Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• MUHAMMAD UMER AND OTHERS vs KHALIQ DINO AND OTHERSPLD 1985 Rev. 189 [Sind] · Board of Revenue · 1975-04-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD UMER and 8 others vs Haji ISLAMUDDIN KHAN1985 CLC 999 · Sindh High Court · 1984-10-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD UMAR vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE And 9 Other1985 SCMR 1591 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-15
  mortgage by conditional saleequity of redemptionclog on redemptionmartial law regulationres judicatadiscretionary remedyredemption of mortgaged lands
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from protracted litigation concerning a mortgage by way of conditional sale executed in 1960. The petitioner sought a declaration of ownership after the expiry of the redemption period, while the respondents sought redemption under the Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act. Lower courts and the High Court previously addressed issues regarding Martial Law Regulation 64 and the equity of redemption. The Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner could contend that the mortgage was void under Martial Law Regulation 64 to prevent redemption. The Court held that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by taking inconsistent positions, that a final judgment barring civil court jurisdiction on Martial Law Regulation 64 issues operates as res judicata, and that allowing the petitioner's plea would perpetuate injustice contrary to the principle 'once a mortgage always a mortgage'. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a litigant who previously argued a transaction was valid can subsequently plead that the transaction is void to defeat redemption?
  • Does a final judgment holding that the civil court lacks jurisdiction to examine Martial Law Regulation issues operate as res judicata against reopening the plea?
  • Is a stipulation requiring redemption of a mortgage within a strict period of one year a clog on the equity of redemption?
  • Can a petitioner invoke the discretionary writ jurisdiction of the court to perpetuate a manifest injustice?
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• MUHAMMAD UMAR and 3 others vs M. MUSHTAQ & SONS1985 PLC 346 · Labour Court · 1983-11-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL vs COMMISSIONER, GUJRANWALA DIVISION, GUJRANWALA1985 PLC (C.S.) 327 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1984-03-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and others1985 MLD 1275 · Sindh High Court · 1984-03-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL and others vs THE STAT E1985 P Cr. L J 1371 · Lahore High Court · 1984-08-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL and others vs MARKET COMMITTEE, KAMALIA1985 CLC 2827 · Lahore High Court · 1985-05-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL and another vs THE STATE1985 MLD 1424 · Lahore High Court · 1984-11-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL and 5 others vs THE STATE1985 P Cr. L J 2471 · Lahore High Court · 1985-05-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TASNEEM vs The STATE1985 SCMR 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-10
  murderinterested witnesschance witnessocular testimonycorroborationrecovery of weaponcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for murder under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court convicted the appellant and two co-accused, sentencing the appellant to death. The High Court subsequently acquitted the co-accused but maintained the appellant's conviction, relying on the ocular testimony of a single witness corroborated by the recovery of a weapon. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained solely on the testimony of an interested and chance witness, corroborated by a disputed recovery. The Supreme Court held that the ocular witness was both a chance witness and an interested witness due to his close relationship with the deceased, necessitating independent corroboration. The Court further found the recovery of the weapon unreliable, as the recovery witness was also an interested party and there were significant discrepancies in the evidence regarding the recovery. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, establishing the principle that the testimony of an interested witness requires independent corroboration, which cannot be provided by another interested witness.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of an interested witness be relied upon without independent corroboration?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon witnessed only by an interested party provide sufficient corroboration for an interested ocular witness?
  • Is a witness who happens to be at the scene of a crime by chance, without a satisfactory explanation, considered a reliable witness in a murder trial?
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• MUHAMMAD TARIQ KHAN and anothers vs THE STATE1985 P Cr. L J 1324 · Balochistan High Court · 1985-03-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TARIQ JILLANI vs Mst. RAHAT PARVEEN and another1985 MLD 387 · Sindh High Court · 1985-01-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TARIQ and anothers vs THE STATE1985 P Cr. L J 1058 · Federal Shariat Court · 1985-02-06Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULTAN and 2 others vs MEMBER (REVENUE), BOARD OF REVENUE1985 CLC 1479 · Lahore High Court · 1985-02-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULLEMAN vs THE STATE1985 PLD Quetta 228 · Balochistan High Court · 1985-06-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULEMAN vs UTILITY STORES CORPORATION1985 PLC 562 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-01-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULEMAN vs THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL And Another1985 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-11
  election matterleave to appealelection tribunalinvalid voteswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  Muhammad Suleman petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dated 19-6-1984, which dismissed his writ petition in an election matter. The core legal question involved whether the Election Tribunal's order declaring certain votes invalid without detailed reasons and the alleged discrepancy in the Presiding Officer's signatures warranted constitutional intervention. The Supreme Court held that the contentions had been properly dealt with and repelled by the High Court, and the petitioner failed to find any fault in the High Court's reasoning. Consequently, the Court decided that the case was not a fit one for interference and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that where findings of fact by an Election Tribunal regarding the validity of votes and signatures are affirmed by the High Court with sound reasoning, the Supreme Court will not interfere under appellate jurisdiction unless perversity or legal flaw is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Election Tribunal is required to give detailed reasons for declaring certain votes invalid?
