Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- NAEEM SHAH AND 14 Other vs ZARIN GUL AND 7 Other1981 PLD Peshawar 141 · Peshawar High Court · 1981-03-21Read full judgment →
- NADEEM AHMAD vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 942 · Lahore High Court · 1981-02-10Read full judgment →
- NABO JAN vs THE STATE-1981 P Cr. L J 951 · Sindh High Court · 1981-02-25Read full judgment →
- N. A. SHAHRIYAR vs CONFORCE LTD., LAHORE AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 1009 · Lahore High Court · 1980-09-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a trial court judgment that dismissed a suit for damages for physical disability and mental shock without allowing the parties to lead evidence. The core legal questions were whether the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the suit under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on external evidence, and whether the suit was barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 and the Limitation Act 1908. The Court held that when considering the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, the court must rely solely on the averments in the plaint, presuming them to be true, rather than considering external documents or evidence provided by the defendant. Furthermore, the Court established that issues of fact, such as whether the plaintiff qualifies as a workman or whether a suit is barred by limitation, require the parties to be given a fair opportunity to lead evidence. Consequently, the trial court's summary dismissal was set aside, and the case was remanded for proper adjudication after evidence is recorded.
Questions settled- Can a trial court consider external evidence or documents provided by the defendant when deciding whether to reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Is it permissible for a court to dismiss a suit on the ground of limitation without framing a specific issue regarding it?
- Does the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow a court to dismiss a suit without affording the parties an opportunity to lead evidence on disputed factual issues?
- N. A. SHAHR.YAR vs CONFORCE LTD., .(1981 PLC 607 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-09Read full judgment →
- MVHAMMAD SIDDIQ AND Others vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND Other1981 SCMR 1022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged an order of a Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a constitutional petition filed under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1972. The appellants challenged the action of the Assistant Political Agent, Khyber Agency, who took cognizance of a criminal complaint under Section 420, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, referred the matter to a Council-of-Elders, and issued warrants and summons to be executed in Faisalabad (then Lyallpur). The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction over proceedings originated by an authority in a Tribal Area where execution of process was to occur outside that area. The Supreme Court affirmed that jurisdiction over Tribal Areas is excluded only in matters exclusively concerned with those areas. However, because the process was issued by an authority acting in the Tribal Area and execution was directed within Faisalabad, jurisdiction lay with the Lahore High Court, not the Peshawar High Court. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with observations.
Questions settled- Whether the jurisdiction of superior Courts is ousted in matters where a part of the cause of action or execution of process occurs outside Tribal Areas?
- Does the High Court of a province have writ jurisdiction over an Assistant Political Agent acting exclusively within a Tribal Area?
- Which High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction when process issued in a Tribal Area is to be executed in a district outside that area?
- MUZAFFAR KHAN vs Mst. ROSHAN JAN AND 2 Other1981 PLD Peshawar 129 · Peshawar High Court · 1981-03-10Read full judgment →
- MUZAFFAR ALI vs MUHAMMAD SHAFI.1981 PLD Supreme Court 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by special leave addresses the core legal question of whether the High Court possesses the power to review its own judgments and orders passed in second appeals under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959. The litigation originated from an eviction application filed by the landlord, which culminated in a second appeal before the High Court and a subsequent review proceeding. The Supreme Court held that the right of review is a substantive right that must be expressly conferred by statute, and since neither the Ordinance nor the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 applicable to such appeals expressly or impliedly confer a power of review—having specifically excluded Part VIII containing Section 114—the High Court has no jurisdiction to review its appellate orders under the Ordinance. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, setting aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and restoring the Single Judge's order dismissing the review application as incompetent.
Questions settled- Does the High Court have the jurisdiction to review its orders passed in second appeals under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959?
- Is a right of review considered a substantive right requiring express statutory conferment?
- Do the provisions of Part VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to second appeals heard under Section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959?
- MUTALLI KHAN ETC. vs GHULAM SARWAR1981 SCMR 983 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over agricultural land in Gujrat District, which the petitioners claimed to have acquired from the respondent, a minor, through an exchange agreement. The petitioners' father had initially secured a civil court decree validating the exchange, but this was overturned by an Additional District Judge, who held that the minor's maternal grandfather lacked the authority under Muhammadan Law to exchange the minor's property. The Lahore High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioners' revision petition, noting the lack of legal authority for such an exchange. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the exchange was in the minor's interest and that the grandfather had been appointed as the minor's guardian. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, finding no evidence of such an appointment and characterizing the trial court's conclusion as perverse. The Court held that neither the minor's mother nor the maternal grandfather possessed the legal authority to exchange the minor's property. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that unauthorized exchanges of a minor's property are legally invalid.
Questions settled- Does a maternal grandfather have the authority under Muhammadan Law to exchange a minor's property?
- Can a court presume the appointment of a guardian without evidence of such an appointment?
- Is a contract for the exchange of property entered into by a minor void?
- MUSTAFA KHAN AND Others vs The STATE1981 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the convictions of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentences of death for the murders of two persons, alongside convictions under Section 307. The core legal question involved the re-appraisal of evidence regarding the right of self-defence, the nature of the encounter, and whether the combat was premeditated or a sudden mutual fight. The Supreme Court, by majority view, held that although the complainant party went in pursuit of the appellants following an earlier altercation, both sides deliberately engaged in an armed encounter, negating the plea of private defence for either party. The majority held that where two bodies of men engage in a deliberate armed fight, the offense falls under culpable homicide not amounting to murder rather than premeditated murder. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the appeal as to conviction but converted the conviction from Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing the death sentence to transportation for life, while maintaining the conviction under Section 307.
Questions settled- Whether the right of private defence is available to either party when both sides knowingly and deliberately engage in a mutual armed encounter?
- Does a premeditated armed clash between two opposing groups amount to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Whether abscondence of an accused can serve as corroborative evidence of participation in a crime?
- Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 304 Part I when both parties are found to have willingly participated in an armed fight?
- MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD., KARACHI vs NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL1981 PLC 538 · Lahore High Court · 1981-07-08Read full judgment →
- MUSHTAQURREHMAN AND 4 OTHERS vs MUHAMMAD AKBAR AND 5 OTHERS1981 CLC 364 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition arises out of a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction regarding ownership and possession of a property, which was dismissed by the trial court and the appellate court based on a report submitted by a Naib Tehsildar. The core legal question is whether a person appointed ostensibly as a Local Commissioner under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 acts as a referee when the parties have explicitly agreed to be bound by his findings, and whether such a report can form the basis of a binding decision without formal objections. The court held that where parties voluntarily agree to be bound by the findings of a person, that person functions as a referee rather than a mere Local Commissioner, and the resulting contract, once acted upon, is fully enforceable and cannot be retracted from after the report is submitted. The key principle laid down is that the legal character of an investigator appointed by a court is determined by the binding nature of the agreement between the parties, and a report made pursuant to an agreement to be bound is treated as a referee's verdict.
Questions settled- Whether a person appointed as a Local Commissioner acts as a referee when the parties agree to be bound by their findings?
- Can a party retract from an agreement to abide by the report of a referee after the report has been submitted and acted upon?
- Is a trial court competent to dismiss a suit based on the report of a referee agreed upon by the counsel and parties?
- MUSHTAQ ETC. vs AKHTAR HUSSAN Etc.S1981 SCMR 944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court dated 13-6-1979 in R. S. A. No. 133/79, wherein the petitioners sought to pre-empt a part of a sale transaction by splitting up the bargain on the ground that the shares of various vendees were separately mentioned in the sale-deed. The core legal question is whether a pre-emption suit can be maintained by splitting up the bargain and pre-empting a part of the sale transaction when the shares of the vendees are specified in the sale-deed but the price is not specified. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the view taken by the High Court—that such a plea is of no effect without specification of price—is supported by established precedents of the Court. The key principle laid down is that splitting up a bargain in a pre-emption suit without specification of price is not permissible.
Questions settled- Can a pre-emption suit be maintained by splitting up the bargain based on separately mentioned shares of vendees without specification of price?
- Whether the High Court's refusal to allow the splitting of a bargain in a pre-emption suit is legally sustainable?
- MUSHTAQ AND Another vs THE STATE-1981 P Cr. L J 989 · Lahore High Court · 1981-03-08Read full judgment →
- MUSHTAQ ALI vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SUKKUR AND ANOTHER, .1981 PLC 474 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-01-04Read full judgment →
- MUSHTAQ ALI KHAN AND ANOTHER vs PROGRESSIVE TOBACCO LTD., KARACHI1981 CLC 1051 · Sindh High Court · 1980-12-09Read full judgment →
- MUSHTAQ AHMED vs MUHAMMAD AKRAM AND Another1981S C M R 1248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that altered the respondent's conviction from murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly applied Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which pertains to sudden fights without premeditation, or whether the circumstances indicated a premeditated murder. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings were sustainable based on the evidence, noting that the respondent could not have reasonably planned an ambush at the chosen location and time, and that the respondent's involvement in a scuffle resulting in his own injuries negated the theory of a pre-planned attack. The key principle laid down is that the possession of a weapon alone does not necessarily prove premeditation, and appellate courts will not interfere with findings of fact that are reasonably supported by the evidence on record.
Questions settled- Does the possession of a weapon by an accused person automatically establish premeditation for a murder charge?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with findings of fact made by a High Court if those findings are reasonably supported by the evidence on record?
- Does a sudden encounter resulting in a scuffle and injuries to both parties qualify for the application of Exception IV to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- MUSHTAQ AHMED vs MEMBER II, FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION AND 2 OTHERS1981 CLC 1044 · Sindh High Court · 1979-09-01Read full judgment →
- MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs WAPDA AND Another1981 SCMR 1077 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 24 March 1980, which was filed with a delay of 66 days. The core legal question is whether the time spent pursuing a mistaken remedy through a writ petition before the High Court can constitute a sufficient ground for the condonation of delay under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that because Article 212(3) explicitly requires orders of the Service Tribunal to be challenged directly before the Supreme Court, time spent pursuing a writ petition in the High Court cannot be regarded as time spent bona fide in a wrong forum. Consequently, the Court ruled that there was no valid ground for condoning the delay and dismissed the petition as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that mistaken recourse to the High Court in matters falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal and the Supreme Court under Article 212 does not afford a basis for condonation of delay.
Questions settled- Whether time spent pursuing a writ petition in the High Court against a Service Tribunal order can be excluded for the purpose of limitation under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
- Does the mistaken filing of a constitutional petition in the High Court constitute a bona fide pursuit of a remedy in a wrong forum for condonation of delay?
- MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 485 · Lahore High Court · 1981-02-10Read full judgment →
- MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs SE:CRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB FINANCE1981 PLC (C. S,) 869 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1981 SCMR 706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee property. The petitioner claimed prior entitlement to a house based on an N.C.H. Form and a P.T.O. issued in 1960, challenging a transfer made to the respondent in the same year. The core legal question was whether the settlement authorities were justified in refusing to reopen a transfer finalized fourteen years prior, particularly where the petitioner had allegedly consented to the transfer to the respondent, a claimant, during the original proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the settlement authorities committed no illegality in refusing to reopen the matter after such an extensive delay. The Court emphasized that the petitioner, as a non-claimant, had no superior right over the respondent, a claimant, and noted the petitioner's failure to pursue his alleged P.T.O. for over a decade. The principle laid down is that stale claims regarding the transfer of evacuee property, especially where the petitioner previously acquiesced to the transfer, cannot be reopened after an inordinate delay.
Questions settled- Can a transfer of evacuee property be reopened after an inordinate delay of fourteen years?
- Does a claimant have a preferential right to the transfer of evacuee property over a non-claimant?
- Is a petitioner who previously consented to the transfer of property to another party entitled to challenge that transfer years later?
