Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• SUO MOTU ACTION REGARDING COMBATING THE PANDEMIC OF CORONA VIRUS (COVID - 19) Versus2020 SCMR 731 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE alias NEELA Versus State2020 SCMR 664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-06
  criminal appealmurder convictiondoctrine of abundant cautionappreciation of evidenceacquittal of co-accusedfatal blowforensic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal matter involves cross-petitions challenging a High Court judgment regarding a murder conviction. The petitioner, Muhammad Rafique, was convicted for the murder of Nazim Hussain, while his co-accused were acquitted. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in maintaining the conviction of the petitioner while acquitting his co-accused based on the same evidence, and whether the doctrine of abundant caution was correctly applied. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions, upholding the conviction of the petitioner and the acquittal of the co-accused. The Court held that the petitioner’s conviction was supported by consistent witness testimony and forensic evidence, specifically the recovery of the murder weapon. Regarding the co-accused, the Court affirmed the High Court’s application of the doctrine of abundant caution, noting that the acquittal of some accused does not necessitate the rejection of the entire prosecution case if the remaining evidence sufficiently establishes the guilt of the principal offender. The judgment reinforces that the doctrine of abundant caution is a vital tool for ensuring the safe administration of criminal justice without invalidating credible evidence against others.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused based on the doctrine of abundant caution necessarily invalidate the conviction of the principal offender?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on witness testimony and forensic evidence even when other co-accused are acquitted?
  • Is the doctrine of abundant caution applicable to the appreciation of evidence in criminal trials?
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• COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, ISLAMABAD Versus ASKARI CEMENT (PVT.) LTD.2020 SCMR 649 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-22
  customs classificationquasi-judicial functionsCentral Board of Revenuestatutory interpretationPCT headingsadministrative instructionsrefractory bricks
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a customs dispute regarding the classification of imported refractory bricks under the Pakistan Customs Tariff (PCT). The core legal question was whether the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) possesses the authority to issue binding administrative instructions on the classification of goods, thereby overriding the quasi-judicial discretion of customs authorities and appellate forums. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the Tribunal's decision which favored the importer's classification. The Court held that the classification of goods involves mixed questions of law and fact, falling exclusively within the domain of the customs hierarchy. It established that the Board’s administrative instructions cannot interfere with the quasi-judicial functions of customs officers or appellate forums. Under Section 223 of the Customs Act, 1969, the Board's directives are limited to administrative matters and cannot encroach upon the discretion of officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. Consequently, the Tribunal and High Court were not bound by the Board's interpretation, as such interpretations are merely administrative and not judicial pronouncements.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Central Board of Revenue have the authority to issue binding instructions on the classification of goods that interfere with the quasi-judicial functions of customs authorities?
  • Are customs authorities and appellate tribunals bound by the administrative interpretations of the Central Board of Revenue regarding the classification of goods under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does the composition of a Customs Appellate Tribunal bench consisting of two technical members and one judicial member satisfy the requirements of Section 194(c) of the Customs Act, 1969?
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• SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LIMITED Versus REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS2020 SCMR 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-07
  trade unioncollective bargaining agentcontract employeesvoters listreferendumindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Sui Southern Gas Company Limited challenging orders allowing contract workers to be included in the voters' list for a referendum to determine the Collective Bargaining Agent. The core legal question is whether workers engaged in an establishment through a labour contractor are eligible to be registered as voters to participate in such a referendum. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, a worker or workman employed either directly or through a contractor is eligible to be a voter provided they have completed three months of service in the establishment. The Court laid down that the definition of worker under the statute includes those employed through a contractor, and contractual arrangements cannot be used as a device to deprive workers of their legitimate rights to participate in trade union activities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a worker engaged in an establishment through a labour contractor is eligible to be registered as a voter to participate in a referendum for choosing a Collective Bargaining Agent?
  • Does the definition of worker under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 include persons employed through a contractor?
  • Can an employment arrangement through a contractor be used as a device to deprive workers of their fundamental rights to participate in trade union activities?
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• COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS Versus BYCO PETROLEUM PAKISTAN2020 SCMR 615 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-13
  customs duty exemptiontemporary importSRO 678(I)/2004Customs Act 1969PCT CodeTug boatsdrilling and seismic vesselstax exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute concerning the applicability of customs duty exemption under SRO 678(I)/2004, issued pursuant to Section 19 of the Customs Act 1969, to three imported Tug boats. The respondent company imported the Tug boats on a temporary basis without payment of duties, contending that they qualified for tax exemption under the SRO as vessels imported for petroleum sector operations. Customs authorities issued a show cause notice alleging violations of Section 32(3) and Section 79(1) of the Customs Act 1969, but the Collector Customs Adjudication subsequently withdrew the notice, a decision affirmed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether Tug boats fall within the exempted category of 'drilling and seismic (on shore or off shore) vessels' specified under sub-clause (vii) of Clause (5) of SRO 678(I)/2004. The Supreme Court held that Tug boats, classified under PCT Code 8904.0000, serve a distinct function of pushing vessels to shore and are functionally and legally separate from drilling and seismic vessels. The Court held that exemption notifications must be strictly construed and reversed the High Court judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Tug boats used for pushing oil tankers fall within the scope of exemption under SRO 678(I)/2004 for drilling and seismic vessels?
  • Does a distinct Pakistan Customs Tariff heading preclude an imported item from claiming exemption under a general or misclassified category?
  • Are temporary imports of specialized vessels exempt from customs duty in the absence of explicit coverage under relevant tax exemption notifications?
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• AURANGZEB Versus State2020 SCMR 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-02
  post-mortem examinationocular evidencecondonation of delaySection 302 PPCcorroborationacquittal of co-accusedprompt FIRsafe administration of criminal justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arose from a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for committing homicide with a firearm during a public event. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court involved whether the ocular testimony of related witnesses could be relied upon without independent corroboration after the acquittal of six co-accused, and whether a delay in filing the petition due to financial incapacity could be condoned. The Supreme Court condoned the delay of 626 days in filing the petition. Examining the merits, the Court upheld the conviction, holding that the prompt reporting of the incident, consistency in assigning the specific fatal role to the petitioner, and alignment with medical evidence excluded any possibility of false substitution or deliberation. The Court reiterated the principle that the acquittal of co-accused out of abundant caution does not automatically undermine the credible, consistent ocular evidence directly implicating the main accused in a broad-daylight occurrence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on ocular evidence against a primary accused after co-accused have been acquitted on the same evidence?
  • Does financial incapacity constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing a criminal petition from jail?
  • Does the failure to obtain a positive forensic report on a recovered weapon automatically invalidate an otherwise consistent ocular account?
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• Dr. SHAMIM TARIQ Versus INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD2020 SCMR 568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-12
  public appointmenteligibility criteriaquo warrantoequal opportunityselection processservice lawacademic appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to the appointment of a respondent as an Assistant Professor (Urdu) at the International Islamic University, Islamabad. The core legal question was whether the appointment was valid given that the respondent did not possess the mandatory Ph.D. or equivalent qualification on the closing date specified in the advertisement. The Supreme Court held that the appointment was illegal, as the respondent failed to meet the prescribed eligibility criteria at the time of application. The Court emphasized that strict adherence to statutory rules and selection procedures is essential to uphold the principles of equal opportunity and fair treatment in public employment. Deviating from these criteria undermines the rule of law. Consequently, the Court set aside the respondent's appointment and directed the University to conduct a fresh selection process among the remaining eligible, shortlisted candidates, excluding both the petitioner and the respondent. The Court clarified that while a quo warranto petition can result in the removal of an unqualified incumbent, it does not automatically entitle the petitioner to the vacant position.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appointment to a public post be sustained if the candidate did not possess the mandatory qualifications on the closing date for applications?
  • Does a successful quo warranto petition automatically entitle the petitioner to be appointed to the vacated post?
  • Is strict adherence to prescribed selection criteria mandatory for public institutions to ensure equal opportunity?
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• PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Secretary Agriculture Department, Lahore Versus MUHAMMAD ARIF2020 SCMR 507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-14
  regularization of servicecontract employeesproject-based employmentPunjab Regularization of Service Act 2018vested rightsservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the Lahore High Court's decision to regularize the services of contract employees engaged under the World Bank-assisted 'Punjab Irrigated Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project.' The core legal question was whether project-based contract employees are entitled to regularization under the Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting regularization. The Court determined that the 2018 Act explicitly excludes persons appointed to project-based posts from its definition of 'contract employee.' The judgment establishes that there is a qualitative and conceptual distinction between general contract employees and project-based employees. Because project appointments are time-bound and sanctioned only for the duration of the project, such employees possess no vested right to regularization or continued employment upon the project's completion. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's orders, affirming that project employees cannot claim the benefits intended for regular government department contract employees, as their service terms are governed strictly by their specific project contracts.

  Questions settled

  • Are project-based contract employees entitled to regularization under the Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018?
  • Does a contract employee appointed to a time-bound project possess a vested right to regularization?
  • Does the definition of 'contract employee' under the Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018 include persons appointed to project-based posts?
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• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (LEGAL) RTO, ABBOTTABAD Versus ED-ZUBLIN AG GERMANY2020 SCMR 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-26
  tax referencelimitation periodreview petitionrectification of clerical errorinherent jurisdictionincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the High Court's dismissal of a Tax Reference as time-barred and its subsequent dismissal of a review petition as incompetent. The core legal question was whether the High Court, exercising reference jurisdiction under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, could correct a factual error regarding the date of receipt of an appellate tribunal's order. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court does not possess inherent review jurisdiction under the statute, it possesses inherent jurisdiction to treat a review application as an application for the rectification of a clerical or factual error. The Court laid down the principle that courts are not fettered from converting one type of proceeding into another to correct an obvious clerical error and ensure that justice is not defeated by technicalities, thereby remanding the matter for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is vested with review jurisdiction under section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a review application seeking the correction of a clerical date error be treated as an application for rectification?
  • Does the High Court have the inherent power to convert one type of proceeding into another to correct an obvious error?
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• MUSHTAQ AHMAD Versus State2020 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-09
  narcotic possessionforensic reportprotocolchemical analysisdirectory rulesconviction appealcharas
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged his conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for possession of 1460 grams of Charas, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the forensic report was legally deficient for failing to include 'protocols' as required by Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substance (Govt. Analysis) Rules, 2001, and the precedent set in State v. Imam Bukhsh. The Supreme Court held that the forensic report, which detailed the analytical balance, chemical spot tests, and Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry used, sufficiently met the required standards for 'protocol'. The Court clarified that the term 'protocol' refers to a formal record of experimental observations, which the report provided. Furthermore, the Court held that Rule 6 is directory in nature and does not prevent an accused from summoning an expert to solicit specific details. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a forensic report failing to explicitly label 'protocols' violate Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substance (Govt. Analysis) Rules, 2001?
  • Is Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substance (Govt. Analysis) Rules, 2001, mandatory or directory in nature?
  • Can an accused challenge a forensic report for lack of detail without summoning the expert witness?
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• STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN Versus MUZAFAR ALI2020 SCMR 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-20
  life insuranceaccidental death and indemnity benefitpermanent disabilitycross-examinationliquidated damagesinsurance claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a dispute regarding a claim filed under an Accidental Death and Indemnity Benefit Policy (AIB Policy) supplementary to a life insurance policy. The petitioner, State Life Insurance Corporation, challenged the concurrent findings of the lower forums, arguing that the claim was filed out of time, that there was insufficient evidence of permanent disability, and that liquidated damages were not leviable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the issue of limitation was not framed before the Insurance Tribunal and could not be raised. On the merits, the Court held that the respondent's permanent disability (traumatic paraplegia) was established as his testimony of being wheelchair-bound was not cross-examined, and the petitioner had itself previously granted sickness benefits based on the same medical evidence. Furthermore, the Court ruled that liquidated damages under Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 are a statutory requirement in cases of late settlement of claims. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal effect of a failure to cross-examine a witness on a material fact, such as the occurrence of an accident and subsequent permanent disability?
  • Can an insurance company reject medical evidence for one benefit under a policy when it has already accepted the same evidence to grant another benefit under the same policy?
  • Are liquidated damages under Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 a mandatory statutory requirement in cases of late settlement of claims?
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• CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE Versus ZIA-UR-REHMAN2020 SCMR 436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-13
  traffic wardenservice tribunaladditional basic payfreezing of allowancespay paritycivil servantsterms of appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Chief Secretary of the Punjab challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which had allowed a service appeal filed by the respondent Traffic Warden and directed the restoration and release of certain emoluments—specifically, one additional basic pay plus 20 days fixed daily allowance—that had been frozen pursuant to a government notification. The core legal question concerned the proper interpretation of the terms of the respondent's appointment letter regarding pay and allowances, and the validity of freezing special pay and allowances across the provincial government. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's judgment, holding that the respondent's terms of appointment guaranteed emoluments at par with the Punjab Highway Patrol Police rather than an immutable additional basic pay, and that the government notification dated 11.07.2011 lawfully froze special pays and allowances for all civil servants to maintain parity without resulting in discrimination. The key principle laid down is that government service terms regarding parity of pay must be interpreted contextually, and general notifications freezing special allowances to rationalize pay scales apply uniformly unless validly challenged.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unaccepted letter of offer can supersede the formal letter of appointment issued by the competent authority?
  • Does an additional basic pay granted as a special allowance form part of the basic pay subject to annual increments?
  • Whether the government has the authority to freeze special pays and allowances for civil servants through a general notification?
  • Does the freezing of allowances uniformly across government departments constitute unlawful discrimination?
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• FAYAZ KHAN Versus GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Aviation Cabinet Secretariat, Aviation Division, Islamabad2020 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-14Read full judgment →
• FAZAL WAHAB Versus State2020 SCMR 404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-14
  narcotic possessionforensic science laboratory reportchain of custodycriminal appealleave to appealsentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld the petitioner's conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, while reducing his sentence. The petitioner was convicted for the possession of 6000 grams of charas gardah. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had successfully established the safe custody and transmission of the recovered narcotic samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory, given that the Forensic Science Laboratory report initially omitted the name of the constable who transported the samples. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had sufficiently proven its case. The court observed that the testimony of the constable (CW.2), who confirmed he transmitted the parcels, cured the procedural defect in the report. Furthermore, the court found no evidence of malice against the prosecution witnesses. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the findings of guilt and the sentence imposed by the High Court, holding that no interference was warranted as the prosecution had met its burden of proof.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of a transporting official's name in a Forensic Science Laboratory report necessarily invalidate the prosecution's case regarding the chain of custody?
  • Can oral testimony of a witness during trial cure a procedural omission in a forensic report regarding the transmission of sample parcels?
  • Is the conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 sustainable when prosecution witnesses remain consistent on material aspects and no malice is proven?
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• SHABLA Versus Ms. JAHAN AFROZ KHILAT2020 SCMR 352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE Versus State2020 SCMR 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-02
  abduction for ransomtest identification paradeappraisal of evidencecriminal appealeyewitness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, authored by Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed, J., arises from the judgment of the High Court of Sindh dated 10.12.2015, which maintained the convictions of the petitioners for abduction for ransom while altering their death penalty to imprisonment for life. The core legal questions involved whether discrepancies regarding the number of assailants and the evidentiary value of a test identification parade warranted setting aside the conviction, and how identification parades and fractional recoveries in abduction cases ought to be evaluated. The Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies in the initial report do not vitiate the prosecution case where eyewitnesses and the abductee remain consistent, and that test identification parades are to be appraised based on the facts and circumstances of each case without imposing unrealistic burdens on the prosecution. The court dismissed the petitions, affirming the conviction and life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an apparent discrepancy in the initial crime report regarding the number of assailants adversely impacts the prosecution case when eyewitnesses remain consistent?
  • How should evidence relating to a test identification parade be appraised in criminal trials involving abductions and dacoities?
  • Does the law cast an artificially heavier onus on the prosecution to demand exact re-enactment of specific roles played by culprits in calamitous situations like abductions?
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• MUHAMMAD SALEEM Versus FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION2020 SCMR 221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-16
  civil serviceoccupational groupsabsorptiondeputationhorizontal movementlateral entryservice tribunalterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the legality of the permanent absorption of civil servants into the Military Lands and Cantonments (ML&C) Group. The appellant, an officer within the ML&C Group, challenged the absorption of officers from other occupational groups, arguing it violated the Civil Servants Act 1973 and the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional and legal framework governing civil services, specifically the relationship between the 1973 Act and the Office Memorandums (OMs) creating Occupational Groups. The Court held that these OMs are valid exercises of the rule-making power delegated under Section 25 of the Civil Servants Act 1973 and possess equal legal standing with other rules framed thereunder. Consequently, the OMs are not subordinate to the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973. The Court found that the absorption of the respondents complied with the specific criteria for 'horizontal movement' and 'lateral entry' set out in the ML&C Group OM, as they were based on identified shortages and proper departmental vetting. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the lawfulness of the absorption process.

