Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• MUHAMMAD YAMIN vs NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN1983 PLC 862 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-03-04Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YAMIN vs DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, D. I. KHAN AND 21983 P Cr. L J 2365 · Peshawar High Court · 1983-06-07Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YAMEEN vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 2411 · Lahore High Court · 1982-01-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YAKOOB JAKHRO vs Haji YAR MUHAMMAD Respendent1983 CLC 1583 · Sindh High Court · 1982-05-25Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YAHYA vs S. JAMILUR REHMAN1983 CLC 2001 · Sindh High Court · 1982-10-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD WALI KHAN vs DR. JAWAD ALI KHAN AND 5 OTHERS1983 PLD Karachi 425 · Sindh High Court · 1983-02-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD WALAYAT AND OTHERS vs LIAQAT HAYAT AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2598 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD vs The STATE1983 SCMR 673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-15
  extra-judicial confessiondying declarationtransportation for lifecriminal appealrecovery of incriminating articlessentencingacquittal reversal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for murder and robbery under Sections 302 and 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an acquittal by the trial court which was subsequently reversed by the High Court. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence regarding an extra-judicial confession and recoveries, and the appropriate sentencing regime for an offense committed prior to the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the prosecution's evidence—including the deceased's dying declaration by signs, the extra-judicial confession, and the recovery of blood-stained incriminating articles from the appellant's shop—to be credible and corroborated. The Court held that since the offense occurred in 1967, the sentence of "imprisonment for life" imposed by the High Court was legally incorrect, as the law at the time mandated "transportation for life." Consequently, the Court modified the sentence to transportation for life while maintaining the conviction, and granted the appellant the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the period of detention.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction can be sustained based on a dying declaration made through signs and an extra-judicial confession?
  • Does the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 apply retrospectively to sentencing for offenses committed before its enactment?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the period spent in custody?
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• MUHAMMAD vs S. D. M. AND TRIBUNAL, MIRPUR SAKRO AND ANOTHERs1983 P Cr. L J 439 · Sindh High Court · 1982-09-01Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD USMAN vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 941 · Sindh High Court · 1982-05-08Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD USMAN vs THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL, UNION COUNCIL/DEPUTY1983 CLC 2170 · Lahore High Court · 1982-09-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD USMAN vs MUHAMMAD USMAN1983 CLC 2875 · Sindh High Court · 1983-04-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD URIS AND ANOTHER vs MUHAMMAD YAQOOB1983 CLC 1130 · Sindh High Court · 1982-05-04Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD UMAR vs Mst. QAISAR JAHAN1983 CLC 3097 · Sindh High Court · 1983-03-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD UMAR AND Another vs BASHIR AHMAD AND Other1983 SCMR 1269(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-01
  ejectment petitionrent restrictionjurisdictionopen sitelease deedsublettingsuperstructure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a rent dispute where the landlord sought the ejectment of the sub-tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the ejectment petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the leased premises constituted a 'mill' and thus fell outside the scope of the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The District Judge reversed this decision on appeal, and the High Court subsequently dismissed the tenant's Second Appeal against Order (S.A.O.). The core legal question was whether the leased property constituted an industrial concern (a mill) or an open site, which would determine the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that since the lease deed explicitly leased out only an open plot of land and required the tenant to remove any superstructure upon the expiry of the lease, the leased premises remained an open site. Consequently, the Rent Controller possessed jurisdiction, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a lease of an open plot of land for the purpose of installing an industrial concern constitutes the lease of an industrial concern or an open site for jurisdictional purposes?
  • Does the requirement in a lease deed to remove any superstructure upon the expiry of the lease term indicate that the leased premises is an open site?
  • Does the Rent Controller have jurisdiction over an ejectment petition where the subject matter of the lease is an open plot of land?
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• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL vs THE STATE1983 P Cr.-L J 324 · Lahore High Court · 1982-10-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TUFAIL vs DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFCER, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1983 PLC (C. S.) 790 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1983-02-28Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TOFIQUE vs THE STATE.1983 P Cr. L J 565 · Sindh High Court · 1982-11-06Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TAYYIB vs GOVERNMENT OF N: W. F. P. AND Other1983 SCMR 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-07-06
  medical college admissionprospectus interpretationmerit determinationeducational policyacademic admissionwrit jurisdictionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding admission criteria for the M.B., B.S. program at Khyber Medical College, Peshawar. The appellant, holding a B.Sc. (Medical Technology) degree, challenged the High Court's decision which restricted his admission merit calculation to his F.Sc. (Pre-Medical) marks, effectively excluding his B.Sc. performance. The core legal question was whether the "Important Notes" in the college prospectus, specifically clause (xv), overrode the substantive admission criteria regarding merit determination. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s interpretation was erroneous. Reading the prospectus as a whole, the Court determined that B.Sc. (Medical Technology) marks were intended to be a valid basis for merit assessment, and the restrictive interpretation was inconsistent with the prospectus's overall scheme. While the Court affirmed the appellant's correct interpretation of the admission policy, it declined to cancel the admissions of the respondents, who had already completed two years of study, opting instead to protect the appellant's entitlement for future academic sessions. The judgment emphasizes that prospectus provisions must be construed harmoniously rather than in isolation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a specific clause in a college prospectus regarding 'Important Notes' override the substantive admission criteria laid down in the prospectus?
