Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- Moulvi HAZOOR BUX vs THE STATE1983 PLD Federal Shariat Court 209 · Federal Shariat CourtRead full judgment →
- Moulana MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs DELITE CINEMA AND 2 OTHERS Opponents1983 CLC 3056 · Sindh High Court · 1983-02-03Read full judgment →
- MOULA BUX vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1752 · Sindh High Court · 1983-03-30Read full judgment →
- MOULA BUX BHUTTO vs MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN1983 CLC 277 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-22Read full judgment →
- MOTIULLAH vs Ch. RUSTAM ALI, ADAOCVTE1983 CLC 3181 (1) · Lahore High Court · 1983-02-20Read full judgment →
- MOOSO AND 4 Others vs The STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1118 · Sindh High Court · 1982-06-27Read full judgment →
- MOOR HUSSAIN vs PAKISTAN MACHINE TOOL FACTORY LTD.1983 PLC 227 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-05-05Read full judgment →
- MONDI'S REFRESHMENT ROOM & BAR, KARACHI vs ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1983 PLD Karachi 214 · Sindh High Court · 1982-08-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This batch of constitutional petitions challenged the imposition of central excise duty on "excisable services," including hotels, restaurants, and liquor bars, under the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944, as amended by the Finance Ordinance, 1970. The core legal questions concerned whether the legislature had the constitutional competence to levy excise duty on services rather than goods, whether the definition of "excisable services" included hotel room rent, and whether the exemption thresholds based on city location were discriminatory. The High Court held that the term "excise duty" is of wide import, encompassing services, facilities, and utilities, and is not restricted to manufactured goods. The court affirmed that the legislature acted within its constitutional competence. Furthermore, the court ruled that the classification for tax exemptions based on turnover and location was reasonable and not discriminatory. Finally, the court determined that room rent in hotels constitutes an excisable service. The principle laid down is that excise duty, as a fiscal measure, may validly extend to services and utilities provided by commercial establishments, and legislative classification for tax purposes is permissible if based on a rational nexus.
Questions settled- Does the term 'excise duty' under the Constitution extend to services, facilities, and utilities, or is it strictly limited to manufactured goods?
- Is the imposition of excise duty on services provided by hotels and restaurants ultra vires the Constitution?
- Does the definition of 'excisable services' under the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944 include rent charged for hotel rooms?
- Are legislative provisions creating different excise duty exemption thresholds for different cities based on turnover unconstitutionally discriminatory?
- MOINUDDIN QURESHI vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 946 · Sindh High Court · 1983-01-15Read full judgment →
- MOHYUDDIN vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 2274 · Lahore High Court · 1982-02-14Read full judgment →
- MOHSIN Alias SAGI vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 2454 · Sindh High Court · 1983-04-19Read full judgment →
- MOHKAMUDDIN vs MEHRABAN AND 8 OTHERS1983 PLD Quetta 42 · Balochistan High Court · 1982-11-29Read full judgment →
- MOHIM DEHVERY vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 441 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
- MOHIBULLAH AND 21 Other vs N.-W.F.P. PROVINCE AND 3 OTHERS1983 PLC (C. S.) 729 · Peshawar High Court · 1982-09-01Read full judgment →
- MOHIB RAZIQ vs SHAH MUHAMMAD AND Another1983 SCMR 1130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the grant of pre-arrest bail to an accused charged with murder. The core legal question was whether pre-arrest bail is appropriate in a murder case where the accused is named in the FIR (which serves as a dying declaration) and medical evidence supports the injuries, despite the fact that the eye-witnesses named in the FIR had not yet provided statements to the police. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in granting bail. The Court emphasized that a dying declaration, if proved, can form the basis of a conviction, and the mere absence of immediate support from eye-witnesses does not negate the existence of a prima facie case. The Court laid down the principle that pre-arrest bail in serious offenses like murder should be rare and is not justified where a prima facie case exists, the accused is named in the FIR, and the motive is established. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower court orders and cancelled the respondent's bail.
Questions settled- Can a conviction be based solely on a dying declaration?
- Does the failure of eye-witnesses to support an FIR at the initial stage automatically negate a prima facie case against an accused named therein?
- Is the grant of pre-arrest bail in a murder case appropriate when the accused is named in the FIR and medical evidence supports the allegations?
- Under what circumstances should the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in granting bail?
- MOHIB ALI AND 2 Others vs THE STATE--Opponent1983 P Cr. L J 2443 (1) · Sindh High Court · 1982-03-03Read full judgment →
- MOHARRAM vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 471 · Sindh High Court · 1982-10-02Read full judgment →
- MOHARRAM ALL vs THE STATE AND Another1983 SCMR 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition challenging an order of detention imposed for the alleged violation of an ad interim injunction. The core legal question concerns the appropriate penalty for the disobedience of a temporary injunction order issued during civil proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the penalty of four months' detention in a civil prison imposed by the trial court was excessive under the circumstances. Converting the petition into an appeal, the Court ruled that the period of rigorous imprisonment already undergone by the petitioner was sufficient to meet the ends of justice and accordingly reduced the detention period to that already undergone. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts may review and mitigate disproportionate penalties imposed for the disobedience of interim court orders.