  Questions settled

  • Are Office Memorandums creating Occupational Groups subordinate to the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973?
  • Does the Civil Servants Act 1973 provide a legal basis for the permanent absorption of civil servants from other groups into a specific Occupational Group?
  • Can the 'horizontal movement' or 'lateral entry' provisions in an Office Memorandum be invoked to absorb deputationists into an Occupational Group?
  • Is the power to regulate terms and conditions of civil servants vested solely in the legislature under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• AJMIR SHAH Versus The INSPECTOR-GENERAL, FRONTIER CORPS KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA2020 SCMR 2129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-19
  limitationdepartmental appealservice mattercondonation of delayFrontier Corpsdismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from the dismissal of the petitioner's service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal as time-barred. The petitioner, a Sepoy with the Bajour Scouts of the Frontier Corps, was dismissed from service in October 2008 under Section 10 of the Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959. He failed to file a departmental appeal within the prescribed one-month period under Rule 14 of the Frontier Corps Rules, 1961, and instead filed it after more than four years, claiming he was waiting for the outcome of a colleague's service appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that waiting for a colleague's case outcome does not constitute a sufficient cause for delay. The Court emphasized that where a statute or rule prescribes a specific manner for doing an act, it must be done in that manner. Under Rule 14, only the authority that passed the original order could certify and extend the limitation period, and no such certification was obtained. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee waiting for the outcome of a colleague's service appeal constitutes a sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing their own departmental appeal?
  • Can an appellate authority impliedly condone a delay in filing a departmental appeal when the relevant rules vest the power of extension solely in the original authority?
  • Does the principle that 'where law requires something to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner' apply to statutory limitation and extension procedures?
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• MUHAMMAD JAVED Versus State2020 SCMR 2116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-07
  murderbenefit of doubtsuppression of injuriesmutually destructive evidenceacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner against his conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where he was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a grocery vendor. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction can be sustained when prosecution witnesses suppress material facts, including injuries sustained by the accused and their family members during the same transaction, and where the evidence presents mutually destructive accounts of the incident. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution witnesses failed to explain or mention the extensive injuries suffered by the petitioner, his mother, and his sister at the time of the incident, which were documented by the investigating officer and medical officers. Furthermore, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses contradicted one another, and the petitioner had provided a consistent defense version from the outset. The Supreme Court held that suppression of material facts and mutually destructive prosecution evidence creates fatal doubt. The Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the petitioner by granting him the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the suppression of material injuries sustained by an accused during the same occurrence creates reasonable doubt in the prosecution case?
  • Can a conviction be maintained where prosecution witnesses present mutually destructive statements regarding the occurrence?
  • Whether an accused is entitled to acquittal when the prosecution fails to reconcile its account with a plausible defense version supported by medical and investigative evidence?
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• The COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE Versus The SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION2020 SCMR 2055 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-28
  income tax exemptionmoderately affected areafranchisee commissionfinal tax regimeexemption certificatetax refund
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, concerning whether a taxpayer located in a moderately affected area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was entitled to a tax exemption under clause (126F) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the said Ordinance. The respondent, a mobile company franchisee operating in District Nowshera, sought an exemption certificate from advance tax deduction on commissions, which the Commissioner refused. The High Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, prompting the department to appeal to the Supreme Court, relying on the precedent in Husnain Cotex Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue and section 169 regarding final tax regimes. The Supreme Court held that the respondent fell squarely within the intended class of 'affectees' of the adverse business environment for whom the exemption clause was enacted, and that section 169 did not bar the relief sought. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that taxpayers physically located and operating within the specified affected areas under the normal tax regime are entitled to the benefit of the exemption clause.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a taxpayer located in a moderately affected area is entitled to the benefit of tax exemption under clause (126F) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the final tax regime under section 169 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 preclude a qualified taxpayer from claiming the tax exemption provided under clause (126F)?
  • Can the tax department deny an exemption certificate and subsequently rely on the resulting tax deduction to bar a refund under section 169?
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• MUHAMMAD ASHRAF Versus State2020 SCMR 1841 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-03
  murderous assaultocular accountmedical evidenceabscondencecriminal petitionappraisal of evidencesafe administration of criminal justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition arising from a family dispute and sudden brawl that resulted in the death of Samra Hafeez and injuries to two other family members. The petitioner was convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to death, which the High Court later altered to imprisonment for life alongside a conviction for murderous assault. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the ocular account, corroborated by medical evidence, sufficiently established the petitioner's presence, participation, and culpability in the crime, notwithstanding contentions regarding a failed motive and selective readings of witness depositions. The Supreme Court held that the daylight occurrence, corroborated by injured eyewitnesses who were inmates of the premises, firmly established the petitioner's guilt, leaving no space for any hypothesis of innocence. The petition was consequently dismissed and leave to appeal was declined, affirming the conviction in accordance with the safe administration of criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the ocular account of injured eyewitnesses provides sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder and murderous assault?
  • Does a selective reading of a witness deposition suffice to establish the absence of an accused from the scene of a crime?
  • Whether the failure of a prosecution motive or inconsequential recovery of a weapon vitiates an otherwise consistent and reliable eyewitness account?
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• Dr. SOHAIL HASSAN KHAN Versus DIRECTOR GENERAL (RESEARCH), LIVESTOCK AND DAIRY DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, PUNJAB, LAHORE2020 SCMR 1708 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-20
  departmental inquirymisconductfinancial corruptiondouble jeopardyproportionality of penaltycivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from the removal and compulsory retirement of the petitioners, who were officials at the Poultry Research Institute, Rawalpindi. They were charged under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act 2006 for abusing their official positions, operating unauthorized bank accounts, and pocketing profits from a donor-funded poultry package meant for earthquake victims. Although a de novo inquiry officer recommended lighter penalties, the competent authority restored the major penalties of removal and compulsory retirement originally proposed. The petitioners challenged these penalties, arguing that their exoneration by the Anti-Corruption Department vindicated them and that the restored penalties were disproportionately harsh. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petitions, holding that departmental proceedings are independent of criminal prosecutions and are governed by different standards of proof. The Court ruled that the principle of proportionality does not apply to financial corruption, as public authority is a sacred trust demanding absolute rectitude, and once a public servant betrays that trust, they cannot be retained in service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal or exoneration of a civil servant in a criminal case bar the department from initiating or continuing disciplinary proceedings based on the same transaction?
  • Does the principle of proportionality of penalty apply to cases involving financial corruption or misappropriation of public funds by a public servant?
  • Can a competent authority restore the original major penalties proposed in an earlier inquiry after a de novo inquiry officer recommends lighter penalties without it being deemed an unlawful enhancement?
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• FARMAN ULLAH Versus State2020 SCMR 1687 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-13
  post-arrest baildelay in FIRsudden affraystone peltingfurther inquiryconstitutional right to liberty
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Peshawar High Court declining him post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 337-A(v) and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail considering the delay in lodging the FIR, the nature of the scuffle, and the attending circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, granting post-arrest bail to the petitioner. The court held that where an incident occurs at the spur of the moment involving stone pelting from both factions during a sudden altercation, and there is an unexplained inordinate delay in lodging the FIR alongside a delayed recovery of the weapon from an open place, the case calls for further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principles laid down include that the liberty of a person is a precious constitutional right and that cumulative attending circumstances such as delayed reporting and sudden affray can tilt the balance in favor of granting post-arrest bail even if an injury is attributed to a vital part of the body.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unexplained delay of nine days in lodging the FIR warrants the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Does an incident arising from a sudden altercation involving mutual stone pelting bring the case within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when injuries are sustained on a vital part of the body but attending circumstances cast doubt on the prosecution's version?
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• NAIMATULLAH KHAN Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN2020 SCMR 1499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-12
  Karachi Port TrustNational Disaster Management Authorityillegal encroachmenthousing societyenvironmental ecologynullah cleaningvoid ab initio
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses various applications and petitions concerning municipal and environmental matters in Karachi, notably involving the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the Karachi Port Trust (KPT). The core legal questions revolved around the legality of KPT leasing its land for residential housing societies to its employees and whether such leases, transfers, or sales were authorized under the governing statute. The Supreme Court held that the Board of Trustees of KPT lacked the legal authority to lease or transfer port land for residential housing purposes to its employees, and that even the Federal Government could not sanction acts lacking statutory support and negatively impacting the environment. The court dismissed the review petitions and civil miscellaneous applications seeking to uphold or modify such leases, declaring them void ab initio, while issuing directives regarding compensation, refund of amounts with mark-up to purchasers, and the removal of encroachments and unauthorized constructions in parks and nullahs by the NDMA and local authorities. The key principles laid down emphasize that statutory bodies cannot exceed their statutory mandates, one illegality does not justify another, and transactions harming ecology without statutory backing are void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Board of Trustees of the Karachi Port Trust is authorized by law to lease or transfer port property for residential housing purposes to its employees?
  • Does the Federal Government have the authority to sanction an act of a statutory body that lacks statutory dispensation and negatively impacts the environment?
  • Whether leases, transfers, or sales of KPT land to its officers and servants for housing societies are void ab initio?
  • What is the appropriate mechanism for refund and compensation when unauthorized land allotments and subsequent transfers are cancelled by the court?
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• NAIMATULLAH KHAN Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN2020 SCMR 1488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-11
  electricity supplyfundamental rightsload sheddingelectrocutionNEPRAregulatory oversightright to life
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the ongoing issues regarding electricity supply, load shedding, and frequent electrocution incidents in Karachi involving K-Electric. The Supreme Court addressed the failure of K-Electric to prevent electrocutions and the regulatory oversight by NEPRA. The Court held that the Federal Government and NEPRA have a constitutional duty to ensure citizens are not deprived of electricity, as access to electricity is inextricably linked to fundamental rights, including the right to life, dignity, privacy, and the right to conduct trade or business. The Court directed the CEO of K-Electric to submit a roadmap for achieving zero load shedding and mandated that the Federal Government ensure the appointment of members to the NEPRA Appellate Tribunal within two months. Furthermore, the Court warned that future electrocution incidents would result in criminal proceedings and the recovery of exceptional damages from K-Electric officials. The key principle laid down is that the State and its functionaries cannot abdicate their constitutional responsibility to secure fundamental rights, including the provision of essential services like electricity, which are vital for the economic and social well-being of the citizenry.