  • Can a candidate holding a B.Sc. (Medical Technology) degree claim admission to an M.B., B.S. program based on the marks obtained in that degree?
  • Should the provisions of an educational prospectus be interpreted in isolation or harmoniously as a whole?
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• MUHAMMAD TARIQ SAEED HASHMI vs HABIB BANK LTD. AND 3 OTHERS1983 PLC 810 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-05-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD YUSUF vs PUNJAB PROVINCE1983 CLC 2425 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TARIQ KHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION, ISLAMABAD AND ANOTHER1983 PLC (C. S.) 311 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1983-01-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TARIQ AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. LJ 2179 · Lahore High Court · 1982-03-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TANVEER KHAN vs FAIZ HUSSAIN SHAH AND OTHERS1983 PLD Azad J & K 28 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1983-04-11Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TAHIR vs ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER_COLLECTOR, SADAR1983 PLC (C.S.) 1016 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1982-07-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TAHIR MAHMOOD vs THE STATE1983 PCr. L J 1654 · Lahore High Court · 1982-08-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD TAHIR KHAN vs The STATE1983 SCMR 1169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-01
  murderdeath sentencemitigating circumstancessentence commutationlife imprisonmentcompensation to legal heirsland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant under Sections 302 and 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Sessions Judge, Malakand, which resulted in a sentence of death and was subsequently confirmed by the Peshawar High Court. Leave to appeal was granted specifically to consider the question of sentence. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot and killed the deceased after an altercation concerning the deceased ploughing an orchard. While the prosecution witnesses claimed the deceased was a lessee, no documentary evidence proved tenancy, and the appellant contended under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 that the deceased was illegally occupying the land. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution is legally bound to exclude all possible extenuating circumstances to justify the normal penalty of death. Finding mitigating circumstances surrounding the dispute and lack of proof of lawful tenancy, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, while imposing substantial compensation and fines under Sections 544-A and 545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is the prosecution bound to exclude all possible extenuating circumstances before the capital sentence of death can be lawfully awarded?
  • Whether the absence of documentary evidence proving lawful possession or tenancy by a deceased in a land dispute can constitute a mitigating ground to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can compensation under Section 544-A and a fine under Section 545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be imposed simultaneously upon commuting a death sentence?
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• MUHAMMAD TAHIR AND 10 Other vs PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND1983 PLC (C. S.) 1173 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULTAN ANSARI AND Others vs Mst. JEHAN ARA AND Other1983 SCMR 1139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-06
  leave to appealconstitutional petitionproperty transferallotmentsurrender of rightspossession
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, successors-in-interest of the brother of the predecessor-in-interest of the contesting respondents, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing their constitutional petition regarding the transfer of Property No. 13, Fane Road, Lahore. The core legal questions involved the validity and effect of an alleged handwritten but unsigned surrender document by which one Shah Rahman Ansari purportedly gave up his rights in favour of his mother, and whether a claimant mother should have received preference over her non-claimant son who was the actual allottee in undisputed possession. The Supreme Court held that the surrender document was rightly rejected as its execution and genuineness were unestablished, and further held that between an allottee-non-claimant and a claimant holding possession under him, preference is given to the allottee in undisputed possession. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unsigned and unestablished handwritten document can operate as a valid surrender of property rights?
  • Does a claimant non-allottee holding possession under an allottee non-claimant enjoy preference over the allottee in property transfer disputes?
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• MUHAMMAD SULEMAN. vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1095 · Lahore High Court · 1982-12-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULEMAN vs ELECTION TRIBUNAL, SIND 2 AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2859 · Sindh High Court · 1982-10-06Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SULEMAN vs EHSAN ALI (REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS)1983 PLD Karachi 537 · Sindh High Court · 1983-03-16
  second appeallimitationcourt-feeimplied extension of timetime-barred appealexclusion of timepoverty as ground for extensionvested rightproper presentation of appealCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal challenged the dismissal of a first appeal by the Additional District Judge, Karachi, on grounds of limitation and deficit court-fee. The respondent/plaintiff had sued for declaration and possession of a hotel, which was decreed by the Civil Judge. The appellant's first appeal was filed with insufficient court-fee, and the deficit was paid after the limitation period expired. The core legal questions were whether the appeal was time-barred, whether time for obtaining copies should be excluded twice, and if the acceptance of deficit court-fee by the office constituted an implied extension of time under Section 149, C.P.C. The Sindh High Court held that the first appeal was time-barred, affirming that an appeal is not properly presented until the correct court-fee is paid. It clarified that time for obtaining copies cannot be excluded twice, and an implied extension of time under Section 149, C.P.C. requires judicial application of mind, not mere acceptance by office. Poverty was also held not to be a valid ground for extending time, especially when a vested right had accrued to the opposing party.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be considered properly presented if filed with deficit court-fee?
