 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal regarding the levy of sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The petitioner, a soap manufacturer, contended that it purchased raw materials from the open market, where sales tax had already been paid, and thus should not be liable for further tax upon resale or use. The core legal questions involve the interpretation of the point of levy for sales tax and the burden of proof regarding the source of raw material purchases—specifically, whether the Sales Tax Officer must prove that goods were purchased under a license (exempting the seller) or if the assessee bears the onus to prove the purchase was from the open market. The Supreme Court observed that the case presented novel legal issues requiring an authoritative pronouncement on the interpretation of sections 3, 4, and 12 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, and the relevant rules. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to resolve these fundamental questions of tax liability and evidentiary burden.
Questions settled- Does the burden of proof lie with the Sales Tax Officer to establish that raw materials were purchased under a license, or with the assessee to prove they were purchased in the open market?
- Is sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1951, leviable at only one stage of the manufacturing or distribution process?
- What is the proper interpretation of the charging provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, regarding the liability of a manufacturer who purchases raw materials from the open market?
- Messrs STAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD vs PAKISTAN Through SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN IN THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ISLAMABAD And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These civil appeals arose from the judgment of the High Court concerning the abatement of capacity duty for shortfalls in shifts in cotton mills. The core legal question was whether the expression 'total production' in the second proviso to Rule 4(1) of the Production Capacity Cotton Fabrics Rules, 1968 and Production Capacity Cotton Yarn Rules, 1968 required the actual production to be converted into a common denominator (such as average count for yarn or picks per inch for fabrics) when compared against production capacity, or whether it referred to actual physical production. The Supreme Court held that the expression 'total production' means the actual physical quantity of goods produced or manufactured, and there is no warrant in the statute or rules to read in a requirement for a notional production based on a common denominator. The key principle laid down is that statutory rules governing excise duty abatement on production capacity must be interpreted according to their plain language, and actual production cannot be notionally adjusted without explicit statutory backing.
Questions settled- Whether the expression 'total production' in Rule 4 of the Production Capacity Rules requires actual production to be reduced to a common denominator based on average count or picks per inch?
- Can an abatement of excise duty be claimed if the total production of a factory in a financial year does not fall short of its production capacity?
- Does the suspension of work in a mill automatically entitle the manufacturer to an abatement of capacity duty without regard to the total actual production?
- Messrs SINGER SEWING MACHINE CO. vs ABDULLA HJAN1986 MLD 1404 · Sindh High Court · 1984-12-16Read full judgment →
- MESSRS SIKANDAR AND BROTHERS vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH MEMBER (JUDICIAL) CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND ANOTHER1986 PLD Karachi 373 · Sindh High Court · 1986-04-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981 sought to challenge the orders of the Customs authorities and the Central Board of Revenue confiscating imported goods and imposing a personal penalty for misdeclaration and illegal import of unlicenced items. The core legal questions involved whether a show-cause notice under section 180 of the Customs Act 1969 is invalid if not issued within the sixty-day period specified in section 168(2) of the said Act, and whether proof of mens rea or guilty knowledge is an essential prerequisite for establishing an offence under section 32 and section 156 of the Customs Act 1969. The Sindh High Court held that the sixty-day limitation period under section 168(2) applies only to the seizure of goods and does not curtail or govern the time limit for issuing a show-cause notice under section 180, which prescribes no specific time limit. The Court further held that mens rea or guilty knowledge is not a necessary ingredient for contravention of section 32 read with section 156 of the Customs Act 1969, as the statutory scheme imposes absolute liability for misdeclaration and evasion of import controls. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a show-cause notice issued under section 180 of the Customs Act 1969 is rendered illegal if it is issued beyond the sixty-day period prescribed for the seizure of goods under section 168(2) of the said Act?
- Does section 180 of the Customs Act 1969 prescribe any strict time limit for the issuance of a show-cause notice for the confiscation of goods or imposition of a penalty?
- Whether proof of mens rea or guilty knowledge is a necessary legal requirement for establishing an offence under section 32 of the Customs Act 1969?
- Does the statutory scheme of section 156 of the Customs Act 1969 create an absolute liability for the importation of unlicenced or misdeclared goods independent of the importer's intention?
- Messrs SIAL ENTERPRISES through its Managing Director, _ Partner , Faisalabad vs DIRECTOR OIL OPERATIONS, MINISTRY OF FUEL, POWER & NATURAL RESOURCES, ISLAMABAD and another1986 MLD 550 · Lahore High Court · 1986-02-18Read full judgment →
- Messrs SHAUKAT AND CO. vs DIRECTOR, OIL OPERATIONS And Other1986 CLC 1031 · Lahore High Court · 1985-10-06Read full judgment →
- Messrs Sh. FAZAL REHMAN & SONS vs Mst. BASHIRAN And Another1986 PLC 427 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-10-15Read full judgment →
- Messrs SERVICE INDUSTRIES Ltd. vs MUHAMMAD RAGHIB And Another1986 SCMR 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind which reversed the Rent Controller's order and allowed the landlord's eviction application under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The appellant-company, tenant of a shop premises, resisted eviction sought on the ground of reconstruction under section 15(2)(vi) of the Ordinance, contending that the proposed work amounted merely to repairs rather than reconstruction, and that the action was mala fide. The core legal question is whether the proposed alterations and construction of a dividing wall and staircase amount to "reconstruction or erection of a new building at the site" under section 15(2)(vi), warranting tenant eviction, as opposed to mere "repairs" governed by section 12. The Supreme Court held that where substantial structural changes are effected in the existing building, such as the construction of a new dividing wall and a staircase to access the upper floor, the work constitutes "reconstruction" rather than repairs, thus entitling the landlord to seek eviction. The key principle laid down is that while "repair" involves restoring a damaged structure to its original condition without terminating tenancy, "reconstruction" in the context of the statute encompasses substantial structural alterations necessitating vacant possession.
Questions settled- Does the proposed work of constructing a new dividing wall and a staircase amount to reconstruction or mere repairs under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
- Whether structural changes in a building are necessary to constitute reconstruction for the purpose of seeking tenant eviction?
- Does the requirement of reconstruction under section 15(2)(vi) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, entail the eviction of the tenant?