  Questions settled

  • Is the provision of electricity a fundamental right under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the State abdicate its duty to ensure the provision of essential services like electricity to its citizens?
  • What are the legal consequences for K-Electric officials in the event of future electrocution incidents in Karachi?
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• NAIMATULLAH KHAN Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN2020 SCMR 1474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-10
  encroachmentamenity plotpublic parkdemolitionKarachi Circular Railwayheritage buildingpublic interest litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses multiple public interest issues, urban planning violations, and encroachments across Karachi. The matters include the construction of underpasses for the Karachi Circular Railway, the demolition of illegally constructed towers at Royal Park, and the removal of unauthorized private schools and residential encroachments from amenity plots and public parks (Kidney Hill Park and Hill Park). The Court held that amenity plots and public park lands cannot be converted for commercial, private, or residential use, declaring all such allotments and encroachments patently illegal and void. The Court directed the immediate removal of these encroachments, ordered the restoration of public parks, and stayed unauthorized construction on heritage sites like the Karachi Gymkhana. The key principles laid down are that public amenity plots and park lands are held in trust for the public, cannot be legally transferred or used for commercial or private purposes, and any such illegal transactions are void ab initio, requiring restoration of the land to its public character.

  Questions settled

  • Can an amenity plot or public park land be legally transferred, leased, or sold for private or commercial purposes?
  • What is the legal status of residential or commercial structures built on land designated as a public park?
  • Can construction be carried out on a heritage site without the approval of the relevant heritage and building control authorities?
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• COMMISSIONER FAISALABAD DIVISION, FAISALABAD Versus ALLAH BAKHSH2020 SCMR 1418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-01
  misconductservice tribunalquantum of punishmentgovernment propertydisciplinary proceedingsscope of appellate powerdismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a decision of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which reduced a penalty of dismissal imposed on a government servant for the unauthorized transfer of government land. The core legal question concerned the scope of the Tribunal's powers under the Service Tribunals Act to modify departmental penalties. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's powers are not unbridled, discretionary, or unstructured. When a government servant admits to misconduct involving the embezzlement or unauthorized transfer of government property, such conduct cannot be treated leniently. The Court emphasized that departmental authorities possess the prerogative to determine the quantum of punishment once misconduct is established. The Tribunal may only interfere if the penalty is perverse or demonstrably disproportionate, and such interference requires detailed, legally sustainable reasoning that withstands judicial scrutiny. Finding the Tribunal's reduction of the penalty lacked cogent reasoning and exceeded its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and restored the respondent's dismissal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Are the powers of a Service Tribunal to modify departmental penalties under the Service Tribunals Act discretionary and unbridled?
  • Can a Service Tribunal reduce a penalty imposed by a departmental authority without providing detailed, legally sustainable reasoning?
  • Does the unauthorized transfer of government land by a government servant constitute misconduct warranting dismissal?
  • Is the recovery of government property a mitigating factor in disciplinary proceedings against a government servant for misconduct?
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• SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LIMITED, KARACHI Versus IMDAD ALI PATHAN2020 SCMR 1259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-02
  master and servantservice disputeconcurrent findingsrevision applicationdeclaratory decreeESTACODEremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a service dispute involving a former Chief Engineer of the Sui Southern Gas Company Limited. The respondent filed a suit for a declaratory decree following the acceptance of his resignation, which was dismissed by the trial court and the appellate court. The High Court, in a revision application, reversed these concurrent findings and directed the appellant to calculate pensionary benefits. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in applying the ESTACODE—which governs civil servants—to an employee of a company where the master-servant relationship applies, and whether it was justified in disturbing concurrent findings of the lower courts without addressing the maintainability of the suit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to properly consider the applicability of service rules and the nature of the employment relationship. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision, emphasizing the necessity of addressing the specific legal status of the employee and providing reasons for interfering with concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the principle of master and servant applies to employees of Sui Southern Gas Company Limited?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts without addressing the legal basis for such interference?
  • Is the ESTACODE applicable to employees of a company that is not a statutory corporation?
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• ABDUL KARIM Versus NASIR SALIM BAIG2020 SCMR 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-24
  encroachmentpublic amenity landKarachi master plancantonment landjudicial oversighturban planningillegal construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the ongoing judicial oversight of illegal encroachments and unauthorized commercial constructions on public lands, parks, and amenity plots across Karachi. The core legal question involves the state's obligation to restore public lands—including those designated for parks, playgrounds, and railway operations—to their original intended use and the removal of illegal commercial structures such as marriage halls and markets. The Court, in its holding, acknowledged the compliance regarding the demolition of specific illegal structures on KW&SB land and the development of a public park. Furthermore, the Court directed the Advocate General of Sindh to coordinate with various government agencies, including KDA, KMC, and Cantonment Boards, to formulate a comprehensive plan for city restoration, rehabilitation of displaced persons, and the removal of encroachments from cantonment and state lands. The key principle established is the state's mandatory duty to protect public amenity land from commercial encroachment, ensuring that lands designated for public use are strictly utilized for their intended purposes, and the requirement for state authorities to submit actionable plans for the restoration of the city's master plan.

  Questions settled

  • Is the state obligated to restore public lands designated for parks and amenities that have been illegally occupied for commercial purposes?
  • Can the Court mandate the removal of commercial structures, such as marriage halls and markets, constructed on land designated for cantonment or public use?
  • Does the Court have the authority to require government agencies to coordinate and submit a comprehensive plan for the restoration of a city's original master plan?
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• NAWAB SIRAJ ALI Versus State2020 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-17
  leave to appealanti-terrorism actocular evidencemedical evidencenon-compoundable offencecriminal appealpremeditated murder
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged their convictions and sentences for the murder of Shahzaib son of Aurangzeb, originally registered under Sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. Following a trial, the petitioners were convicted and sentenced, with some receiving death sentences and others life imprisonment. The High Court upheld the convictions but commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the incident was not premeditated, the ocular evidence was unreliable and contradictory, medical evidence failed to corroborate witness accounts, and the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 were inapplicable to the facts of the case. Furthermore, the petitioners noted that while a compromise had been reached between the parties, it could not be materialized due to the non-compoundable nature of the offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The Supreme Court, upon considering these submissions regarding the applicability of anti-terrorism laws and the evidentiary challenges, granted leave to appeal to examine the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal incident involving murder necessarily attract the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can a compromise between parties be accepted if the conviction includes a non-compoundable offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Does the late submission of crime empties to the Forensic Science Laboratory undermine the prosecution's case?
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• TARIQ SAEED Versus State2020 SCMR 1177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-12
  white-collar crimecorruption and corrupt practicesassets disproportionate to known sourcesplea bargainreduction of sentenceunrebutted evidenceNational Accountability Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a public servant, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding his conviction and sentence under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for corruption and corrupt practices, specifically acquiring assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution substantiated the charges and if the use of attested copies of documents vitiated the trial. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts were well-founded and supported by unrebutted evidence, rejecting the petitioner's contentions regarding document admissibility. However, considering the petitioner's advanced age, poor health, and the substantial portion of the sentence already served, the Court partly allowed the appeal by reducing the sentence of imprisonment from seven years to five years, while maintaining the fine and the confiscation order. The key principle laid down is that unrebutted evidence during cross-examination is treated as an admitted fact, and while white-collar crimes demand strict deterrence, mitigating factors like old age and health may be considered for sentence reduction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to cross-examine a witness on a material aspect leads to the conclusion that the testimony is an admitted fact?
  • Can a sentence of imprisonment under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 be reduced on the grounds of old age and poor health?
  • Whether the concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court regarding corruption charges warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
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• COLLECTOR OF CUSTOM FBR Versus FITTER PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD.2020 SCMR 1157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-25
  sales tax exemptiontax interpretationPakistan Customs Tarifftextile exemptionstrict construction of statutesburden of proof in tax matters
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent imported 'Artificial Filament Tow' (PCT Heading 5502.0090) and claimed a sales tax exemption under SRO 509(I)/2007, which granted zero-rated sales tax to 'Textile and articles thereof' falling under Chapters 50 to 63 of the Pakistan Customs Tariff. The departmental authorities denied the exemption, finding the imported item was used for cigarette filter rods and did not qualify as a textile item. The High Court allowed the respondent's petition, assuming the item was a textile. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that tax exemptions must be construed strictly and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving eligibility. The Court affirmed that the item, being used for cigarette filters, did not meet the description of 'textiles and articles thereof' required by the notification. It established that where an exempting provision is susceptible to two interpretations, the construction favoring the tax authority is preferred, and literal interpretation of the description in an exemption notification is mandatory.