Questions settled- Whether the penalty imposed for the disobedience of a temporary injunction can be reduced by an appellate court?
- Is detention in a civil prison the appropriate remedy for the wilful disregard of a status quo order?
- Can a petition against an order punishing for the violation of an injunction be converted into an appeal?
- MOHAN LAL vs Mst. GHULAM FATIMA AND 2 OTHERS1983 CLC 2743 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-06Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD SHAFI vs MESSRS BAMBINO LTD. AND ANOTHER1983 CLC 985 · Sindh High Court · 1982-11-25Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN QURESHI vs CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB1983 PLC (C. S.) 743 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1982-06-13Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD ARIF EFFENDI vs EGYPT AIR1983 SCMR 238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, an agent of the respondent, sought leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed an Intra Court Appeal concerning the denial of interim relief, specifically attachment before judgment and injunctions against the respondent's remittance of earnings abroad. The core legal question was whether the respondent's routine remittance of earnings through the State Bank of Pakistan constituted an attempt to defeat a potential decree, thereby justifying attachment under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that routine business remittances do not equate to the removal of assets intended to defeat a decree. However, to protect the petitioner's financial interests and ensure compliance with previous court orders regarding the petitioner's agency commission, the Court modified the interim relief. The principle laid down is that while the court possesses inherent jurisdiction to preserve property for the benefit of a potential decree-holder, such relief must be balanced against the ongoing business operations of the parties, and routine commercial remittances do not automatically warrant attachment before judgment.
Questions settled- Does the routine remittance of business earnings by a foreign entity through the State Bank of Pakistan constitute an attempt to defeat a potential decree warranting attachment before judgment?
- Can a court exercise its inherent jurisdiction to preserve the property of a defendant for the benefit of a potential decree-holder?
- Is the High Court the appropriate forum to ensure obedience to its own orders under Article 187(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- MOHABBAT KHAN vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 2305 · Lahore High Court · 1983-06-28Read full judgment →
- MOHABBAT ALI AND OTHERS vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2527 · Lahore High Court · 1982-11-20Read full judgment →
- MITHAL SHAH vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 182 (1) · Sindh High Court · 1977-08-03Read full judgment →
- Mistri MUHAMMAD NAZIR vs Mian MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND Other1983S C M R 921 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This review petition was filed against the dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal, wherein the petitioner claimed rights over the disputed property. The petitioner argued that the Supreme Court was influenced by the fact that the property was disposed of on January 29, 1960, prior to the issuance of a Press Note dated May 3, 1960, which governed properties converted to other uses after August 14, 1947. The petitioner contended that the Court overlooked his pre-existing rights under paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No. I, promulgated in July 1959. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that it was doubtful whether any rights accrued to the petitioner under the said paragraph. Furthermore, the Court noted that this specific contention was never pressed during the appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner against the original disposal order of January 29, 1960. Consequently, the grounds for review were found to be unsustainable.
Questions settled- Can a petitioner raise a ground in a review petition before the Supreme Court if that ground was not pressed in the appeal before the lower settlement authorities?
- Does the subsequent issuance of a Press Note affect the validity of a property disposal that was finalized prior to its publication?
- Miss SHAMIM ALI vs AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR COUNCIL THROUGH SECRETARY1983 CLC 626 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1982-12-23Read full judgment →
- Miss SHAHNAZ BANO vs SECRETARY, STATISTICS DIVISION, GOVERNMENT OF1983 PLC (C. S.) 247 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1982-04-17Read full judgment →
- Miss SAMINA NIGHAT vs P. R. C. APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND 3 OTHERS1983 PLD Karachi 324 · Sindh High Court · 1983-02-21Read full judgment →
- Miss RUKHSANA RASHID vs PRINCIPAL, KING EDWARD MEDICAL COLLEGE, LAHORE AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2461 · Lahore High Court · 1982-12-03Read full judgment →
- Miss RUKHSANA RASHID vs PRINCIPAL, KING EDWARD MEDICAL COLLEGE, LAHORE And Other1983 SCMR 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an Intra-Court Appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the denial of the petitioner's admission to the first M.B., B.S. class for the 1979-1980 session. The petitioner, daughter of a private medical practitioner, sought admission under a specific quota reserved for children of doctors. The core legal questions were whether the admission rules were applied retrospectively and whether the petitioner was illegally denied a seat within her category. The Supreme Court found that the admission rules were in operation prior to the session in question, and that the petitioner was rightfully denied admission because other candidates in her category possessed higher marks. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's refusal to exercise discretionary jurisdiction, noting that three years had elapsed since the academic session, and displacing students currently in their third year would be inequitable. The Court held that discretionary relief is inappropriate when significant time has passed and the merits of the underlying claim are factually unsupported.
Questions settled- Can a court deny discretionary relief in an admission matter if significant time has elapsed since the academic session?
