Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- FAZAL KARIM vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, AGRICULTURE1983 PLC (C.S.) 214 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1082-09-27Read full judgment →
- FAZAL KARIM vs Mst. SHABBIRAN AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2877 · Lahore High Court · 1983-07-01Read full judgment →
- FAZAL KARIM CHAUDHRY vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, LIVESTOCK1983 PLC (C. S.) 1301 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- FAZAL KARIM AND OTHERS vs ABDUL AZIZ1983 CLC 675 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1982-04-05Read full judgment →
- FAZAL KARIM AND ANOTHER vs MUHAMMAD ASHIQ AND 2 OTHERS1983 CLC 272 · Lahore High Court · 1982-11-06Read full judgment →
- FAZAL ELLAHI vs WAPDA1983 PLC 601 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-07-08Read full judgment →
- FAZAL DIN vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 932 · Sindh High Court · 1981-04-29Read full judgment →
- FAZAL DIN vs TAJ DIN1983 PLD Federal Sbariat Court 33 · Federal Shariat CourtRead full judgment →
- FAZAL DIN vs Mst. ROBEENA AURANGZEB AND 2 OTHERS1983 CLC 1280 · Lahore High Court · 1983-03-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is directed against the appellate judgment whereby the order granting a temporary injunction to the petitioner-plaintiff regarding a disputed shop was set aside. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner made out a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction, given the absence of record substantiating his possession as a tenant. The Lahore High Court held that interference with the appellate court's order was not called for as no jurisdictional error was pointed out, affirming that a temporary injunction cannot be allowed as a matter of course where evidence must still be produced to establish a prima facie case. The key principle laid down is that temporary injunctions are not granted as a matter of course when a party fails to establish a prima facie case at the preliminary stage.
Questions settled- Can a temporary injunction be granted as a matter of course where evidence has to be produced to establish a prima facie case?
- Whether long and old possession entitles a petitioner to a temporary injunction irrespective of whether the possession is authorized or unauthorized?
- Under what circumstances will the High Court interfere in revision against an appellate order regarding a temporary injunction?
- FAZAL DIN AND OTHERS vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AND ANOTHER1983 CLC 1901 · Lahore High Court · 1983-07-08Read full judgment →
- FAZAL DIN AND 3 Others vs The STATE1983SCMR 648 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioners for culpable homicide not amounting to murder and allied offences. The core legal question involved whether the petitioners acted in the exercise of the right of private defence of person and property during a dispute over the forceful occupation of land and diversion of canal water. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the incident constituted a free fight, negating any right of private defence, particularly given that the injuries sustained by the petitioners were self-inflicted while members of the complainant party suffered severe and fatal injuries. The court laid down the principle that in situations characterized by a free fight over land and water rights where the accused party's injuries are self-inflicted and disproportionate to the fatal violence inflicted on the deceased, the plea of private defence is untenable, and concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding guilt will not be interfered with absent illegality or misreading of evidence.
Questions settled- Whether the right of private defence can be claimed by an accused party in a case of a free fight arising from a dispute over land possession and water diversion?
- Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the guilt of accused persons and self-inflicted nature of their injuries be interfered with by the Supreme Court without proof of misreading of evidence?
- Whether an accused person inflicting a fatal blow during a sudden altercation can be convicted under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- FAZAL DIN Alias MUHAMMAD FAZIL AND Others vs MAZHAR IQBAL AND Other1983SCMR 1017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the abatement of an appeal in the High Court. The core legal questions involve whether an appeal can abate against certain co-appellants when another co-appellant remains on the record, whether delay in applying to set aside an abatement can be condoned if the legal representatives were misled by the belief that the appeal was saved, and whether a surviving co-appellant can represent the joint interest of the estate of deceased brothers. The Court granted leave to appeal, identifying that the High Court's decision regarding total abatement requires review in light of established precedents concerning the representation of joint interests and the powers of the appellate court under the Code of Civil Procedure. The key principle to be examined is the extent to which the presence of a surviving co-appellant prevents the total abatement of an appeal and the applicability of appellate powers to preserve the integrity of the proceedings despite the death of other parties.
Questions settled- Can an appeal abate against specific co-appellants when another co-appellant remains on the record?
- Can delay in applying to set aside an abatement be condoned if legal representatives were misled regarding the status of the appeal?
- Does a surviving co-appellant have the capacity to represent the joint interest of the estate of deceased co-appellants?
- FAZAL DIN & SONS vs CHAIRMAN. EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BOARD1983 CLC 2504 · Lahore High Court · 1982-10-23Read full judgment →
- FAZAL DAD vs SETTLEMENT AUTHORITY AND 3 Other1983 SCMR 925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning urban properties in Rawalpindi, originally transferred to the fourth respondent by the Settlement Department in 1960. The third respondent, who had initially filed a claim form, remained inactive and took no steps to prosecute his application for nearly fifteen years while protracted litigation ensued between other parties. After the property was sold to the petitioners by a registered sale deed in 1968, the third respondent belatedly sought to revive his pending form. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner dismissed his application, but a writ petition filed before the Lahore High Court was subsequently allowed. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in granting relief to a claimant who had slept over his rights for nearly fifteen years, as against a petitioner claiming to be a bona fide transferee for value without notice. Finding merit in the submissions, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider the applicability of relevant precedents regarding laches and bona fide purchasers.
Questions settled- Whether a claimant who remains inactive and fails to prosecute an application for fifteen years is entitled to discretionary relief in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Does a bona fide transferee for value without notice acquire protection against a belated claim revived after protracted settlement proceedings?