  Questions settled

  • Does the classification of an item under a specific PCT chapter automatically qualify it for a tax exemption restricted to a specific description of goods?
  • What is the rule of interpretation when an exempting provision in a tax statute is susceptible to two different interpretations?
  • Is 'Artificial Filament Tow' used for cigarette filter rods considered a 'textile or article thereof' for the purposes of SRO 509(I)/2007?
  Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE LEGAL DIVISION, RTO III KARACHI Versus YASMEEN BANO2020 SCMR 1120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-24
  wealth taxlimitation periodsuo motu revisionrevisional powerstatutory interpretationrevenue protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding the limitation period applicable to the exercise of suo motu revisional power by the Commissioner under Section 25(2) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963. The High Court had held that in the absence of an express limitation period in Section 25(2), the one-year limitation period from Section 25(1) of the Act should be applied. The Supreme Court analyzed the distinct purposes of both subsections, noting that Section 25(1) protects the assessee's interests, whereas Section 25(2) protects the revenue's interests. The Court held that where a statute is silent on limitation, courts must supply a reasonable time limit based on the statutory purpose. Drawing a parallel with Sections 17 and 17B of the Act, which also protect revenue interests and prescribe a four-year limitation period, the Court determined that a four-year limitation period applies to Section 25(2). Consequently, the Commissioner's revisional order was declared within time, and the High Court's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can the limitation period prescribed under Section 25(1) of the Wealth Tax Act 1963 be applied to the exercise of revisional power under Section 25(2) of the same Act?
  • What is the appropriate limitation period for the exercise of suo motu revisional power by the Commissioner under Section 25(2) of the Wealth Tax Act 1963 when the statute is silent?
  • How should courts determine a reasonable time limit when a statutory provision fails to prescribe a limitation period?
  Read full judgment →
• SUO MOTU ACTION REGARDING COMBATING THE PANDEMIC OF CORONA VIRUS (COVID -19) Versus2020 SCMR 1036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-08Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF SINDH Versus Dr. NADEEM RIZVI2020 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-17
  18th AmendmentFederal Legislative ListProvincial autonomyDevolution of powerConstitutional interpretationPith and substance doctrineRight to healthExecutive authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the constitutionality of the devolution of several federal institutions—Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre (JPMC), National Institute of Cardiovascular Diseases (NICVD), National Institute of Child Health (NICH), National Museum of Pakistan (NMP), and Sheikh Zayed Postgraduate Medical Institute (SZPMI)—from the Federal Government to the provinces following the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether these institutions constituted federal subjects under the Federal Legislative List (FLL) and were thus improperly devolved. The Supreme Court held that the transfer was unconstitutional. The Court determined that these institutions fell within the ambit of Entries 15 and 16 of the FLL, as they were federal agencies for research and training. Consequently, the Implementation Commission lacked the mandate to devolve them, as they were not part of the omitted Concurrent Legislative List. The Court affirmed that legislative entries must be construed liberally using the "pith and substance" doctrine. It further held that the Federation retains the authority to operate institutions necessary to fulfill constitutional obligations, such as the right to life and health, and that such transfers require strict adherence to legal procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Whether medical and research institutions falling under Entry 16 of the Federal Legislative List can be devolved to provinces under the 18th Amendment?
  • Does the Federal Government possess the executive authority to establish and operate hospitals within a province to fulfill fundamental rights such as the right to life?
  • Can the Implementation Commission created under Article 270AA of the Constitution devolve institutions that were not part of the Concurrent Legislative List?
  • Does the Prime Minister have the unilateral authority to transfer federal administrative control of institutions to a province without Federal Cabinet approval?
  Read full judgment →
• SECRETARY REVENUE DIVISION/CHAIRMAN, FBR Versus MUHAMMAD ARSHAD HILALI2019 SCMR 980 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-26Read full judgment →
• HABIB BANK LIMITED Versus GULZAR KHAN2019 SCMR 946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-11
  workman statuslabour court jurisdictionbank managerburden of proofmanagerial capacitygrievance petitionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether an Officer Grade-II and Branch Manager of a bank qualifies as a "workman" under labour laws, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The respondent, dismissed for mishandling funds, sought reinstatement. The High Court had remanded the matter to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, finding the respondent to be a "workman." The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's decision. The Court held that the respondent was not a "workman" because his duties—including managing branch affairs, supervising staff, and handling financial instruments—were managerial and administrative, not clerical. The Court reaffirmed that the status of an employee is determined by the nature of duties performed, not by job designation. Furthermore, the burden of proof rests on the employee to demonstrate they are a "workman." Since the respondent failed to prove his duties were clerical, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain his grievance petition. Consequently, the Court concluded that the remand to the Tribunal was legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the designation of an employee as an Officer Grade-II or Branch Manager automatically exclude them from the definition of a 'workman'?
  • On whom does the burden of proof lie to establish that an employee is a 'workman' in a grievance petition?
  • Are the duties of a bank branch manager considered clerical or managerial/administrative for the purpose of labour law jurisdiction?
  • Can a High Court remand a matter to a tribunal after determining a jurisdictional issue without deciding the case on its merits?
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• SME BANK LIMITED Versus IZHAR UL HAQ2019 SCMR 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-15
  Intra-Court AppealLaw Reforms Ordinance 1972second writ petitionres judicataexecution of judgmentVoluntary Separation Schemeconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court allowing a second writ petition filed by the respondent employee to claim financial benefits and implementation of an earlier High Court judgment. The appellant bank challenged the decision, whereas the respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability on the ground that the appellant had not filed an Intra-Court Appeal (ICA). The Supreme Court held that the appeal before it was competent because Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 bars an ICA where the statute governing the original proceedings provides a right of appeal or review against the original order, as was the case under the relevant service regulations. On the merits, the Court held that a second writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 cannot be maintained to execute a judgment passed in an earlier writ petition or to seek reliefs that were previously sought but omitted in the earlier judgment. Such ungranted reliefs are deemed denied, rendering the subsequent writ petition barred by the principle of res judicata. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned High Court judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal barred under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 when the law governing the original proceeding provides for a remedy of appeal or review?
  • Can a second writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be maintained to execute or enforce a judgment passed in an earlier writ petition?
  • Does the principle of res judicata bar a fresh writ petition seeking reliefs that were prayed for in a former writ petition but not granted by the court?
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• FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Finance Versus MUHAMMAD SHARIF2019 SCMR 915 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-16Read full judgment →
• SAJJAN SOLANGI Versus State2019 SCMR 872 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-26
  hearsay evidenceextra-judicial confessionpolice custodycriminal appealacquittalforensic evidencemurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that maintained the petitioner's conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a conviction could be sustained when based entirely on hearsay evidence, inadmissible extra-judicial confessions made in police custody, and uncorroborated recovery evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to produce the primary informant, rendering the testimonies of the police witnesses as hearsay, which is inadmissible under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Furthermore, the Court found that the alleged extra-judicial confession made while in police custody was inadmissible, and the recovery of the weapon was inconsequential due to the lack of forensic verification. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that hearsay evidence and extra-judicial confessions made in police custody cannot form the basis of a criminal conviction, and recovery evidence without forensic corroboration is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of reliable ocular testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of hearsay evidence?
  • Is an extra-judicial confession made while in police custody admissible as evidence?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon without forensic verification constitute sufficient evidence for conviction?
  • Can medical evidence alone identify an assailant in the absence of ocular testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• ABU BAKAR FAROOQ Versus MUHAMMAD ALI RAJPAR2019 SCMR 830 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-31
  ad hoc appointmentregularizationseniorityFederal Public Service Commissionstopgap arrangementcivil servantsback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by leave against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had directed the Pakistan Railways to regularize ad hoc appointments of respondent employees from their initial appointment dates, count intervening unemployed periods as spent on duty with full back benefits, and grant retrospective seniority. The core legal issue was whether ad hoc civil servants could lawfully be regularized retrospectively and granted seniority from the date of their ad hoc appointments, overriding statutory selection procedures and adversely affecting regular employees. Setting aside the Service Tribunal's decision and allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court held that ad hoc appointments are merely temporary stopgap arrangements under the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973 and Section 11(3) of the Civil Servants Act 1973. Such appointments confer no vested right to regular appointment, continuous service, or seniority under Section 8 of the Act, and regular appointments in BS-16 and above can only be made through the Federal Public Service Commission.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ad hoc employee claim retrospective seniority from the initial date of their ad hoc appointment upon subsequent regular selection?
  • Does prolonged continuation of an ad hoc appointment confer a vested right upon the employee to be regularized in service?
  • Can an appointing authority or tribunal regularize an ad hoc appointee to a post within the purview of the Federal Public Service Commission without the prescribed statutory selection process?
  • Is an ad hoc appointee entitled to claim back benefits and service credit for the intervening period during which they remained out of employment prior to regular appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ARIF Versus State2019 SCMR 631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-07
  murdercriminal appealappreciation of evidenceocular accountmedical evidencematerial improvementsacquittalbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Muhammad Arif, along with co-accused, faced trial for murder and attempted murder arising from an FIR registered under sections 302, 324, 427, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court convicted the appellant under section 302(b) and sentenced him to death, alongside convictions under section 324 and section 337-A(i). On appeal, the Lahore High Court acquitted the co-accused but maintained the appellant's conviction while converting his death sentence to imprisonment for life. Upon appeal with leave of the Supreme Court, the core legal question concerned whether the prosecution established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt through consistent ocular accounts, medical evidence, and corroborative material. The Supreme Court held that material improvements in the ocular testimony, contradictions between medical witnesses regarding the injuries, lack of weapon matching from the crime scene, and doubtful circumstantial evidence rendered the prosecution case untrustworthy. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitting the appellant of the charges.

  Questions settled

  • Whether material improvements in the statements of ocular witnesses render their testimony unsafe for sustaining a capital conviction?
  • Does a contradiction between the initial medical examination and the post-mortem report regarding the number of firearm injuries weaken the prosecution's case?
  • Can the conviction of an accused be maintained on uncorroborated testimony when co-accused with similar allegations have already been acquitted?
  • Whether proof of abscondance for a brief period without proper compliance with warrants can serve as valid corroboration of guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• SUO MOTU ACTION TAKEN BY HCJ REGARDING SERVICE STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN KIDNEY AND LIVER INSTITUTE (PKLI) Versus2019 SCMR 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-28Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF SINDH through Secretary Health Department Versus Dr. NADEEM RIZVI2019 SCMR 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-17
  devolution of powerprovincial autonomyfederal legislative listfundamental rightsconstitutional interpretationmedical institutionsright to life
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against the transfer and devolution of several major medical institutions, including the Sheikh Zayed Medical Complex, Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Center, and others, from the Federal Government to the Provincial Governments. The core legal question was whether this transfer was constitutionally valid and whether the Federation retains authority to operate such institutions. By a majority of four to one, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, declaring the transfer of these institutions unconstitutional and without lawful authority. The Court held that the Federal Government failed to follow due process or apply its mind during the devolution. It established that the Federation maintains the power to operate projects for "federal purposes," especially where the enforcement of fundamental rights, such as the right to life, is implicated. While affirming that provincial autonomy is sacrosanct under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the Court clarified that federal projects operating within provincial territories remain subject to provincial laws and regulatory control, and any transfer of assets must be executed in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have the authority to operate medical institutions for federal purposes within a province?
  • Is the transfer of federal medical institutions to provinces without due process constitutionally valid?
  • Are federal projects located within a province subject to provincial laws and regulatory control?
  • Does the enforcement of fundamental rights constitute a 'purpose' of the Federation under the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• TALAL AHMED CHAUDHRY Versus State2019 SCMR 542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-09
  contempt of courtunconditional apologyfreedom of speechscandalizing the courtintra-court appealburden of proof in contemptdefective charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal under section 19 of the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellant for committing contempt of court through derogatory public speeches directed against the Supreme Court and its judges. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant's unconditional apology warranted the setting aside of his conviction, whether the speeches were protected under the right to freedom of speech and expression, and whether any procedural defects in the framing of the charge vitiated the trial. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the contempt was grave, the apology lacked bona fides and remorse, the freedom of speech under the Constitution is subject to reasonable restrictions including contempt of court laws, and technical defects in the charge not causing prejudice do not vitiate a trial. The key principle laid down is that an apology in contempt proceedings does not automatically purge the contemnor unless it is unconditional, offered at the earliest stage, and backed by genuine remorse, and that fundamental rights like freedom of speech cannot be invoked to shield scurrilous attacks on the judiciary that undermine the administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unconditional apology tendered at the appellate stage automatically purge a contemnor of contempt of court?
  • Can the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 be invoked to justify making derogatory remarks that scandalize the judiciary?
  • Whether an omission or defect in framing a charge that causes no prejudice to the accused vitiates a contempt trial?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the alleged contemnor once the prosecution brings on record the contemptuous material and it is confronted under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed AZHAR HUSSAIN SHAH Versus State2019 SCMR 537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-10
  Section 30 MagistrateCriminal jurisdictionDiyatArshConcurrent sentencesSection 382-B CrPCAttempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence for offences under sections 324, 334, and 336 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, primarily questioning the jurisdiction of a Magistrate empowered under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to try offences involving Diyat and Arsh. The Supreme Court addressed whether such Magistrates possess the competence to try these offences and whether sentencing limitations affect their jurisdictional authority. The Court held that a Magistrate invested with powers under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is competent to try such offences, as the sentencing limitation regulates punishment rather than the jurisdiction to try the offence. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Diyat, under section 299 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, is exclusively relevant to cases involving the death of a victim and is inapplicable to cases where the victim survives. Consequently, the Court upheld the convictions but ordered the sentences to run concurrently, granting the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Magistrate empowered under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 competent to try offences punishable with Diyat or Arsh?
  • Does the limitation on sentencing power of a Magistrate empowered under section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 affect their jurisdiction to try an offence?
  • Is the payment of Diyat under section 299 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 relevant to offences where the victim has survived?
  Read full judgment →
• MIR BAT KHAN Versus Mst. SHERIN BIBI2019 SCMR 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-08Read full judgment →
• MEMBER (TAXES) BOARD OF REVENUE PUNJAB, LAHORE Versus QAISAR ABBAS2019 SCMR 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-08
  agricultural income taxnon-obstante clauseretrospective effecttax assessmentrecovery noticesincome tax returnstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter addresses appeals against judgments of the High Court allowing constitutional petitions filed by respondents challenging recovery notices issued for agricultural income tax under the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997. The core legal questions involved the prospective or retrospective application of Section 3B of the Act, inserted via the Punjab Finance Act, 2013, and whether tax authorities could directly issue recovery notices based on income tax returns filed under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, without undergoing the formal assessment procedure under Section 3. The Supreme Court held that while tax statutes operate prospectively, Section 4(4) of the Act read with Rule 14(3) of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Rules, 2001 permits recovery for the two prior assessment years. Furthermore, Section 3B acts as a non-obstante clause with an overriding effect, dispensing with the standard assessment procedure when agricultural income is voluntarily declared in income tax returns. The key principle laid down is that where an assessee declares agricultural income under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, direct recovery notices can be issued under Section 3B without a separate assessment order under Section 3, provided that absent such declaration, regular assessment mechanisms remain mandatory.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 has an overriding effect on Section 3 of the said Act?
  • Does Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 apply retrospectively to allow recovery of agricultural income tax for assessment years prior to its enactment?
  • Is the declaration of agricultural income in a return filed under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 sufficient for the direct issuance of recovery notices without a separate assessment order?
  • Are tax authorities required to follow the formal assessment procedure under Section 3 of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 when an assessee has not declared agricultural income in their income tax return?
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• CHAIRMAN, FBR Versus MUHAMMAD ASFANDYAR JANJUA2019 SCMR 349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-30
  length of servicepromotion eligibilitynotional senioritycivil servantsacting charge promotionpre-appointment litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal granting the respondent benefits of length of service and pay fixation with his original competitive examination batch mates, despite his delayed actual appointment due to pre-service litigation regarding domicile allocation. The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the period spent in pre-appointment litigation prior to a civil servant's first induction can be counted toward the prescribed minimum length of service required for promotion to higher pay scales. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's judgment, holding that seniority and eligibility for promotion are not vested rights and must be reckoned from the date of regular initial appointment and actual joining. The Court declared that while a civil servant may be allowed notional inter se seniority with batch mates upon rectification of an administrative error, such notional seniority cannot operate as a substitute for the actual length of service mandated by statutory rules for promotion to higher posts.

  Questions settled

  • Can time spent in litigation prior to initial appointment be counted towards the mandatory length of service required for promotion?
  • Does notional seniority serve as a substitute for actual length of service required under the rules for promotion to a higher grade?
  • From what date is the seniority of a civil servant on initial appointment to be reckoned under the Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules 1993?
  Read full judgment →
• MINHAJ KHAN Versus State2019 SCMR 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-14
  narcoticscharascriminal appealbenefit of doubtcontradictory testimonyrecovery witnesschemical examiner reportacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his appeal by the Lahore High Court, which maintained his conviction and sentence under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for possession of 1430 grams of charas. The petitioner contended that the chemical examiner's report was unreliable for failing to mention testing protocols as mandated by Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, relying on precedent. Conversely, the State argued that the precedent was per incuriam as neither the parent statute nor Form-II required protocols, and that rules could not override the statute. The Supreme Court examined the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and identified material contradictions regarding the distance to the place of occurrence, conflicting accounts of the arrest, inexplicable procedural delays, the failure to produce a material witness, and the dubious manner of FIR registration. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the conviction could not be sustained on such shaky evidence, rendering it unnecessary to decide the technical legal question regarding testing protocols. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal, allowed, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions in the testimonies of police witnesses regarding material facts are sufficient to create reasonable doubt and warrant acquittal in narcotics cases?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce a material witness and recovery witness weaken its case?
  • Whether a conviction for possession of narcotics can be sustained when the prosecution's sequence of events and FIR registration mode appear incredible and unexplained?
  Read full judgment →
• SHOAIB ULLAH CHEEMA Versus ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES, SECP2019 SCMR 306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-15
  winding upmaintainability of appealdirect appeal to Supreme Courtofficial liquidatorintra-court appealcompany judgepost-winding up orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before a larger bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed a key jurisdictional question regarding the maintainability of direct appeals under Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance 1984. The appellant sought the removal of an official liquidator, but the High Court dismissed his application. A preliminary objection was raised that direct appeals to the Supreme Court under Section 10(1) lie exclusively against original winding-up orders, while all subsequent or interim orders in winding-up proceedings must be appealed via Intra-Court Appeals under Section 10(2) before a High Court Division Bench. Resolving conflicting precedent between *Kamaluddin Qureshi* (PLD 2009 SC 367) and *Ibrahim Shamsi* (2005 SCMR 1450), the Supreme Court held that the phrase 'where the company ordered to be wound up' paired with 'any order, decision or judgment' encompasses both the winding-up order itself and any subsequent orders passed after a company has been ordered to be wound up. Overruling *Kamaluddin Qureshi*, the Court reaffirmed *Ibrahim Shamsi*, holding that post-winding-up orders are directly appealable to the Supreme Court under Section 10(1).