- Is it permissible to challenge admission rules on the basis of retrospective application if the rules were in effect prior to the application date?
- Does a candidate have a legal right to admission under a quota system if other candidates in the same category have higher merit marks?
- Miss RUBINA ALMAS AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1983 P Cr. L J 47 · Sindh High Court · 1982-05-10Read full judgment →
- Miss N. Z. SIDDIQUI vs DIRECTOR, SOCIAL WELFARE, PUNJAB AND ANOTHER1983 PLC (C. S.) 1019 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1982-07-06Read full judgment →
- Miss FAKHUR-UN-NISA NAQVI vs DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION, LAHORE DIVISION AND 2 OTHERS1983 PLC (C. S.) 506 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1982-11-01Read full judgment →
- Miss AZIZ BEGUM CHOUDHRY vs SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND1983 PLC (C. S.) 234 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1982-02-14Read full judgment →
- MISRI KHAN vs KALA KHAN AND Other1983SCMR 623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had acquitted the respondents of murder charges, overturning their conviction by the Sessions Judge. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in discarding the prosecution's evidence, particularly regarding the recovery of crime weapons and the corroboration of ocular testimony, in a case involving deep-seated family enmity. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had rejected the recovery evidence based on the alleged partiality of an attesting witness and the timing of the recovery, without sufficiently addressing the trial court's reasoning. Finding that the High Court's dismissal of the recovery evidence and the subsequent lack of corroboration required deeper judicial scrutiny to prevent a potential miscarriage of justice, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The principle affirmed is that appellate courts must provide robust, legally sound reasons when discarding trial court findings on evidence, especially when such findings are central to the conviction and the assessment of corroborative material.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court discard evidence of recovery of crime weapons solely on the ground that the recovery occurred on the last day of police remand?
- Is the testimony of a witness related to the complainant party inherently unreliable in a criminal trial?
- Does the existence of bitter enmity between parties automatically necessitate the rejection of motive as corroborative evidence for ocular testimony?
- MISKEEN vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1113 · Peshawar High Court · 1983-02-06Read full judgment →
- MISHAL KHAN vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1628 · Sindh High Court · 1983-01-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns criminal appeals against convictions under the Explosive Substances Act 1908. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the recovery of explosive substances and whether the circumstances established a 'reasonable suspicion' of unlawful possession to shift the burden of proof onto the accused under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975. The Court held that the convictions were unsustainable because the prosecution failed to prove the recovery beyond doubt, as the independent witnesses (mashirs) turned hostile and the investigating officer’s testimony was unreliable. Furthermore, the Court determined that mere possession of 10 kilograms of gunpowder did not inherently raise a 'reasonable suspicion' of unlawful purpose, particularly as such quantities were permissible under the Explosives Rules 1940. The key principles laid down are that the initial burden of proof rests on the prosecution even under special statutes; 'reasonable suspicion' is an objective criterion; and the mere presence of individuals at a location where contraband is found does not constitute possession or abetment under the Act.
Questions settled- Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975 before the prosecution establishes a prima facie case?
- Is the testimony of a police officer sufficient to prove recovery when the independent mashir witnesses have turned hostile?
- Does the mere presence of an individual at a premises where explosive substances are recovered constitute an offence under the Explosive Substances Act 1908?
- What constitutes 'reasonable suspicion' for the purpose of establishing unlawful possession under the Explosive Substances Act 1908?
- MISBAHUDDIN AND OTHERS vs THE STATE1983 PLD Supreme Court 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and death sentence of appellant Misbahuddin, along with life imprisonment sentences for his co-appellants, for murder and hurt under Sections 302/34 and 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the appellants attacked the deceased and injured witnesses following a dispute. The defense argued that the prosecution failed to explain injuries sustained by Misbahuddin, suggesting a sudden fight. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution's shifting motives and the unexplained contemporaneous injuries on Misbahuddin indicated a sudden, unpremeditated quarrel without undue advantage or cruelty. Consequently, the Court held that the case fell within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court ruled that in a sudden fight, the question of common intention does not arise, making vicarious liability inapplicable. Misbahuddin's conviction was altered to Section 304, Part I, and the convictions of the co-appellants under Section 302/34 were set aside, substituting them with individual convictions under Section 324.
Questions settled- Whether a sudden, unpremeditated fight arising from a minor dispute where both parties sustain injuries falls under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Can the principle of common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be applied to hold co-accused vicariously liable in a sudden fight?
- Is the right of private defence available to an accused when the court determines the transaction to be a sudden fight under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Mirza YOUSAF BEG vs Mst. NUSRAT MALIK1983 CLC 223 · Lahore High Court · 1980-06-20Read full judgment →
- Mirza TAHIR BAIG AND Others vs CANTONMENT BOARD, MULTAN CANTT. AND Another1983 SCMR 1096 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine a civil revision petition regarding a dispute over easement rights and the construction of commercial buildings by the Cantonment Board, Multan. The petitioners had filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, alongside an application for a temporary injunction, which were concurrently dismissed by the lower courts. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, the parties reached an amicable settlement to resolve the grievance concerning restricted passage to the petitioners' houses. The respondents undertook to remove the front and back walls of a specific shop to serve as a passageway, cover the drains, and refrain from building structures projecting into the street. In consideration of this binding undertaking, the petitioners agreed to withdraw their pending civil suit. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the petition in terms of the compromise.