- FAZAL AHMAD AND OTHERS vs Rana WARRIS ALI KHAN1983 CLC 2506 · Lahore High Court · 1982-11-15Read full judgment →
- FAYYAZ GHANI AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1983 PCr.LJ 781 · Lahore High Court · 1983-01-21Read full judgment →
- FAYYAZ Alias MANNA H vs THE STATE1983 PCr. L J 2164 (1) · Lahore High Court · 1981-08-30Read full judgment →
- FAWWAD & FAREEN ENTERPRISES LTD. vs THE DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIES,GOVERNMENT OF SIND, KARACHI AND OTHERS1983 PLD Supreme Court 268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition regarding a government tender process. The core legal questions were whether the Sind Purchase Manual, 1977, possesses statutory force enforceable through writ jurisdiction, and whether a bidder acquires a vested right to a contract solely by submitting the lowest tender. The Supreme Court held that the Sind Purchase Manual, 1977, constitutes mere departmental instructions for internal guidance, lacking statutory or constitutional backing, and thus cannot create enforceable legal rights. The Court affirmed that a bidder does not acquire a vested right to a contract merely by being the lowest bidder, especially when the tender conditions explicitly reserve the government's right to reject any tender. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner, having participated in the subsequent fresh tender process without demur, was estopped from challenging the validity of that process. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the principle that internal administrative instructions are not justiciable in a court of law.
Questions settled- Does the Sind Purchase Manual, 1977, have the force of statutory law?
- Can a bidder acquire a vested right to a contract merely by submitting the lowest tender?
- Is a government department's internal administrative manual justiciable in a court of law?
- Does participation in a fresh tender process without objection preclude a party from challenging the initial tender cancellation?
- FAWWAD & FAREEN ENTERPRISE LTD. vs DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIES, GOVERNMENT OF SIND, KARACHI AND OTHERS1983 PLD Karachi 340 · Sindh High Court · 1980-11-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the decision of the Director of Industries, Government of Sindh, to reject the petitioners' lowest tender and invite fresh tenders for supply contracts. The petitioners argued that a binding contract had been formed upon the opening of tenders and that the authorities violated Clause 38 of the Sind Purchase Manual, 1977. The Court held that the petition involved disputed questions of fact regarding the formation of a contract, which are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court determined that the Sind Purchase Manual, 1977 constitutes administrative instructions rather than statutory rules; therefore, any alleged breach does not confer a justiciable right for the High Court to intervene. Additionally, the Court affirmed that contractual rights cannot be enforced through extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the petitioners failed to establish a vested legal right, and the authorities acted within their reserved rights under the tender conditions to reject bids.
Questions settled- Can disputed questions of fact regarding the formation of a contract be resolved in the High Court's writ jurisdiction?
- Do the instructions contained in the Sind Purchase Manual, 1977, constitute statutory rules enforceable through writ jurisdiction?
- Are contractual rights enforceable by recourse to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
- Does the submission of the lowest tender create a vested legal right to the grant of a contract?
- FAUJI FOUNDATION AND ANOTHER vs SHAMIMUR REHMAN1983 PLD Supreme Court 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerned the validity of Martial Law Regulation No. 103 and President's Order No. 22 of 1972, which led to the dissolution of Rehmania Fauji Sugar Mills Ltd. and the transfer of its assets and liabilities to Fauji Foundation. The High Court had declared these legislative instruments void, citing mala fides, lack of public purpose, and violation of natural justice. The Supreme Court, reversing the High Court's decision, held that the legislative instruments were validly made by competent authority and were immune from judicial challenge under Article 281(1) of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1972 and Article 269(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court emphasized that legislative motives are not justiciable, and the constitutional validation clauses provided blanket protection, curing any defects in competency or validity. It further held that the transaction, being past and closed, was protected, and the concept of public interest was involved in the transfer of the mill, which was established with Army Welfare Funds for ex-servicemen.
Questions settled- Can the motives of a legislative authority be inquired into by courts when examining the validity of a legislative instrument?
- Do constitutional validation clauses, such as Article 281(1) of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1972 and Article 269(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, provide blanket protection to legislative instruments, curing all defects including mala fides?
- Does the doctrine of 'past and closed transaction' apply to actions taken under legislative instruments that are subsequently challenged?
- Is a legislative instrument that lacks generality and targets a specific entity or individual considered an executive fiat or a legislative judgment, rather than a law?
- Can a legislative instrument be challenged on the ground that it is repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam, given constitutional provisions regarding Principles of Policy?
- FATIMA vs MUHAMMAD DIN1983 CLC 226 · Lahore High Court · 1974-05-20Read full judgment →
- FATIMA TEXTILE MILLS vs MRS. SURAYYA BEGUM1983 SCMR 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a second appeal in a rent matter where the High Court upheld the eviction of the appellant-tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent. The core legal questions revolved around the computation of the default period, the effect of a grace period on the due date of rent, and whether a payment made in March could be treated as advance rent for April in the absence of explicit proof. The Supreme Court held that the rent for April and May was not paid within the contractually agreed dates or the grace periods, thereby constituting a default. The Court further ruled that the mere silence of the landlady in her pleadings regarding the tenant's assertion of advance payment was insufficient to overturn a finding of fact, especially since the landlady was not cross-examined on this point. Consequently, the Court found no justification to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact and dismissed the appeal, granting the tenant two months to vacate upon undertaking to surrender possession.
Questions settled- Whether a payment made after the contractually fixed date but within an allowed grace period constitutes a legal default in payment of rent?
- Can a tenant's assertion of advance payment of rent be accepted solely based on the landlord's silence in pleadings without supporting evidence or cross-examination?
- Does the failure to formally place a written tenancy agreement on the record of the Rent Controller invalidate eviction proceedings if both parties were aware of its terms?
- FATEH SHAH vs MUHAMMAD HASSAN AND 2 Others1983 P Cr. L J 1893 · Lahore High Court · 1983-06-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for the cancellation of bail granted to two respondents in a murder case. The respondents were initially granted bail by an Additional Sessions Judge, primarily relying on statements purportedly made by eye-witnesses under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which exonerated them, and a police report claiming their innocence. The petitioner challenged this, alleging the statements were not genuine and that the police report was factually incorrect regarding the respondents' culpability. The High Court observed that the Magistrate in Jhang acted irregularly by recording statements for an occurrence in Sargodha. Furthermore, the Court criticized the Additional Sessions Judge for departing from standard procedure by requesting the case be transferred to his file. Finding that the investigating agencies had actually implicated the respondents and noting the presence of multiple injuries attributed to them, the Court held that the bail was improperly granted. Consequently, the Court cancelled the bail, ordered the respondents into custody, and directed that the trial be conducted by the Sessions Judge, Sargodha.