- MUSHTAQ AHMAD vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND 2 Others1981 P Cr. L J 1263 · Lahore High Court · 1980-09-20Read full judgment →
- MUSHTAQ AHMAD KHAN vs NASIMUR REHMAN1981 CLC 137 · Sindh High Court · 1980-09-06Read full judgment →
- MUSHTAQ AHMAD AND Another vs THE STATE--1981 P Cr. L J 1206 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- MURREE BREWERY Co. LTD., RAWALPINDI vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN And 4 Others1981 PLD Lahore 640 · Lahore High Court · 1981-05-02Read full judgment →
- MURID AHMAD AND Others vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE AND OR Other1981S C M R 1182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the resumption of disputed State land. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioners were entitled to relief and extension of time for depositing defaulted installment payments after failing to avail multiple opportunities granted by revenue authorities. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no fault in dismissing the constitutional petition since the petitioners were afforded reasonable opportunities to make up the default but persistently failed to do so without pointing to any governing law or rule supporting their claim. The key principle laid down is that discretionary leniency granted by revenue authorities for clearing default payments cannot be endlessly claimed or extended when a party fails to comply with the stipulated conditions and deadlines.
Questions settled- Whether a party failing to avail opportunities to pay defaulted installments for State land can challenge the resumption of land?
- Is a constitutional petition maintainable against orders upholding the resumption of State land due to non-payment of dues?
- MURID AHMAD AND OTHERS vs GHULAM HUSSAN AND Other1981 SCMR 1253 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a second appeal by the High Court, which had affirmed the decree in favour of the respondent for the possession of a disputed house. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioners had established title through adverse possession, and whether additional evidence could be permitted at the belated stage of leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings against the plea of adverse possession were unexceptionable, and that documents newly discovered after many years of litigation and not pleaded earlier could not be introduced to reopen the case. The Court dismissed the petition, laying down that stale claims of adverse possession unsupported by clear, hostile evidence within the statutory period cannot succeed, and appellate courts will not lightly permit additional evidence at the leave stage to contradict previous pleadings and prolong litigation.
Questions settled- Can a plea of adverse possession be sustained on the basis of documents that fall within the limitation period of the institution of the suit?
- Whether additional evidence can be permitted at the stage of a petition for leave to appeal to reopen a long-standing litigation.
- Is possession considered hostile when the occupant's predecessor has admitted the true owner's title in prior judicial proceedings?
- MURAD ALI vs The STATE1981 SC M R871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld his conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner, a Line Superintendent of WAPDA, was accused of demanding and accepting illegal gratification from a complainant for facilitating the installation of an electric connection. A trap was successfully organized, and tainted currency notes were recovered from the petitioner's possession, though he claimed the amount was a friendly loan. The core legal question involved the sufficiency of evidence in a trap case and whether acquittal under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 undermines a conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution proved its case through cogent evidence, the defence plea was rightly rejected, and an acquittal on a separate charge does not diminish the proof regarding the established offence. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the recovery of tainted currency notes in a trap case sufficiently establishes the charge of accepting illegal gratification under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
- Does an acquittal under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 adversely affect or whittle down the prosecution case regarding a charge under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
- Can a defence plea claiming a friendly loan without supporting defence witnesses successfully rebut consistent prosecution evidence in a bribery case?
- MUQTADA KHAN IQTIDA KHAN vs ALLAH RAKHI BEGUM1981 CLC 568 · Sindh High Court · 1980-03-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Letters Patent Appeal arises from ejectment proceedings initiated by a landlord against a tenant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal questions involved were whether the omission to make consequential amendments in subsection (4) of section 15 of the Ordinance after the amendment of subsection (1) affected the limitation period for second appeals, and whether section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to second appeals filed under section 15(4) of the said Ordinance. The Sindh High Court held that despite the draftsman's omission to amend subsection (4), the right of second appeal is retained by interpreting the reference to the appellate authority in accordance with the legislative intent. However, the Court held that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to second appeals under section 15(4) because the special law prescribes a period of limitation different from the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, thereby excluding section 5 pursuant to section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The appeal was consequently dismissed as time-barred.
Questions settled- Whether the omission to amend subsection (4) of section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 nullifies the right of second appeal to the High Court?
- Does section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to second appeals filed under section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- How should a statutory provision containing an unamended reference resulting from a legislative oversight be interpreted by the courts?
- Whether section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 excludes the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act to special laws prescribing a different period of limitation?
- Munshi SIRAJUL HAQUE vs NIZAMUDDIN1981 CLC 864 · Sindh High Court · 1980-05-02Read full judgment →
- Munshi MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs THE STATE1981 PLC (C. S.) 670 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-12-06Read full judgment →
- Munshi AKBAR ALI vs THE STATE1981 PLC (C. S.) 462 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-02-09Read full judgment →
- Munshi ABDUL SHAKOOR vs AMMAN RIFAH-E-AMA (Ram)1981 PLC 782 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-08-23Read full judgment →
- MUNIR KOOSAR vs CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS, MIRPUR CIRCLE, MIRPUR1981 PLC (C. S.) 578 · Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal · 1981-07-17Read full judgment →
- MUNIR HUSSAIN vs MUHAMMAD SHAFI AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 1712 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal and a civil revision arising from conflicting decrees regarding land ownership and pre-emption rights. The core legal question was whether a declaratory decree, obtained by the appellants through a confession of judgment by the vendee during the pendency of a pre-emption suit, was void under the doctrine of lis pendens. The court held that the declaratory decree was indeed hit by the principle of lis pendens as codified in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The court reasoned that by confessing judgment in the declaratory suit, the vendee had 'dealt with' the property in a manner that adversely affected the pre-emption rights of the respondent, thereby attempting to defeat the pre-emption claim. The court affirmed that the doctrine of lis pendens applies not only to transfers of property but to any dealing with the property that prejudices the rights of a party to a pending suit. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and revision, upholding the lower appellate court's decision to strike down the declaratory decree as legally ineffective.
Questions settled- Does the principle of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply to a confession of judgment that adversely affects a pending pre-emption suit?
- Can a declaratory decree obtained during the pendency of a pre-emption suit be considered void if it defeats the pre-emptive rights of the plaintiff?
- Does the term 'dealt with' in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 extend beyond the physical transfer of property?