Questions settled- Can a petition for leave to appeal be disposed of in terms of a compromise reached between the parties before the Supreme Court?
- Whether easement rights over an open space in a Cantonment area can form the basis of a suit for permanent injunction?
- Mirza MUSTAFA BEG vs Mst. KHATOON HADI1983 CLC 2063 · Sindh High Court · 1982-09-01Read full judgment →
- Mirza MUHAMMAD SAEED vs SHAHABUDDIN AND 8 OTHERS1983 PLD Supreme Court 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal as time-barred. The petitioner had initially filed an appeal against a decree for specific performance in the District Court, despite the jurisdictional value of the suit exceeding the District Judge's pecuniary limits. Consequently, the appeal was returned for presentation to the proper forum, resulting in a significant delay in filing before the High Court. The core legal question was whether the delay caused by the counsel's error in filing the appeal in the wrong forum could be condoned under the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the counsel's mistake was not a bona fide error made with due diligence, but rather the result of gross negligence. The Court laid down the principle that while courts may condone delays arising from bona fide mistakes, they will not grant relief under the Limitation Act where the error stems from a lack of due care and caution, leaving the aggrieved client to seek damages against the negligent counsel.
Questions settled- Can a delay caused by a counsel's gross negligence in filing an appeal in the wrong forum be condoned under the Limitation Act 1908?
- Does a mistake arising from a lack of due diligence and caution constitute 'sufficient cause' for the extension of limitation?
- What is the appropriate remedy for a litigant who suffers loss due to the gross negligence of their legal counsel?
- Mirza MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 2315 · Lahore High Court · 1983-08-14Read full judgment →
- Mirza MAQBOOL AHMAD vs ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND ANOTHER1983 SCMR 971 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a property dispute concerning a residential building in Hyderabad previously transferred to the appellant, a claimant displaced person, under the Earmarking Scheme, culminating in the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.) in 1960. Respondent No. 2, a local occupant whose initial transfer form had been rejected because the property's evaluation exceeded Rs. 10,000, subsequently moved a miscellaneous application years later, leading the Additional Settlement Commissioner to re-examine the valuation and direct the disposal of the respondent's form, which decision was maintained by the High Court. The core legal question was whether settled transfer proceedings and an issued P.T.O. could be reopened on a miscellaneous application based on a subsequent discovery regarding the market value of the property. The Supreme Court held that once a transfer attains finality under the relevant statutory provisions, it cannot be reopened on grounds of newly discovered facts or altered valuation. The Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and Additional Settlement Commissioner, and restored the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order.
Questions settled- Whether settled transfer proceedings and an issued Permanent Transfer Order can be reopened on a miscellaneous application based on a subsequent discovery regarding the market value of a property?
- Does a local occupant whose transfer form was rejected for property valuation exceeding Rs. 10,000 have the right to have the matter reopened years later?
- Whether an Additional Settlement Commissioner can set aside a finalized transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, on time-barred and misconceived miscellaneous proceedings?
- MIRZA KHAN AND Another vs SUB. NASEER AHMAD AND ANOTHERs1983 P Cr. L J 207 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-24Read full judgment →
- Mirza KHALIQ HUSSAIN vs MUHAMMAD SHAH WALT KHAN AND 3OTHERS1983 PLD Lahore 409 · Lahore High Court · 1983-04-12Read full judgment →
- Mirza BASHIR MUHAMMAD vs MUHAMMAD ALI AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2453 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-21Read full judgment →
- Mirza BASHIR AHMAD vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1899 · Lahore High Court · 1982-02-14Read full judgment →
- MIRDAD AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1983 PLD Peshawar 81 · Peshawar High Court · 1982-11-21Read full judgment →
- MIRBAZ KHAN vs WAPDA1983 PLC 1017 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-02-07Read full judgment →
- MIRAN BAKHSH AND OTHERS vs MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND OTHERS1983 CLC 3085 · Lahore High Court · 1983-02-01Read full judgment →
- MIRAJ DIN vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 91 · Lahore High Court · 1982-08-22Read full judgment →
- MIRAJ DIN AND Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1983 P Cr. L J 1951 · Lahore High Court · 1982-08-03Read full judgment →
- MIR ZAMANs vs Mst. BEGUM JAN AND 11 OTHERS1983 PLD Peshawar 100 · Peshawar High Court · 1982-11-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision petition challenged the dismissal of a suit seeking to declare a mutation cancellation illegal. The dispute originated from an exchange of land between the parties, which was later contested in a previous suit. In that earlier litigation, the plaintiffs withdrew their suit based on a compromise, admitting that the exchange transaction never occurred and consenting to the cancellation of the relevant mutation. The High Court addressed whether the plaintiffs could subsequently challenge the resulting mutation cancellation. The Court held that the revision petition must fail, affirming the lower courts' findings. It ruled that the plaintiffs were bound by their previous judicial admissions. Although the earlier suit was withdrawn, the admissions made therein, which were acted upon by the revenue authorities to cancel the mutation, created an estoppel. The Court affirmed that while admissions are generally not conclusive, they become binding and conclusive when they amount to a representation on a matter of fact that induces the other party to alter their position, thereby preventing the maker from later denying the truth of that admission.