  • Does an alleged discrepancy in the signatures of the Presiding Officer on election documents warrant interference by the High Court?
  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of the Election Tribunal and the High Court in an election matter?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULEMAN vs NASIB UD DIN And Other1985 SCMR 1709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-03
  cancellation of bailabscondenceZinapre-arrest bailHudood Ordinancepolice negligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a petition seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent, Naseebuddin, in a case involving the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The appellant contended that the respondent had absconded for five months, thereby disentitling him to bail under the principle established in Muhammad Sadiq v. Sediq, and further alleged that the respondent's name was interpolated into the bail order. The Supreme Court examined whether the respondent had intentionally absconded and if the bail order was valid. The Court held that the evidence did not support the allegation of intentional abscondence, noting that the police had shown a lack of keenness to arrest the respondent, evidenced by their recommendation to cancel the case. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the circumstances fell within the exceptions to the rule regarding abscondence as a bar to bail, as established in Awal Gul v. Zawar Khan. The Court affirmed that where police inaction or slackness is apparent, the presumption of intentional abscondence is rebutted, justifying the retention of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the police to actively pursue an accused negate the presumption of intentional abscondence for the purpose of bail?
  • Is an accused person who has not been actively sought by the police entitled to bail despite a period of non-appearance?
  • Can an appellate court cancel bail granted by a lower court based on the allegation of interpolation in the bail order without supporting evidence?
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• MUHAMMAD SULEMAN vs NASEEBUDDIN And 4 Other1985 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-23
  bail cancellationabsconsionpre-arrest bailleave to appealnon-speaking order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of an application for bail cancellation by the Lahore High Court. The respondents, including Naseebuddin, were charged under sections 6, 10, and 11 of Ordinance VII of 1979 and section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and were granted bail by the Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioner sought cancellation of bail on the grounds that Naseebuddin had absconded and that the bail order failed to discuss his case, addressing only the female co-accused. The core legal question is whether bail granted without considering the specific case of an accused who allegedly absconded is sustainable. The Supreme Court held that there is substance in the contention that the bail order omitted any reference to Naseebuddin and that he had not surrendered or appeared seeking pre-arrest bail. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal against Naseebuddin while dismissing the petition against the remaining respondents, and issued a show-cause notice regarding the setting aside of the impugned order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted to an accused without discussing his specific case in the order is sustainable?
  • Can an accused who has absconded and failed to surrender be granted bail?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the impugned bail order suffers from material non-appraisal regarding a specific respondent?
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• MUHAMMAD SULEMAN And Others vs MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM Through His Legal Heirs And Other1985 SCMR 67 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-11
  necessary partylimitation periodclerical errormemo of partiespartition suitcivil appealsubstitution of heirs
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether the Lahore High Court correctly applied the principle in Labhu Ram and others v. Ram Partap and others regarding the limitation period for impleading a necessary party in an appeal. The core legal question was whether an appeal should fail for non-joinder or misdescription of a legal representative when all actual heirs were in fact served, had participated, and the omission was merely a clerical or typographical error in the memorandum of parties. The Supreme Court held that where a necessary party has actually participated in the appellate proceedings and the omission in the memo of parties is a mere clerical or typographical slip rather than a total failure to implead, the strict rule barring late impleaded parties after limitation does not apply, distinguishing it from Labhu Ram's case. The Court set aside the High Court's dismissal and remanded the matter for decision on merits, affirming that procedural slips where notice and representation are substantially present should not defeat substantive rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal can be dismissed for a typographical error in the memo of parties when the necessary party has actually been served and participated in the proceedings?
  • Does the principle in Labhu Ram's case apply when a necessary party was already substantially represented and participating despite a clerical mistake in their description?
  • Can the appellate court invoke powers under the Code of Civil Procedure to correct a misdescription of a legal representative after the expiry of the limitation period?
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• MUHAMMAD SULEMAN AND ANOTHERs vs JAVED 1QBAL AND OTHERSPLD 1985 SC (A J & K) I · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1984-08-07Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SUBHAN vs THE CABINET SECRETARY AND ANOTHER1985 PLC (C.S.) 528 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1985-02-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SOOTA And Others vs The STATE1985 SCMR 596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-19
  criminal appealsentence reductionminor rolerigorous imprisonmentappellate discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a criminal revision by the High Court, which had upheld the conviction and sentence of the petitioners for an offence under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners, Muhammad Boota and Bashir Ahmad, were originally sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine. Upon hearing the petition, the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the judgment regarding Muhammad Boota. However, regarding Bashir Ahmad, the Court considered the minor role attributed to him in the commission of the offence. The State counsel having no objection, the Court exercised its discretion to convert the petition into an appeal and accepted it to the extent of reducing Bashir Ahmad's sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone, while maintaining the sentence of fine. The key principle established is that the appellate court may exercise discretion to reduce a sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone where the role of the accused is minor and the prosecution does not object.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court reduce a sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone based on the minor role of an accused?