Questions settled- Can a Magistrate record statements under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for an occurrence outside their territorial jurisdiction?
- Is it procedurally proper for an Additional Sessions Judge to request the transfer of a specific case to their file for trial?
- Does the existence of conflicting affidavits regarding statements made under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a ground for cancellation of bail?
- FATEH MUHAMMAD vs The STATE1983 SCMR 963 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by conversion arises from an order of the High Court which set aside the bail granted to the appellant by the Sessions Judge in a case registered under sections 502, 307 and 148 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in cancelling the post-arrest bail of the appellant on the ground of vicarious liability without considering the specific grounds evaluated by the Sessions Judge. The Supreme Court held that the Sessions Judge had allowed bail on cogent grounds—including discrepancies between medical evidence and ocular accounts, lack of motive, police finding of innocence, and advanced age—which the High Court failed to advert to or properly reverse. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that an appellate or revisional court reviewing a bail cancellation order must consider and address the specific factual and medical grounds that weighed with the trial court in granting bail, rather than relying solely on abstract propositions of vicarious liability.
Questions settled- Whether bail once granted by a trial court can be set aside without adverting to the cogent grounds that formed the basis of the bail order?
- Does the mere invocation of vicarious liability under an unlawful assembly justify the cancellation of bail without examining individual circumstances and medical evidence?
- Can discrepancies between ocular testimony and medical evidence serve as valid grounds for granting post-arrest bail in a murder case?
- FATEH MUHAMMAD vs PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT1983 CLC 485 · Lahore High Court · 1982-10-31Read full judgment →
- FATEH MUHAMMAD vs GHULAM SARWAR AND Another1983 SCMR 1116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the maintainability of pre-emption suits following the cancellation of a sale deed. The core legal question was whether a suit for pre-emption can be maintained when the underlying sale transaction has been rescinded by a registered deed of retraction prior to the institution of the suit. The Supreme Court held that the right of pre-emption is contingent upon the existence of a valid, subsisting sale. Since the trial court and the first appellate court concurrently found that the deed of retraction was a genuine and valid cancellation of the original sale—rather than a re-sale—and that this cancellation occurred before the pre-emption suits were filed, no cause of action existed. The Court affirmed that in the absence of a subsisting sale, the right of pre-emption cannot be exercised. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the lower courts' findings that the pre-emption suits were not maintainable.
Questions settled- Can a suit for pre-emption be maintained if the underlying sale transaction has been cancelled prior to the institution of the suit?
- Does a registered deed of retraction, found to be genuine, effectively extinguish the right of pre-emption?
- Is a pre-emption suit maintainable in the absence of a subsisting sale?
- FATEH MUHAMMAD AND Another vs Syed AFZAL HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER1983 SCMR 1050 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from two petitions for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the cancellation of land allotments made to the respondents. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities could rely on Khasra Girdawaris instead of the Special Jamabandi to cancel land allotments made sixteen years prior on the allegation of excess entitlement. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of genuine efforts to secure the relevant Special Jamabandi from proper repositories such as the Record Room, District Headquarters, or Canal Department, reliance could not be placed on Khasra Girdawaris to interfere with long-standing allotments. The Court affirmed the High Court's view and dismissed the petitions, holding that allotments should not be lightly disturbed after a prolonged period without proper verification from the primary revenue records.
Questions settled- Can the Settlement authorities rely on Khasra Girdawaris for cancelling land allotments without making proper efforts to secure the relevant Special Jamabandi?
- Whether land allotments made to displaced persons can be interfered with after sixteen years merely on the basis of Khasra Girdawari entries?
- FATEH KHAN vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 793 · Lahore High Court · 1982-10-15Read full judgment →
- FATEH KHAN vs ABDUL RAHMAN1983 SCMR 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his civil revision by the Lahore High Court concerning a pre-emption suit over agricultural land comprising specific Khasra numbers. The core legal question revolved around whether a tenant-at-will cultivating a portion of land is entitled to a superior pre-emption right over the entire area under his tenancy or only to the extent of the vendor's share purchased. The Supreme Court held that the tenant's right as a tenant under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 is protected only to the extent of the fractional share purchased by the vendor in the specific tenancy land, rather than the entire cultivated area. The key principle laid down is that a tenant's pre-emption or protective right regarding tenancy land is proportionate to the vendor's share in the joint holding.
Questions settled- Whether a tenant-at-will is entitled to claim a superior right of pre-emption over the entire area of his tenancy or only in proportion to the vendor's share?
- Does a tenant cultivating a portion of land possess a protected right under paragraph 25(3)(d) of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 extending beyond the purchased fractional share?
- FATEH KHAN MUHAMMAD YUNUS vs MUHAMMAD YUNUS AND Other THE STATE1983 SCMR 268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-17Read full judgment →
- FATEH KHAN AND 2 Others vs The STATE1983 SCMR 519 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that had reduced, but maintained, the sentences of the petitioners convicted under sections 307/34 and 458 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a compromise between the parties, reached after the conviction and during the appellate/revisional stages, justifies a further reduction of sentence to the period already undergone. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners had already endured a protracted trial and significant periods of incarceration. Citing the precedent in Khurshid Ahmad v. The State, the Court held that where parties have compromised, it is desirable in the interest of peace and good relations to accept such a compromise to prevent further bitterness. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, reduced the sentences to the period already undergone, and set aside the order for compensation under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The principle established is that a post-conviction compromise between parties can be a valid ground for the appellate court to reduce a sentence to the period already served.
Questions settled- Can a post-conviction compromise between parties justify the reduction of a sentence to the period already undergone?
- Does a compromise between parties in a criminal case warrant the setting aside of a compensation order passed under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- FATEH CHAND AND 2 0THERS vs THE STATE AND 3 OTHERS--1983 P Cr. L J 253 · Sindh High Court · 1983-05-03Read full judgment →
- FARZAND ALI vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 398 · Lahore High Court · 1982-11-29Read full judgment →
- FARZAND ALI AND ANOTHER vs The STATE1983 SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners filed a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of their application for suspension of sentence pending their appeal before the Lahore High Court. They had been convicted under section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. The High Court had suspended the sentences of some co-accused whose injuries were simple, but dismissed the petitioners' application on the ground that their exact role could only be determined after appreciation of evidence. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretionary order refusing to suspend the sentences. The Supreme Court held that it would not interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in a matter still pending before it, while observing that the petitioners could approach the High Court again if advised. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to suspend a sentence pending appeal?