- MUNIR AHMED/ vs GOVERNMENT OF ~BALUCHISTAN AND 4 Other1981 PLD Supreme Court 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court regarding the refusal of admission to the first-year M.B., B.S. class at Bolan Medical College. The core legal question was whether the Selection Committee could validly reject the petitioner's application for a reserved seat based on an informal report by the Deputy Commissioner, despite the petitioner possessing a valid permanent residence certificate issued by the District Magistrate. The Supreme Court held that the Selection Committee’s decision was without lawful authority. The Court determined that the Committee ignored the valid certificate required by the prospectus and improperly relied on extraneous reports. The Court established that administrative bodies must strictly follow the criteria stipulated in their prospectuses and cannot disregard valid official documentation in favor of informal inquiries. Furthermore, the Court held that innocent students already admitted should not be displaced due to administrative errors. Consequently, the petitioner was declared entitled to admission, though the request to displace the existing student was refused to avoid penalizing an innocent party.
Questions settled- Can a selection committee reject a candidate based on an informal report when the candidate holds a valid permanent residence certificate as required by the prospectus?
- Does a local certificate that is revalidated by a District Magistrate satisfy the requirement for a permanent residence certificate for college admission?
- Should an innocent student already admitted to an educational institution be displaced to accommodate a petitioner who was wrongly denied admission due to administrative error?
- Is a decision by a selection committee that ignores valid official documentation and relies on extraneous reports subject to judicial review?
- MUNIR AHMAD vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER AND ANOTHER1981 PLD Lahore 735 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-10Read full judgment →
- MUNAWAR vs The STATE1981 SCMR 1092 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from the refusal of the Lahore High Court to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Munawar, who was implicated along with others under sections 302, 307, and 326 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and causing firearm injuries. The core legal question was whether an accused person who is not alleged to have caused any injury to the deceased, but is attributed injuries to a prosecution witness, is entitled to bail as a matter of law on the premise that constructive liability under section 34 cannot be invoked at the bail stage. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that there is no universal rule of law that an accused who causes no injury to the deceased cannot be burdened with vicarious liability at the bail stage. The court clarified that the question of constructive liability depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, and where the material prima facie reveals a shared common intention among armed assailants, vicarious liability is properly attracted, disentitling the accused to bail.
Questions settled- Whether an accused who has not caused any injury to the deceased can be burdened with common intention under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at the bail stage?
- Does previous case law lay down a universal rule that a person who causes no injury to the deceased is entitled to bail?
- Can courts examine the question of constructive liability on the basis of available material at the time of considering bail?
- MUNAWAR HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 906 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- MUNAWAR HUSSAIN vs THE STATE-1981 P Cr. L J 974 · Lahore High Court · 1979-03-16Read full judgment →
- MUNAWAR HUSSAIN AND Another vs REHMAT ALI1981 SCMR 971 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises from an eviction proceeding initiated by a landlord against a tenant, Sh. Noor Hussain, under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. Following the eviction order, the petitioners, who are the nephew and son of the original tenant, filed an application to prevent their dispossession, claiming independent possession of the premises. The Rent Controller and the High Court dismissed their application, with the High Court ruling that an application under Order XXI, Rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is not maintainable by a person who has not yet been dispossessed. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court declined to examine the legal correctness of the High Court's interpretation of Rule 100. Instead, the Court held that the petitioners failed to establish any independent right to possession, noting they were merely attempting to evade an eviction order against their relative. Consequently, the Court refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, dismissing the petition on the grounds that the petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of independent tenancy.
Questions settled- Is an application under Order XXI, Rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable by a person who has not yet been dispossessed of immovable property?
- Does the Supreme Court have an obligation to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 185 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when a petitioner fails to substantiate their claim of independent possession?
- MUNAWAR AHMAD vs THE SIND PROVINCIAL COOPERATIVE BANK LTD., HYDERABAD ,1981 PLC 344 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-08-16Read full judgment →
- MUMTAZUDDIN AHMED vs Mst. SULTAN JEHAN BEGUM1981 PLD Karachi 329 · Sindh High Court · 1981-01-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 arose from an eviction order passed by the Rent Controller under Section 14 of the Ordinance directing the tenant to deliver vacant possession. The tenant contended that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to defend, that an earlier application under Section 15 barred the Section 14 proceedings, and that the landlady was disentitled because another flat in the building had been re-let after she turned 60. The High Court analyzed the statutory distinction between summary proceedings under Section 14 and regular trials under Section 15. The Court held that Rent Controllers retain discretion to determine the scope of inquiry in Section 14 cases provided natural justice is observed, and the statutory proviso restricting re-letting applies strictly to the specific rented premise in dispute, not other independent units in the building. Furthermore, the pendency of a Section 15 application does not bar resort to Section 14. Finding no jurisdictional error or denial of due process, the High Court dismissed the appeal and granted thirty days to vacate.
Questions settled- Does the pendency of an eviction application under Section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 bar a landlord from filing a summary application under Section 14?
- Is a Rent Controller required to conduct a full formal inquiry with affidavits and cross-examination when deciding an application under Section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
- Does the statutory restriction against re-letting after attaining sixty years of age under Section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 apply to any property owned by the landlord or strictly to the specific building unit subject to the eviction application?
- MUMTAZ ALI BHUTTO vs THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND 3 Other1981 PLD Karachi 98 · Sindh High Court · 1980-09-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the refusal by the Government of Pakistan to issue a passport to the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the issuance of a passport is a matter of absolute executive discretion immune from judicial review, or if the refusal is subject to the principles of natural justice. The Court held that while the issuance of a passport may be an executive function, the exercise of such public power cannot be arbitrary or capricious. It determined that because the Passports Act 1974 prohibits travel without a passport, the refusal to issue one adversely affects a citizen's ability to move, thereby invoking the principles of natural justice. The Court established that even in the exercise of discretionary public power, authorities must act fairly and provide the affected party an opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the Court directed that the petitioner's appeal against the refusal be considered and decided within a specified timeframe, satisfying the requirement for a fair hearing.
Questions settled- Does the refusal to issue a passport by the government constitute an administrative act subject to the principles of natural justice?
- Is the issuance of a passport a matter of absolute executive discretion immune from judicial review?