- Messrs SALIM INDUSTRIES Ltd. vs THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN and 31986 MLD 118 · Sindh High Court · 1985-10-15Read full judgment →
- Messrs S.M. Sadiq vs Collector Of Customs And OtherPTCL 1986 CL. 30 · Sindh High Court · 1984-02-13Read full judgment →
- Messrs RIAZ ENTERPRISES Ltd. vs NATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION and others1986 MLD 635 · Sindh High Court · 1984-12-23Read full judgment →
- Messrs RAZZAK INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION (C.B.A) vs SECOND SIND1986 PLC 109 · Sindh High Court · 1985-10-28Read full judgment →
- Messrs Raleigh Investment Co. Limited vs Commissioner of Income TaxPTCL 1986 CL. 194 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Messrs RAFIQUE INDUSTRIES Ltd., And 3 Others vs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN1986 CLC 201 · Lahore High Court · 1985-10-16Read full judgment →
- Messrs RAFHAN MAIZE PRODUCTS CO., FAISALABAD vs MUHAMMAD RAMZAN1986 PLC 320(2) · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
- Messrs RAFHAN MAIZE PRODUCTS C0. Ltd. vs PAKISTAN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE And Another1986 SCMR 1114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the classification of maize as an "oilseed" under the Oilseeds Committee Act, 1946, for the purpose of levying excise duty on oil extracted therefrom. The appellant, a manufacturer of maize starch and by-products, challenged the imposition of cesses, arguing that maize is a foodgrain rather than an oilseed and that the extraction process involving maize germs does not constitute "crushing" within the meaning of the Act. The core legal questions were whether maize qualifies as an oilseed and whether the extraction of oil from maize germs satisfies the statutory requirement of being "crushed" in a mill. The Supreme Court held that maize is an oilseed, as it is a seed capable of germination, and the legislative intent behind the term "oilseeds" is broad, excluding only coconuts. Furthermore, the Court interpreted "crushed" broadly to include indirect extraction methods that disintegrate the seed's integrity. The Court affirmed that maize falls within the scope of the Act, dismissing the appeal and upholding the levy of excise duty on the extracted oil.
Questions settled- Does the term "oilseeds" under the Oilseeds Committee Act, 1946, include maize?
- Can the term "crushed" in the context of oil extraction be interpreted to include indirect methods of processing seeds?
- Is a commodity that is primarily a foodgrain excluded from the definition of "oilseed" for the purposes of excise duty?
- Messrs PECO Ltd., LAHORE vs SHER JANG1986 PLC 642 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1986-01-17Read full judgment →
- Messrs PAKISTAN REFINERY LIMITED vs SAFEERUL HASAN, GENERAL SECRETARY, PAKISTAN REFINERY EMPLOYEES UNION1986 PLC 568 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1986-02-18Read full judgment →
- Messrs PAKISTAN ASSOCIATED CONSTRUCTION Ltd. vs ASIF H. KAZI And Another1986 SCMR 820 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a plaintiff in a pending civil suit, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing its revision petition against the denial of ad interim relief by the courts below. The dispute arose from a construction contract for the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project, which was delayed, leading the employer to issue a cancellation notice under Contract Clause 63(1). The petitioner filed a civil suit and sought temporary injunctions under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to restrain the respondents from acting upon the notice or interfering with its equipment and site. The trial court, first appellate court, and High Court all declined to grant ad interim relief. The Supreme Court held that the interim relief sought—essentially resurrecting the contract and extending its period—was barred by statutory constraints under Section 21(a) and (d) and Section 56(f) of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The Court concluded that interim relief was rightly refused, dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, and directed the trial court to ensure expeditious disposal of the suit within six months.
Questions settled- Whether interim relief keeping in abeyance the cancellation of a construction contract can be granted by a court?
- Does Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 impose statutory constraints on granting specific performance or related interim relief for contracts of such nature?
- Can a court grant an interim injunction to resurrect a commercial contract and extend its period of performance?
- Messrs PAK. CRAFTS EMORIUM vs BASIT YAR KHAN1986 SCMR 1832 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court, which restored the ejectment order passed against the petitioner-tenant by the Rent Controller on the grounds of default in rent payment and personal requirement. The petitioner contended that the Rent Controller's order was vague and that personal need was not proved. The Supreme Court considered whether any question of law arose from the concurrent findings of fact and whether the High Court erred in interfering with the first appellate court's decision. The Court held that the findings were purely ones of fact, that each aspect of the case had been well considered by the High Court in second appeal, and that no question of law arose. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in rent matters where no substantial question of law is made out.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact in an ejectment matter arising from rent proceedings?
- Does a second appeal lie on pure questions of fact in rent restriction cases?
- Whether default in payment of rent and personal requirement constitute valid grounds for ejectment of a tenant?
- Messrs PAK INTERNATIONAL GOODS TRANSPORT Co. (Regd.) vs Messrs ADAM1986 MLD 1258 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Messrs PACKAGES Ltd. vs MUHAMMAD AKBAR1986 PLC 426 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-10-15Read full judgment →
- Messrs NORWICH UNION FIRE INSURANCE SOCIETY LIMITED vs MUHAMMAD1986 SCMR 1071 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-08-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind dismissing the petitioner company's constitutional petition, which had challenged an order of the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal setting aside the dismissal in default of a respondent employee's grievance application and remanding the matter. The core legal questions involved whether a party could move the Labour Appellate Tribunal to exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction under section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, and whether the amendment conferring such revisional power applied retrospectively to prior orders. The Supreme Court held that while parties have no right to file a revision, there is no bar preventing the Tribunal from acting upon information brought by a party, and further declined to examine the retrospective applicability of the amendment because the original order of the Labour Court dismissing the grievance application was vitiated by illegal service of summons contrary to the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Upholding the High Court's view, the Supreme Court affirmed that writ relief may be refused where the impugned order fosters the cause of justice and rights a wrong.
Questions settled- Can a party move the Labour Appellate Tribunal to exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction under section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
- Does service of summons on a female member of a party's family comply with Order V Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- May a High Court refuse constitutional relief in writ jurisdiction where an impugned tribunal order rights a wrong and fosters the cause of justice?