  Questions settled

  • Does a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 lie against orders passed after a company has been ordered to be wound up?
  • Whether post-winding-up orders passed by a Company Judge must be challenged through an Intra-Court Appeal under Section 10(2) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 or directly before the Supreme Court under Section 10(1)?
  • What is the statutory scope and meaning of the phrase 'where the company ordered to be wound up' in Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance 1984?
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• PAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION LIMITED Versus COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (LEGAL) LTU, ISLAMABAD2019 SCMR 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI Versus State2019 SCMR 2054 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-17
  criminal appealidentification of accusedacid attackmurderous assaultItlaf-i-Salahiyyat-i-Udwhouse trespassconcurrent findingscredibility of witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioner for murderous assault, Itlaf-i-Salahiyyat-i-Udw, and house trespass, resulting in concurrent sentences and fine, which were upheld by the High Court. The core legal question involved the credibility of the victim's identification of the assailant during a winter morning acid attack and the reliability of the prosecution evidence. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on a proper appraisal of evidence, noting that the victim's immediate recognition of the neighbor-petitioner was reliable and corroborated by cross-examination and supporting witnesses. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the identification of an assailant by the victim in the early morning hours can be considered reliable despite adverse weather conditions?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts be interfered with by the Supreme Court when based on proper appraisal of evidence?
  • Whether the testimony of an injured prosecutrix is sufficient to maintain a conviction for violent assault without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HANIF Versus State2019 SCMR 2033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-16
  narcotics controlcriminal appealdeath sentence commutationforensic samplingconscious knowledgeappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence imposed upon the appellant for the transportation of a large quantity of charas concealed within a vehicle. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution's sampling method (taking samples from bundles rather than each individual piece) was sufficient to prove the narcotic nature of the entire consignment, and whether the appellant, a driver, could be held criminally liable despite claiming ignorance of the contraband. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's evidence was consistent and reliable, and that sampling from each bundle was sufficient for forensic proof, rejecting the argument that samples were required from every individual piece. Regarding culpability, the Court found the appellant's plea of ignorance unconvincing. However, the Court exercised judicial discretion regarding the sentence, noting that while the quantity of narcotics was significant, the death penalty was excessive. The Court upheld the conviction but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life, granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is it legally necessary for the prosecution to take forensic samples from each individual piece of contraband, or is sampling from bundles sufficient?
  • Can a driver be held criminally liable for transporting narcotics concealed in a vehicle if they claim ignorance of the contraband?
  • Does the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment entitle a convict to the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HANIF Versus State2019 SCMR 2029 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-18
  criminal investigationpolice independencejudicial interferencequashing of proceedingsseparation of powerssubmission of challan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a High Court order that dismissed the appellant's petition under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which sought to quash criminal proceedings initiated against him. The core legal question concerns the extent of judicial authority to direct the police to submit a challan against specific individuals and the permissible scope of judicial interference in the investigative process. The Supreme Court held that the investigation of a criminal case falls within the exclusive domain of the police, and courts cannot insist that a challan be submitted against any particular person. The Court emphasized that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and that undue interference by the judiciary in the police's investigative duties violates the principle of separation of powers. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's impugned order, and quashed the pending proceedings against the appellant, noting that the lower courts had acted contrary to established legal principles regarding the independence of the investigating agency.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court legally direct the police to submit a challan against a specific person?
  • Does the judiciary have the authority to interfere in the investigative process of the police during a criminal case?
  • Under what circumstances can proceedings be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• AL-KHAIR GADOON LTD. Versus The APPELLATE TRIBUNAL2019 SCMR 2018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-21
  Central Excise Dutyshow cause noticetax evasionad valorem assessmentretail price assessmentappellate jurisdictionsubstantial compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns tax appeals filed by Al-Khair Gadoon Ltd. challenging show cause notices issued by the Revenue for alleged evasion of Central Excise Duty. The core legal questions were whether citing an incorrect section of the Central Excises Act, 1944, in a show cause notice vitiates the entire recovery proceedings, and whether the High Court should adjudicate issues not previously raised before the Appellate Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the mere citation of a wrong provision of law in a show cause notice does not automatically invalidate the proceedings, provided the recipient was not prejudiced in their defense and the issuing authority possessed the requisite legal jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the focus should be on whether substantial compliance occurred and if the party had sufficient notice of the allegations. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's decision and remanded the case to the Appellate Tribunal to determine the mixed questions of law and fact, including the validity of the notices and the timing of the goods' manufacture, to ensure justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the citation of a wrong provision of law in a show cause notice automatically vitiate the recovery proceedings?
  • What criteria determine whether a show cause notice is legally valid despite containing incorrect statutory references?
  • Is it appropriate for an appellate court to decide mixed questions of law and fact that were not previously adjudicated by the tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• SELLING OF NATIONAL ASSETS INCLUDING PIA AT THROWAWAY PRICE Versus2019 SCMR 1952 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-03Read full judgment →
• JUSTICE QAZI FAEZ ISA Versus The PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN2019 SCMR 1875 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-17
  recusal of judgesFull CourtCode of Conductpersonal interestconstitutional petitionbias
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application seeking the constitution of a Full Court comprising eligible judges and requesting the recusal of certain bench members in a constitutional petition, based on the alleged prospective and contingent possibility of personal advantage regarding the future office of the Chief Justice of Pakistan. The core legal question concerns whether a judge is required to recuse himself based on a contingent, speculative, and future interest rather than an existing, tangible, personal, or pecuniary interest. The Supreme Court held that the involvement of any existing tangible, palpable, personal, or pecuniary interest justifies recusal, whereas contingent, prospective, and speculative interests do not constitute disqualifying factors under the Code of Conduct or judicial oath. However, two learned members of the bench voluntarily recused themselves for personal reasons to safeguard the dignity and sanctity of the institution, and the Court directed that the file be placed before the Chief Justice of Pakistan for constituting a Full Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judge should recuse himself from hearing a case based on a contingent, prospective, and speculative future interest?
  • Does Article 4 of the Code of Conduct of Judges require recusal in the absence of an existing tangible, palpable, personal, or pecuniary interest?
  • Whether the possibility of a future benefit or advantage four years later constitutes a disqualifying factor for a judge?
  Read full judgment →
• HASHMAT ULLAH Versus State2019 SCMR 1730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-07
  National Accountability Ordinancecriminal breach of trustentrustment of propertyinvestment fraudcivil disputedishonest intentionaccountability court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for failing to pay profits and return investments to individuals who had invested in his business. The core legal question was whether such business investment arrangements, where profits were initially paid but later ceased, constituted criminal offences of corruption or corrupt practices under the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was unsustainable, setting aside the lower courts' judgments and acquitting the appellant. The Court clarified that the offence of criminal breach of trust, as defined in the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and incorporated into the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, requires the 'entrustment' of property. Investment of money in a business does not amount to entrustment. Furthermore, the Court established that where an accused has paid profits for a duration, it negates the existence of initial dishonest intention, rendering the matter a civil dispute concerning the rendition of accounts rather than a criminal offence. Consequently, the absence of entrustment and dishonest intent precluded criminal liability.

  Questions settled

  • Does the investment of money in a business constitute 'entrustment of property' for the purposes of establishing criminal breach of trust?
  • Can a failure to pay profits on a business investment be prosecuted as a criminal offence under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Is initial dishonest intention a necessary ingredient for establishing criminal liability in cases involving the cessation of profit payments to investors?
  • Does the payment of profits for a period of time negate the existence of initial dishonest intention in a business dispute?
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• CHIEF COMMISSIONER INLAND TAX, through RTO,Zone-I, Federal Board of Revenue, Hyderabad Versus GHULAM MUSTAFA MARI, EX-INSPECTOR, INCOME TAX, REVENUE DIVISION, FBR, HYDERABAD2019 SCMR 1657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-12Read full judgment →
• FAIZAN ALI Versus State2019 SCMR 1649 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-29
  narcoticscharaschain of custodybenefit of doubtsafe custodytampering of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose out of a case under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, where the appellant was allegedly apprehended with ten packets of charas concealed in a motorcar. The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Act, sentencing him to ten years' rigorous imprisonment, which the High Court subsequently altered to a conviction under Section 9(b) and reduced the sentence to time already undergone. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had established the safe custody, transmission, and identity of the seized narcotics beyond reasonable doubt. Reappraising the evidence, the Supreme Court noted significant discrepancies between the initial recovery claims and the physical property produced in court, as well as the absence of testimony establishing safe chain of custody or seal integrity during transmission. Holding that the prosecution's case was full of doubts, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure to prove the safe custody and transmission of seized narcotics entitle an accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Can a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 be sustained when the physical property produced in court contradicts the description in the recovery memorandum?
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• COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE,RTO, RAWALPINDI Versus TRILLIUM PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD.,RAWALPINDI2019 SCMR 1643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-31
  income taxpenaltytax payableretrospective applicationstatutory interpretationwithholding taxdefault in filing return
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals regarding the interpretation of the term "tax payable" within the Table appended to Section 182(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, specifically regarding penalties for failing to file income tax returns on time. The core legal question was whether "tax payable" refers to the tax remaining to be deposited with the return or the total tax liability for the year, and whether a 2011 legislative Explanation expanding this definition could be applied retrospectively to tax years 2008 and 2009. The Supreme Court held that the Explanation, which increased the penal liability, operates prospectively and cannot retrospectively impose a larger penalty for past defaults. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that for the relevant tax years, the penalty must be calculated based on the tax payable at the time of filing, which was nil due to withholding tax deductions. The principle laid down is that penal provisions imposing increased liability must be interpreted narrowly and cannot be applied retrospectively unless the statute explicitly warrants such an interpretation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term "tax payable" in Section 182(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 refer to the total tax liability or only the tax remaining to be deposited with the return?
  • Can an explanation inserted into a statute by the Finance Act 2011 be applied retrospectively to increase penal liability for tax years prior to its enactment?
  • Is a penalty for failure to file an income tax return calculated based on total tax chargeable or the tax payable with the return?
  Read full judgment →
• FAWAD ALI Versus State2019 SCMR 1641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-25
  condonation of delaylimitationcancellation of bailproclaimed offendernon-bailable warrantipso facto cancellation of bailcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from Criminal Miscellaneous Applications seeking condonation of a 45-day delay in filing criminal petitions that sought the cancellation of bail granted to the private respondents. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the applications for condonation of delay, finding no valid or sufficient grounds, and consequently dismissed the main petitions as time-barred. On the merits, the Court observed that the petitions were misconceived. It reiterated and affirmed the settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that where an accused person who has been admitted to bail subsequently fails to appear, leading to a declaration as a Proclaimed Offender or the issuance of unexecuted non-bailable warrants for his arrest, such declaration or issuance of warrants ipso facto operates as a cancellation of the bail previously granted. The court cited established precedents confirming that no separate petition for cancellation of bail is necessary once non-bailable warrants or proclaimed offender status intervene.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of non-bailable warrants for an accused person admitted to bail ipso facto result in the cancellation of their bail?
  • Whether declaring a bailed accused a Proclaimed Offender automatically operates as cancellation of his bail?
  • Can a petition for cancellation of bail be maintained when non-bailable warrants against the accused remain unexecuted due to non-appearance?
  Read full judgment →
• TARIQ SHAH Versus State2019 SCMR 1394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-24
  criminal appealqatl-e-amdbenefit of doubtacquittal of co-accusedreappraisal of evidencesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the High Court judgment affirming the appellants' convictions for qatl-e-amd and murderous assault, with their death sentences altered to imprisonment for life. The core legal question concerns the safety of maintaining convictions based on tainted eyewitness testimony and inconsistent prosecution evidence when identically placed co-accused have already been acquitted. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions, holding that where prosecution witnesses have been found unworthy of reliance regarding co-accused, their evidence cannot be safely used to sustain identical charges against the remaining appellants, and forensic inconsistencies further compound the unreliability of the case. The key principle laid down is that the benefit of doubt must be extended to accused persons where the prosecution fails to establish participation beyond reasonable doubt in the face of widespread acquittals of identically placed co-accused and corroborative forensic contradictions.