Questions settled- Does a judicial admission regarding the cancellation of a land mutation create an estoppel against the party making it?
- Can a party challenge a mutation cancellation if they previously consented to it in a withdrawn suit?
- Does a compromise statement regarding land title require registration under the Registration Act 1908 if it does not create new rights?
- MIR ZAMAN KHAN vs MUHAMMAD NAZIR AND OTHERS1983 CLC 143 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1981-09-11Read full judgment →
- Mir REHMAN KHAN AND ANOTHERss vs Sardar ASADULLAH KHAN AND 141983 PLD Quetta 52 · Balochistan High Court · 1982-08-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision matter addresses whether a suit for declaration under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 is triable by a normal civil court or by a tribunal under the Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968, and whether section 172 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 bars such a suit. The petitioners challenged revenue mutations regarding agricultural land belonging to their late father. The Senior Civil Judge dismissed the suit holding it barred by section 172 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967. On appeal, the District Judge held the suit maintainable but ordered the return of the plaint to be presented before the Deputy Commissioner under the Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968. The Balochistan High Court held that section 172 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 does not bar a civil suit challenging revenue actions, as section 53 of the same Act expressly allows approaching civil courts under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Furthermore, the Court held that tribunals under the Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968 are not 'Courts' in strict legal parlance since they are not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Evidence Act. Consequently, suits for declaration under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 must be tried by regular civil courts of law rather than tribunals under the Ordinance.
Questions settled- Does section 172 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967 bar a civil suit challenging the actions of revenue authorities?
- Whether a tribunal constituted under the Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Ordinance 1968 qualifies as a 'Court' under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
- Are suits involving the declaration of status, right, title, or interest triable by ordinary civil courts or by special tribunals under Ordinance I of 1968?
- Mir RASOOL BUX vs OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION1983 PLD Karachi 346 · Sindh High Court · 1983-01-13Read full judgment →
- Mir NAZIR AHMAD vs PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB1983 PLC (C. S.) 912 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1982-06-26Read full judgment →
- Mir MUSTAFA ALI KHAN AND ANOTHER vs THE ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT1983 CLC 2202 · Sindh High Court · 1981-09-17Read full judgment →
- MIR MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 957 · Sindh High Court · 1983-02-12Read full judgment →
- MIR MUHAMMAD vs CHAIRMAN, ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE, MIRPUR1983 CLC 159 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1982-10-14Read full judgment →
- MIR AND OTHERS vs THE STATE-1983 P Cr. L J 1518 · Sindh High Court · 1982-02-07Read full judgment →
- Mir ALI AHMED KHAN TALPUR vs JOSEPH D'MELLO1983 PLD Karachi 208 · Sindh High Court · 1982-10-16Read full judgment →
- MILL WALA SONS LTD. AND ANOTHER vs COLLECTOR OR CUSTOMS, KARACHI1983 PLD Karachi 480 · Sindh High Court · 1978-12-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner imported a vessel ("Stolt Atlantic") and sought a declaration that the recovery of customs duty at 32.5% ad valorem was without lawful authority, claiming the bill of entry was presented on June 6, 1975, prior to the enhancement of duty by the Finance Act, 1975. The core legal questions involved whether the bill of entry was validly presented before the delivery of the import manifest under the Customs Act, 1969, and when the increased customs duty under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931 became effective. The Sindh High Court held that a bill of entry presented before the actual delivery of the manifest without the requisite permission of the Collector of Customs is not in accordance with law and is deemed to be filed on the date the manifest is delivered. The Court further held that budgetary proposals having a declared provision under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931 become effective from the midnight of the day the bill is introduced, rejecting the contention that they operate from the exact hour of presentation. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a bill of entry presented before the delivery of the import manifest without the permission of the Collector of Customs is valid?
- Does the requirement of delivering an import manifest apply to the import of a vessel?
- From what time does a declared provision under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931 take effect upon the introduction of a Finance Bill?
- Can the powers of a Collector of Customs under the Customs Act, 1969 be delegated to a Principal Appraiser without statutory enabling provisions?
- Mian SAID BAGHDAD vs SAID MIAN AND 2 Other1983 SCMR 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from the acquittal of two respondents by the Peshawar High Court, reversing their convictions and sentences of death and life imprisonment under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondents shot and killed the deceased in a mosque following a dispute over a refuse dump. The High Court acquitted the respondents on several grounds, including an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR), discrepancies in the complainant's testimony regarding his presence, the deferral of eye-witness examinations to the next day, and physical inconsistencies between the single entry wound on the deceased and the pellets recovered from the scene. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in dismissing the appeals, held that the High Court's appraisal of the evidence did not violate any legal principles or ignore material facts. The Court reaffirmed that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with unless the findings are unreasonable, opposed to established rules of evidence, or suffer from patent error.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by a High Court?