  • Is it permissible for the appellate court to maintain a fine while reducing the term of imprisonment to the period already undergone?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIRJEES NAGI vs SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ISLAMABAD1985 PLC (C.S.) 432 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1984-12-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs ZAHOOR-UD-DIN and 6 others1985 MLD 292 · Lahore High Court · 1983-10-11Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs THE STATE1985 MLD 1418 · Lahore High Court · 1984-12-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, HOME1985 PLC (C.S.) 56 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1984-04-07Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs S.H.0.1985 MLD 831 · Lahore High Court · 1984-02-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs RURAL SUPPLY CO-OPERATIVE CORPORATION Ltd., LAHORE and another1985 PLC 200 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs AMIR AND OTHERSPLD 1985 Rev. 202 [Punjab] · Board of Revenue · 1985-01-07Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs ABDUL OHANI AND 3 OTHERSPLD 1985 Rev. 182 [Punjab] · Board of Revenue · 1984-04-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE and others vs THE STATE1985 P Cr. L J 2539 · Lahore High Court · 1985-04-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE And Others vs Haji TALIB HUSSAIN And Other1985 SCMR 1918 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-22
  temporary injunctionsubordination of courtsrevenue court jurisdictioncivil court powersstay of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the refusal of lower courts to grant a temporary injunction. The petitioners, who were parties to pending civil proceedings regarding an arbitration award for land, sought to restrain the respondents from pursuing a separate suit in a Revenue Court for rent recovery and ejectment. The core legal question was whether a Civil Court possesses the authority to issue a temporary injunction to stay proceedings pending before a Revenue Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that a Civil Court cannot grant an injunction to stay proceedings of another court that is not subordinate to it. The key principle laid down is that the power of a court to issue an injunction is limited by the hierarchy of the judicial system; specifically, a Civil Court lacks the jurisdiction to restrain proceedings in a Revenue Court because the latter is not subordinate to the former in the relevant context.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Civil Court issue a temporary injunction to stay proceedings pending in a Revenue Court?
  • Is a Revenue Court considered subordinate to a Civil Court for the purpose of granting an injunction to stay proceedings?
  • Does a Civil Court have the authority to restrain parties from pursuing litigation in a court that is not subordinate to it?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE and others vs DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THARPARKAR1985 CLC 2885 · Sindh High Court · 1984-10-17
  res judicatadismissal in limineinfructuous petitionNo-Objection Certificateminority disabilitycinematograph rulespower of reviewfunctus officio
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by residents of Kunri Town challenging the grant and extension of a No-Objection Certificate (N.O.C.) by the District Magistrate, Tharparkar, for establishing an open-air cinema. The N.O.C. was originally granted to a minor's guardian under the West Pakistan Cinematograph Rules 1962 and was later extended in review after an initial refusal. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the dismissal in limine of a previous petition filed on identical grounds operated as res judicata. The Sindh High Court held that the dismissal of a writ petition on technical grounds as infructuous does not constitute an adjudication on merits and does not attract res judicata. On the merits, the Court held that under Rules 3 and 5 of the 1962 Rules, a minor cannot hold a cinema licence and is thus incompetent to apply for or hold an N.O.C. Furthermore, review is a statutory right, and in the absence of an express provision, the District Magistrate had no authority to review his order refusing extension. The grant and extension of the N.O.C. were declared null, void, and without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a constitutional petition in limine as infructuous operate as res judicata against a subsequent petition?
  • Can a minor or their guardian lawfully apply for and be granted a No-Objection Certificate (N.O.C.) for a cinema licence under the Cinematograph Rules?
  • Does an administrative authority or statutory officer possess an inherent power of review in the absence of an express statutory provision conferring such power?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE And Others vs ABDUL GHANI And Other1985 SCMR 1104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-16
  sale deed interpretationappurtenant rightsAbadi Dehconcurrent findingscivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a civil revision petition challenging concurrent findings of the trial court and the first appellate court regarding the ownership of a residential house. The core legal question was whether a registered sale deed, which transferred agricultural land and appurtenant rights to an 'Ahata' (enclosure), also included the transfer of a specific residential house located in the Abadi Deh. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly interpreted the sale deed, finding that the disputed property was not included in the transaction. The Court reasoned that the sale deed did not specifically describe or mention the house in question, and the right to an 'Ahata' as an appurtenant right to agricultural land could not be extended to include existing residential structures in the village Abadi that were not part of the sold property. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts were based on a correct interpretation of the documentary evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a general reference to appurtenant rights in a sale deed for agricultural land be interpreted to include specific residential property located in the Abadi Deh?