  Questions settled

  • Can prosecution evidence rejected with respect to acquitted co-accused be relied upon to sustain convictions of identically placed appellants?
  • Whether contradictions between ocular testimony and forensic evidence warrant the extension of benefit of doubt to the accused?
  • Is it safe to maintain convictions in cases marked by a large number of accused and an over-implication in the crime report?
  Read full judgment →
• State Versus MUHAMMAD KALEEM BHATTI2019 SCMR 1321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  National Accountability Bureaufine recoverydefault imprisonmentforfeiture of assetsspecial lawdouble jeopardystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns whether a convict, having served a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of a fine imposed under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, remains liable to pay the fine and whether assets can be forfeited to satisfy that fine. The High Court had previously held that serving the default sentence absolved the convict of liability, viewing further recovery as double jeopardy. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is a punishment for non-payment, not a substitute for the fine itself. Consequently, the liability to pay the fine persists even after the default sentence is served. Furthermore, the Court clarified that recovery of fines under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 is governed by Section 33-E of that Ordinance, which operates as a special law and is not restricted by the limitation period set out in Section 70, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court set aside the High Court's judgments, affirming that assets remain subject to forfeiture if the fine remains unpaid.

  Questions settled

  • Does serving a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of a fine absolve a convict from the liability to pay the fine?
  • Is a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine a substitute for the fine itself?
  • Does Section 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 control the recovery of fines imposed under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  • Can assets be forfeited to satisfy a fine after a convict has served the sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of that fine?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. MUKHTAR MAI Versus ABDUL KHALIQ2019 SCMR 1302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-13
  criminal review petitionreview jurisdictionre-appraisal of evidencejudicial fallibilitySupreme Court of Pakistanscope of review
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal review petitions were filed against a common judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had previously disposed of criminal appeals and a suo motu case concerning a gang rape incident. The petitioner sought a review based on several formulations regarding the re-appraisal of evidence, including the necessity of corroboration for a rape victim's testimony, the impact of tribal Jirga involvement, and the use of modern forensic techniques like DNA. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court could re-evaluate evidence and the merits of a case under its review jurisdiction. The Court held that review jurisdiction under Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is limited and does not permit the re-appraisal of evidence or a rehearing of the matter as if it were an appeal. The key principle laid down is that the power of review is restricted to correcting patent mistakes, glaring omissions, or obvious errors of law or fact that are self-evident, and cannot be invoked to challenge the merits of a final judgment. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court's review jurisdiction under Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 permit the re-appraisal of evidence?
  • Is a review petition maintainable for the purpose of rehearing a case on its merits?
  • What are the specific grounds required to invoke the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• NADEEM HUSSAIN Versus State2019 SCMR 1290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-11
  criminal appealsuicide bombingcircumstantial evidenceconfession before policeanti-terrorismbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant for his alleged involvement in suicide bombings at the Pakistan Naval War College, Lahore, which resulted in multiple deaths and injuries. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the circumstantial evidence and a confessional statement produced during the trial. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of the doubt. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove any of the incriminating pieces of circumstantial evidence, including the alleged recovery of items and the connection to the crime scene, and further held that an unsigned confessional statement made before the police under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is inadmissible when no other independent evidence connects the accused to the offense. The key principle laid down is that a conditional confession before police under terrorism laws cannot be acted upon in the complete absence of corroborative supporting evidence connecting the accused to the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Is an unsigned confessional statement made by an accused while in police custody admissible in evidence under section 21-H of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the basis of a police confession when all other pieces of circumstantial evidence fail to connect the accused with the alleged offense?
  • What are the mandatory statutory conditions for the admissibility of a confession made before the police under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• ARSALAN MASIH Versus State2019 SCMR 1152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-03
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausefurther inquirybail as rulecircumstantial evidencecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to two petitioners, Arsalan Masih and Muhammad Nadeem, in a case involving offences under sections 457, 380, and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the nature of the evidence and the statutory provisions governing bail. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as not pressed regarding the first petitioner. Regarding the second petitioner, the Court held that the case against him for the offence under section 457, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, required further inquiry due to the absence of direct evidence. Furthermore, the Court held that the offences under sections 380 and 411, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, do not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, where bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. The Court established that prior registration of a similar case without conviction does not justify denying bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the registration of a similar case without a conviction constitute sufficient grounds to deny post-arrest bail?
  • Are the offences under sections 380 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 covered by the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • When does a case qualify for further inquiry under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the absence of direct evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• SECRETARY M/O DEFENCE, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN Versus GHUFRAN ALI2019 SCMR 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-27
  service lawdepartmental inquiryconfessional statementfinancial improprietydisciplined forceservice tribunalmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Service Tribunal, which had set aside the removal from service of the respondent, a government employee, on the grounds that witnesses were not examined in his presence during departmental proceedings. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal erred in ignoring the respondent's clear, recorded confessional statements regarding financial impropriety merely because of a procedural lapse in witness examination. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal misdirected itself by focusing exclusively on the technicality of witness examination while disregarding the respondent's explicit admissions of guilt made before the inquiry officer. The Court observed that the respondent failed to substantiate claims that his confessions were obtained under duress. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's judgment, and upheld the penalty of removal from service. The key principle laid down is that in disciplinary proceedings involving corruption within a disciplined force, a voluntary and unretracted confession before an inquiry officer carries significant weight and cannot be discarded solely on technical procedural grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Can a service tribunal set aside a disciplinary penalty solely on the ground that witnesses were not examined in the presence of the accused, despite the existence of a clear confessional statement?
  • Does a confession made before an inquiry officer in departmental proceedings lose its evidentiary value if the accused later claims it was made under duress without having raised such a grievance during the proceedings?
  • Is a technical procedural lapse in a departmental inquiry sufficient to override an admission of guilt regarding financial impropriety?
  Read full judgment →
• COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS Versus FAISAL ENTERPRISES2019 SCMR 1126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-14
  customs valuationtransaction valuein-bondingex-bondinggoods declarationunder-invoicingimport duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute concerning the customs valuation of imported HR Steel Sheets. The core legal question was whether the imported goods should be assessed for customs duty based on the actual transaction value under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969, or under the alternate valuation methods provided in Section 25(5) based on an endorsement of secondary quality by appraising staff during in-bonding. The Supreme Court held that when goods can be assessed on the basis of the transaction value—the actual price paid or payable as reflected in invoices and letters of credit—recourse to subsection (5) or other alternate valuation methods of Section 25 does not arise. The Court laid down the principle that customs valuation must primarily be based on the actual transaction value under Section 25(1), and alternate methods under subsequent subsections of Section 25 can only be invoked when the transaction value cannot be determined or is genuinely disputed as an outcome of under-invoicing or damaged goods where claims were raised with the supplier.

  Questions settled

  • Whether customs duty is to be assessed on the basis of the actual transaction value under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969, when invoices and letters of credit reflect the actual price paid?
  • When does the occasion arise to have recourse to alternate valuation methods under subsections (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does an endorsement by appraising staff regarding secondary quality at the time of in-bonding override the actual transaction value disclosed in import documents?
  Read full judgment →
• SUPER ENGINEERING Versus COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, KARACHI2019 SCMR 1111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-24
  presumptive tax regimenormal tax regimeretrospective operationvested rightsfiscal statute interpretationassociation of personswithholding tax
  Summary & questions settled

  These direct appeals challenge a common judgment of the High Court of Sindh concerning whether the appellants, registered as Associations of Persons (AOPs) and engaged in manufacturing auto parts, were subject to the normal tax regime or the presumptive tax regime for the tax year 2008 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether the amendment introduced in subsection (6A) of section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 by the Finance Act, 2008—which restricted exemptions from the presumptive tax regime to 'companies' rather than 'any person'—applied retrospectively to the tax year 2008. The Supreme Court held that the amendment could not be applied retrospectively to impair vested rights that had accrued at the culmination of the tax year on 30th June 2008. The Court laid down the principle that procedural or machinery provisions in fiscal statutes cannot be given retrospective operation if they prejudicially affect vested rights or impose new liabilities for a completed tax period, affirming that the appellants were entitled to file their returns under the normal tax regime.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment substituting 'any person' with 'a company' in section 153(6A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 applies retrospectively?
  • Can procedural provisions in a fiscal statute be applied retroactively if they affect vested rights accrued at the culmination of a tax year?
  • Whether manufacturers registered as an Association of Persons are entitled to the normal tax regime under section 153(6A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for the tax year 2008?
  Read full judgment →
• H.M. EXTRACTION GHEE AND OIL INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. Versus FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE2019 SCMR 1081 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-15
  tax credittax exemptionadvance income taxexemption certificatefiscal interpretationrefund of taxindustrial undertaking
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the interpretation of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, specifically whether a taxpayer entitled to a 100% tax credit under Section 65D is entitled to an exemption certificate under Section 159 regarding advance income tax collection under Section 148. The core legal question was whether a "tax credit" and an "exemption" are legally synonymous for the purposes of obtaining an exemption certificate. The Supreme Court held that they are conceptually distinct; an exemption operates at the stage of assessment, potentially eliminating it, whereas a tax credit operates post-assessment at the recovery stage. Consequently, the Court ruled that Section 159(1)(a) does not authorize the issuance of exemption certificates for tax credits. The key principle laid down is that tax credits and exemptions are not interchangeable in fiscal statutes, and the former does not trigger the procedural mechanisms designed for the latter. Despite ruling against the taxpayers on the legal interpretation, the Court issued mandatory directions for the prompt refund of advance taxes collected where no ultimate tax liability exists, citing the need to prevent unjust retention of funds by public functionaries.