- Does a delay in examining eye-witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 weaken the prosecution's case?
- Can an acquittal be reversed if the High Court's view of the evidence is reasonable and does not suffer from patent error, even if a different view is possible?
- Mian NAZIR AHMAD vs MAGISTRATE (SECTION 30), JHELUM AND OTHERS1983 P Cr. L J 2428 (1) · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-30Read full judgment →
- Mian MUHAMMAD MUNIR vs WAPDA AND OTHERS1983 CLC 211 · Lahore High Court · 1982-06-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition concerns the legality of detection bills issued by WAPDA to a consumer for alleged electricity meter slowness. The petitioner challenged the issuance of multiple detection bills without the meter being tested by an Electric Inspector or the charges being based on past average consumption. The core legal question was whether WAPDA could unilaterally impose detection bills for alleged meter defects without following the statutory procedure prescribed for determining such defects. The Court held that the respondents acted without lawful authority by failing to adhere to the requirements of the Electricity Act. The Court emphasized that when a meter is suspected of being defective, the utility provider is legally obligated to either replace the meter and have it tested by an Electric Inspector or calculate charges based on past average consumption. By failing to do so, the respondents acted as judges in their own cause, violating the petitioner's rights. Consequently, the impugned bills were declared void, and the Court directed the immediate referral of the meter to the Electric Inspector for a formal determination.
Questions settled- Is a utility provider authorized to issue detection bills for a defective meter without referring the matter to an Electric Inspector?
- Can a utility provider unilaterally determine the slowness of a meter and charge a consumer without following the procedure under the Electricity Act 1910?
- What are the legal obligations of a utility provider when a consumer's electricity meter is suspected of being defective?
- Mian MUHAMMAD MASUD AHMAD vs ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, KHARIAN1983 PLD Lahore 92 · Lahore High Court · 1982-11-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenges the removal of the petitioner from the office of Chairman of a Union Council via a no-confidence motion. The core legal questions involve whether the mandatory procedural requirements regarding a seven days' notice, affixing notice on the notice board, and circulating the written explanation of the chairman under the relevant local council rules were violated, and whether such non-compliance caused prejudice to the petitioner. The Lahore High Court held that the failure to provide the mandatory seven days' notice and to circulate the petitioner's written explanation caused material prejudice to him, rendering the no-confidence proceedings unlawful. The Court laid down the principle that while non-compliance with directory procedural rules may not always be fatal, any deviation that substantially deprives a person of the time and rights allowed by law to arrange their defense causes legal prejudice and vitiates the proceedings.
Questions settled- Whether the failure to provide a seven days' notice for a no-confidence meeting under the Punjab Local Councils (Vote of No-Confidence against Chairman and Vice-Chairman) Rules, 1980 causes legal prejudice to the chairman?
- Does the non-circulation of the written personal explanation of a chairman against whom a no-confidence motion is moved vitiate the proceedings?
- Are the procedural provisions regarding notice and explanation in no-confidence matters mandatory or directory?
- Can a no-confidence resolution passed in violation of mandatory procedural safeguards be sustained on the ground that the chairman lost the majority's confidence?
- Mian MUHAMMAD INAYAT AND ANOTHER vs Haji GHULAM NABI1983 CLC 944 · Lahore High Court · 1982-01-10Read full judgment →
- Mian MUHAMMAD HANIF AND Other vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB,1983 PLC (C. S.) 747 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- MIAN MUHAMMAD AND Others vs THE MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE THROUGH ITS1983 SCMR 732 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court. The petitioners, who occupied shops in Khushab, initially paid rent to the Municipal Committee but later paid rent to the Government of the Punjab after the Government claimed ownership of the site. When the Municipal Committee resolved to demolish the shops to construct a bus stand, the petitioners challenged the action. The High Court dismissed the petition, noting pending proceedings under M.L.O. 821 and the historical tenancy relationship. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the dismissal, holding that the status of the petitioners as tenants, trespassers, or licensees constituted a controverted question of fact. The Court laid down the principle that disputed questions of fact regarding the status of occupants and property title cannot be resolved under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, and the appropriate remedy for such disputes lies before a civil court of competent jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Can a disputed question of fact regarding an occupant's status as a tenant, trespasser, or licensee be resolved under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
- What is the appropriate legal forum for resolving a title dispute and tenancy status between occupants, a municipal committee, and the provincial government?
- Does the existence of a factual controversy regarding property ownership and tenancy bar the maintainability of a constitutional petition?