  • Can the time requisite for obtaining copies of judgment and decree be excluded twice under Section 12 of the Limitation Act?
  • Does the mere acceptance of deficit court-fee by the court office constitute an implied extension of time under Section 149, Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Is poverty a valid ground for the court to exercise discretion and extend the period for paying deficit court-fee, especially when a vested right has accrued to the defendant?
  • Is a court bound to grant time to make up a deficiency in court-fee under Order VII Rule 11(c), Code of Civil Procedure, when the suit has already become time-barred?
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• MUHAMMAD SULAIMAN MALIK AND ANOTHERS vs ROYAL TRUST CORPORATION1983 PLD Karachi 382 · Sindh High Court · 1983-01-08
  administration suitstamp dutyinstrument of partitioncourt feesfinal decreepartition suitestate administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This office reference addressed whether a final decree passed in an administration suit is liable to stamp duty as an instrument of partition under the Stamp Act, in addition to court fees payable under the Court Fees Act. The court examined the legal distinction between administration suits, which involve the management and distribution of a deceased's estate, and partition suits. It held that while administration suits and partition suits are distinct legal proceedings, a decree in an administration suit may still fall within the definition of an instrument of partition under Section 2(15) of the Stamp Act if it effectively partitions property. However, the court determined that because the specific decree in this case did not effect a partition—as assets remained to be realized and further acts were required—it did not constitute an instrument of partition. Consequently, the court ruled that no stamp duty was payable on the decree. The principle established is that stamp duty liability for an administration suit decree depends on whether the decree actually effects a partition of property.

  Questions settled

  • Is a decree passed in an administration suit liable to stamp duty as an instrument of partition?
  • Does the payment of court fees in an administration suit exempt the decree from stamp duty?
  • What is the legal distinction between an administration suit and a partition suit for the purposes of stamp duty?
  • Under what circumstances does a decree in an administration suit qualify as an instrument of partition under the Stamp Act?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE, vs RURAL SUPPLY CO-OPERATIVE CORPORATION LTD.1983 PLC 576 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-03-29Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1859 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs THE MARKET COMMITTEE, TANDLIANWALA1983 SCMR 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  interlocutory injunctionerroneous source of powersubordinate legislationretrospective operationaudi alteram partemfarm marketsfreedom of traderepealed statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This leave petition arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision against the refusal of an interlocutory injunction in a representative suit filed by traders. The petitioners, holding licences under the repealed Agricultural Market Produce Act 1939, challenged a government notification restricting the establishment of markets and prohibiting business outside newly notified Farm Markets under the Punjab Local Government Act 1975. The core legal questions concerned whether a notification citing a repealed statute is ultra vires, whether delayed publication in the official Gazette makes subordinate legislation retrospective, and whether such a notification violates the principle of audi alteram partem. The Supreme Court held that an erroneous reference to a repealed source of power does not invalidate a notification if statutory power exists aliunde under current legislation, that delayed publication does not render subordinate legislation retrospective prior to its signing, and that general legislative or administrative measures do not attract the rule of audi alteram partem. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an erroneous reference to a repealed statute in the preamble of a notification render the notification ultra vires when statutory power is available under a subsequent Act?
  • Does the delayed publication of a notification in the official Gazette render subordinate legislation retrospective in operation?
  • Does the issuance of a notification establishing a notified market without prior notice to affected traders violate the principle of audi alteram partem?
  • Does Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 confer an absolute right to engage in trade or profession free from statutory regulation?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs MUHAMMAD BOOTA1983 SCMR 1262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-08
  ejectmentbona fide personal useconcurrent findings of factadditional evidencerent restrictionprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order passed against a tenant on the grounds of the landlord's bona fide personal use. The ejectment order was upheld by both the District Judge and the Lahore High Court. The petitioner contended that the Rent Controller erred by deciding the case without first disposing of an application to adduce additional evidence. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that the appellate courts had found this application was maneuvered onto the trial court's file after the appeal had already been admitted, and that the petitioner had failed to raise this ground in the memorandum of the first appeal or seek further inquiry under the relevant statutory provisions. The Court held that since the matter involved concurrent findings of fact concluded against the petitioner by three lower courts, there was no scope for interference. The petition was dismissed, affirming that procedural irregularities alleged for the first time at the appellate stage, which appear to be fabricated, do not warrant Supreme Court intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding ejectment orders?
  • Is an application for additional evidence valid if it is maneuvered onto the trial court file after an appeal has been admitted?