  Questions settled

  • Is a taxpayer entitled to a 100% tax credit under Section 65D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, eligible for an exemption certificate under Section 159?
  • What is the conceptual difference between a tax credit and a tax exemption in the context of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the term 'exempt' in Section 159(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, encompass tax credits?
  • Can the state retain advance income tax collected under Section 148 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, when the taxpayer is entitled to a 100% tax credit?
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• INDEPENDENT MEDIA CORPORATION(PVT.) LIMITED Versus PROVINCE OF SINDH2019 SCMR 1053 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-22
  sales tax on servicesdefault surchargeamnesty notificationSindh Revenue BoardFederal Board of Revenueretrospective exemptionrepeal and saving
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions for leave to appeal assail a judgment of the High Court of Sindh concerning sales tax on advertising services under the Sindh Sales Tax Ordinance, 2000. The core legal questions involved whether the Sindh Revenue Board possessed the statutory authority to issue an exemption notification waiving penalties and default surcharges for tax periods prior to the enactment of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, and whether the Federal Board of Revenue retained the authority to collect past sales taxes on behalf of the province after the establishment of the Sindh Revenue Board. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and allowed them, holding that the Sindh Revenue Board, with the approval of the Government of Sindh, validly issued the exemption notification covering arrears under the repealed Ordinance, and that administration and recovery powers vested in the Sindh Revenue Board upon its creation under the Sindh Revenue Board Act, 2010. The key principle laid down is that taxing authorities and provincial governments cannot unilaterally undermine or restrict the scope of unrevoked exemption notifications issued within their statutory competence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Sindh Revenue Board has the power to exempt penalties and default surcharges for tax periods predating the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011?
  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue retain jurisdiction to collect provincial sales tax on services after the establishment of the Sindh Revenue Board?
  • Can the Government of Sindh contest the validity of its own unrevoked exemption notification in court?
  Read full judgment →
• SOMAID Versus ALI GOHAR alias GOHAR ZAMAN2019 SCMR 1008 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-30
  dying declarationcriminal appealbenefit of doubtmurder convictionappreciation of evidencedeath sentencefirst information report
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-appeals arising from a criminal conviction for murder. The complainant challenged the High Court's reduction of the death sentence to life imprisonment, while the convict challenged the conviction itself, primarily arguing that the prosecution's case rested on an unreliable dying declaration. The core legal question was whether a conviction can be safely maintained when the authenticity and authorship of the dying declaration, which serves as the foundation of the prosecution's case, are shrouded in mystery due to conflicting witness testimony regarding who recorded the statement. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was unsafe. It reasoned that while a dying declaration is an exception to the rule of direct evidence, the prosecution must demonstrate beyond a shadow of doubt that it contains the declarant's words without extraneous influence. Because the witness who purportedly recorded the statement denied doing so, and the actual recorder remained unidentified, the court could not verify the declaration's veracity. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellant, and acquitted him.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on a dying declaration when the identity of the person who recorded it remains unverified and disputed by the prosecution witnesses?
  • Is a dying declaration admissible without the testimony of the person who recorded the declarant's words?
  • What is the standard of proof required for a dying declaration to form the sole basis of a criminal conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad Versus HORIZON INTERNATIONAL, KARACHI2018 SCMR 960 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-06
  customs dutyburden of proofimport restrictionscertificate of originmisdeclarationfactual disputeremand
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federation of Pakistan appealed a High Court judgment which held that textile products imported by the respondents were not subject to the import restrictions on Indian goods under the Import Policy Order, 2016. The High Court had ruled that the Customs authorities bore the burden of proving the Indian origin of the goods, and that the importers' failure to prove the claimed Chinese origin was inconsequential. The Supreme Court of Pakistan reversed this decision, holding that under the Customs Act, 1969 and the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, the primary burden of proof regarding the origin of imported goods lies on the importer, who possesses the relevant documentation and knowledge. The Court observed that the Customs authorities are empowered to demand information to satisfy themselves of the lawful importability of goods. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority to resolve the factual dispute regarding the origin of the goods.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving the country of origin of imported goods lie upon the Customs authorities or the importer?
  • Can the High Court resolve a serious factual dispute regarding the origin of imported goods in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Do the provisions of the Customs Act 1969 empower Customs authorities to demand documentation from importers to verify the lawful importability of goods?
  Read full judgment →
• COMMANDANT, FRONTIER CONSTABILARY, KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA, PESHAWAR Versus GUL RAQIB KHAN2018 SCMR 903 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-29
  civil servantservice of PakistanFrontier ConstabularyFederal Service Tribunalconstitutional jurisdictionterms and conditions of serviceArticle 212service grievance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns whether employees of the Frontier Constabulary (FC) are civil servants, thereby necessitating that service-related grievances be adjudicated exclusively by the Federal Service Tribunal rather than through the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the FC employees' terms and conditions of service, regulated by the North-West Frontier Constabulary Act, 1915 and the North-West Frontier Constabulary Rules, 1958, satisfy the criteria for 'civil servant' status under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that FC employees are indeed civil servants. Applying the tests established in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 602), the Court determined that because the FC performs sovereign functions related to the protection of frontiers—a duty directly connected to the affairs of the Federation—and because their service conditions are governed by statutory rules, they fall within the definition of the 'service of Pakistan.' Consequently, the Court ruled that the High Court lacks jurisdiction over their service disputes, and the exclusive remedy lies with the Federal Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Frontier Constabulary considered civil servants under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction over service disputes involving employees of the Frontier Constabulary?
  • Do the duties performed by the Frontier Constabulary constitute service in connection with the affairs of the Federation?
  • Can the High Court exercise writ jurisdiction in service matters governed by the North-West Frontier Constabulary Act 1915?
  Read full judgment →
• ASAD IQBAL Versus PAKISTAN RANGERS SINDH2018 SCMR 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD MANSHA Versus State2018 SCMR 772 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-07
  qatl-i-amddishonest improvementseyewitness testimonyappraisal of evidencebenefit of doubtcorroborative evidencemedical evidencerecovery of weapon
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by appellant Muhammad Mansha, challenging the judgment of the Lahore High Court which altered his conviction from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and reduced his sentence to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment. The trial court had acquitted three co-accused, and the High Court acquitted another co-accused on the ground that the eyewitnesses made dishonest improvements to align their testimony with medical evidence. The core legal questions were whether an accused could be convicted on the same evidence already disbelieved against co-accused without independent corroboration, and whether medical evidence or uncorroborated weapon recovery can serve as corroborative proof. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that testimony marred by dishonest improvements is untrustworthy, evidence disbelieved qua one accused cannot be accepted against another without strong independent corroboration, medical evidence only supports injury details without establishing identity, and recovery of a firearm without matching crime empties holds no corroborative evidentiary value.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on the testimony of eyewitnesses who have made dishonest improvements to align their statements with medical evidence?
  • Can the prosecution evidence disbelieved qua co-accused be relied upon to convict another accused without strong and independent corroboration?
  • Does medical evidence serve as independent corroborative evidence establishing the identity of the accused?
  • Can the recovery of an alleged crime weapon constitute corroborative evidence when no crime empty is recovered or matched through forensic analysis?
  Read full judgment →
• YOUNUS HABIB Versus IMRANUR RASHID2018 SCMR 705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-16
  evacuee trust propertyland acquisitionproprietary titleMartial Law Regulation No. 57vesting of propertypublic purposedefunct association
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the proprietary title of land in Deh Okewari, Karachi, originally owned by the Karachi Panjrapore Association. The appellants, claiming through tenants (Haris), challenged the title of the respondents, who are allottees of the Works Cooperative Housing Society (WCHS) deriving title from the Karachi Development Authority (KDA). The core legal questions involved the status of the Association as an evacuee entity, the validity of 1954 land acquisition proceedings for the Police Lines, and the status of the land as evacuee trust property. The Supreme Court held that the 8 acres of land were validly acquired by the Federal Government in 1954, and the remaining land was validly transferred by the Evacuee Trust Property Board to the KDA. The Court affirmed that once land is acquired by the government, it vests absolutely and may be utilized for alternative public purposes. Furthermore, the Court held that the Haris’ lease was invalid due to the Association being defunct, and that Martial Law Regulation No. 57 nullified prior judicial orders regarding such properties. The appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can evacuee trust property be compulsorily acquired by the government for a public purpose?
  • Does the acquisition of land for a specific public purpose become void if the purpose is subsequently changed to a housing society?
  • Does the taking of possession under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 vest title absolutely in the government?
  • What is the effect of Martial Law Regulation No. 57 on prior judicial orders concerning evacuee trust property?
  Read full judgment →
• ABDUL JABBAR Versus GENERAL MANAGER (PERSONNEL) PAKISTAN RAILWAYS2018 SCMR 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-16Read full judgment →
• CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SENATOR NEHAL HASHMI Versus2018 SCMR 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-01
  contempt of courtjudicial independencescandalizing the courtunconditional apologyparliamentary disqualificationcontempt of court ordinancejudicial authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns contempt of court proceedings initiated against Senator Nehal Hashmi following a public speech in which he issued threats against judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and members of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) tasked with investigating corruption allegations. The core legal question was whether the respondent's conduct constituted contempt of court under the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, and whether his belated unconditional apology warranted leniency or acquittal. The Court held that the respondent's speech was a deliberate attempt to obstruct, interfere with, and prejudice the judicial process, thereby bringing the Court into disrepute and hatred. The Court rejected the apology as an afterthought, noting it was submitted only after the prosecution had closed its evidence. Consequently, the Court convicted the respondent for contempt, sentencing him to imprisonment and a fine. The judgment affirms the principle that an apology for contempt is not automatically accepted but is subject to the Court's satisfaction regarding its bona fides, and that conviction for such contempt entails disqualification from Parliament under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unconditional apology for contempt of court require automatic acceptance by the court?
  • Does a conviction for contempt of court result in disqualification from being a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)?
  • Can public threats against judges and court-appointed investigative teams constitute contempt of court?
  • Is an apology submitted at the conclusion of contempt proceedings considered bona fide?
  Read full judgment →
• CDA Versus HASHWANI HOTELS LTD.2018 SCMR 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
• ORANGZAIB Versus State2018 SCMR 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-04
  abduction for ransomextortionalteration of convictionsentence reductioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the appellant's conviction for abduction for ransom under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, following his acquittal of a murder charge under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution failed to produce evidence linking the appellant to the actual abduction, the demand for ransom, or the recovery of the victim's body. The sole evidence against the appellant was that he drove the vehicle containing the confined victim when the ransom was collected. The Supreme Court held that driving the vehicle under such circumstances did not constitute abduction for ransom but instead fell squarely under the definition of extortion under Section 383 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, punishable under Section 384. Consequently, the Court altered the conviction to extortion, reduced the sentence to the maximum statutory period of three years, and ordered the appellant's immediate release as he had already served twelve years in custody.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted of abduction for ransom under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if there is no evidence of their involvement in the abduction or the demand for ransom?
  • Does driving a vehicle containing a confined victim during the collection of ransom constitute the offence of abduction for ransom or the offence of extortion under Section 383 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What is the maximum sentence that can be awarded for an offence of extortion under Section 384 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• RUSTAM Versus State2018 SCMR 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-04
  abduction for ransomacquittalbenefit of doubtsuo motu noticecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a case where the appellant Rustam and co-accused Asif Hussain and Salah-ud-Din were tried for abduction for ransom under section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The trial court convicted them, but upon appeal, the High Court maintained Rustam's conviction while acquitting Asif Hussain and Salah-ud-Din. Rustam appealed to the Supreme Court, which subsequently issued a show-cause notice to the acquitted co-accused regarding their acquittal. The core legal question was whether the acquittal of the co-accused by the High Court warranted interference and setting aside after a significant lapse of time and in the absence of an appeal against acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution evidence against the acquitted co-accused was deficient, the recovery of cash was inconsequential, and no appeal against acquittal had been filed by the State or complainant for about twelve years. Consequently, the Supreme Court discharged the notice issued to the acquitted co-accused, upholding the principle that weak evidence and delayed interference do not justify setting aside an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal by the High Court should be set aside when the prosecution evidence is deficient?
  • Can a notice for enhancement or setting aside of acquittal be discharged after a long lapse of time when no appeal against acquittal was filed by the State or complainant?
  • Is recovery of cash legally consequential when it is not connected with the alleged offence?
  Read full judgment →
• ATTA-UR-REHMAN Versus State2018 SCMR 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-05
  terrorismocular evidencetest identification paradesentence reductionjoint liabilitydeath penaltycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns the conviction of the appellants for their involvement in a terrorist attack on a Rangers party in Karachi, resulting in two deaths and five injuries. The core legal question was whether the evidence, particularly the ocular account and identification parade, sufficiently established the appellants' guilt, and whether the death sentences imposed by the lower courts were appropriate given the circumstances. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, finding the ocular evidence consistent and corroborated by medical testimony, despite minor irregularities in the identification parade. However, the Court exercised judicial discretion regarding sentencing. Noting that the prosecution failed to attribute specific fatal injuries to individual accused persons and that forensic evidence regarding firearm matching was misconstrued by the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty was not warranted. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals regarding the convictions but reduced the death sentences to imprisonment for life. The principle laid down is that where multiple accused are involved in a joint act and specific fatal injuries cannot be attributed to individuals, the imposition of the death penalty should be avoided in favor of life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Does an irregularity in a test identification parade, such as failing to change dummies, vitiate the entire proceeding?
  • Is the death penalty appropriate when specific fatal injuries cannot be attributed to individual accused persons in a joint criminal act?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on ocular evidence when the FIR does not initially name the culprits?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. KHALIDA AZHAR Versus VIQAR RUSTAM BAKHSHI2018 SCMR 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-07
  inheritancegift deedagricultural landmutationburden of proofpartitionmesne profits
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court dismissing the appellant's suit for a declaration and partition of her late father's estate. The core legal questions involve the validity of a registered gift deed executed by the legal heirs regarding a residential property, the authenticity of agricultural land gift mutations, and claims of benami ownership over other assets. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to impeach the duly registered gift deed of the residential house, which was executed by all legal heirs including the appellant and corroborated by marginal and official witnesses, nor did she substantiate claims regarding other movable assets. However, regarding the agricultural lands, the Court held that the respondent failed to prove the essential ingredients of a valid Islamic gift and the authenticity of the mutation proceedings independent of mere entries. The Court concluded that the residential gift is valid, while the agricultural lands remain part of the estate subject to inheritance and mesne profits. The key principle laid down is that while registered gift deeds supported by consistent contemporaneous conduct and witness testimony are sustainable, mutation entries regarding agricultural land cannot substitute for strict proof of the essential ingredients of a gift under law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a registered gift deed executed by multiple co-heirs can be successfully challenged after a prolonged delay without cogent evidence of fraud?
  • Is a mere revenue mutation entry sufficient to prove a valid gift of agricultural land without establishing the essential ingredients of offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession?
  • Whether a party denying signatures on a registered document is bound to permit handwriting expert comparison?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. MADIHA YOUNUS Versus IMRAN AHMED2018 SCMR 1991 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-03
  custody of minorsvisitation rightswelfare of minorsmatrimonial litigationchild maintenanceparental responsibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh regarding the custody and visitation rights of two minor children, Huzaifa Imran and Aashad Imran, following the dissolution of the matrimonial relationship between their parents, Mst. Madiha Younus and Imran Ahmed. The core legal question concerned the determination of custody arrangements and visitation rights that best serve the welfare of the minors. Upon the parties reaching a mutual compromise, the Supreme Court of Pakistan disposed of the petition by formalizing a detailed visitation schedule. The Court held that the minors shall remain in the custody of the mother, with specific, structured visitation rights granted to the father, including alternate weekends, portions of summer and winter vacations, and specific arrangements for Eid festivals. Furthermore, the Court directed the father to bear all educational and miscellaneous expenses, alongside a monthly maintenance payment for each minor. The key principle laid down is that in custody disputes, the court prioritizes the welfare of the minors and encourages parental cooperation to ensure children maintain meaningful relationships with both parents without prejudice.