- Does the prohibition on travel without a passport under the Passports Act 1974 necessitate that the refusal of a passport be based on reasonable grounds?
- MULLAH AHMED vs ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, SIBI AND 7 Other1981 PLD Quetta 15 · Balochistan High Court · 1981-06-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition arises out of a pre-emption suit filed by the petitioner concerning agricultural land that was mutated as an exchange but claimed by the petitioner to be a sale. The trial under the Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968 went through various rounds before tribunals, commissioners, and the Board of Revenue, resulting in concurrent findings against the petitioner on the ground that he failed to prove the mandatory making of 'Talabs' under Muhammadan Law. The core legal question involved whether the failure of the contesting respondents to explicitly deny the assertion of 'Talabs' in their written statement dispensed with the requirement of proving the same under procedural law, and whether concurrent factual findings warranted interference in constitutional jurisdiction. The Balochistan High Court held that the fact of making 'Talabs' must be strictly proved with all attending circumstances regardless of pleadings, and that erroneous findings of fact by lower tribunals, unless lacking jurisdiction, do not attract constitutional interference. The court laid down that proof of 'Talabs' in pre-emption cases governed by Muhammadan Law is an indispensable foundational requirement that cannot be bypassed on technical rules of pleadings.
Questions settled- Whether the failure to explicitly deny the making of 'Talabs' in a written statement dispenses with the requirement of proving the same under Muhammadan Law?
- Does the Civil Procedure Code strictly apply to proceedings under the Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968?
- Can erroneous findings of fact by tribunals be interfered with under the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
- MUKTADA KARIM AND Other vs GOVERNMENT OF Pakista1rnd ANOTHER1981 PLD Lahore 359 · Lahore High Court · 1980-11-24Read full judgment →
- MUKHTAR vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 713 · Sindh High Court · 1979-09-16Read full judgment →
- MUKHTAR BEGUM vs THE STATE-1981 P Cr. L J 1270 · Lahore High Court · 1981-04-10Read full judgment →
- MUJEEBUR REHMAN ALAVI AND 3 OTHERS vs ALVIA TABLIGHI TRUST, KARACHI1981 CLC 175 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- MUJAHID HUSSAIN vs THE STATE---1981 P Cr. L J 1245 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- MUHAMNIAD KHAN vs The STATE1981 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, wherein the appellant Muhammad Khan challenged his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as maintained by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the conviction of the sole remaining appellant could be sustained upon the solitary statement of an interested witness, corroborated by an inadmissible statement made by the accused to an investigating officer during the course of investigation. The Supreme Court held that the statement made by the accused to the police sub-inspector during investigation was inadmissible in evidence under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (referred to in the text as Section 16 of the Cr. P. C.), and that the accused's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 did not amount to an admission or corroboration. The Court established the principle that statements made to an investigating officer by an accused are barred from being used as corroborative evidence, leading to the setting aside of the conviction and the acquittal of the appellant due to lack of independent corroboration.
Questions settled- Is a statement made by an accused person to an investigating officer during the course of investigation admissible in evidence as corroboration?
- Can the conviction for murder be sustained on the solitary testimony of an interested witness without independent corroboration?
- What is the evidentiary value of a vague statement made by an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding statements made to police?
- MUHAMMAIAKRAM's vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 219 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-21Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD, IQBAL vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BAHAWALPUR AND ANOTHER1981 PLC (C. S.) 785 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1978-12-13Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ZAMAN vs COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND 2 OTHERS1981 CLC 991 · Sindh High Court · 1980-03-10Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD ZAFAR vs Mst. KAMAL FATIMA AND ANOTHER1981 PLD Lahore 732 · Lahore High Court · 1981-07-07Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YUSUF SHAH vs PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES1981 PLD Supreme Court 224 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant's suit challenging his dismissal from service as a Security Guard by the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation. The core legal question was whether an employee of a statutory corporate body can maintain a civil suit for a declaration that his dismissal was illegal, in the absence of statutory rules governing his service. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of formal statutory rules or regulations—since the Pakistan International Airlines Service Code constitutes mere internal administrative instructions rather than statutory rules—the relationship between the corporation and its employee is governed by the ordinary law of master and servant. Consequently, a declaratory suit to challenge termination of service is not maintainable. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a civil suit for a declaration of illegal dismissal is maintainable by an employee of a corporate body governed by the master and servant rule?
- Do the internal administrative instructions or service codes of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation have the status of statutory rules?
- Whether the termination of service of a corporate employee without statutory rules can be challenged through a declaratory suit?
- MUHAMMAD YUSAF AND 3 OTHERS vs HAKIM ALI AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 200 · Lahore High Court · 1980-06-16Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YUNUS vs The STATE1981 SCMR 422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that reduced the death sentence of the respondent, Karam Khan, to imprisonment for life following his conviction for the murder of Abdul Rahman. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in reducing the sentence and whether the sentence of 'imprisonment for life' was legally applicable given the date of the offense. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court's reasoning regarding the nature of the injuries was flawed, the reduction of the sentence was justified because the motive involved the accused's family honor regarding his wife, a factor consistently recognized by the Court as warranting a lesser penalty than death. Furthermore, the Court held that because the offense occurred before the enforcement of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, the sentence of 'imprisonment for life' was impermissible under the principle against retrospective punishment. Consequently, the Court altered the sentence to 'transportation for life,' which, under the unamended law, was equivalent to twenty years, ensuring compliance with Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.
Questions settled- Is a sentence of imprisonment for life applicable to an offense committed before the enforcement of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
- Does the principle of family honor regarding female relatives justify a lesser penalty than death in murder cases?
- Can a court impose a penalty greater than that prescribed by law at the time the offense was committed?