  • Does the failure to describe a specific property in a registered sale deed preclude a claim of ownership over that property based on the deed?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts regarding the interpretation of a document?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE and anothers vs THE STATE1985 P Cr. L J 2988 · Sindh High Court · 1985-07-08Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE and another vs MUHAMMAD ARIF RANA ADDITIONAL1985 MLD 498 · Lahore High Court · 1984-01-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE and 8 others vs WAZIR HUSSAIN1985 CLC 1091 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1984-12-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND 6 OTHERS vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, FINANCE DEPARTMENT AND ANOTHER1985 PLC (C.S.) 810 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1985-03-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND 6 OTHERS vs BOOTA1985 PLD Lahore 243 · Lahore High Court · 1985-02-03
  pre-emptionpartial pre-emptionnotice before appealOrder XLIII Rule 3 CPCremand of suitcaveat systemdismissal of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a pre-emption suit where the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit for partial pre-emption due to the non-joinder of a vendee. The lower appellate court allowed the plaintiff's application under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure to amend the plaint and remanded the suit under Order XLI, Rule 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The vendees appealed this remand order. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the competency of the appeal due to the lack of prior notice under Order XLIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Lahore High Court held that Rule 3 applies to any appeal preferred during the pendency of a suit, whether against an order of the trial court or an appellate court, and requires obtaining an acknowledgment of receipt of notice before filing the appeal. The court found that a suit stands revived immediately upon a remand order, making it a pending suit, and that the appellants failed to comply with the mandatory notice requirement. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as not entertainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Order XLIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to appeals against orders passed by an appellate court during the pendency of a suit?
  • At what point does a suit become a pending suit after an order of remand by an appellate court?
  • Is obtaining an acknowledgment of receipt of notice mandatory prior to the presentation of an appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Does the revival of a suit upon remand depend upon the actual filing of the amended plaint?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQI vs Sh. IQBAL BAKHSH And Other1985 SCMR 874 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-09
  property transfersettlement schemeleave to appealfinality of litigationauction of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's claim regarding the transfer of a property. The petitioner sought the transfer of a portion of property he occupied, alleging it had not been auctioned, under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's claim for the transfer of the remaining portion of the property was maintainable in light of previous litigation regarding the same property. The Supreme Court examined the record and the High Court's findings, noting that a prior judgment of the Supreme Court had already conclusively determined the issues of transfer, auction, and the petitioner's eligibility. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court correctly applied the principle of res judicata or finality of litigation, as the matter had been previously adjudicated. The petition was dismissed, affirming that the petitioner could not re-litigate issues already settled by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner re-litigate the transfer and auction eligibility of a property after a final decision by the Supreme Court?
  • Is a claim for the transfer of property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII maintainable if the underlying issues of eligibility and auction have been previously decided by the Court?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ vs THE STATE1985 P Cr. L J 2892 · Lahore High Court · 1984-11-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ vs Mst. ARSH BIBI-- Respondent1985 CLC 1701 · Sindh High Court · 1985-04-13
  rented landejectment applicationlandlord-tenant relationshipestoppelstatutory interpretationpersonal usetitle extinction
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal concerns an ejectment application filed by a landlady against tenants of 'rented land' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether a landlord can evict a tenant from rented land for the purpose of constructing a residential building, or if the statutory ground of 'own use' is limited to business or trade purposes. Additionally, the court addressed whether a tenant is estopped from challenging a landlord's title that has expired. The court held that the phrase 'for his own use' in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Ordinance, when read with the restrictive conditions in sub-clauses (b) and (c) and the restoration provisions of subsection (4), limits the ground of eviction to business or trade purposes. Consequently, a landlord cannot evict a tenant from rented land to build a residence. Furthermore, the court ruled that while Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872 prevents a tenant from denying a landlord's title at the commencement of tenancy, it does not estop a tenant from pleading that the landlord's title has subsequently been extinguished.

  Questions settled

  • Does the expression 'for his own use' in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, permit eviction of a tenant from rented land for the construction of a residential building?
  • Is a tenant estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872 from challenging the landlord's title if that title has been extinguished subsequent to the commencement of the tenancy?