- Can an accused whose sentence suspension was refused approach the High Court again for relief?
- FAROOQ-UZ-ZAMAN FAROOQI vs WAPDA1983 PLC (C. S.) 878 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1983-05-16Read full judgment →
- FAROOQ AHMAD vs SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, SAHIWAL AND 2 OTHERS1983 PLC (C. S.) 1295 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- FAROOQ AHMAD MALIK vs CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE1983 PLC (C. S.) 80 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1978-09-11Read full judgment →
- FARID KHAN vs ATIQUR REHMAN AND ANOTHER1983 PLD Karachi 510 · Sindh High Court · 1982-11-07Read full judgment →
- FARID AHMED vs KARACHI SHIPYARD & ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. AND ANOTHER1983 PLD Karachi 576 · Sindh High Court · 1983-02-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a Marine Engineer employed by Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Limited, challenged his dismissal from service through a constitutional petition after being found unsatisfactory following a show-cause notice. The core legal question addressed by the court was whether the constitutional petition was maintainable in view of the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978. The Sindh High Court held that corporation service is declared to be the service of Pakistan under section 5 of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978, thereby bringing the petitioner within the ambit of civil servants for service matters and attracting the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. Consequently, the court laid down the principle that the first part of section 5 of the Ordinance operates as a general declaration making corporation service the service of Pakistan, independently of whether an employee was removed or demoted under section 3, thus barring the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 212 of the Constitution. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine.
Questions settled- Whether a constitutional petition by a corporation employee is maintainable in view of the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution?
- Does section 5 of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978 declare all corporation service to be the service of Pakistan independently of actions taken under section 3?
- Are employees of corporations deemed civil servants for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
- FAREED vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 2430 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-19Read full judgment →
- FAQIR. MUHAMMAD AND OTHERS vs MUHAMMAD ISMAIL AND arms1983 PLD Supreme Court 451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a writ petition. The petitioners, previously acquitted by a Magistrate, challenged an order by an Additional Sessions Judge, passed under Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for retrial. The core legal questions were whether a writ petition is competent against an order passed by a Sessions Judge in revisional jurisdiction, and whether an order for retrial based on existing evidence constitutes an improper direction to convict. The Supreme Court held that writ petitions against such revisional orders are generally incompetent, as they circumvent the legislative intent to curtail High Court jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court held that an order for retrial, even when involving a reappraisal of evidence or rehearing of arguments, does not amount to a direction to convict, provided the trial court is directed to decide the matter afresh with an open mind. The principle established is that retrial may be ordered from the stage of arguments without prejudicing the trial court.
Questions settled- Is a writ petition competent against an order passed by a Sessions Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does an order for retrial that directs a fresh decision based on existing evidence amount to a binding direction to convict the accused?
- Can a court order a retrial from the stage of arguments after the evidence has already been recorded?
- FAQIR MUHAMMAD vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND 2 OTHERS1983 CLC 2178 · Lahore High Court · 1982-09-18Read full judgment →
- FAQIR MUHAMMAD vs BIONT COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS1983 CLC 607 · Lahore High Court · 1981-10-02Read full judgment →
- FAQIR MUHAMMAD MALIK vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1757 · Sindh High Court · 1983-04-02Read full judgment →
- FAQIR MUHAMMAD ETC. vs MUHAMMAD ALI ETC.1983 PLD Rev. 38 · Board of Revenue · 1982-10-20Read full judgment →
- FAQIR MUHAMMAD AND Others vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND Other1983SCMR812 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition challenging orders passed under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, whereby certain oral gifts of land made by the petitioner Faqir Muhammad in favour of his sons and daughters were declared void by the Land Commissioner and affirmed through subsequent appellate, review, and revisional forums, concluding with the Federal Land Commission. The High Court of Sind dismissed the constitutional petitions filed against these orders, holding that there was no proof of the alleged gifts and that possession of the land remained with the donor. The core legal question addressed is whether unproven oral gifts of land can be validated as bona fide alienations under paragraph 7 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that in the absence of proof of the transactions and delivery of possession, the question of the bona fides of the alienations does not arise. The key principle laid down is that an oral gift under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, requires strict proof of the transaction and delivery of possession to be sustained.
Questions settled- Whether oral gifts of land under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 require proof of delivery of possession?
- Can the bona fides of an alienation be examined when the underlying transaction of gift is not proved?
- Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-proof of land alienations?
- FAQIR MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1983 PLD Lahore 542 · Lahore High Court · 1983-05-22Read full judgment →
- FAQIR MUHAMMAD AND 2 OTHERS vs Mst. KAMO AND OTHERS1983 CLC 141 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1982-07-26Read full judgment →
- FAQIR HUSSAIN vs The STATE1983 SCMR 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for review of a judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a criminal appeal. The petitioner sought a review of his dismissed appeal and death sentence, contending that his chosen counsel was unable to attend the hearing due to official engagements in the Majlis-e-Shoora, and that the Advocate-on-Record representation prejudiced his case. The petitioner also argued that the benefit of exceeding the right of private defence extended regarding one deceased should have similarly applied to the murder of the other deceased in the same transaction, and that his confessional statement and statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 were not properly analysed. The Supreme Court held that the Advocate-on-Record was present, prepared, and permitted to argue, and that counsel must give preference to court duties over other engagements. The Court further found no error apparent on the record and that all points had been duly considered in the original judgment. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed as incompetent.
Questions settled- Whether a review petition is competent when the counsel of choice was absent but the Advocate-on-Record argued the case?
- Does the failure of a petitioner's primary counsel to attend due to other engagements constitute a ground for reviewing a judgment?
- Whether an error apparent on the record is established where all points in the grounds of appeal and leave granting order were considered?