  • Does the failure to raise a procedural ground in the memorandum of first appeal preclude its consideration in subsequent appeals?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs MESSRS VARIETY FABRICS1983 PLC 1154 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-03-09Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs ABDUL KARIM AND 8 OTHERS1983 CLC 913 · Lahore High Court · 1982-12-19
  rent restrictionstriking off defencewilful defaultbona fide mistakerent controllertenant's liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This Second Appeal from Order (S.A.O.) challenges concurrent orders by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge, which struck off the appellant-tenant's defence for failing to comply with a rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the tenant's failure to deposit the rent for June 1974 by the specified date constituted a wilful default warranting the striking off of the defence, or whether it resulted from a bona fide misunderstanding of the court's order. The Court held that the Rent Controller failed to exercise jurisdiction properly by not considering the tenant's plausible explanation for the delay, which arose from confusion regarding whether the June rent fell under 'arrears' or 'future rent'. The Court established that the penalty of striking off a defence is reserved for contumacious or wilful disobedience. Where a tenant offers a reasonable, bona fide explanation for non-compliance, the element of wilfulness is absent, and the court must apply a judicious approach rather than a perfunctory rejection of the tenant's plea.

  Questions settled

  • Does a bona fide misunderstanding of a rent deposit order negate the element of wilful default?
  • Is a Rent Controller required to provide a reasoned order when deciding to strike off a tenant's defence?
  • Can a defence be struck off under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 if the default in rent payment is not wilful?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE KHAN vs CHIEF DIRECTOR, CENTRAL DIRECTORATE1983 PLC (C. S.) 109 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1980-11-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND Another vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 2394 (1) · Lahore High Court · 1982-04-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND ANOTHER vs MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND OTHERS1983 PLD Azad J & K 5 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1982-07-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND 2 OTHERS vs REGISTRAR COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES1983 CLC 1996 · Lahore High Court · 1982-10-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND 2 Others vs Mst. SHEEDI1983 SCMR 448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-30
  limitationleave to appealfraud and deceitremandknowledge of decreecivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that had remanded a case regarding the validity of a decree and the issue of limitation. The respondent, Mst. Sheedi, had challenged a 1954 civil decree, alleging fraud and deceit, and filed a suit for possession in 1973 after withdrawing an earlier suit. The trial court initially dismissed the suit as time-barred under Article 95 of the Limitation Act 1908. On appeal, the High Court remanded the matter, requiring the appellate court to first determine the merits before addressing limitation. Upon remand, the appellate court ruled the suit was within time, finding the respondent only learned of the decree on 29-1-1970. The petitioners challenged this, arguing the respondent had actual knowledge of the decree as early as 18-8-1969, evidenced by her obtaining a copy of the mutation. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, primarily to determine the correct date of the respondent's knowledge of the decree and whether the suit was barred by limitation under the relevant statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a suit challenging a decree on the basis of fraud commence from the date of the decree or the date of the plaintiff's knowledge of the fraud?
  • Is it legally necessary for an appellate court to decide issues on merits before addressing a preliminary issue of limitation?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ.GHULAM HAIDER. vs Ch. FAZAL DIN AND OTHERS.FAROOQ AHMAD BHATTI AND OTHERS1983 PLD Supreme Court 238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-01
  cantonment rent restrictionadditional rent controlleradditional executive officerpersona designataappointment by designationeviction proceedingsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals by special leave challenged judgments of the Lahore High Court which dismissed constitutional petitions against eviction orders passed by Additional Rent Controllers of Lahore Cantonment under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The core legal question was whether the notification appointing Additional Executive Officers as Additional Rent Controllers was in contravention of Section 6(2) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, read with Section 10 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, rendering the proceedings a nullity. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Government is empowered under Section 6(2) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, to appoint any person as an Additional Controller of Rents, and when such appointment designates individuals by their office as Additional Executive Officers, they function as persona designata. The Court ruled that regardless of any questions concerning the creation or status of the post of Additional Executive Officer under the Cantonments Act, 1924, the appointees were validly designated and clothed with full power and authority of a Controller under Section 2(d) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of an Additional Executive Officer as an Additional Rent Controller contravenes Section 6(2) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Does the Federal Government have the authority to appoint a person as an Additional Controller of Rents by designation under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Is the competency of an Additional Executive Officer under the Cantonments Act, 1924, relevant when determining their valid designation as an Additional Controller of Rent?
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• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ A. MEMON vs MESSRS PAKISTAN MILK FOOD1983 CLC 845 · Sindh High Court · 1982-11-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIK vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1163 · Sindh High Court · 1982-06-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAUKAT ALI vs Khawaja AMMAR HUSSAIN1983 CLC 2015 · Sindh High Court · 1982-10-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs TOWN COMMITTEE, SHAHICOT AND ANOTHER1983 CLC 1980 · Lahore High Court · 1982-10-31Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs THE STATE1983 PCr. LJ 1817 · Lahore High Court · 1983-02-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs STATE AND OTHERS1983 PLD Rev. 49 · Board of Revenue · 1983-01-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs MUHAMMAD UMAR AND 3 Other1983 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-19
  local government electionsmisconductadministrative lawremand orderwrit jurisdictiondisqualificationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had remanded an election dispute to the Commissioner. The respondents were unseated as members of a Town Committee by the Commissioner based on two grounds: membership in a political party and misconduct regarding encroachment on municipal land. The High Court set aside the Commissioner's order, holding that one ground (political affiliation) related to pre-election disqualification, and applied the principle that if one ground of an administrative order is invalid, the entire order must be set aside and remanded for a fresh decision. The petitioner, who was elected in the subsequent by-election, challenged this, arguing that the principle of invalidating an entire order due to one bad ground does not apply outside the context of preventive detention. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether an administrative order based on multiple grounds must be struck down entirely if one ground is found invalid, and whether the alleged encroachment constitutes 'misconduct' under the relevant local government legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle that an administrative order must be set aside if one of its grounds is invalid apply to cases outside the scope of preventive detention?