- Messrs NORTHERN TRADERS Ltd. vs Mst. NAFISA1986 SCMR 1388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner-company filed a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which had accepted a second appeal and restored an eviction order against the petitioner on the ground of default in rent. The petitioner was a tenant of the disputed premises purchased by the respondent. After receiving a notice of transfer of ownership, the petitioner claimed to have sent four months' rent by cheque to the address specified by the respondent. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, but the first appellate court reversed this finding upon re-assessing the evidence and held that the respondent failed to dispute the receipt of the cheque. The High Court, in second appeal, interfered with this factual finding. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court re-assessing evidence and interfering with a conclusive finding of fact by the first appellate court in second appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised important questions of law requiring consideration, and directed that the stay already granted shall continue.
Questions settled- Can the High Court re-assess evidence and interfere with a conclusive finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court in a second appeal?
- Whether the dispatch of rent by cheque to the address provided in the landlord's notice constitutes a valid tender of rent?
- Does a failure to tender rent to the previous landlord prior to receiving notice of ownership amount to default under rent laws?
- Messrs NORTH WESTERN HOTEL vs BEGUM SULTANA AHMAD1986 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from an ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent landlady against the appellant tenant firm occupying commercial premises under a lease agreement dated 29th September, 1972. The core legal question is whether the tenancy was validly subsisting at the time of the ejectment application so as to bar the landlord's claim for bona fide personal requirement, based on an option for renewal clause requiring one month's clear notice. The Supreme Court held that an option for renewal of a lease must be exercised strictly within the stipulated time limit, otherwise it lapses, and failure to give the requisite one month's clear notice meant the contractual tenancy had expired, rendering the ruling in Mrs. Zehra Begum v. Messrs Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. inapplicable. The key principle laid down is that time is of the essence when exercising a contractual option for the renewal of a lease, and failure to strictly comply with the notice requirements terminates the contractual tenancy, allowing the landlord to seek ejectment on the ground of bona fide personal use.
Questions settled- Must an option for renewal of a lease be exercised strictly within the time limit prescribed by the agreement?
- Does the failure to give the requisite clear notice for renewal cause the contractual tenancy to expire?
- Can a tenant invoke the protection against personal requirement ejectment when the lease agreement has expired due to non-renewal?
- Messrs NISHAT MILLS Ltd. vs THE SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL EXCISE, And Other1986 SCMR 1476(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court regarding the entitlement of Messrs Nishat Mills Limited to claim a rebate under the relevant excise rules. The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the documentary evidence provided—specifically a certificate detailing the number of spindles and power looms installed, dismantled, or operational at the petitioner's facility as of specific dates—constituted sufficient compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements to qualify for the claimed rebate. The High Court had previously held that the evidence was insufficient. Upon review, the Supreme Court found merit in the petitioner's argument that the provided certificate satisfied the necessary criteria for the rebate. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to further examine the interpretation of the relevant rule and the sufficiency of the evidence presented. The principle established is that where documentary evidence clearly establishes the operational status of industrial machinery as required by statute, such evidence should be deemed sufficient compliance for rebate claims.
Questions settled- Does a certificate detailing the operational status of spindles and power looms constitute sufficient compliance for claiming an excise rebate?
- Can the High Court's finding on the sufficiency of evidence for a rebate claim be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon a grant of leave to appeal?
- Messrs New Snow-White Dry Cleaners vs The Commissioner Of Income-PTCL 1986 CL. 123 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Messrs NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION vs Messrs PAKISTAN NATIONAL1986 MLD 1885 · Sindh High Court · 1986-04-22Read full judgment →
- Messrs NATIONAL EMBROIDERY MILLS Ltd. And Others vs THE EMPLOYEES!'SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTION, LAHORE And Other1986 SCMR 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the view that 'attendance allowance', being in the nature of an incentive, forms part of 'wages' as defined under the relevant social security legislation for the purpose of making contributions to the Employees' Social Security Institution. The core legal question is whether such an attendance allowance constitutes wages under section 2(3) of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965. The Supreme Court noted a conflict of judicial views on the subject and granted leave to appeal to provide an authoritative pronouncement. The key principle established is that conflicting decisions regarding the interpretation of statutory definitions of wages in social security laws require authoritative settlement by the apex court through a regular appeal.
Questions settled- Does attendance allowance constitute part of wages under section 2(3) of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965?
- Can an attendance allowance given as an incentive be subjected to contributions by the Employees' Social Security Institution?
- Messrs NATIONAL CEMENT INDUSTRIES LIMITED vs NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL1986 PLC 105 · Sindh High Court · 1985-07-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition was filed by the employer, Messrs National Cement Industries Limited, challenging an ad interim order of the National Industrial Relations Commission (N.I.R.C.) which suspended the transfer order of an employee. The employer contended that the N.I.R.C. lacked jurisdiction because the interim order was passed without prior notice, the transfer had already been implemented, and there was no case of unfair labour practice to attract Regulation 32 of the N.I.R.C. Regulations. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the N.I.R.C. possessed the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the application and grant interim relief. The Court observed that prior notice is not mandatory for ad interim orders, the employer failed to prove that the employee had actually been relieved of his charge before approaching the Commission, and the timing of the transfer (two days after the employee's election as Union President) prima facie indicated a case of unfair labour practice. The Court ruled that where jurisdiction exists, any grievance against an interim order must be agitated before the Full Bench of the Commission under Section 22-D of the Ordinance.
Questions settled- Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have jurisdiction to pass an ad interim stay order without prior notice to the employer?
- Can an employer challenge an interim order of a Single Bench of the N.I.R.C. directly in constitutional jurisdiction without exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal before the Full Bench under Section 22-D of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
- Whether a transfer order issued immediately after an employee's election to a trade union office constitutes sufficient material to invoke the N.I.R.C.'s jurisdiction regarding unfair labour practices.