- FAQIR HUSSAIN AND 4 OTHERS vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1263 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- FAQIR HUSSAIN AND 2 OTHERS vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER PUNJAB1983 CLC 2357 · Lahore High Court · 1982-10-05Read full judgment →
- FAQIR HUSSAIN & Co. vs ASGHAR ALI GHULAM HUSSAIN ANTRIA AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2270 · Sindh High Court · 1981-12-16Read full judgment →
- FAQIR AND 2 Others vs The STATE1983 SCMR 938 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a murder case where four persons were tried for the killing of Mukhtar A.I. The trial court convicted two accused under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 with death sentences, and two others with life imprisonment, while the High Court subsequently altered the death sentences to life imprisonment and acquitted one co-accused. Leave to appeal was granted to Muhammad Aslam alone regarding his specific role of throwing a noose and sharing a common intention. The core legal question was whether improvements in ocular testimony regarding the specific overt act of the appellant were sufficient to discard the testimony and warrant acquittal, and whether common intention was established. The Supreme Court held that despite omissions of detail in the initial report, the possession of the rope at the inception of the attack, corroborative recovery of the rope, and medical evidence establishing ligature marks sufficiently proved his participation and shared common intention, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal with the modification of extending the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that minor omissions or lack of detailed overt acts in the initial report do not vitiate a conviction where ocular testimony is corroborated by material and medical evidence establishing shared common intention.
Questions settled- Whether minor omissions in the initial police report regarding a specific overt act are sufficient to discard ocular testimony and warrant acquittal?
- Does the possession and use of a rope at the inception of an attack establish common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Can medical evidence corroborate the specific role assigned to an accused by eye-witnesses despite discrepancies in police statements?
- FALAK SHER vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 756 · Lahore High Court · 1982-12-18Read full judgment →
- FALAK SHER KHAN AND Another vs MUKHTAR AHMAD AND Other1983 SCMR 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which set aside a 1978 notification amending the West Pakistan Agriculture Service (Class I) Rules, 1965. The amendment had restricted promotions to the rank of Agriculture Engineer (Grade 18) to those holding a B.Sc. degree in Agricultural Engineering, thereby disqualifying existing Assistant Agriculture Engineers who held only diplomas. The Service Tribunal had ruled in favor of the respondents, finding the Engineering Council's refusal to grant a grace period for qualification improvement unreasonable and unjust. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, primarily addressing whether the Service Tribunal had jurisdiction to challenge the notification, the limitation period for such challenges, the competence of the Tribunal to bypass decisions of the Pakistan Engineering Council, and the necessity of impleading the Council and affected parties. The Court affirmed that individuals adversely affected by a tribunal's judgment have standing to petition for leave to appeal, even if not originally impleaded, and identified that the case involves significant questions of law regarding service rules and administrative authority.
Questions settled- Can a person adversely affected by a Service Tribunal judgment file a petition for leave to appeal if they were not impleaded as a party before the Tribunal?
- Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to set aside a departmental notification amending service rules if the challenge is brought years after the notification's issuance?
- Is the Pakistan Engineering Council a necessary party in proceedings where its decisions regarding professional qualifications are challenged before a Service Tribunal?
- FALAK SHER AND Another vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1312 · Lahore High Court · 1983-04-03Read full judgment →
- FALAK SHER AND 4 OTHERS vs GHIAS UDDIN1983 PLD Lahore 238 · Lahore High Court · 1982-12-18Read full judgment →
- FAKHAR-UD-DIN vs ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2518 · Lahore High Court · 1983-01-05Read full judgment →
- FAIZULLAH vs The STATE1983 SCMR 640 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner for possession of 1,700 grams of charas, initially sentenced under Section 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The petitioner challenged the conviction, arguing that mere possession of an intoxicant falls under Section 4, which carries a lesser maximum punishment of two years, rather than Section 3, which concerns manufacturing, importing, or selling and carries a higher penalty. The State conceded that the offence of possession is correctly categorized under Section 4. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the conviction must be under Section 4. Consequently, the Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment from two years to one year, determining that the original sentence was excessive. However, to serve the ends of justice and act as a deterrent, the Court exercised its discretion to enhance the fine from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 5,000. The judgment clarifies the distinction between the offences of possession and the more serious acts of manufacturing or trafficking under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979.
Questions settled- Does the offence of possessing an intoxicant fall under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
- Can the Supreme Court reduce a sentence of imprisonment while simultaneously enhancing the fine imposed on a convict?
- Is the offence of mere possession of an intoxicant subject to the same maximum punishment as the offence of manufacturing or trafficking under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
- FAIZUL HAQUE AND OTHERS vs JAMILA BEGUM AND OTHERS1983 CLC 454 · Lahore High Court · 1980-12-21Read full judgment →
- FAIZAN ALI vs ALI MUHAMMAD AND Other1983 SCMR 1063 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from two petitions filed against the order of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petitions in a settlement matter. The core legal question concerns whether grounds exist for interfering with the concurrent findings and judgments of the High Court and the Settlement Department rendered over a protracted period. The Supreme Court held that no good ground was urged to warrant interference with the impugned judgment, noting that numerous officers in the Settlement Department and the learned Judges of the High Court had thoroughly examined every aspect of the case over twenty years. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of lower forums and the High Court in settlement matters absent a compelling and valid legal ground.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal against concurrent dismissal of writ petitions in settlement matters without a compelling ground?
- Can a party successfully challenge concurrent findings of the High Court and Settlement Department without pointing out material legal infirmities?
- FAIZ UDDIN AHMAD vs MUHAMMAD YUSUF AND Other1983 SCMR 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from a dispute over the transfer of property under Land Settlement Law. The core legal questions presented for examination are twofold: first, whether the Civil Court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the subject matter of the suit, specifically regarding property transfers governed by Land Settlement Law; and second, whether the High Court, upon finding that the Civil Court had jurisdiction after the plaint was initially rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, erred by remanding the case for trial rather than deciding the matter itself and decreeing the suit in favour of the respondent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address these jurisdictional and procedural issues, directing that the appeal be prepared for hearing on the existing record with liberty for parties to submit additional documentation.
Questions settled- Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to try a suit relating to the transfer of property under Land Settlement Law?