- MUHAMMAD YUNUS AND ANTOHER vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER----1981 P Cr. L J 1271 · Sindh High Court · 1981-10-31Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YOUSUF vs Mst. NAFISA KHATOON AND ANOTHER1981 PLD Karachi 773 · Sindh High Court · 1978-08-20Read full judgment →
- NAEEM AHMAD vs Mst. NUZHAT ALMAS AND 2 OTHERS1981 CLC 195 · Lahore High Court · 1980-10-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a constitutional petition against the judgment and decree of the Family Court directing him to pay a dower amount of Rs. 20,000 to respondent No. 1. The core legal questions involved whether the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 applies to non-Muslims such as Qadianis, and whether oral evidence is admissible to contradict the dower amount expressly stated in an admitted Nikahnama. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 applies equally to Muslims and non-Muslims, and that once the execution of the Nikahnama is admitted, no evidence contrary to its written terms regarding the dower amount can be led. The court laid down the principle that Family Courts possess jurisdiction over non-Muslim family disputes unless expressly barred, and that documentary evidence of dower in an admitted Nikahnama cannot be altered by oral testimony.
Questions settled- Whether the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 is applicable to non-Muslims?
- Does a Family Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate family suits involving Qadianis declared as non-Muslims?
- Can oral evidence be led to contradict the dower amount recorded in an admitted Nikahnama?
- Can a finding of fact regarding the fixation of dower be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
- MUHAMMAD YOUSUF KHAN vs JUBILEE SPINNING & WEAVING MILLS LTD., KARACHI ,1981 PLC 823 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-01-26Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YOUSUF ANSARI AND 2 OTHERS vs MESSRS NATIONAL1981 PLC 151 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-01-29Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YOUSUF AND 5 OTHERS vs ADAM ALI AND 4 OTHERS1981 CLC 596 · Sindh High Court · 1980-02-15Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YOUSAF vs PUNJAB URBAN TRANSPORT CORPORATION/1981 PLC 88 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1979-11-21Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YOUSAF vs MUZAFFAR ALI1981 SCMR 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent landlord against the petitioner tenant for non-payment of rent of a disputed room in Faisalabad. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, which was upheld by the Additional District Judge and subsequently by the High Court in second appeal. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the landlord's title as transferee under a somewhat vague Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) could be established by referring to underlying transfer orders of the Settlement Authorities, and whether the tenant could set up a plea of adverse possession or deny the tenancy. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Rent Controller and appellate courts were fully justified in looking to the specific orders of the Settlement Commissioner to clarify the property transferred, and that the tenant's possession prior to statutory notice was under the Settlement Department rather than adverse. The key principle laid down is that where a transfer order issued by settlement authorities is general or vague, the actual property transferred can be ascertained and given effect to by referring to the specific foundational orders of the Settlement Authorities, and a tenant cannot defeat an ejectment action by raising a belated plea of adverse possession against a statutory landlord.
Questions settled- Whether a Rent Controller can refer to the underlying orders of the Settlement Authorities to identify property when a Provisional Transfer Order contains a vague description?
- Does a tenant's possession prior to the issuance of a statutory eviction notice constitute adverse possession against a transferee landlord?
- Can a tenant challenge the transfer orders of the Settlement Authorities in rent proceedings after failing to overturn them before the settlement authorities?
- MUHAMMAD YOUSAF vs MUHAMMAD HASSAN AND 7 Others1981 CLC 1181 · Lahore High Court · 1981-04-05Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YOUSAF vs Mian FAIZ MUHAMMAD1981 CLC 101 · Lahore High Court · 1980-09-29Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YOUSAF vs BRIG. MUHAMMAD ANWAR AND ANOYDER1981 P Cr. L J 718 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-09Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YOUSAF BAJWA vs I.-G. OF POLICE, PUNJAB AND OTHERS , _1981 PLC (C. S.) 650 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YOUNUS vs THE STATE-19811 P Cr. L J 1208 (1) · Sindh High Court · 1985-08-12Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YOUNUS vs ISMAIL AND Another1981 SCMR 1216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the Sind High Court releasing respondent No. 2 on bail. The High Court granted bail on the ground that the case required further inquiry as to whether the offence fell under Exception 1 of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 or Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and also concerning the exact age of the respondent based on conflicting medical evidence and a birth certificate. The core legal question was whether the discretion exercised by the High Court in granting post-arrest bail on these grounds was proper. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the grounds cited by the High Court indeed presented a case of further inquiry under the law, and the discretion to grant bail was properly exercised. The Supreme Court established the principle that where the applicability of a penal provision or the determination of age requires further inquiry, the grant of bail by the High Court constitutes a proper exercise of discretion which will not be interfered with. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the determination of whether an offence falls under Exception 1 of Section 300 or Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 constitutes a ground for further inquiry warranting bail?
- Whether conflicting evidence regarding the age of an accused person justifies the grant of post-arrest bail for further inquiry?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion exercised by a High Court in granting bail?
- MUHAMMAD YOUNUS vs DR. S. MUZAMMIL ALI1981 CLC 327 · Sindh High Court · 1980-11-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the order of the Rent Controller directing the appellant-tenant to hand over possession of the disputed residential bungalow to the respondent-landlord on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. The core legal questions involved whether the landlord had successfully established his bona fide personal requirement in good faith, the evidentiary value of the landlord's statement on oath, and whether the landlord could support the ejectment order on the ground of default under appellate provisions. The Sindh High Court held that the landlord had satisfactorily proved his bona fide personal requirement through his un-shaken statement on oath, retirement from service, and the fact that he resided in a rented flat, whereas the tenant failed to establish any lack of good faith. The Court further held that vague allegations of default without particulars are insufficient, and past defaults waived by continuous acceptance of rent cannot be relied upon. The appeal was consequently dismissed, upholding the ejectment order on personal requirement.
Questions settled- Whether the un-shaken statement on oath of a landlord is sufficient to prove bona fide personal requirement in the absence of rebuttal evidence?
- Does a tenant on the expiry of a written lease agreement become a statutory tenant from month to month?
- Can a landlord succeed on the ground of default in rent payment when the allegations in the rent application are vague and lacking in particulars?
- Whether an appellate authority under the rent laws can maintain an order on a ground decided against the respondent by the Rent Controller?