- MIAN MUHAMMAD AND OTHERS vs ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER1983 CLC 2375 · Lahore High Court · 1983-02-14Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs Mst. ZOHRA KHATOON1983 CLC 346 · Sindh High Court · 1982-09-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal directed against the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, on the application of a respondent landlord seeking possession of the premises for personal use. The core legal question is whether the failure of a landlord to conclusively prove the prior service of a notice under Section 14(1) of the Ordinance before filing the ejectment application renders the entire proceedings incompetent, or if subsequent service of the application and the lapse of two months constitutes substantial compliance. The court held that where a landlord fails to substantiate prior notice, the object of the statute is still achieved if the eviction order is passed after the expiry of two months from the service of the application itself, amounting to substantial compliance with Section 14(1). The key principle laid down is that a landlord should not be non-suited on the technical ground of defective prior notice if the mandatory two-month period has elapsed during the pendency of proceedings subsequent to the service of the ejectment application.
Questions settled- Whether the failure to prove prior service of a notice under Section 14(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, renders an ejectment application incompetent?
- Does the service of an ejectment application coupled with the lapse of a two-month period during proceedings constitute substantial compliance with Section 14(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
- How can the presumption of service of notice under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872, be rebutted by a tenant denying receipt?
- Mian MLINIR AHMAD vs THE STATE--Opponent1983 P Cr. L J 1043 · Sindh High Court · 1983-02-12Read full judgment →
- Mian MAHMOOD vs WAPDA1983 PLC (C. S.) 107 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1983-07-06Read full judgment →
- Mian MAHMOOD vs WAPDA AND ANOTHER1983 PLC (C. S.) 556 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1983-02-20Read full judgment →
- Mian INAM KARIM AND OTHERS vs Mirza ISRARUL QADIR AND OTHERS1983 CLC 1648 · Lahore High Court · 1983-05-22Read full judgment →
- Mian HAYATULLAH (REPRESENTED BY HIS. REPRESENTATIVES) vs Mst.1983 PLD Peshawar 202 · Peshawar High Court · 1981-05-16Read full judgment →
- Mian GHULAM MUSTAFA vs Mst. ARIFA QAYYUM AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2152 · Lahore High Court · 1982-03-30Read full judgment →
- Mian DIN AHMAD AND OTHERS vs THE COLLECTOR, LAHORE DISTRICT AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2079 · Lahore High Court · 1982-10-05Read full judgment →
- MIAN DAD vs Haji NAZAL SHAH AND 13 OTHERS1983 CLC 699 · Peshawar High Court · 1981-06-16Read full judgment →
- METROPOLITAN STEEL CORPORATION WORKERS' UNION vs METROPOLITAN1983 PLC 1023 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-01-23Read full judgment →
- MESSRS.ARAG INDUSTRIES LTD. vs HABIB TEXTILE MILLS LABOUR UNION1983 PLC 74 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-04-20Read full judgment →
- MESSRS WAHEED TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs WORKERS UNION1983 PLC 336 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-11-16Read full judgment →
- MESSRS VULCAN COMPANY LTD. vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND Other,1983 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing its constitutional petition regarding the levy of customs duty and sales taxes on a Mercedes Benz car in its possession, which had been smuggled into Pakistan in contravention of import and custom laws. Although the petitioner was exonerated from the actual act of smuggling, the High Court held that the acquisition and possession of the vehicle created a liability to pay the duties and taxes if the owner wished to retain the goods. The Supreme Court examined the contentions regarding the interpretation of section 156(11) of the Customs Act, holding that the statutory language is comprehensive and applies to the circumstances of the case, rejecting the restrictive interpretation proposed by the petitioner. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's view that the incidence of customs duty and sales tax falls on imported goods and the current owner seeking retention is liable, and therefore dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Whether a person exonerated of actual smuggling is liable to pay customs duty and sales tax on a smuggled vehicle found in their possession if they wish to retain it?
- Does section 156(11) of the Customs Act 1969 apply only to goods imported with the intention of re-exporting them?
- MESSRS UNITEDINTERNATIONAL LTD. vs MUHAMMAD SERAJUDDIN1983 PLC 454 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-11-02Read full judgment →
- MESSRS UNITED BANK LTD.s vs MESSRS INTERIOR DECORATION AND DESIGN1983 CLC 244 · Sindh High Court · 1982-03-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The plaintiffs filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 30,227.80 against the defendants based on an overdraft facility extended to defendant No. 1, which was secured by a promissory note and a letter of guarantee executed by both defendants jointly and severally. The core legal questions involved whether the suit was barred by time against the principal debtor and whether the guarantor stood discharged due to limitation or the expiry of time against the principal debtor. The court held that the liability of defendant No. 1 was effectively renewed and kept within time by a subsequent promissory note, and the suit against defendant No. 2 (the guarantor) was also within time because the cause of action against a guarantor accrues only upon a formal demand, which acts as a condition precedent under the terms of the guarantee. The key principles laid down are that a mere omission by a creditor to sue a principal debtor within the period of limitation does not discharge the surety, and that a guarantee creating a collateral promise requiring a demand postpones the accrual of the cause of action until such demand is made.
Questions settled- Whether a suit against a principal debtor is within time when a fresh promissory note is executed acknowledging the debt?