- Should a High Court remand a case for trial or decide the matter itself when it determines the Civil Court had jurisdiction after an initial rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- FAIZ MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 697 · Lahore High Court · 1974-06-26Read full judgment →
- FAIZ BAKHSH vs DISTRICT JUDGE, MULTAN AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2437 · Lahore High Court · 1982-05-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a constitutional petition filed under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, challenging the orders of the lower courts whereby the petitioner's evidence as a defendant in a pre-emption suit was closed under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The core legal question was whether it is a mandatory requirement for the application of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. that the immediately preceding adjournment must have been granted specifically at the request of the party against whom the provision is invoked. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that once a case has been adjourned at the request or instance of a party at any prior stage, the court is legally competent to close the evidence on a subsequent default date, and it is not a legal requirement that every preceding adjournment must be at that party's request or expressly recorded as such if circumstances indicate otherwise.
Questions settled- Whether the application of Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires that the immediately preceding adjournment must be granted at the request of the defaulting party?
- Is it legally necessary for a court to explicitly write in its order that an adjournment is granted at the request of a particular party for the purpose of closing evidence under Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
- FAIZ AND Others vs THF STATE1983 SCMR 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1932-06-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court had discarded all prosecution ocular evidence but convicted the appellants based solely on their statements recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, reasoning that they had exceeded the right of private defense. The core legal question was whether a court, in the absence of any other evidence, may selectively accept the inculpatory portion of an accused's statement while rejecting the exculpatory portion regarding self-defense. The Supreme Court held that where no other evidence exists to test the veracity of the accused's statement, the court cannot split the statement to accept only the incriminating parts while discarding the exculpatory parts as incredible. The Court affirmed the principle that in such circumstances, the statement must be accepted in its entirety. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellants were acquitted, as their version, which claimed self-defense, was the only material available on the record.
Questions settled- Can a court convict an accused by accepting only the inculpatory part of their statement while rejecting the exculpatory part when no other evidence exists?
- Must an accused's statement be accepted in its entirety when it is the only evidence available on the record?
- Does the right of private defense extend to inflicting more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defense?
- FAIZ AND 2 OTHERSContractss vs THE STATE1983 PLD Lahore 602 · Lahore High Court · 1983-03-21Read full judgment →
- FAIZ ALI vs MESSRS BARKAT ALI AND Other1983 SCMR 1036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed in limine a writ petition challenging the decision of a Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of a property. The parties, both in occupation of different portions of a house in Lahore, had engaged in multiple rounds of litigation. The Settlement Commissioner, relying on an inspection report by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, ordered the division and transfer of the property to the parties based on their actual physical possession. The High Court upheld this decision as a just and fair resolution. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner attempted to raise legalistic arguments challenging the Settlement authorities' order. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner's decision, based on the physical division of the property according to possession, was fair and proper. Consequently, the Court ruled that the High Court correctly refused to interfere with the administrative order in its writ jurisdiction, and the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a High Court interfere with a Settlement Commissioner's order that divides property based on actual physical possession?
- Is a property division order based on an inspection report by an Additional Settlement Commissioner considered a fair and proper resolution?
- FAIZ AHMAD vs THB STATE1983 P Cr. L J 11 · Lahore High Court · 1982-08-22Read full judgment →
- FAHIM DAD KHAN AND Others vs Mst. ZUBAIDA BEGUM1983 SCMR 888 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from proceedings relating to the transfer of a double-storied house in Sialkot under settlement laws. The Settlement Commissioner ordered the division of the house, transferring the ground floor to respondents' predecessor and the upper floors to the petitioners' predecessor. After writ proceedings and a Letters Patent Appeal, the LPA Bench restored the Settlement Commissioner's order. The petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the LPA had abated upon the death of their predecessor and, having been restored after the promulgation of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, should be deemed a fresh institution and thus barred under section 3 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court observed that the restoration placed the appeal back on its original number as a pending appeal, and further declined to interfere on equitable grounds since the parties had occupied and been transferred their respective portions for decades. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. The key principle is that the setting aside of an abatement restores an appeal to its original number and pending status, and equitable considerations regarding long-standing possession may weigh against interference under settlement jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal restored after setting aside abatement is deemed a newly instituted appeal or a pending appeal?
- Does the bar under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 apply to a Letters Patent Appeal pending at the time of its promulgation?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere under settlement jurisdiction where parties have been in long-standing possession of their respective portions for decades?
- F. U. MALI K vs WAPDA AND ANOTHER1983 SCMR 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal as time-barred. The petitioner, a permanent employee and Senior Budget and Accounts Officer of WAPDA, was removed from service following departmental proceedings regarding allegations of misconduct. After pursuing remedies through the Labour Court and High Court, where it was established that WAPDA employees are deemed civil servants under the law, the petitioner approached the Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerned the computation of limitation and the requirement of exhausting departmental remedies when an order of removal is passed by the authority itself. The Supreme Court held that WAPDA employees are deemed civil servants for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act, and upheld the Service Tribunal's finding that the appeal was barred by limitation and that no adequate ground existed for condonation of delay. The key principle laid down is that statutory provisions declaring WAPDA employees to be civil servants apply strictly, and established periods of limitation for filing appeals before the Service Tribunal must be adhered to.
Questions settled- Whether employees of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority are deemed civil servants for the purpose of the Service Tribunals Act?
- Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is liable to be dismissed if it fails to comply with the limitation requirements provided under the Service Tribunals Act?
- Whether the delay in filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal can be condoned without sufficient cause?
- F. A. ZUBERI vs ALI HUSSAIN AND OTHERS1983 PLC 477 · Sindh High Court · 1982-01-27Read full judgment →
- EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, PESHAWAR vs MESSRS TOUR MUHAMMAD & SONS AND 4 Other1983SCMR619 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a civil revision against an ex parte decree. The petitioner had failed to file a written statement despite multiple adjournments, leading the trial court to strike off the defence and subsequently pass an ex parte decree. The core legal question was whether the interlocutory order striking off the defence remained challengeable after the final ex parte decree had been passed, and whether the trial court's procedure was legally sound. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court reasoned that the interlocutory order striking off the defence ceased to exist upon the passing of the final ex parte decree. The Court affirmed that where a party is granted time to perform an act but fails to do so, the court may proceed under Order XVII, Rule 3, and that an interlocutory order's life effectively ends when a final decree is rendered, precluding separate revision against the interlocutory order once the final adjudication is complete.