  • Is the explanation provided in Section 29 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 an exhaustive definition of misconduct?
  • Can a court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, sustain an administrative order if one of the grounds relied upon by the tribunal is found to be irrelevant or outside its jurisdiction?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs Mst. ZUBAIDA BEGUM AND Other1983 SCMR 1197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-07
  unclean handswrit jurisdictionfalse surety bondeviction proceedingsabuse of processbona fidesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from proceedings initiated against the petitioner for allegedly furnishing a false surety bond in an urban tenancy eviction case, where the bond was a condition for staying physical ejectment. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's refusal to interfere with a lower court's direction for the petitioner's prosecution under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the petitioner's conduct throughout the protracted litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the lower courts' findings that the petitioner had approached the court with unclean hands and lacked bona fides. The Court observed that the petitioner had engaged in a subversion of the legal process to frustrate lawful ejectment orders. The key principle laid down is that a petitioner who approaches a court with unclean hands and demonstrates a lack of bona fides in the context of legal proceedings is disentitled to discretionary relief, particularly in writ jurisdiction, as the court will not assist those who abuse the legal process.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petitioner who approaches the court with unclean hands and lacks bona fides forfeit the right to discretionary relief in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a court decline to interfere with a direction for prosecution under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the petitioner has abused the legal process?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs MESSRS RAFHAN MAIZE PRODUCTS Co. LTD.1983 PLC 273 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-11-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs MAZHARUL HAQ AND 5 OTHERS1983 P Cr. L J 1440 · Sindh High Court · 1983-01-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs DEPUTY MEDICAL SUPERINTENDENT,1983 PLC (C. S.) 226 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1982-10-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOOD, SARGODHA REGION,1983 PLC (C. S.) 636 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1983-02-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs BEGUM SALEEMAN MOEEZ KHAN1983 CLC 2411 · Lahore High Court · 1982-11-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF CHEEMA AND Others vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER1983 SCMR179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-22
  service lawleave to appealdepartmental representationstopgap promotionreversioncivil servantcompetency of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, sixteen individuals holding the posts of Overseers or Sub-Engineers, sought leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal. The Tribunal had dismissed their appeals regarding their threatened reversion from the acting charge of Sub-Divisional Officers or Assistant Engineers back to their original posts. The petitioners had been promoted to these acting charges on a stopgap basis, subject to termination without notice under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The core legal question was whether the petitioners' appeals before the Service Tribunal were competent given the procedural requirements of the governing legislation. The Supreme Court held that the petitions were not fit for leave to appeal because the petitioners had failed to comply with the mandatory departmental representation requirements under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, rendering their appeals before the Service Tribunal incompetent under the Punjab Service Tribunals Act. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's direction for the petitioners to approach the Government directly for the redressal of their grievances, emphasizing the necessity of exhausting departmental remedies before seeking judicial intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal before the Service Tribunal competent if the petitioner has not complied with the departmental representation requirements under the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974?
  • Can a civil servant claim a right to regular promotion when appointed to an acting charge on a stopgap basis?
  • Does the failure to exhaust departmental remedies render an appeal before the Service Tribunal incompetent?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND Others vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1766 · Lahore High Court · 1982-11-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND Others vs THE ADMINISTRATOR (RESIDUAL1983SCMR1140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-06
  leave to appealconstitutional petitionurban settlementtransfer of propertylachesfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine a constitutional petition relating to an urban settlement case. The petitioners sought the transfer of a property in 1979, claiming that parts of it were available for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. IX, notwithstanding that the property had been transferred to respondent No. 3 nearly two decades prior. The core legal question concerned whether findings of fact regarding the entirety of the property's transfer and the inordinate delay constituting laches could be reopened. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact stood properly concluded and no question of law or principle was involved. The Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact that are well-concluded, particularly when the challenge suffers from inordinate delay and laches.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the transfer of property under a settlement scheme be reopened in the Supreme Court?
  • Does an inordinate delay in applying for the transfer of property amount to laches in urban settlement cases?