  Questions settled

  • What specific visitation schedule can be ordered by the court to balance the rights of parents in a custody dispute?
  • Is a father legally obligated to bear educational and miscellaneous expenses for minors in addition to monthly maintenance?
  • Can the court formalize a compromise between parents regarding the custody and visitation of minor children?
  Read full judgment →
• SHER BAZ KHAN GAADHI Versus MUHAMMAD RAMZAN2018 SCMR 1952 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-05
  dual citizenshipnomination papersfalse affidavitgeneral electionsdisqualificationconcealment of facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a constitutional petition allowing Respondent No. 1 to contest the General Elections, 2018. The core legal question was whether a candidate who held dual citizenship and concealed foreign travel history while submitting a false declaration on oath in nomination papers was eligible to contest elections. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that a candidate who holds foreign citizenship at the time of filing nomination papers and makes a false statement or conceals material facts such as foreign travel history and dual nationality in the mandatory affidavit is liable to be disqualified from contesting elections. The key principle laid down is that the submission of a false affidavit or concealment of material facts before a Returning Officer renders a candidate liable to disqualification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate who holds dual citizenship at the time of filing nomination papers is eligible to contest elections?
  • Does the filing of a false affidavit or making a false declaration on oath before a Returning Officer entail disqualification?
  • What are the legal consequences of concealing foreign travel history in an election affidavit?
  Read full judgment →
• BAHRIA TOWN Versus GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB2018 SCMR 1864 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  forest landencroachmentdemarcationrecord of rightsexchange of landsuo motu jurisdictionrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a long-standing dispute regarding alleged encroachments upon the Rukh Takht Pari forest land by Bahria Town, with conflicting claims concerning the total area of the forest—whether it measures 2210 acres or 1741 acres—and the validity of previous demarcation reports and land exchanges. The core legal question revolves around determining the true acreage of the forest land, whether prior settlement and exchange mutations based on an area of 1741 acres were legally sustainable, and whether this Court should resolve title disputes or leave them to pending civil and revenue forums. By a majority of two to one, the Supreme Court held that the total area of Takht Pari is 2210 acres, that previous exchanges based on the erroneous lower acreage were void, and directed a fresh coordinated demarcation by the Forest Department, Revenue Department, and Survey of Pakistan, alongside a NAB investigation. The key principle laid down is that official records of rights and historical gazetteers establishing forest acreage override erroneous demarcation reports, and transactions based on factual misrepresentations regarding government land are legally ineffective.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct method to determine the true acreage of a reserved forest when conflicting revenue records and historical gazetteers are presented?
  • Can a land exchange between a private housing entity and the government, based on erroneous demarcation and lower acreage figures, be sustained?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can determine disputed questions of title and property boundaries in human rights or suo motu proceedings instead of leaving them to civil courts?
  • Do previous settlement reports and mutated exchanges attain finality if they are founded upon a material misrepresentation or miscalculation of land area?
  Read full judgment →
• BOURBON MARITIME (PVT.) LTD. Versus M.V. SALAJ2018 SCMR 1828 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-12
  admiralty jurisdictionstatutory priorityport duespossessory liensale proceedsmarkupport authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed the competing priority claims between a port authority and maritime lienholders over the sale proceeds and accrued profits of a vessel sold under the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court. The core legal questions involved the scope and effect of statutory powers of detention and sale under the Port Qasim Authority Act, 1973, whether filing an admiralty suit preserves or waives statutory priority, and the treatment of markup awarded on such claims. The Supreme Court converted the leave petition into an appeal and held that while the Port Qasim Authority enjoys statutory priority over the sale proceeds and accretions up to the amount of its actual principal claim, any markup awarded on the claim does not enjoy the same priority and is subject to general rules of distribution. The appeal was allowed, and the decrees were modified to direct the pro-rata and prioritized disbursement of the excess funds among the remaining decree holders.

  Questions settled

  • What priority is to be accorded to a port authority's claim for amounts due and payable under the Port Qasim Authority Act, 1973?
  • What is the nature of a suit filed by a port authority under section 23 of the Port Qasim Authority Act, 1973 in relation to its statutory powers?
  • What is the effect on a port authority's statutory priority when it files and obtains a decree in an admiralty suit?
  • Does markup awarded on a port authority's decretal claim enjoy the same priority as the principal statutory claim?
  Read full judgment →
• AL-NOOR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN2018 SCMR 1792 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-26Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, KARACHI Versus PAKISTAN BEVERAGES LIMITED, KARACHI2018 SCMR 1544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-14
  Sales Tax Actdiscretionary poweradministrative lawmonitoringstatutory interpretationInland Revenue Officertax evasion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the interpretation of Section 40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, specifically whether the power to post Inland Revenue officers to monitor a registered person's premises must be time-bound. The appellant, the Commissioner Inland Revenue, challenged the High Court's observation that such an order must specify a timeframe, arguing that the statute imposes no such limitation. The Supreme Court held that while Section 40B confers discretionary power, such discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised in accordance with administrative law principles. The Court reasoned that the statutory power to 'monitor' is purpose-driven and cannot be indefinite; once the purpose is achieved or the ground for monitoring is exhausted, the authority must cease. Consequently, the Court affirmed that an order under Section 40B must contain a reasonable timeframe, as the nature of discretionary statutory power requires that it be exercised within defined limits, subject to reassessment or extension if legitimate grounds persist. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the necessity of a time-bound exercise of this statutory power.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power to post Inland Revenue officers under Section 40B of the Sales Tax Act 1990 allow for indefinite monitoring of a registered person's premises?
  • Is the discretionary power conferred by Section 40B of the Sales Tax Act 1990 subject to the requirement of being time-bound?
  • Can a statutory discretionary power be exercised without any limitation or timeframe?
  Read full judgment →
• FARRUKH SHAHZAD Versus COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (LEGAL) RTO, RAWALPINDI2018 SCMR 1375 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-10Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Revenue Division/CBR House, Islamabad Versus MUHAMMAD JUNAID TALAT2018 SCMR 1305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-07
  tax evasioninformant rewarddefinite informationincome taxtax defaulterFederal Tax Ombudsman
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the entitlement of an informant to claim a monetary reward under government reward orders for allegedly providing definite information regarding tax evasion. The respondent had published an article pointing out that Pakistani seafarers working on foreign flagships were not paying income tax, leading the tax department to raise demands and issue ex parte assessments. The respondent claimed a reward, which led to conflicting departmental decisions and recommendations by the Federal Tax Ombudsman, subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether general information regarding non-payment of tax by a category of persons constitutes 'definite information' of tax evasion qualifying the informant for a reward. The Supreme Court held that mere failure to pay tax or drawing attention to tax defaulters does not amount to tax evasion, which strictly requires the concealment of income through deceitful or manipulative means. The Court laid down the principle that an informant is entitled to a reward only upon supplying specific information that uncovers concealed income and leads to the detection of actual tax evasion, thereby setting aside the impugned judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does pointing out a category of persons failing to pay tax constitute definite information of tax evasion?
  • What distinguishes tax avoidance or failure to pay tax from tax evasion under taxation laws?
  • Is an informant entitled to a reward for merely drawing the tax department's attention to general tax defaults without uncovering concealed income?
  Read full judgment →
• Syeda SAKINA RIAZ Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN2018 SCMR 1272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-01
  family pensionqualifying servicepensionary benefitsservice lawfamily assistance packagestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, the widow of a deceased University of Karachi employee, challenged the denial of family pension benefits following her husband's death after five years of service. The University denied the claim on the basis that the deceased had not completed the minimum ten-year qualifying service required under Section 26 of the University of Karachi Service Pension Statute, 1972. The appellant argued that the Prime Minister's Family Assistance Package, adopted by the University, entitled her to such benefits. The core legal question was whether the Family Assistance Package could override the statutory requirement of minimum qualifying service for pension eligibility. The Supreme Court held that the right to pension is inherently tied to the rendition of service and cannot be equated with an insurance policy. The Court ruled that the Family Assistance Package merely enhances the quantum of pension payable under existing law and cannot convert non-pensionable service into pensionable service. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the minimum qualifying service threshold remains a mandatory prerequisite for any pensionary claim, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Prime Minister's Family Assistance Package override the requirement of minimum qualifying service for pension eligibility?
  • Is the rendition of minimum qualifying service a mandatory prerequisite for claiming family pension?
  • Can the Family Assistance Package convert non-pensionable service into pensionable service?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. IKRAMULLAH KHAN Versus KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY, PESHAWAR2018 SCMR 1191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-12
  service matteracademic appointmentdoctorate evaluationweed scienceteaching experienceexpert opinionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the selection and appointment of respondents Nos. 6 and 7 to the post of Associate Professor (BS-20) in Weed Science at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Agricultural University, Peshawar, arguing that they lacked a doctorate and the requisite ten years of teaching experience in Weed Science. The core legal question concerned whether the doctoral degrees and teaching experience of respondents Nos. 6 and 7 qualified them for the post in question. The Supreme Court held that the dissertations, research work, and academic history of the respondents conclusively demonstrated that their doctorates pertained to Weed Science, notwithstanding the literal text of their degree certificates, and that they possessed the requisite teaching experience. The Court laid down the principle that in determining the specific field of a doctoral degree, the substance of the candidate's research and dissertation is determinative rather than the mere title or text printed on the degree, and courts cannot substitute expert academic evaluations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the text of a doctoral degree or the research dissertation is determinative of the specific field of specialization?
  • Can courts substitute the evaluation and recommendation of expert academic committees and selection boards in specialized appointments?
  • Whether regular teaching experience is calculated from the date of initial appointment or the date of subsequent regularisation when determining eligibility for promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• HASHIM QASIM Versus The STATE2017 SCMR 986 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-12
  circumstantial evidenceretracted confessionjuvenile offenderbenefit of doubtmurdersodomycapital punishmentlast seen evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the appellant Hashim Qasim, alongside the life imprisonment and sentences of co-accused Khayam Khurshid and Shoaib Ahmed, for offenses including murder, sodomy, and kidnapping. The core legal question concerns the reliability of circumstantial evidence, a retracted judicial confession by a juvenile, private sniffer dog evidence, last-seen evidence, and a belatedly set-up motive in a capital case. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and acquitted all the accused, holding that the prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence with a broken chain of links, an uncorroborated and legally flawed retracted confession, inadmissible sniffer dog evidence, and an unestablished motive. The key principle laid down is that in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must form an unbroken chain pointing unmistakably to the guilt of the accused, and a retracted confession of a juvenile without proper procedural safeguards and independent corroboration cannot sustain a capital conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession of a juvenile sustain a conviction on a capital charge without strong independent corroboration?
  • Is evidence obtained through private sniffer dogs legally admissible under the Qanun-e-Shahdat Order or general criminal jurisprudence in Pakistan?
  • What is the required standard of proof for circumstantial evidence in cases involving capital punishment?
  • Whether the benefit of acquittal extended to appealing accused can be extended to non-appealing co-accused whose case is indistinguishable?
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• ARMY WELFARE TRUST (NIZAMPUR CEMENT PROJECT), RAWALPINDI Versus COLLECTOR OF SALES TAX (NOW COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE), PESHAWAR2017 SCMR 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-14
  sales tax exemptionappellate jurisdictionquestion of lawcollection of excess sales taxtribunal statusfactual findingsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of the High Court's appellate jurisdiction under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the interpretation of Section 3B regarding the collection of excess sales tax. The petitioner challenged a High Court judgment that reversed an Appellate Tribunal's decision, which had found that the petitioner did not collect sales tax on exempted supplies. The Supreme Court first addressed a procedural objection, ruling that the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is not a 'court' under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution, thereby necessitating a petition for leave to appeal rather than a direct appeal. On the merits, the Court held that the High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is strictly limited to questions of law. The High Court erred by overturning the Appellate Tribunal's factual findings without evidence. The Court affirmed that Section 3B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 requires actual collection of tax from consumers, not merely a notional calculation in internal pricing. The appeal was allowed, and the Appellate Tribunal's order was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal a 'court' for the purposes of Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to overturn factual findings of the Appellate Tribunal under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Does Section 3B of the Sales Tax Act 1990 apply to notional sales tax calculations in internal pricing where no tax was actually collected from consumers?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be filed against a High Court judgment that sets aside an order of a tribunal?
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• FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION Versus ANWAR-UL-HAQ (PRIVATE SECRETARY) ISLAMABAD2017 SCMR 890 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-30
  upgradationcivil servantservice tribunal jurisdictionpromotionlength of servicesubstantive grade
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) challenged a decision of the Federal Service Tribunal (FST) which had set aside an order declining the respondent's representation for the grant of BPS-19 and re-designation as Senior Private Secretary. The core legal question was whether the respondent civil servant was entitled to upgradation to BPS-19 based on length of service calculations under specific Office Memorandums. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that upgradation is distinct from promotion, does not amend terms and conditions of service, and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Furthermore, the Court held that the Service Tribunals lack jurisdiction to entertain issues relating to the upgradation of civil servants, and the respondent did not meet the requisite qualifying length of service in the substantive grade for the claimed grade enhancement. The key principles laid down are that upgradation is personal to incumbents of isolated posts to address stagnation and does not constitute a promotion, and that Service Tribunals lack jurisdiction over upgradation disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal involving the issue of upgradation of a civil servant?
  • Is upgradation of a post considered a promotion under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Can a civil servant claim upgradation to a higher grade as a matter of right based on length of service in lower grades?
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• Dr. FARHAT ABBAS Versus DR. MEHMOOD-UL-HASSAN2017 SCMR 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-24
  service lawmedical faculty appointmentpromotion criteriasubordinate legislationultra viresPMDC regulationsacademic qualification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Civil Appeals against a Peshawar High Court judgment that set aside the promotion of Dr. Farhat Abbas to Associate Professor of Cardiology. The core legal question was whether an Assistant Professor holding general medical qualifications (FCPS in Medicine) was eligible for promotion to Associate Professor of Cardiology under the Regulations for the Appointment of Faculty Professorial Staff/Examiners/Principals/Deans/Administrative Staff in Undergraduate and Postgraduate Medical and Dental Institutions of Pakistan, 2011. The Supreme Court held that Regulation 19 of the 2011 Regulations explicitly permits candidates who possess general postgraduate qualifications and have attained the post of Assistant Professor in a sub-specialty to be promoted to higher academic ranks, including Associate Professor, without requiring a specific sub-specialty degree. The Court emphasized that the High Court erred in setting aside the promotion, as the Regulations were validly framed under the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962, and no grounds were established to declare them ultra vires. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and dismissed the underlying writ petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does Regulation 19 of the Regulations for the Appointment of Faculty Professorial Staff/Examiners/Principals/Deans/Administrative Staff in Undergraduate and Postgraduate Medical and Dental Institutions of Pakistan, 2011 allow for the promotion of an Assistant Professor with general medical qualifications to the post of Associate Professor in a sub-specialty?
  • Can a court set aside a promotion based on medical faculty regulations without establishing that the relevant regulation is ultra vires to the parent statute?
  • Is a candidate who has already attained the post of Assistant Professor in a sub-specialty required to hold a specific sub-specialty degree for subsequent promotion to Associate Professor under the 2011 Regulations?
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