- Messrs MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK Ltd. vs BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE1986 MLD 45 · Sindh High Court · 1986-01-13Read full judgment →
- Messrs MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM & SONS vs DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL1986 MLD 2091 · Lahore High Court · 1985-04-07Read full judgment →
- Messrs MUHAMMAD BAKHSH & Sons Ltd. and another vs AZHAR WALI1986 MLD 1870 · Sindh High Court · 1986-02-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves applications for temporary injunctions and the appointment of a Receiver in a suit instituted by a private limited company and its majority shareholder against former directors and a newly incorporated competing entity. The core legal questions concern whether a prima facie case of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation warrants the appointment of a receiver over a corporate entity and the issuance of interim injunctions against passing off and conducting competing business. The Sindh High Court held that directors occupy a fiduciary position akin to trustees regarding company assets and funds, and where serious allegations of clandestine transfer of business and assets are established at the interlocutory stage, the court possesses ample power under the Companies Act and Companies Ordinance to appoint a receiver and restrain unfair trade practices. The court laid down the principle that courts will pierce the corporate veil to prevent a company from being used as a device to mask business operations in violation of agreements or fiduciary duties, and that a registered company can be restrained from using a deceptively similar name to pass off its business as that of another.
Questions settled- Whether a court has the jurisdiction under the Companies Act and Companies Ordinance to appoint a receiver over a subsequently incorporated company pending the final decision of a suit?
- What is the nature of the fiduciary relationship between the directors and a company regarding its assets, funds, and business opportunities?
- Can a company be restrained from carrying on business under a name that is deceptively similar or nearly identical to that of an existing registered company?
- On what grounds will a court pierce the corporate veil to treat a newly incorporated company as a mere device or mask for a former employee or director?
- Messrs MUHAMMAD AQIL & SONS vs MUSHTAQ AHMED ALLAHWALA and 31986 MLD 1329 · Sindh High Court · 1986-03-16Read full judgment →
- Messrs MODERN COMFORTS And Others vs The STATE1986 SCMR 1437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 1973 and Civil Appeal No. 109 of 1973 arising from the seizure of electronic appliances and spare parts suspected of being smuggled goods under Section 550 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Special Judge initially ordered the release of the goods to the appellants, but the High Court set aside that order in criminal revision and directed the appellants not to dispose of the returned items. Subsequently, police re-seized certain refrigerators and handed them to Customs authorities for adjudication, which was separately challenged by the appellants via a writ petition. During the Supreme Court hearing, the appellants' counsel withdrew Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 1973 to agitate the issue of re-seizure and Customs adjudication within the pending writ petition or before the relevant authorities. Additionally, Civil Appeal No. 109 of 1973 was declared infructuous because the goods had been returned and disposed of following the outcome of the writ petition. The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals accordingly.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal challenging the seizure and custody of goods under criminal procedure becomes infructuous upon the withdrawal of the appeal to pursue pending writ proceedings?
- Can an appeal be dismissed as infructuous when the seized goods have already been returned to and disposed of by the party following separate writ proceedings?
- Messrs MIRJINA AND COMPANY Ltd. vs The SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER And Another1986 SCMR 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Sind and Baluchistan dismissing a constitutional petition concerning the cancellation of a Permanent Transfer Deed for a shop. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities were justified in cancelling the appellant's Permanent Transfer Deed and ordering public auction in the absence of fraud, merely due to procedural defects and delay in the transfer application. The Supreme Court held that procedural defects in an application and a failure to use a prescribed form cannot defeat a valuable substantive right that has accrued, and that the time limit prescribed under the relevant settlement scheme is merely an enabling provision rather than a strict statutory limitation. The Court laid down the principle that procedural technicalities and time limits in administrative settlement schemes should not be used to invalidate substantive entitlements to property transfers where no fraud or statutory bar exists.
Questions settled- Whether the Settlement authorities are justified in cancelling a Permanent Transfer Deed in the absence of any allegation of fraud?
- Does the time limit mentioned in the settlement scheme operate as a strict statutory limitation for submitting an application for the transfer of property?
- Can a procedural defect, such as filing an application on plain paper instead of a prescribed form, defeat a valuable right accrued to a claimant?
- Messrs MACK INDUSTRIES vs Haji ABDUL KARIM and 9 others1986 MLD 1595 · Sindh High Court · 1986-01-11Read full judgment →
- MESSRS M. A. RASHID AND COMPANY vs THE PUNJAB SMALL INDUSTRIES1986 PLD Labour 254 · Lahore High Court · 1986-04-21Read full judgment →
- Messrs Lassani Brother vs The Commissioner Of Income Tax And OtherPTCL 1986 CL. 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's application under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law by dismissing the reference application in limine instead of answering the referred question of law regarding the sustainability of a penalty imposed under the Income-tax Act. The Supreme Court held that the appeal must be dismissed because the appellant's counsel did not press or question the power to impose the penalty before the High Court, meaning the High Court was not expected to decide the question. The key principle laid down is that a High Court is not required to answer a reference application under the Income-tax Act if the party concerned chooses not to press the point during the hearing.
Questions settled- Whether a High Court is justified in dismissing a reference application under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 when the counsel for the applicant does not press the question of law before it?
- Does the High Court act as an appellate court when deciding a reference application under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
- Messrs L.P.G. MARKETING COMPANY Ltd. vs Messrs INDUS GAS COMPANY Ltd.1986 MLD 1659 · Sindh High Court · 1985-11-27Read full judgment →
- MESSRS KUWAIT AIRWAYS CORPORATION vs MESSRS UNION SURGICAL COMPANY1986 SCMR 890 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by the defendant examines whether the plaintiff's suit for damages arising out of a contract for the carriage of goods by air was barred by limitation under rule 29 of the First Schedule to the Carriage By Air (International Convention) Act, 1966. The plaintiff consigned goods from Sialkot to Dallas on 30-9-1981, and was informed on 1-11-1981 that the parcels had been delivered to the consignee. The plaintiff ultimately filed a civil suit for damages on 29-9-1984. The trial court and the High Court both held the suit to be within time, construing the starting point of limitation to be the date of final refusal or communication regarding non-acceptance. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the plaintiff was unequivocally informed of the arrival of the goods on 1-11-1981, and limitation began to run from that date, extinguishing the right to bring an action after two years under rule 29. The key principle laid down is that the statutory period of limitation for filing a suit for damages under the Carriage by Air Act commences from the date of arrival, or when the aircraft ought to have arrived, and is not extended or delayed by subsequent correspondence or the failure of the carrier to communicate a consignee's refusal to accept delivery.
Questions settled- Does the two-year limitation period under rule 29 of the First Schedule to the Carriage By Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 begin to run from the date the plaintiff has notice of arrival or when the carrier finally communicates a refusal?
- Whether subsequent correspondence or failure to notify the consignor about a consignee's refusal to accept delivery extends the limitation period under the Carriage By Air (International Convention) Act, 1966?