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• MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND OTHERS vs MUZAFFAR IQBAL AND OTHERS1983 CLC 3091 · Lahore High Court · 1983-02-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND Others vs Mst. NAZIR BEGUM AND Other1983 SCMR 728 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-19
  public documentprivate documentsecondary evidencecertified copiesregistered sale deedpower of attorneydisputed execution
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from an order refusing the petitioners (defendants in a suit for permanent injunction) permission to produce certified copies of a power of attorney and a sale deed as secondary evidence at a belated stage of the trial. The plaintiffs had from the outset denied the execution and authenticity of the disputed documents. The trial Court refused the application, and subsequent revision and writ petitions were dismissed. The Supreme Court considered whether a registered document, such as a sale deed or power of attorney whose execution is disputed, qualifies as a public document under Section 74 of the Evidence Act, thereby permitting proof via certified copies as secondary evidence. Dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that a private document does not become a public document merely because it is registered under the Registration Act. Consequently, where the execution of a registered document is disputed, it cannot be proved merely by producing certified copies under the pretext of it being a public document.

  Questions settled

  • Does a private document become a public document merely because it is registered under the Registration Act?
  • Can a registered document whose execution is denied by the opposing party be proved by the mere production of certified copies as secondary evidence under Section 74 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Whether the original document executed by an individual and registered constitutes a public record of a private document within the meaning of Section 74(2) of the Evidence Act 1872?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAREEF vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 475 · Sindh High Court · 1982-10-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAREEF vs Mst. NASEEM BEGUM AND ANOTHER1983 CLC 341 · Sindh High Court · 1982-08-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAM vs CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND 421983 PLC (C, S.) 701 · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAKIR ANSARI vs PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN/CHIEF MARTIAL1983 PLC (C. S.) 396 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1981-12-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAH vs Mst. ZOHRA KHATOON1983 CLC 1234 · Sindh High Court · 1979-02-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAH AND 4 Others vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1941 · Lahore High Court · 1982-01-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFIQUE vs S. M. KHURRAM AND Other1983 SCMR 1227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-21
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantbona fide personal requirementreconstructionmutually destructive pleaswrit jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld his ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed in appeal. The ejectment was sought by the respondent landlord on the grounds of reconstruction and personal use for his son. The appellate court reversed the finding regarding reconstruction but upheld the bona fide requirement for the son's use. The core legal question was whether the pleas of reconstruction and personal need are mutually exclusive or destructive, and whether the failure of reconstruction vitiates the claim for personal use. The Supreme Court held that the pleas of reconstruction and personal use are not mutually destructive, as affirmed in prior jurisprudence. The Court found that the landlord's cross-examination did not establish that the son would not require the shop if reconstruction was disallowed, and that the matter of bona fide need is fundamentally a question of fact. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Are the pleas of reconstruction and personal use of premises mutually exclusive or destructive?
  • Does the failure of the ground of reconstruction necessarily defeat the landlord's claim for personal use of the property?
  • Is the question of a landlord's bona fide requirement for personal use a question of fact not warranting interference in writ jurisdiction?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAFIQUE vs ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (SADDAR)_COLLECTOR, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1983 PLC (S. C.) 978 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFIQUE MUJAHID vs SUPERINTENDENT, SMALL TELEGRAPH1983 PLC 572 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-03-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ vs THE RETURNING OFFICER AND Another1983 SCMR 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-07-03
  local government electionsdisqualification of candidatesdepot-holdercontract for serviceretrospective effect of amendmentrestoration to membershipquo warranto
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the interpretation and cumulative effect of the amendment introduced by Punjab Ordinance IV of 1981 to section 21 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979, specifically concerning the disqualification of depot-holders as candidates or members of local councils. The core legal question was whether the removal of disqualifications by the proviso and subsection (2) of section 21 applied retrospectively to restore members who had already been unseated by court judgments. The Supreme Court held that a depot-holder had an interest in the performance of a service undertaken by the government and thus fell within the disqualification under Article 10(2)(b)(8) of the House of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order 1977. However, the Court ruled that the newly added subsection (2) of section 21 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 operated retrospectively, rendering such disqualifications as if they never existed and automatically restoring previously unseated members to their seats.

  Questions settled

  • Does a foodgrain depot-holder have a share or interest in the performance of a service undertaken by the Government under Article 10(2)(b)(8) of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order 1977?
  • Whether the amendment introduced by Punjab Ordinance IV of 1981 to section 21 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 has retrospective effect?
  • Does subsection (2) of section 21 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 operate to restore members who had already been removed from their seats on the grounds of disqualification?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ vs MUHAMMAD RAMZAN AND 4 OTHERS1983 PLD Lahore 152 · Lahore High Court · 1982-11-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ vs MUHAMMAD AZEEM KHAN1983 CLC 774 · Sindh High Court · 1982-11-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs The STATE1983 SCMR 880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-05
  Zinarapeleave to appealmedical evidencecorroborationdelayed FIRcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by the convict Muhammad Shafi against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had dismissed his appeal and upheld his conviction and sentence under section 10(3) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance and section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions involved whether the conviction for Zina and causing hurt could be sustained despite delays in the first information report, omissions therein regarding the offence of Zina, and alleged defects in the police investigation. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on proper evidence, as the testimony of the prosecutrix corroborated by medical evidence and the testimony of the injured father sufficiently established the charges. The Court affirmed that the conviction was legally sound and refused leave to appeal, laying down that the uncorroborated elements or investigative flaws do not vitiate a conviction where direct testimony is amply supported by medical evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for Zina be sustained when the first information report is delayed and does not initially mention the offence of Zina?