  • Must Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, be read in conjunction with sub-clauses (b) and (c) to determine the scope of 'own use'?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ vs Mistri MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ And Other1985 SCMR 1269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-15
  Settlement Scheme No. 1evacuee propertyremand orderauction-purchaseruninhabitable buildingproperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order remanding a property dispute to the Settlement Commissioner. The dispute involves a shop in Hafizabad, which was damaged by fire during the 1947 disturbances. While the shop was allotted to the respondent's father in 1954, it was subsequently auctioned to the petitioner in 1960. The core legal question was whether the shop, having been damaged, was transferable under the provisions of Settlement Scheme No. 1, specifically paragraph 21, which bars the transfer of incomplete or uninhabitable buildings. The High Court had remanded the case to the Settlement Commissioner, finding that the authority had failed to properly consider the nature of the property and acted with undue haste. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the remand order, holding that the question of the property's state on August 14, 1947, remained to be determined. The Court clarified that the High Court's findings on the property's habitability were merely tentative and should not prejudice the Settlement Commissioner's final determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does paragraph 21 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 bar the transfer of a shop that was rendered uninhabitable due to fire damage in 1947?
  • Can the High Court remand a case to the Settlement Commissioner if the authority failed to consider relevant documents regarding the nature of the property?
  • Are tentative findings made by the High Court in a remand order binding on the Settlement authority during subsequent proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ vs Master MUHAMMAD MUNIS1985 SCMR 1250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-14
  auction salesettlement authoritiesnatural justiceconstitutional jurisdictionproperty transferfactual findingswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the auction and transfer of property by settlement authorities. The respondent, an occupant of a shop, challenged the auction of the property in the High Court, claiming it was not included in the auction list and that he was denied natural justice by not receiving notice. The High Court accepted the petition, holding that the authorities erred by failing to serve notice on the occupant. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in reopening the auction. The Court held that the respondent's argument regarding the lack of notice was legally unfounded, as there was no statutory requirement to notify an occupant who lacked an entitlement to the property at the time of auction. Furthermore, the Court determined that the question of whether the specific property was auctioned was a factual matter already decided by the settlement hierarchy. Finding no misreading of evidence or jurisdictional error, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, affirming that factual findings by settlement authorities are not subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is there a legal requirement under the settlement laws to serve notice to an occupant of property before it is auctioned?
  • Can the High Court interfere with factual findings made by settlement authorities in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure to serve notice on an occupant of property, who has no entitlement to its transfer, provide grounds to reopen an auction sale?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ vs ADDITIONAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (G) and others1985 CLC 1893 · Lahore High Court · 1985-03-09Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ and 2 others vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB1985 CLC 1897 · Lahore High Court · 1985-03-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHOAB vs Hakim FEROZEUDDIN And Other1985 SCMR 1557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-26
  Provisional Transfer Deedcompensation poolsuo motu revisionmultiple allotmentlocus standidisplaced personssettlement of claims
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a Lahore High Court order regarding the cancellation of a property transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether a Provisional Transfer Deed (PTD) issued to a displaced person could be set aside by the Settlement Commissioner through suo motu revision on grounds of alleged multiple allotment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. It held that the Additional Settlement Commissioner's earlier finding—that the disputed portion was part of the shop transferred to the respondent—was a finding of fact that had attained finality. The Court established the principle that once a PTD is issued and the property exits the compensation pool, Settlement authorities lack jurisdiction to reopen the transfer via suo motu revision. Furthermore, a party lacking locus standi cannot challenge a transfer years later, particularly when the challenge is time-barred and the property is no longer available for disposal. Administrative finality must be respected to prevent endless litigation over settled property rights.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement authority reopen a property transfer via suo motu revision after a Provisional Transfer Deed has been issued and the property has left the compensation pool?
  • Does a finding of fact regarding the identity of property made by an Additional Settlement Commissioner attain finality if not challenged within the limitation period?
  • Does a local occupant have the locus standi to challenge a transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, if they failed to establish entitlement before the relevant settlement scheme was promulgated?
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• MUHAMMAD SHER vs THE ST A TE1985 P Cr. L J 55 · Lahore High Court · 1983-02-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHER And Others vs The STATE1985 SCMR 1688 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-27
  murdermitigating circumstancesdeath penaltycriminal appealabductionblood feudcompensationocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had maintained the convictions of the appellants for multiple murders and other offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while enhancing their sentences from life imprisonment to death. The appellants challenged these convictions and sentences before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence regarding one appellant, Sultan, who lacked a clear motive, and whether the abduction of a female family member by the complainant party constituted a mitigating circumstance justifying the reduction of the death penalty. The Supreme Court held that the evidence against Sultan was insufficient, leading to his acquittal. Regarding the remaining appellants, the Court maintained their convictions but reduced their sentences from death to life imprisonment, citing the complainant party's provocation—specifically the abduction of a woman—as a significant mitigating factor. Furthermore, the Court enhanced the fine imposed on the remaining appellants, directing that the proceeds be paid as compensation to the heirs of the deceased.

  Questions settled

  • Does the abduction of a female family member by the complainant party constitute a mitigating circumstance for the reduction of a death sentence?