- When does the right to claim damages get extinguished under rule 29 of the First Schedule to the Carriage By Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 in respect of international carriage of goods?
- Messrs KUWAIT AIRWAYS CORPORATION vs Messrs JEHANGIR TRAVEL CORPORATION RAWALPINDI1986 SCMR 1166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated from an application filed before a Civil Judge to initiate arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration Act, alongside a request for an interim injunction to restrain the realization of a bank guarantee. The trial court refused the injunction. The District Judge, treating the appeal as a revision, granted the injunction. The High Court subsequently entertained and dismissed a revision against the District Judge's order. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the competency of the initial appeal. The Court held that the order passed by the Civil Judge was not appealable under the Arbitration Act, making the District Judge's treatment of the matter as a revision correct. However, the Court further held that the second revision filed before the High Court was barred under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Consequently, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the second revision, rendering its order void. The Supreme Court recalled the leave previously granted and dismissed the petition as incompetent, establishing that a second revision is barred by statute.
Questions settled- Is an order refusing an interim injunction in arbitration proceedings appealable under the Arbitration Act 1940?
- Does a second revision lie against an order passed by a District Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
- Is a High Court order passed without jurisdiction subject to a petition for leave to appeal?
- Messrs KUNDI SERVICES Ltd. vs THE UNITED BANK Ltd.1986 MLD 2661 · Sindh High Court · 1986-08-25Read full judgment →
- MESSRS KOHINOOR TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs MESSRS GHARO TEXTILE MILLS LTD.PLD 1986 Karachi 157(2) · Sindh High Court · 1985-11-05Read full judgment →
- Messrs KHYBER ELECTRIC LAMPS MANUFACTURING LIMITED And Others vs CHAIRMAN, DISTRICT COUNCIL, PESHAWAR And ANOTHER1986 CLC 533 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns three consolidated writ petitions challenging notifications issued by the Chairman, District Council, Peshawar, imposing an export tax on goods transported out of the district. The petitioners contended that such taxation violated the freedom of trade guaranteed under Article 151 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 and that the District Council lacked legislative competence, as export taxation falls under the Federal Legislative List. The core legal question was whether the District Council was empowered to levy such an export tax and whether the distinction between a tax and a fee rendered the levy ultra vires. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that Article 151 does not provide absolute freedom of trade and permits reasonable restrictions in the public interest. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the term export in the context of the North-West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 1979, includes moving goods out of a district, and that the Ordinance’s definition of tax explicitly encompasses fees, thereby validating the Council's authority to impose the levy.
Questions settled- Does Article 151 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 guarantee absolute freedom of trade and commerce?
- Is the imposition of an export tax by a District Council on goods moving out of the district within its legislative competence under the North-West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
- Does the definition of tax in the North-West Frontier Province Local Government Ordinance, 1979, include fees, thereby authorizing the District Council to levy such charges?
- Can a local authority impose taxes on the movement of goods without violating the Federal Legislative List regarding export and import?
- Messrs Khawaja Brother, Lahore And Another vs The Government Of Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1986 CL. 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal filed by importers challenging the classification of imported 'black rubber air hoses' by Customs Authorities. The core legal question is whether the imported rubber hoses, imported in lengths of 50 meters, fall under item No. 40.09 of the Import Trade Control Schedule, specifically regarding the interpretation of rules concerning incomplete or unfinished articles that retain the essential character of the finished product. The petitioners argued that the goods should be classified under the relevant sub-head based on established rules of interpretation and previous administrative practice where similar goods were accepted under that category. The Supreme Court, finding that the matter required further consideration regarding the application of the Import Trade Control Schedule rules and the alleged inconsistent treatment by Customs Authorities, granted leave to appeal. The Court held that the issues raised regarding the classification of goods and the consistency of administrative action warranted a full hearing on the merits, allowing the petitions to proceed for further adjudication.
Questions settled- Does the import of rubber hoses in 50-meter lengths qualify for classification under item No. 40.09 of the Import Trade Control Schedule?
- How should the rules of interpretation within the Import Trade Control Schedule be applied to incomplete or unfinished articles?
- Can previous administrative treatment of similar goods by Customs Authorities be used to challenge a current classification decision?
- Messrs KARACHI TEXTILE DYEING AND PRINTING WORKS vs ABDUL MAJEED And 2 Others1986 PLC 714 · Sindh High Court · 1986-01-23Read full judgment →
- Messrs KARACHI PORT TRUST vs Messrs GOLDEN PLASTICS Ltd.1986 MLD 1319 · Sindh High Court · 1986-04-14Read full judgment →
- Messrs JAFFAR E TAYYAR CO OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. And Others1986 SCMR 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which had quashed an order by the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, removing the respondent from membership of the appellant society. The High Court held that the removal order was void for violating principles of natural justice, specifically alleging the respondent was denied an opportunity of hearing and to produce evidence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its factual determination regarding the denial of natural justice. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record clearly demonstrated the respondent had been served with show-cause notices, granted multiple opportunities for personal hearings, and was represented by counsel at the final inquiry. Furthermore, the respondent had failed to raise the grievance of procedural unfairness in his revision application or initial constitutional petition. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court’s finding was factually incorrect. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside, reaffirming that administrative actions are valid when the record confirms that the affected party was afforded adequate opportunity to defend themselves.
Questions settled- Can a court set aside an administrative order on the ground of violation of natural justice if the record shows the party was given adequate opportunity to be heard?
- Does the failure to raise a grievance regarding procedural fairness in a revision application preclude a party from raising it in a constitutional petition?
- Is an order removing a member from a co-operative society valid if the member was provided show-cause notices and represented by counsel at the hearing?