  • Whether flaws and dishonest attitudes in the police investigation vitiate an otherwise well-supported prosecution case?
  • Is the testimony of the prosecutrix, when corroborated by medical evidence, sufficient to uphold a conviction under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance?
  • Whether the delay in filing an appeal can be condoned upon satisfactory reasons being shown?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs MUHAMMAD ADAM KHAN1983 CLC 2657 · Sindh High Court · 1982-01-30
  ejectmentbona fide requirementpersonal uselandlord and tenantfirst appealrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a first appeal arising from an order of the Rent Controller which accepted the ejectment application of the respondent-landlord in respect of a commercial shop on grounds including default in rent, damage to property, construction of a unauthorized structure, and personal bona fide use. The Rent Controller decided against the landlord on default and unauthorized construction, but found in favour of the landlord regarding property damage and bona fide requirement. Upon appeal, the High Court evaluated the evidence concerning personal requirement and the availability of other properties. The core legal question was whether the landlord established a bona fide personal requirement and whether the possession of other properties precludes such a claim. The Court held that a landlord has the prerogative and discretion to choose any suitable property for his personal use, and his consistent statement on oath is sufficient proof of bona fide requirement. The Court set aside the finding on property damage due to insufficient evidence, but upheld the ejectment order based on proven bona fide personal requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ownership or possession of other commercial properties by a landlord preclude him from seeking ejectment of a tenant for his bona fide personal use?
  • Is the statement of a landlord regarding his personal bona fide requirement sufficient proof of the fact if consistent with his averments?
  • Does a tenant or a Rent Controller have the power to dictate which property a landlord should choose for his personal requirement?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, NELIBAR FOREST DIVISION,1983 PLC (C. S.) 299 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1982-08-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs ABDUL GHANI AND ANOTHER1983 CLC 2345 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI DAD KHAN vs HASSANULAZMI1983 CLC 2238 · Sindh High Court · 1982-08-07Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND Others vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 2281 · Lahore High Court · 1982-03-02Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND OTHERS vs NAZIR AHMAD AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2266 · Lahore High Court · 1980-12-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND OTHERS vs KANEEZ ZOHRA BIBI1983 CLC 2541 · Lahore High Court · 1978-05-19
  pre-emptiontemporary injunctiondefendant-vendeeproperty improvementbalance of convenienceirreparable losscivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent orders of the trial court and the district court granting a temporary injunction in a pre-emption suit, which restrained the defendant-vendee from making improvements, specifically installing a tubewell, on the disputed land. The core legal question was whether a defendant-vendee in a pre-emption suit can be restrained via temporary injunction from making improvements on the property pending the outcome of the suit. The High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the lower courts' orders. The Court held that a defendant-vendee remains the full owner of the property until a pre-emption decree is passed and executed, and thus possesses an absolute right to enjoy the property. The Court established the principle that an injunction restraining a defendant from making improvements in a pre-emption suit is legally impermissible, as the defendant acts at their own risk regarding reimbursement for such improvements. Furthermore, the Court found that the plaintiff suffers no irreparable loss or injury by the defendant's improvements, rendering the issuance of an injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 improper.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a temporary injunction restraining a defendant-vendee from making improvements on land subject to a pre-emption suit?
  • Does a defendant-vendee in a pre-emption suit have the right to enjoy the property and make improvements before a decree is passed?
  • Is a defendant-vendee entitled to reimbursement for improvements made to property before having knowledge of a pending pre-emption suit?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND ANOTHER vs ELECTION TRIBUNAL, MULTAN AND ANOTHER1983 CLC 3031 · Lahore High Court · 1982-01-31
  election petitiondismissal in defaultrestoration of petitioninherent jurisdictiontribunal powersconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the order of the Election Tribunal restoring an election petition that had been previously dismissed in default. The core legal question was whether an Election Tribunal possesses the inherent jurisdiction to restore a matter dismissed in default when not expressly authorized by the governing rules. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that an adjudicating body or tribunal possesses the inherent jurisdiction to recall an order of dismissal for non-prosecution and restore the matter to prevent a failure of justice, unless such power is expressly taken away by statute. The key principle laid down is that courts and tribunals inherently possess all powers necessary to do justice between the parties and determine matters on merits unless restricted by express statutory provision.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Election Tribunal have the inherent jurisdiction to restore an election petition dismissed in default?
  • Can a court or tribunal recall an order of dismissal for non-prosecution if not expressly authorized by statute?
  • Does the absence of an express provision in the rules regarding restoration bar a tribunal from restoring a dismissed matter?