  • Can an accused person be acquitted when there is no evidence of motive and a possibility of false implication?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to enhance the fine imposed on appellants while reducing their capital sentence to life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAUKAT vs THE STATE1985 P Cr. L J 1602 · Lahore High Court · 1984-07-11Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs THE STATE1985 P Cr. L J 709 · Sindh High Court · 1984-11-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB through Secretary, Industries and Mineral Development Department and 2 others1985 PLC (C.S.) 501 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1983-09-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, PUNJAB and others1985 CLC 1886 · Lahore High Court · 1985-02-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs SARDAR KHAN and others1985 CLC 2394 · Lahore High Court · 1985-05-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs SAEED AKHTAR HASSAN AND 8 OTHERS1985 PLD Lahore 365 · Lahore High Court · 1985-03-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs PUNJAB PROVINCE THROUGH THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, FOOD DEPARTMENT LAHORE AND ANOTHER1985 PLC (C.S.) 907 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs MUHAMMAD SADIQ and another1985 CLC 1645 · Lahore High Court · 1984-12-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs MUHAMMAD AMIN and 3 others1985 CLC 466 · Lahore High Court · 1984-10-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT1985 PLC 157 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs COLLECTOR/ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, SADDAR1985 PLC (C.S.) 604 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs BIR WALI and 14 others1985 CLC 1134 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1984-11-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs AFSAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD. And Another1985 SCMR 1181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-05
  land acquisitionreference to courtenhancement of compensationamendment of pleadingsspecial jurisdictionobjection to award
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the court addresses whether a court hearing a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act can permit an objector to amend their original application to claim increased compensation for acquired land. The appellant's land was acquired, and after being dissatisfied with the Collector's award, the appellant sought a reference claiming a flat rate. During the civil court proceedings, the appellant applied under Order VI, Rule 17 and section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code to enhance the claimed amount. The trial court partially allowed the amendment, but the High Court set it aside in revision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the jurisdiction of the court under section 18 is a special and strictly limited jurisdiction confined to the specific objection and matter referred. The claimant must be bound by their pleadings and claims presented before the Collector. Consequently, a claimant cannot be permitted to introduce a fresh case or enhance the compensation claim through amendment beyond the scope of the specific reference and initial objections.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court hearing a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act allow an objector to amend their application to claim increased compensation?
  • Does the civil court acting on a reference under the Land Acquisition Act exercise general civil jurisdiction or a special limited jurisdiction?
  • Is a claimant bound by the specific claim and pleadings presented before the Collector during land acquisition proceedings?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE1985 MLD 1250 · Lahore High Court · 1985-02-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF PURI And Another vs THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE1985 SCMR 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-26
  civil reviewreview jurisdictionevacuee propertyindustrial concernsettlement authoritiesconcurrent findingslaches
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition arises out of a common judgment dismissing earlier petitions concerning the transfer of evacuee property alleged to house an industrial concern. The core legal question involves the scope and limits of review jurisdiction against concurrent findings of fact and the assessment of whether an erroneous finding or alleged misreading of a document warrants a rehearing of the matter. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that the exercise of review jurisdiction does not amount to a rehearing of the matter and that a mere erroneous decision, per se, is insufficient to justify review when finality attaches to the original judgment. The key principle laid down is that review cannot be used as a vehicle to re-argue the merits of a case or challenge concurrent factual findings unless an error of record is shown to be material and consequential to the final outcome.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the exercise of review jurisdiction permits a rehearing of the matter on merits?
  • Does an erroneous decision per se constitute a sufficient ground to justify its review?
  • Can a party challenge concurrent findings of fact through a review petition?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF BHATTI vs DIRECTOR-GENERAL, T & T AND 4 OTHERS , . (1985 PLC (C.S.) 895 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1985-07-01Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND OTHERS vs SHER MUHAMMADPLD 1985 Rev. 201 [Punjab] · Board of Revenue · 1985-05-07Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF And Others vs ADMINISTRATOR THAL And Other1985 SCMR 1358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-22
  leave to appealretrospective effectvested rightspending actionsjurisdiction of civil courtland allotmentcancellation of allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' regular second appeal. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners was allotted government land in 1950, which allotment was cancelled in 1957 without notice. A civil suit challenging the cancellation was eventually decreed by the trial court, but subsequently dismissed upon re-trial following the setting aside of ex parte proceedings. The District Judge dismissed the first appeal on the sole ground that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred with retrospective effect by the Thal Development (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance 1975. The core legal question concerns whether a statutory bar on civil court jurisdiction applies retrospectively to pending actions and appeals instituted prior to the promulgation of the amending law. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that a statute affecting rights of action or taking away vested rights is presumed not to apply to pending actions unless express words compel such construction, and that the question regarding the legality of the cancellation required detailed consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a statute taking away or impairing vested rights or jurisdiction has retrospective effect over pending actions?
  • Does a bar on civil court jurisdiction created by an amending ordinance apply to suits and appeals already instituted prior to its enactment?