- Messrs INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES Ltd. vs SHAHEEN1986 MLD 1753 · Sindh High Court · 1986-05-28Read full judgment →
- Messrs HUSSAIN CORPORATION Ltd. vs Messrs H ABIB BANK Ltd.1986 MLD 344 · Sindh High Court · 1985-12-17Read full judgment →
- MESSRS HOTEL PLAZA INTERNATIONAL vs PAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION1986 PLD Karachi 432 · Sindh High Court · 1986-05-26Read full judgment →
- MESSRS HASSAN BROTHERS & COMPANY vs MESSRS MAQBOOL COTTON1986 PLD Karachi 21 · Sindh High Court · 1978-04-23Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ARSHAD JAVED vs THE STATE1986 MLD 1206 · Sindh High Court · 1986-04-29Read full judgment →
- Messrs HAFIZ TEXTILE MILLS. Ltd. vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1986 MLD 206 · Sindh High Court · 1985-09-18Read full judgment →
- MESSRS HABIBULLAH MINES LTD. AND 1 0 OTHERS vs MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, QUETTA1986 PLD Quetta 225 · Balochistan High Court · 1986-04-23Read full judgment →
- Messrs Gum International Ltd vs Collector Of Customs, Karachi And 2 OtherPTCL 1986 CL. 88 · Sindh High Court · 1985-10-01Read full judgment →
- Messrs GALADARI CEMENT (GULF) Ltd. vs DISTRICT JUDGE KHUZDAR And 61986 CLC 10 · Balochistan High Court · 1985-08-25Read full judgment →
- Messrs FECTO SUGAR MILLS, DARYA KHAN vs COMMISSIONER, DERA GHAZI1986 MLD 649 · Lahore High Court · 1985-03-16Read full judgment →
- Messrs Farrukh Chemical Indus-Tries Limited vs The Commissioner Of Income Tax (South Zone), KarachiPTCL 1986 CL. 224 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- MESSRS EASTERN EXPRESS Co. LTD., KARACHI vs TARIQ HAMEED1986 PLD Karachi 84 · Sindh High Court · 1985-10-19Read full judgment →
- Messrs DELITE HOUSE Ltd. vs Ch. FAYYAZ AKBAR1986 CLC 495 · Lahore High Court · 1985-11-23Read full judgment →
- Messrs DELHI FINE ART PRESS vs Mst. SALAMA BEGUM1986 MLD 368 · Sindh High Court · 1985-12-21Read full judgment →
- MESSRS DAWOOD YAMAHA LTD. vs GOVERNMENT OF BALUCHISTAN AND 31986 PLD Quetta 148 · Balochistan High Court · 1985-11-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the levy and recovery of Octroi tax by the Town Committee, Uthal, from the petitioner’s factory. The petitioner argued that the factory was outside the Town Committee's jurisdiction, that the tax rate was excessive and discriminatory, and that the recovery was illegal. The respondents contended that the petition was incompetent, suffered from laches, and that the tax was validly imposed. During the proceedings, the Baluchistan Local Government (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985, was promulgated, which retrospectively validated the levy and recovery of such taxes. The Court held that the Validation Ordinance was a curative piece of legislation that effectively rectified any potential defects in the levy or recovery of the tax. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the legislature possesses plenary powers to enact curative legislation with retrospective effect, even to validate actions previously considered illegal or to override judicial findings, provided the legislative intent is clear and unambiguous. The Court also noted that the petitioner’s grievance regarding the tax rate could be addressed through administrative representations.
Questions settled- Can a legislature enact curative legislation to retrospectively validate a tax levy previously challenged in court?
- Does the definition of 'consumption' in the Baluchistan Local Government Ordinance, 1980, include the conversion of goods for mechanical purposes?
- Is a constitutional petition maintainable when the petitioner is a limited company but the petition is signed by an attorney without a specific board resolution?
- Can a court dismiss a constitutional petition on the grounds of laches if the petitioner has a recurring cause of action?
- Messrs Dada Sons. vs Commissioner Of Income TaxPTCL 1986 CL. 339 · Sindh High Court · 1986-02-18Read full judgment →
- Messrs CONFORDE LIMITED/ vs Messrs RAFIQUE INDUSTRIES Ltd. And Other1986 SCMR 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an application for interim relief filed in a pending appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from proceedings under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner, a co-defendant in a recovery suit, sought to suspend the operation of a High Court judgment that had remanded a banking case for fresh decision, and further requested to restrain the respondents from encashing a bank guarantee previously furnished by the petitioner. The core legal questions involved the effect of failing to appeal a preliminary decree and the scope of the Special Court's power under the Ordinance to execute decrees in various manners. The Supreme Court granted the interim relief to the extent of maintaining the status quo regarding the bank guarantee, thereby restraining the respondents from encashing it pending the disposal of the appeal. The Court also clarified that the respondents could seek the reversal of debit entries from the Special Court, which would decide such requests on their own merits. The holding establishes that during the pendency of an appeal, interim relief may be granted to preserve the status quo regarding financial security instruments like bank guarantees.
Questions settled- Can a party obtain interim relief to restrain the encashment of a bank guarantee pending the disposal of an appeal?
- Does the failure of a party to appeal against a preliminary decree affect the subsequent proceedings in a banking recovery suit?
- What is the scope of the power possessed by a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 to execute a decree?
- Messrs BURQUE CORPORATION KARACHI And Another vs DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE AND LAND CUSTOMS, QUETTA And Another1986 SCMR 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding the imposition of sales tax on imported NIDO powdered milk. The core legal question was whether NIDO qualified for a sales tax exemption under the category of milk food for infants and invalids as provided by government notifications issued under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The appellants argued that because the milk was modified with vegetable fat and vitamins, it constituted infant food. The Supreme Court held that the exemption applied only to products intended for the exclusive use of infants and invalids. Upon examining the product packaging, which advertised the milk as suitable for the whole family, the Court concluded that NIDO did not meet the criteria for exclusive infant use. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the product remained subject to sales tax. The principle established is that tax exemptions for specific categories of goods, such as infant food, require strict adherence to the intended use criteria, and products marketed for general consumption cannot claim such exemptions.
Questions settled- Is NIDO powdered milk exempt from sales tax as food for infants and invalids?
- What criteria must a product meet to qualify for a tax exemption designated for the exclusive use of infants?
- Does the Federal Government have the authority to impose sales tax on imported goods under the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
- Can a product marketed for general family consumption qualify for a tax exemption designated specifically for infant food?