- MUHAMMAD YOUNUS vs AKHTAR HUSSAIN AND Other1981 SCMR 1049 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the respondents from interfering with his possession of a shop, claiming title through adverse possession. The trial court dismissed the suit, noting the petitioner had previously admitted to being a tenant of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest in earlier ejectment proceedings. The appellate court and the Lahore High Court affirmed this dismissal, further holding that a suit for permanent injunction under the Specific Relief Act 1877 was not maintainable without a prayer for a declaration of ownership. Upon seeking special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the petitioner was bound by his own judicial admission of tenancy. The Court held that the suit was a frivolous attempt to thwart ejectment proceedings and that the petitioner could not simultaneously claim tenancy and adverse possession. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine, and the interim order previously granted was vacated.
Questions settled- Can a party who has admitted to being a tenant in prior ejectment proceedings subsequently maintain a suit claiming title by adverse possession?
- Is a suit for permanent injunction maintainable under the Specific Relief Act 1877 without a prayer for a declaration of ownership where title is disputed?
- Does a judicial admission of tenancy preclude a claim of adverse possession over the same property?
- MUHAMMAD YOUNUS AND 2 Others vs MUHAMMAD YOUNUS KHAN ETC.S1981 SCMR 899 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1950-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the orders of the Settlement authorities. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners sought the transfer of disputed land as an unregistered industrial concern (a brick kiln), claiming possession since 1951. However, the land had been transferred to the respondents as agricultural land. The predecessor-in-interest initiated proceedings by making a reference to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on June 13, 1975, after the repeal of the evacuee laws. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities had jurisdiction to entertain the reference and subsequent revision petition after the repeal of the relevant settlement laws. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Section 2 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974, only proceedings pending immediately before July 1, 1974, were saved. Since the petitioner failed to prove that any transfer proceedings were pending on the target date, the fresh reference initiated in 1975 was incompetent, and the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether Settlement authorities have the jurisdiction to entertain fresh applications or references filed after the repeal of the evacuee laws under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance 1974?
- What is the effect of the target date of July 1, 1974, specified in the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance 1974 on proceedings initiated after that date?
- Can a revision petition be maintained before Settlement authorities after the repeal of the relevant settlement laws if no proceedings were pending on the statutory cutoff date?
- MUHAMMAD YOUNAS vs SHAHZAD QAMAR AND 3 Other1981 PLD Lahore 280 · Lahore High Court · 1981-01-10Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YASIN vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 823 · Sindh High Court · 1979-05-18Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YASIN vs PUNJAB ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, LAHORE1981 SCMR 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a service appeal by the Punjab Administrative Tribunal concerning the compulsory retirement of a Basic Kanungo. The core legal question was whether the Collector, Muzaffargarh, possessed the jurisdiction to order the appellant's compulsory retirement, or whether such authority resided exclusively with the Director of Land Records, given the appellant's status as a candidate on the Director's list. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Collector was the competent authority to impose the penalty. The Court established that the West Pakistan Kanungo Service (Northern Zone) Rules, 1964 and the Board of Revenue Delegation of Powers Rules, 1958 effectively superseded the earlier Punjab Kanungos Service Rules, 1945 and the Land Records Manual. Consequently, the Collector, as the appointing authority, held the power to impose disciplinary penalties, including compulsory retirement. The Court further clarified that administrative circulars issued under the now-redundant provisions of the 1945 Rules could not override the prevailing statutory delegation of powers, thereby affirming the Collector's disciplinary jurisdiction over the appellant.
Questions settled- Does the Collector have the jurisdiction to order the compulsory retirement of a Basic Kanungo?
- Do the West Pakistan Kanungo Service (Northern Zone) Rules, 1964, supersede the Punjab Kanungos Service Rules, 1945, regarding disciplinary authority?
- Can administrative circulars issued under repealed rules override the Board of Revenue Delegation of Powers Rules, 1958?
- MUHAMMAD YAR Alias YARA vs The STATE1981 SCMR 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for murder. The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court for the murder of his wife, Mst. Bivi, based on circumstantial evidence and an extra-judicial confession made to his mother-in-law, Mst. Jallan. The Lahore High Court upheld the conviction but erroneously rejected the extra-judicial confession on the ground that the witness did not inform her father first. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the guilt was proven. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the High Court's rejection of the extra-judicial confession unjustified, noting the witness was truthful and uncontradicted. Furthermore, the Court relied on the testimony of a witness who heard the appellant's voice at the scene during the time of the murder, corroborated by medical evidence regarding the cause of death (lathi blows). The Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the recoveries of incriminating items and that the appellant failed to explain his presence at the scene. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction based on the totality of circumstantial evidence and the credible extra-judicial confession.
Questions settled- Can an extra-judicial confession be rejected solely because the witness did not inform a specific family member first?
- Is the testimony of a witness who has turned hostile admissible to implicate an accused?
- Does the failure of an accused to explain their whereabouts at the time of a crime, when placed at the scene by evidence, support a conviction?
- MUHAMMAD YAQUB vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 1016 · Lahore High Court · 1981-06-14Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YAQUB vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB , .1981 PLC (C. S.) 534 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1981-03-23Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YAQOOB vs THE STATE1981 P Cr. L J 693 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-02Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YAQOOB vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER--1981 P Cr. L J 1037 · Lahore High Court · 1991-04-12Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YAQOOB vs Mst. SHAGUFTA BEGUM AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 143 · Lahore High Court · 1980-11-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition was filed by a husband challenging a family court's decree of dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula. The petitioner contended that the wife's second suit for dissolution was barred by res judicata due to a previous dismissed suit, and that she had failed to provide objective, logical reasons for her aversion to her husband. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the principle of res judicata did not apply because the previous suit challenged the validity of the marriage itself, whereas a claim for khula assumes a valid marriage. On the merits of khula, the Court ruled that under Islamic law, a wife is not required to provide objective or logical reasons to satisfy the court of her aversion. Rather, the court must satisfy its conscience that the rift is so serious that there is no possibility of the spouses living in harmony within the limits prescribed by God, and that forcing them to remain in a hateful union is contrary to Islamic principles.
Questions settled- Does the dismissal of a wife's suit challenging the validity of her marriage operate as res judicata against a subsequent suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of khula?
- Is a wife seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of khula required to provide objective, logical, and sufficient reasons for her aversion to her husband?