  • Whether the cancellation of a land allotment without notice can be challenged in a civil court notwithstanding subsequent jurisdictional bars?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF and anothers vs THE STATE1985 P Cr. L J 2730 · Lahore High Court · 1985-04-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF and another vs THE STATE1985 MLD 890 · Lahore High Court · 1984-08-01Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF And Another vs QUDRATULLAH1985 SCMR 1722 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-27
  restoration of appealdismissal for defaultnon-prosecutionjudicial discretionleave to appealcounsel negligenceprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' application for the restoration of a regular second appeal that was previously dismissed for default and non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether the failure of the petitioners' counsel to notice the listing of the appeal, resulting in non-appearance, constituted sufficient grounds for the restoration of the appeal and condonation of delay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the High Court had properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the restoration application. The Court held that the explanation provided for the absence was insufficient and that the discretionary exercise of the High Court in such procedural matters is not open to further scrutiny by the Supreme Court. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot automatically claim indulgence for the negligence or oversight of their counsel in failing to track case listings, and the High Court's refusal to restore an appeal dismissed for default, based on insufficient grounds, is a valid exercise of judicial discretion that will not be interfered with on appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal to restore an appeal dismissed for default?
  • Is the oversight of a counsel in failing to notice a case listing sufficient ground for the restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND 9 OTHERS vs THE STATE1985 PLD Sh. C (A J & K) 10 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1985-02-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF and 6 others vs ALI JAN and another1985 MLD 1071(1) · Lahore High Court · 1985-02-04Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF and 4 others vs THE STATE1985 MLD 1041 · Lahore High Court · 1985-06-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF and 2 others vs BOARD OF REVENUE (COLONIES1985 CLC 1928 · Lahore High Court · 1984-11-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF AASI vs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN Ltd., KARACHI1985 PLC 85 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-03-07Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAKIR vs KARACHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION1985 PLC 552 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-01-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAKIL vs STAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD. KARACHI1985 PLC 1023 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-02-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAHID IQBAL vs THE STATE1985 MLD 1331 · Lahore High Court · 1985-07-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAHEEN AZIZ N1AZI vs MUHAMMAD BAQIR and another1985 CLC 2733 · Lahore High Court · 1980-12-22
  specific performanceinterim injunctionlis pendensalienation of propertyCode of Civil Procedureconditional injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a trial court order in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell property. The trial court granted the appellant an interim injunction restraining the alienation of the property, but conditioned this relief upon the appellant depositing the balance sale consideration of Rs. 1,70,000, failing which the injunction would be rejected and the respondents would be at liberty to dispose of the property. The core legal question was whether a trial court possesses the authority to impose such a financial condition when granting a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court held that while Order XXXIX, Rule 2(2) allows for conditions such as security, Rule 1—which governs the present case involving the risk of alienation—does not authorize the imposition of financial conditions. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the doctrine of lis pendens prevents respondents from alienating property during litigation, as any such transfer remains subject to the final decree. The appeal was accepted, the condition set aside, and the injunction granted unconditionally.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court impose a financial condition for the deposit of sale consideration when granting a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the doctrine of lis pendens render a property transfer made during the pendency of a suit subject to the final decree?
  • Is there a distinction between the power to impose conditions under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 and Rule 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAH vs MESSRS CO-OP AND ANOTHER1985 PLC 771 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1985-03-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAH vs AZIZ AKBAR AND 4 OTHERS1985 PLD Peshawar 142 · Peshawar High Court · 1985-05-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAH MALIK vs THE STATE1985 P Cr. L J 1925 · Lahore High Court · 1985-04-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFIQUE vs The STATE1985 SCMR 1478 · Federal Shariat Court · 1985-05-11Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFIQUE vs Mst. MUBEEN KHATOON and 3 others1985 CLC 2413 · Sindh High Court · 1985-03-09Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ vs THE STATE1985 P Cr. L J 858(1) · Lahore High Court · 1985-01-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ And Another vs ATTA MUHAMMAD And Other1985 SCMR 1272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-20
  civil suitleave to appealfraud and misrepresentationres judicatasettlement authoritiesfrivolous litigationcosts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioners against the concurrent dismissal of their civil suit and rejection of their plaint challenging the transfer of disputed property in favour of the contesting respondents. The core legal question is whether a party can resort to a fresh civil action to re-open a matter finally decided up to the highest court on a new ground of fraud that was available but never raised during the earlier settlement proceedings. The Supreme Court held that initiating a civil suit to re-open finally decided matters on grounds available earlier is improper, vexatious, and frivolous, thereby dismissing the petition for leave to appeal with costs. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot circumvent final adjudications by launching a fresh civil action on new grounds that could and should have been raised in prior proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party file a fresh civil suit to challenge a transfer order already finalized up to the highest court on the ground of fraud?
  • Whether resorting to a civil action to re-open a finally decided matter on a new ground available earlier constitutes frivolous and vexatious litigation?