- Messrs BUCKWELL Co. Ltd. vs SPENCER & Co.(PAKISTAN) Ltd.1986 MLD 2964 · Sindh High Court · 1986-10-12Read full judgment →
- Messrs BHABHA Ltd. vs Messrs UNITED ORIENTAL STEAMSHIP Co.1986 MLD 1350 · Sindh High Court · 1986-02-04Read full judgment →
- Messrs BAITHAK-E-KATABAN and others vs MUHAMMAD YAQUB and others1986 MLD 2036 · Lahore High Court · 1986-04-20Read full judgment →
- Messrs AYESHA TEXTILE MILLS Ltd. vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN Through Secretary, Ministry Of Commerce, Islamabad And Other1986 SCMR 836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns appeals against orders issued by an Enquiry Officer under the War Risks Insurance Ordinance, 1971, which assessed the insurable value of goods and a factory, ordering the payment of evaded premiums, surcharges, and penal interest. The petitioner had initially challenged these assessment orders directly through constitution petitions in the Lahore High Court rather than pursuing the statutory appellate remedy. Following the precedent established in Pakistan Chrome Mines Ltd v. The Enquiry Officer, War Risk Insurance (Sind and Baluchistan), the Supreme Court addressed the procedural irregularity of bypassing the appellate forum. The Court held that where an appeal was not filed against the Enquiry Officer's order, the appropriate course of action is to remand the matter to the designated appellate authority for a decision on the merits. Consequently, the Court directed that the pending constitution petitions be treated as appeals against the Enquiry Officer's orders and remanded the cases to the Ministry of Commerce, Insurance Wing, for adjudication on the merits.
Questions settled- Can a constitution petition filed against an assessment order under the War Risks Insurance Ordinance, 1971 be treated as an appeal?
- Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to remand a matter to the appellate authority when the petitioner bypassed the statutory appellate process by filing a writ petition?
- Messrs Awami Autos Ltd vs Assistant Collector Of CustomsPTCL 1986 CL. 35 · Sindh High Court · 1983-10-12Read full judgment →
- MESSRS ASSOCIATED WINE MERCHANTS vs MESSRS HOTEL METROPOLE LTD.1986 PLD Karachi 229 · Sindh High Court · 1985-03-25Read full judgment →
- Messrs ANWAR INDUSTRY LTD. vs Mst. REHMAT BIBI And Other1986 SCMR 1435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from proceedings in the High Court involving a dispute over land. The central legal questions involve the standing of a party to compromise and withdraw a Letters Patent Appeal after having sold the subject property during the pendency of a writ petition, and whether such an act prejudices the rights of a bona fide purchaser. Furthermore, the Court addresses whether the High Court was under a mandatory obligation to conduct an inquiry under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 upon allegations of collusion between the parties, and the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 at the appellate stage in the context of alleged collusive proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these issues, confirming an interim order while prohibiting further construction on the property pending the final disposal of the appeal, thereby preserving the status quo.
Questions settled- Does a party retain the right to compromise and withdraw a Letters Patent Appeal after selling the subject land during the pendency of a writ petition?
- Is the High Court obligated to conduct an inquiry under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when allegations of collusion are brought to its notice?
- Does Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply at the appellate stage in cases involving collusive proceedings?
- Messrs ANTIBIOTIC (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs MUHAMMAD AFZAL1986 PLC 656 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-12-22Read full judgment →
- Messrs ANNO R TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs Messrs SH. ISHFAQ and 2 others1986 MLD 1535 · Sindh High Court · 1986-04-07Read full judgment →
- MESSRS ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. vs MESSRS TAHIR TRADERS AND 81986 PLD Karachi 369 · Sindh High Court · 1986-04-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This application was filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 by defendants seeking condonation of delay in filing an application for leave to appear and defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The plaintiff, a banking company, had filed a recovery suit under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979. Summonses were issued simultaneously through three modes under Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Ordinance: publication, bailiff, and registered post. The publication occurred on November 29, 1985, while personal service via the bailiff was effected on January 4, 1986. The defendants filed their leave application on January 11, 1986. The High Court of Sindh held that where summonses are served on different dates through multiple modes, the period of limitation under Article 159 of the Limitation Act 1908 must be computed from the latest date of service. Consequently, the application was within time from the date of bailiff service, rendering the condonation application an act of abundant caution.
Questions settled- Whether mere publication of summons under Rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Rules constitutes proper service if other modes are not successfully executed?
- How should the period of limitation for filing a leave to defend application under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be computed when service of summons is effected on different dates through multiple modes?
- Does the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 completely exclude the application of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the service of summons?
- Messrs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN Limited vs Syed WAHID HUSSAIN1986 SCMR 946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court affirming an order of eviction against the petitioner-bank on the ground of bona fide personal occupation by the respondent-landlord for establishing a medical store for his son. The tenancy of two shops was terminated by notice, and the landlord subsequently filed an eviction application. The tenant resisted, claiming the renewal option was exercised and that the eviction request was mala fide due to a demand for increased rent. Both the Rent Controller and the High Court found the landlord's personal requirement to be genuine and supported by evidence regarding his son's qualification in pharmacy. The Supreme Court held that a mere demand for higher rent does not by itself establish bad faith, and the burden lies on the tenant to prove that the ejectment application is a colourable device when the landlord independently establishes bona fide requirement. Finding no legal infirmity in the concurrent findings of the lower forums, the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does a landlord's demand for higher rent prior to filing an ejectment application automatically render the ground of personal requirement mala fide?
- Where a landlord independently establishes a bona fide personal requirement, upon whom does the burden lie to prove that the ejectment application is a colourable device?
- Can concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding personal requirement be interfered with by the Supreme Court without showing legal error?
- Messrs ALLAH DITTA MUSICAL COMPANY vs MUHAMMAD IDREES BAQIR And 81986 CLC 591 · Lahore High Court · 1985-10-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a revision petition filed by a tenant challenging concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the District Judge, which ordered the tenant's ejectment from a non-residential property based on the landlord's bona fide personal need and reconstruction. The core legal questions were whether a non-residential building can be vacated for residential use by the landlord, and whether the landlord's right to reconstruct is limited by the tenant's right to reoccupy under the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The Court held that there is no legal restriction against converting a non-residential building into a residential one for the landlord's personal use. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the landlord's right to reconstruct under the relevant clause is not subject to the tenant's right of reoccupation, provided the reconstruction is bona fide. The key principles laid down are that the bona fide nature of a landlord's requirement is a question of fact not subject to interference in revision, and that no legal bar exists preventing the conversion of non-residential premises into residential property for personal use.