- Does the expiry of the period of limitation against the principal debtor automatically discharge the surety from liability?
- Does a guarantee requiring payment on demand create a collateral promise where the cause of action arises only after a formal demand is made?
- Whether the mere omission by a creditor to sue a debtor within the limitation period results in the debtor's discharge?
- MESSRS UNITED BANK LTD.DecreeHolder vs Mst. REHANA1983 PLD Karachi 467 · Sindh High Court · 1983-03-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This office reference addressed whether execution applications filed after April 1, 1979, concerning decrees within the jurisdiction of the Special Court established under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, should be returned for presentation to the proper court. The core legal question was whether the High Court retained jurisdiction to execute such decrees or if exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Special Court. The Court held that the Ordinance, being a special law, overrides the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 6(4) of the Ordinance explicitly excludes the jurisdiction of other courts regarding matters within the Special Court's purview, including decree execution. Consequently, the High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain execution applications for such matters filed after the Special Court's establishment on May 3, 1979. The principle laid down is that where a special statute creates a specific tribunal and excludes the jurisdiction of existing courts, the special law prevails, and the ouster of jurisdiction becomes effective from the date the special tribunal is actually constituted and operational.
Questions settled- Does the Special Court have exclusive jurisdiction to execute decrees in matters falling within its ambit under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
- Does the ouster of jurisdiction of the High Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, apply to execution proceedings pending before the Special Court was established?
- Can the general provisions of Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, override the specific jurisdictional exclusions provided in the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
- MESSRS UNITED BANK LTD. vs MESSRS MUHAMMAD SAEED MUHAMMAD1983 CLC 428 · Sindh High Court · 1981-12-23Read full judgment →
- MESSRS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY OF PAKISTAN LTD vs ASSISTANT1983 CLC 129 · Lahore High Court · 1982-11-03Read full judgment →
- MESSRS UGANDA HOTEL vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS1983 CLC 1507 · Lahore High Court · 1983-01-23Read full judgment →
- MESSRS TIGER WIRE PRODUCT LTD. vs S. ABRAR HUSSAIN1983 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that ordered the eviction of the petitioner from demised premises under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the landlord's requirement for personal use is invalidated if the landlord also intends to accommodate dependent relations, and whether the size of the property relative to the landlord's needs is a valid ground for a tenant to object. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that where a landlord seeks eviction for personal use, the inclusion of dependent family members in that requirement does not negate the bona fide nature of the claim. The Court affirmed that once a landlord establishes a bona fide personal requirement, the law does not prohibit them from accommodating others in the property. Furthermore, the Court held that a tenant cannot object to the size of the premises or claim the landlord is being extravagant, as such matters do not undermine the landlord's right to occupy their own property.
Questions settled- Is the requirement of a landlord to accommodate dependent relations relevant when determining the bona fide nature of a personal use eviction claim?
- Can a tenant object to an eviction order on the grounds that the property is too large for the landlord's genuine needs?
- Does the law prohibit a landlord from accommodating others in a property after obtaining possession for personal use?
- MESSRS THAVER & Co. LTD. vs MRS. MUMTAZ1983 PLD Karachi 450 · Sindh High Court · 1983-03-28Read full judgment →
- Messrs THAVER & Co. LTD. vs Mrs. MUMTAZ BEGUM1983 SCMR 1152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that upheld the striking off of the petitioner-tenant's defense for failing to comply with a rent deposit order issued by the Rent Controller under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner argued that the defense should not be struck off under Section 16(2) of the Ordinance before the final determination of the rate of rent and arrears, as contemplated by Section 16(3) of the same Ordinance. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal. The Court held that the legal question regarding the interplay between Section 16(2) and Section 16(3) did not arise in the present case because the rent deposit order was passed with the consent of the parties, there was no genuine dispute regarding the rate of rent, and the tenant had failed to deposit any rent after the application for striking off the defense was filed. Consequently, the Court found the case unsuitable for granting leave to appeal, noting that the broader legal question was already pending consideration in another case.
Questions settled- Can a tenant's defense be struck off for non-compliance with a rent deposit order passed with the consent of the parties?
- Does the failure to deposit rent after an application for striking off the defense has been filed justify the striking off of the defense?
- MESSRS THACKERS, H. P. & COMPANY, RATPUR vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-1983 PTD 378 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1981-07-27Read full judgment →
- MESSRS TAJ ICE FACTORY vs KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION LTD.1983 CLC 2081 · Sindh High Court · 1982-07-27Read full judgment →
- MESSRS TAIPAN SHIPPING Co. INC. vs MESSRS BAMACRI, S. A. AND ANOTHER1983 CLC 2030 · Sindh High Court · 1982-10-10Read full judgment →
- MESSRS SUNGREEN & Co. LTD. AND ANOTHER vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER1983 CLC 897 · Sindh High Court · 1982-04-19Read full judgment →
- MESSRS SOUVENIR TOBACCO Co. LTD. vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES1983 PTD 41 · Sindh High Court · 1982-10-13Read full judgment →