  • Is the Supreme Court empowered to award costs while dismissing a petition for leave to appeal under its rules?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI. vs SIRAJUDDIN and 3 others1985 CLC 1788 · Sindh High Court · 1984-08-04Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs THE STATE1985 PLD Lahore 173 · Lahore High Court · 1985-01-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs THE PAKISTAN ENGINEERING CO. AND OTHERS1985 PLC 738 · Lahore High Court · 1985-01-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs SOHRAB and 3 others1985 CLC 555 · Lahore High Court · 1983-01-24Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs REHMAT ALI1985 CLC 432 · Lahore High Court · 1984-09-18
  pre-emption suitcourt-fee deficiencyrejection of plainturban immovable propertycivil revisionpleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a pre-emption suit concerning the sale of land. The petitioner-vendee challenged the lower courts' findings on two primary grounds: first, that the plaint was grossly under-assessed for court-fee purposes, rendering it legally defective; and second, that the property had acquired an urban character, making it exempt from pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The Court held that while the lower courts erred in their assessment of the court-fee issue, a plaint cannot be rejected for deficiency in court-fee without the court first determining the payable amount and granting the plaintiff an opportunity to make good the deficiency. Regarding the nature of the property, the Court ruled that the petitioner failed to lay a factual foundation in the pleadings or provide sufficient evidence to establish the property as urban immovable property. The Court affirmed the findings on the merits but directed the respondent to pay the deficient court-fee, failing which the plaint would be liable for rejection, establishing that the Court Fee Act is a revenue measure, not a weapon for litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint be rejected for deficiency in court-fee without the court first determining the payable amount and providing an opportunity to make up the deficiency?
  • Is a party permitted to raise a plea regarding the urban character of property in a pre-emption suit if such a plea was not specifically raised in the written statement?
  • Does the Court Fee Act 1870 allow a defendant to use the deficiency of court-fee as a weapon to defeat a suit on technical grounds?
  • What is the procedure for a court to determine the market value of land for court-fee purposes when annual net profits are not provided?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT BOARD1985 PLC 655 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1984-10-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs PLANT PROTECTION ADVISOR AND DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT1985 SCMR 1893 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service appealtransfer orderdisobedienceremoval from serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his removal from service. The petitioner, a Chowkidar, was transferred by departmental authorities, but his immediate superior, the Security Officer, refused to relieve him from his current posting due to security responsibilities and administrative control. Consequently, the petitioner was suspended and eventually removed from service following departmental proceedings for alleged disobedience. The core legal question is whether an employee can be held guilty of disobedience for failing to report to a transferred post when his immediate superior officially refused to relieve him and maintained control over his duties. The Supreme Court held that the submissions regarding the employee being trapped in an administrative conflict and obeying his immediate superior deserved consideration. The Court granted leave to appeal and allowed the petition, establishing that an employee acting under the binding instructions of their immediate superior prior to a modification of administrative control cannot be arbitrarily penalized for non-compliance with a transfer order.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee be held guilty of disobedience of a transfer order when his immediate superior refuses to relieve him from duty?
  • Does an employee incur liability for following the administrative directions of a superior officer who holds lawful control over his posting at the relevant time?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs MUHAMMAD NAJIB and another1985 CLC 1087 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1985-01-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE and others1985 CLC 2991 · Lahore High Court · 1985-04-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE And Other1985 SCMR 817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-04-08
  Grow More Food Schemeproprietary rightsState landleasehold rightsadministrative policyconcession of salecivil appeals
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns twenty-eight consolidated civil appeals arising from disputes over the acquisition of proprietary rights in State land leased under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' of 1955-56. The core legal controversy involved whether lessees who were denied the option to purchase land due to specific restrictive conditions—specifically that leases must have expired before 1961—were entitled to relief. While the High Court initially dismissed petitions challenging these restrictions, a subsequent Bench took a contrary view, allowing such claims. During the pendency of the appeals before the Supreme Court, the Provincial Government of the Punjab revised its policy via a letter dated April 26, 1971, extending the offer to acquire proprietary rights to all allottees under the scheme, regardless of lease expiry dates. Consequently, the Government conceded the lessees' claims and sought to withdraw its own appeals. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the lessees and permitted the withdrawal of the appeals filed by the Provincial Government, thereby settling the dispute in accordance with the Government's revised policy.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent change in government policy regarding the acquisition of proprietary rights for State land allottees render pending litigation moot?
  • Can the Provincial Government withdraw appeals filed by it against a High Court judgment if it has adopted a new policy that concedes the underlying claim?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs LYALLPUR COTTON MILLS, FAISALABAD1985 PLC 149 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-06-29Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs CHAIRMAN, AZAD KASHMIR LOGGING AND SAW MILL1985 PLD SC (A J & K) 119 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1985-05-10Read full judgment →