Questions settled- Can a non-residential building be vacated for the purpose of converting it into a residential house for the landlord's personal use?
- Is the landlord's right to reconstruct a building subject to the tenant's right to reoccupy the premises under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
- Does the Rent Restriction Ordinance prohibit the conversion of a non-residential building into a residential house?
- MESSRS ABASEEN INTERNATIONAL LTD. vs ADDITIONAL CONTROLLER OF RENT, CLIFTON CANTONMENT, KARACHI 'AND ANOTHER1986 PLD Karachi 365 · Sindh High Court · 1986-03-26Read full judgment →
- Messrs A And B Food Industries vs Commissioner Of Sales Tax. Ltd., And OtherPTCL 1986 CL. 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a private limited company manufacturing biscuits, sought a refund of sales tax paid on vegetable ghee consumed in the production process for the assessment years 1968-69, 1969-70, and 1970-71. The petitioner argued that because vegetable ghee was subject to capacity duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and subsequently exempted via a 1967 notification, they were entitled to a refund. The Sales Tax Officer rejected this claim, reasoning that since no sales tax was actually paid on the vegetable ghee due to the exemption, no refund could be granted. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, but the High Court reversed this decision, answering in the negative regarding the Tribunal's justification for ordering a refund. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying the core legal question as whether a manufacturer is entitled to a refund of sales tax on raw materials consumed in production when those materials were exempted from sales tax and suffered no such tax burden. The Court deemed this an important question of law requiring an authoritative decision.
Questions settled- Is a manufacturer entitled to a refund of sales tax on raw materials consumed in production if those materials were exempted from sales tax and suffered no tax burden?
- Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in directing a refund of sales tax on goods that did not suffer any sales tax liability?
- MESERs STERLING ENGINEERING CORPORATION vs THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1986 PLD Karachi 211 · Sindh High Court · 1983-06-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This full bench of the Sindh High Court was constituted to resolve a conflict of decisions regarding the interpretation of section 18(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, specifically whether the Federal Government is empowered under the second part of the subsection to impose a regulatory duty at a rate not exceeding 100% of the value of articles on all or any articles specified in the First Schedule, even if a rate is already specified therein. The core legal question revolved around whether the two parts of section 18(2) are disjunctive and give the Federal Government an independent option to levy regulatory duty under either part, or if the second part is restricted only to items where no rate is specified in the schedule. The court held that the Federal Government has the discretion to levy regulatory duty either under the first part (up to 50% of the specified rate read with protective duties) or under the second part (up to 100% of the value under section 25) for any articles specified in the First Schedule. The key principles laid down are that taxing statutes must be strictly construed according to the letter of the law and plain language, that the word "or" in section 18(2) has an alternative and disjunctive significance, and that the word "such" refers back to the articles mentioned in the preceding part without restricting the government's fiscal powers.
Questions settled- Whether under subsection (2) of section 18 of the Customs Act 1969, the Federal Government can impose a regulatory duty at a rate exceeding 50% of the rate specified in the First Schedule?
- Does the second part of section 18(2) of the Customs Act 1969 empower the Federal Government to levy a regulatory duty up to 100% of the value of articles determined under section 25 independently of whether a rate is already specified in the First Schedule?
- How should the word "or" appearing in section 18(2) of the Customs Act 1969 be construed with respect to the powers of the Federal Government?
- What are the established principles for interpreting taxing and fiscal statutes regarding the strict construction of the letter of the law?
- MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE vs MUHAMMAD IQBAL RATHORE1986 SCMR 905 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a service matter arising from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government against the judgment of the Punjab Services Tribunal dated 13-11-1983, which had accepted the respondent's appeal. The core legal question raised was whether a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government is barred by time when a certified copy of the impugned judgment was already received by the petitioner through the Service Tribunal under rule 21(1) of the relevant rules, and whether the petitioner can still exclude the time spent in obtaining a fresh certified copy from the copying agency under section 12 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the case of first impression requires detailed consideration regarding the calculation of limitation and the applicability of section 12 of the Limitation Act when a copy has already been received directly from the Tribunal. The key principle laid down is that the statutory right to deduct time spent in obtaining a certified copy from the copying agency requires examination to determine if it is ousted by the receipt of an official copy under tribunal rules.
Questions settled- Whether a petition for leave to appeal is barred by time if a certified copy was already received under rule 21(1) of the Tribunal rules?
- Can a party deduct the time spent in obtaining a fresh certified copy from the copying agency under section 12 of the Limitation Act when an official copy was already supplied by the Tribunal?
- MEHTAB ALI And Others vs MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE And Another1986 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine a writ petition filed by the petitioners. The dispute pertains to the transfer of an evacuee shop in Sahiwal Town. The predecessor of the petitioners, Basit Ali, had originally been transferred the shop on the basis of a compensation form, though a discrepancy existed regarding the property number, which he contended was inadvertently stated as 70/2 instead of 69/2-A. Following earlier remand proceedings, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner concluded that possession was not proved and transferred the shop to respondent Muhammad Siddique under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent constitutional petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the lower settlement authorities and the High Court had failed to properly consider material documentary and oral evidence, including the testimony of the rehabilitation inspector and survey records regarding the correct property number and actual possession. Finding that the orders were based on misreading and non-reading of evidence, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and ordered status quo to be maintained.
Questions settled- Whether a finding of fact by a settlement authority based on the misreading and non-reading of material evidence can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Does a discrepancy in property numbers on a compensation form vitiate the transfer when contemporaneous survey and official records establish actual possession?
- Whether the High Court is justified in dismissing in limine a writ petition where the orders of the tribunal below suffer from a failure to consider material evidence?
- MEHRULLAH KHAN BAZAI vs COMMISSIONER, QUETTA DIVISION /PRESIDING1986 CLC 3010 · Balochistan High Court · 1986-07-27Read full judgment →
- MEHRAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY vs FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION1986 MLD 1408 · Sindh High Court · 1986-04-28Read full judgment →
- MEHRAJ DIN alias MAJHOO vs THE STATE1986 PLD Lahore 159 · Lahore High Court · 1986-01-25Read full judgment →
- Mehr MUHAMMAD TARIQ vs MUHAMMAD SHAFI And OTHER1986 CLC 2309 · Lahore High Court · 1985-12-08Read full judgment →