Questions settled- Does an interlocutory order striking off a defence survive the passing of a final ex parte decree?
- Can a court proceed under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a party fails to file a written statement after being granted time?
- Is a revision petition competent against an interlocutory order after a final decree has been passed in the suit?
- EXCISE AND TAXATION OFFICER, SUKKUR AND 2 OTHERS vs AHSANULLAH KHAN1983 CLC 716 · Sindh High Court · 1981-01-29Read full judgment →
- ESSO AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 530 · Sindh High Court · 1982-11-21Read full judgment →
- EMPLOYEES UNION vs PAKISTAN TOBACCO Co. LTD.1983 PLC 1087 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-02-13Read full judgment →
- EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS R. C. D. BALL BEARINGS LTD.1983 PLC 317 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-11-13Read full judgment →
- EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS NEW JUBILLE INSURANCE Co. LTD.1983 PLC 346 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-10-31Read full judgment →
- EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS NATIONAL BOOK FOUNDATION1983 PLC 905 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-10-30Read full judgment →
- EMI (PAKISTAN) LTD. vs SHALIMAR RECORDING CO. LTD.AND 3 OTHERS1983 CLC 1750 · Sindh High Court · 1983-03-15Read full judgment →
- ELECTRIC LAMP MANUFACTURERS OF PAKISTAN LTD. vs MAZDOOR UNION1983 PLC 25 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1982-08-01Read full judgment →
- ELECTRIC LAMP MANUFACTURERS OF PAKISTAN LTD. vs ADDITIONAL1983 CLC 3105 · Sindh High Court · 1983-02-14Read full judgment →
- EJAZ MUHAMMAD KHAN vs PROVINCE OF PUNJAB1983 PLC (C. S.) 303 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1982-08-25Read full judgment →
- EJAZ MAHMOOD vs Mst. HUMAIRA AND ANOTHER1983 CLC 3305 · Lahore High Court · 1983-06-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Constitutional Petition challenged an interlocutory order of a Family Court allowing the amendment of a plaint to include a claim for deferred dower. The petitioner argued that the Code of Civil Procedure was inapplicable, thus no amendment could be allowed, that it introduced a fresh cause of action, and that the claim for deferred dower had been waived. The High Court held that while the Code of Civil Procedure is not strictly applicable, Family Courts can adopt any procedure not expressly barred, including allowing amendments necessary for the final disposal of a suit, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It clarified that a divorce becomes effective 90 days after notice to the Chairman under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, and therefore, a suit for prompt dower filed before the divorce became effective did not constitute a waiver of deferred dower. The Court also found the Family Court's order to be a speaking order. Crucially, the High Court ruled that a Constitutional Petition is not maintainable against an interlocutory order when an alternative remedy by way of appeal is available. Consequently, the Constitutional Petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a Family Court allow amendment of a plaint even if the Code of Civil Procedure is not strictly applicable?
- Is an amendment to include a claim for deferred dower permissible in a suit for prompt dower if the cause of action for deferred dower accrues during the pendency of the suit?
- Does filing a suit for prompt dower before a divorce becomes effective constitute a waiver of the claim for deferred dower?
- Is a Constitutional Petition maintainable against an interlocutory order of a Family Court when an appeal remedy is available?
- When does a 'Talaq' become effective under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance?
- EJAZ MAHMOOD vs Mst. HUMAIRA AND 2 OTHERS1983 PLD Lahore 615 · Lahore High Court · 1983-06-26Read full judgment →
- EJAZ ALI vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2414 · Lahore High Court · 1982-11-21Read full judgment →
- EJAZ AHMAD vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 1678 · Lahore High Court · 1983-02-14Read full judgment →
- EHSAN BEG AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1983 P Cr. L J 921 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-19Read full judgment →
- EHSAN ALI vs The STATE1983 SCMR 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the appropriateness of a death sentence awarded to the appellant for a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the death penalty was justified given the circumstances of the offense, specifically the suddenness of the quarrel and the lack of premeditation. The appellant, provoked by a verbal confrontation following an offensive remark, retrieved a firearm from his home and killed the deceased. The Court held that the incident arose from a sudden quarrel where both parties contributed to the escalation of tempers, negating the element of cold-blooded malice aforethought. Consequently, the Court set aside the death sentence and substituted it with life imprisonment, while enhancing the fine and compensation payable to the heirs of the deceased. The key principle laid down is that crimes committed in 'hot blood' arising from a sudden quarrel, where the victim shares responsibility for the provocation, should not be visited with the same severity of punishment as deliberate, cold-blooded offenses.
Questions settled- Whether a crime committed in 'hot blood' arising from a sudden quarrel warrants the imposition of the death penalty?
- Does a sudden quarrel where both parties contribute to the escalation of tempers mitigate the sentence for murder?
- Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a sentence of life imprisonment?
- EASTERN SCALES (P.) LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX1983 PTD 55 · Calcutta High Court · 1981-08-16Read full judgment →
- EASTERN FEDERAL UNION INSURANCE Co. LTD. AND 2 Other vs MUHAMMAD1983 PLC 536 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1983-01-17Read full judgment →
- EARTHWORM TRACTOR CO. (INC.), NEW YORK,U. S. A. vs NATIONAL1983 CLC 2067 · Sindh High Court · 1982-05-16Read full judgment →
- DUR MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1983 PLD Lahore 24 · Lahore High Court · 1982-07-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment provides the detailed reasons for a short order previously issued granting post-arrest bail to the petitioner under the third proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner sought bail on the ground that he had been detained for an offence punishable with death for a continuous period exceeding two years without the conclusion of his trial. The State opposed the bail, arguing that the two-year period should be extended by excluding an adjournment caused by an application filed by the petitioner due to the sudden illness of his counsel. The court held that the phrase 'act or omission of the accused' in the third proviso refers to wrongful acts causing avoidable delay, and does not include innocent, bona fide, or justifiable acts or delays—such as an adjournment due to sudden counsel sickness accepted by the court as genuine. Consequently, such periods cannot be deducted from the statutory two-year period. The court affirmed that the mandatory right to bail accrues once the continuous period expires, successfully advancing the remedy intended by the Criminal Procedure (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1979.