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• MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND ANOTHER vs ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS1983 PLD Karachi 463 · Sindh High Court · 1983-05-08Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND 2 OTHERS vs Haji IBRAHIM AND 8 OTHERS1983 CLC 2197 · Sindh High Court · 1982-08-31Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHABBIR AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1983 PLD Lahore 91 · Lahore High Court · 1982-11-01Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SHABAN vs THE STATE1983 PLD Azad J& K Shariat Court 4 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1982-06-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SERAJUDDIN vs LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND ANOTHER1983 PLC 1286 · Sindh High Court · 1983-01-26
  workmanjurisdiction of labour courttermination of servicesre-organizationconstitutional petitionback benefitsmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arose from the termination of the petitioner's services as a Supervisor due to re-organization, prompting him to file a grievance petition before the Labour Court, which ordered his reinstatement with back benefits. The Labour Appellate Tribunal subsequently set aside the Labour Court's order, leading to the instant petition before the Sindh High Court. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner qualified as a 'workman' under the relevant labor law to invoke the Labour Court's jurisdiction, and whether the termination resulting from re-organization was mala fide. The High Court held that the petitioner failed to establish that he was a workman based on the nature of his duties, and that the employer's re-organization was bona fide and not a cloak to victimize employees. The court laid down the principle that the determination of an employee's status as a workman depends strictly on the actual nature of their duties rather than their designation or salary, and that proving such status is a jurisdictional prerequisite for maintaining a claim before the Labour Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the determination of an employee being a workman is a prerequisite for the assumption of jurisdiction by the Labour Court?
  • Does designation or salary determine the status of an employee as a workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can an employer undertake re-organization of its institution to retrench redundant employees in the absence of mala fides?
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• MUHAMMAD SARWAR vs SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, TRAFFIC, LAHORE AND 21983 PLC (C. S.) 1197 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SARWAR vs MUHAMMAD ASGHAR1983 P Cr. L J 1885(1) · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-12Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SARWAR vs LIVESTOCKECONOMIST, DIRECTORATE OF LIVESTOCK1983 PLC (C. S.) 1159 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1983-03-27Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SARWAR vs FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY M_FINANCE AND Other1983SCMR740 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-25
  premature incrementsbasic minimum qualificationservice lawdiscriminatory treatmentNational Pay Scaleservice tribunaladministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the Federal Service Tribunal's dismissal of the petitioner's claim for five premature increments. The core legal question is whether the petitioner, a Statistical Officer, met the basic minimum qualification of a Master's Degree required for such increments, given that the post was also open to Bachelor's degree holders. The petitioner further argued that the government applied discriminatory standards by granting similar increments to Engineers despite their posts also being open to lower-qualified candidates. The Court held that the mere upgrading of a post to National Pay Scale 17 does not elevate the basic minimum qualification if the original recruitment criteria still permitted Bachelor's degree holders. Consequently, the Master's degree was not the basic minimum qualification. However, the Court found substance in the petitioner's contention regarding inconsistent administrative treatment compared to Engineers. The Court concluded that the matter required further examination to determine if different yardsticks were applied to similarly situated categories, and thus granted leave to appeal to resolve the issue of discriminatory administrative practice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the upgrading of a post to a higher National Pay Scale automatically elevate the basic minimum qualification for that post?
  • Is a Master's degree considered the basic minimum qualification for a post if the original recruitment advertisement permitted candidates with a Bachelor's degree?
  • Can an administrative authority apply different criteria for granting premature increments to different classes of employees performing similar functions?
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• MUHAMMAD SARWAR vs ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER_COLLECTOR, FEROZEWALA1983 PLC (C. S.) 1149 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SARWAR BUTT vs DEPUTY MEDICAL SUPERINTENDENT, MAYO HOSPITAL,1983 PLC (C. S.) 518 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1982-11-01Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SARWAR AND 2 Others vs The STATE1983 SCMR 712 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-31
  leave to appealmurdergrave and sudden provocationdeath sentencecriminal appealcommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 29th March, 1981, which dismissed the petitioners' appeal and confirmed the death sentences of petitioners Muhammad Sarwar and Muhammad Anwar under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of Siddiq and his son Ashfaq, while another petitioner received a lesser penalty. The core legal question is whether the offence fell under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, or if a lesser charge was attracted in view of the sudden provocation arising from an earlier morning quarrel between the boys of the respective families. The Supreme Court held that the contention regarding grave and sudden provocation requires detailed examination. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal to the petitioners. The key principle laid down is that an antecedent quarrel and sudden provocation involving family members can furnish sufficient grounds to examine the applicability of a lesser sentence than capital punishment in a murder case.

  Questions settled

  • Does an earlier quarrel between family members constitute grave and sudden provocation sufficient to alter a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal when the proportionality of the sentence in light of immediate provocation requires examination?
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• MUHAMMAD SARFRAZ MAHMOOD vs MESSRS PACKAGES LTD.1983 PLC 1069 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-02-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SAMI vs K. E. S. C. LTD.1983 PLC 780 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-08-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SALIM vs Tim STATE1983 PLD Lahore 619 · Lahore High Court · 1983-06-07Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SALIM vs ROTI CORPORATION PAKISTAN LTD.1983 PLC 750 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-08-23Read full judgment →