Questions settled- Whether the mandatory right to bail under the third proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 arises upon the expiry of the continuous period of detention without conclusion of the trial?
- Does a bona fide adjournment caused by the sudden illness of an accused person's counsel constitute an act or omission of the accused that should be deducted when calculating the statutory detention period for bail?
- How should the expression 'act or omission of the accused' in the third proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be interpreted in relation to trial delays?
- DUR MUHAMMAD vs BASHIR AND 2 Others1983 P Cr. L J 2053 · Sindh High Court · 1983-04-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from an application filed by an injured victim seeking cancellation of post-arrest bail previously granted to two respondents by the High Court. Bail had originally been granted without opposition from the State on the belief that the injuries were simple and on non-vital body parts. The applicant subsequently produced medical certificates demonstrating that both injured persons suffered grievous injuries, bringing the alleged offense under Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which carries potential life imprisonment or ten years' imprisonment. The respondents challenged the competence of an injured person who is not the F.I.R. complainant to seek bail cancellation under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court held that an injured victim, as a person vitally interested in the prosecution, is fully competent to apply for cancellation of bail. Finding that the grant of bail was based on an erroneous factual basis and that the statutory prohibition under Section 497, Cr.P.C. applied, the High Court cancelled the respondents' bail.
Questions settled- Does an injured victim who is not the original complainant have locus standi to move an application for cancellation of bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Can bail granted under a misapprehension of the nature of injuries be cancelled upon subsequent production of medical certificates showing grievous injuries under a prohibitory clause offense?
- DR.AKHLAQUE AHMED vs THE STATE AND Othsrss1983 SCMR 976 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the acquittal of the respondents in a criminal case involving charges of bigamy and Zina. The petitioner, having obtained a decree of dissolution of marriage, challenged it in the High Court and secured an interim stay order. The respondent wife subsequently remarried. The petitioner alleged this constituted a criminal offence, despite the dissolution decree. The trial court acquitted the respondents under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a decision upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the marriage occurred after the statutory 90-day period following the original dissolution decree. The Court reasoned that the interim stay order merged into the final dismissal of the appeal, thereby restoring the original decree. Consequently, the marriage was legally valid, and no criminal offence was committed. The Court affirmed that where a challenge to a dissolution decree fails, the original decree retains its legal force and effect, precluding criminal liability for subsequent marriages contracted after the statutory period.
Questions settled- Does a marriage contracted after the expiry of the statutory period following a decree of dissolution of marriage constitute an offence if the decree was temporarily suspended by an interim order that was later vacated?
- What is the effect of the merger of an interim stay order into a final judgment dismissing an appeal against a decree of dissolution of marriage?
- Can an acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be sustained when the underlying criminal charge relies on a marriage being void due to a pending legal challenge that was ultimately dismissed?
- DR. TAJUDDIN MANJI vs SOCIETE INTERNATIONAL DETELECOMMUNICATIONS1983 CLC 295 · Sindh High Court · 1982-03-02Read full judgment →
- DR. SHER DIL BATRA vs ABDUL REHMAN WAHLA1983 PLD Lahore 491 · Lahore High Court · 1983-04-18Read full judgment →
- DR. SHAMSUNNISA vs Mst. FIRDAUS BEGUM1983 SCMR 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a rent dispute where the respondent-landlady sought the eviction of the appellant-tenant on grounds including nuisance, default in rent, and property damage. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, but the High Court allowed the respondent's appeal, ordering eviction. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the alleged acts constituted 'nuisance' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and whether such nuisance must affect occupants of buildings in the neighbourhood to qualify for eviction. The Court held that the appellant's conduct, including throwing rubbish and intercepting mail, constituted continuous nuisance rather than a solitary instance. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's interpretation that the statutory reference to 'occupants of buildings' includes occupants within the same building, as the General Clauses Act allows for singular terms to encompass the plural. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the eviction order, and reaffirmed that acts causing nuisance to any occupant in a multi-tenement building fall within the scope of the Ordinance.
Questions settled- Does a single instance of misconduct constitute 'nuisance' sufficient to warrant eviction under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- Can a tenant be evicted for nuisance if the affected party resides in the same building rather than a separate neighbouring building?
- Do statutory references to 'occupants of buildings' in the plural include a single occupant within a multi-tenement building?
- DR. SHAFQAT HUSSAIN CHAUDHRY vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB AND ANOTHER1983 PLC (C. S.) 744 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1982-06-13Read full judgment →
- DR. SALAHUDDIN AHMED vs MINISTRY OF WORKS AND ANOTHER1983 CLC 457 · Sindh High Court · 1982-03-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition arose from the concurrent dismissal of the applicant's suit and rejection of his plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by the lower courts, who held that the suit was barred under Sections 10 and 11 of the Central Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1965. The core legal questions were whether Section 10 of the Ordinance bars permanent injunctions or only temporary injunctions, and whether Section 11 completely ousts civil court jurisdiction when mala fides are alleged. The Sindh High Court held that Section 10 only bars temporary or interim injunctions without ousting jurisdiction over permanent injunctions, and Section 11 does not bar civil suits where mala fides are alleged in the plaint. The court established the principle that while considering a rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, the court must assume the averments in the body of the plaint to be true and cannot rely on defence pleas, and allegations of mala fides require framing issues and recording evidence before a plaint can be dismissed or rejected.
Questions settled- Does Section 10 of the Central Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1965 bar the grant of permanent injunctions alongside temporary injunctions?
- Does Section 11 of the Central Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1965 oust the jurisdiction of civil courts when mala fides are alleged against government functionaries?
- Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the basis of pleas raised in the defence rather than the statements made in the body of the plaint?
- DR. S. H. RAHIMTOOLA vs DR. HABIBA AND OTHERS1983 CLC 2099 · Sindh High Court · 1982-08-07Read full judgment →