- What is the standard of satisfaction required of a Family Court Judge when deciding whether to grant a decree of dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula?
- MUHAMMAD YAQOOB vs FEROZE DIN AND 3 Other1981 SCMR 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, who had dismissed the petitioner's writ petition both for default of appearance and on merits. The core legal question concerned the propriety of a court deciding a case on its merits when the petitioner and their counsel were absent, rather than restricting the order to a dismissal for default. Upon hearing arguments, the Supreme Court observed that the proper course of action in cases of default is to address the restoration of the petition rather than adjudicating the merits in the absence of the party. Consequently, the Supreme Court, by consent of the parties, set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that the petitioner must file a restoration application in the High Court, and the writ petition should only be decided on its merits if the restoration application is allowed. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the High Court for this purpose, granting a temporary status quo order to facilitate the filing of the restoration application.
Questions settled- Can a court dismiss a writ petition on merits when the petitioner is absent and the dismissal is based on default?
- Is it appropriate for a court to decide a case on merits after dismissing it for default due to the absence of the petitioner?
- What is the correct procedure when a writ petition is dismissed for default of appearance?
- MUHAMMAD YAQOOB KHAN vs MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN1981 CLC 755 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1981-05-08Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YAQOOB ETC. vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD ETC.1981 CLC 654 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners filed a civil suit for a declaration and perpetual injunction claiming that the disputed property belonged to the Provincial Government, was not evacuee property, and that the transfer in favor of the respondents was obtained by fraud. The trial court rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, holding that the suit was not maintainable under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act since the petitioners were pleading the title of the Provincial Government. The lower appellate court dismissed the appeal. In the civil revision, the Lahore High Court examined whether the petitioners had a possessory title enabling them to maintain the declaratory suit. The High Court held that abstract possessory rights do not warrant a declaration under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, that a mere right to remain in possession can only be protected against illegal eviction, and that possessory title is strictly relevant to a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act when unlawfully dispossessed. The Court concluded that the suit was barred under section 42 and failed to disclose a cause of action. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a plaintiff can maintain a declaratory suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act on the basis of an abstract possessory title?
- Does a suit for declaration lie where the plaintiff pleads title vesting in the Provincial Government rather than in themselves?
- Is a declaratory suit maintainable when the protection claimed under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 can be raised in eviction proceedings?
- When is possessory title relevant for filing a suit under the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
- MUHAMMAD YAQOOB ETC. vs DEPUTY SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LAND)1981 SCMR 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This review petition was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking review of its previous order dated 1st June 1978, whereby Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 222 of 1978 was dismissed. The original petition was dismissed on the primary ground that the underlying High Court order was a consent order, disentitling the petitioners from reopening the matter. The petitioners sought review on the contention that they had not consented to the arrangement proposed by their counsel during the writ petition hearing in the High Court and therefore should not be bound by the consent order. The Supreme Court observed that this specific contention had neither been raised before the High Court nor before the Supreme Court during the hearing of the main petition. Consequently, the Court held that raising a new plea regarding lack of consent for the first time in review proceedings provides no valid justification for reviewing a previous order. The review petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a review petition be entertained on grounds and pleas that were never raised before the High Court or the Supreme Court during the main proceedings?
- Whether a client can challenge a consent order in review on the ground that counsel lacked consent when such objection was not raised earlier?
- MUHAMMAD YAQOOB AND ANOTHER vs SADIQ AND 4 Other1981 SCMR 947 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves civil petitions for special leave to appeal arising from concurrent orders of the settlement authorities and the Lahore High Court concerning land allotments made under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The core legal question was whether inhabitants of a riverine village, who were treated as statutory refugees and allotted alternative land after their village was inundated and who surrendered their original land to the Government, could subsequently be compelled to return to their original village when it re-appeared due to a shift in the river's course. The Supreme Court held that once displaced persons are permanently settled on alternative evacuee property and have surrendered their original proprietary rights to the Government, they cannot be forced to return to their original lands upon re-appearance, as asking them to do so is unrealistic and uncalled for. The key principle laid down is that statutory refugees settled under paragraph 27 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme retain their permanent allotments and cannot be displaced merely due to the subsequent re-emergence of their original riverine lands after they have surrendered their title.
Questions settled- Whether statutory refugees settled on alternative land under paragraph 27 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme can be forced to return to their original land when it re-appears due to a change in the river's course?
- Does a previous dismissal of a writ petition for want of jurisdiction constitute a bar on merits regarding entitlement to land allotments?
- What is the effect of surrendering proprietary rights in original riverine land in favour of the Government under the land settlement laws?
- MUHAMMAD YAMIN vs MUHAMMAD YOUNIS BAIG AND ANOTHER1981 CLC 512 · Lahore High Court · 1981-01-31Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YAMIN KHAN vs Mt8s1ts k. C. D. I3ALL BEARING LTD., ItARACI-111981 PLC 726 · Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-10-13Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YAMIN AND 16 OTHERS vs MEMBER (LAND UTILIZATION), BOARD1981 CLC 1700 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YAMEEN vs MUHAMMAD YASEEN1981 CLC 1706 · Sindh High Court · 1981-04-11Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD YAKOOB vs MESSRS AL-AMIN TEXTILE MILLS LTD. , . (1981 PLC 937 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1981-02-04Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD USMAN vs FAZAL KARIM1981 CLC 104 · Sindh High Court · 1980-08-30Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD USMAN AND 26 Other vs FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1981 PLD Lahore 537 · Lahore High Court · 1981-03-22Read full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD US MAN (REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL HEIRS). Appellant vs BEGUM1981 CLC 771 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- MUHAMMAD URIS-Opponent vs ZAINUDDIN Applicant1981 PLD Karachi 345 · Sindh High Court · 1980-01-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts directing the ejectment of the appellant-tenant from a residential house on grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide requirement for use as an 'Otak' (sitting place). The core legal questions concern whether the tenant committed a default under the relevant rent restriction law regarding the computation of the 60-day period for rent tender, and whether the landlord's claim for personal requirement was made in good faith. The Sindh High Court held that the 60-day grace period for rent payment commences from the expiration of the entire monthly period for which the rent is payable, rather than from the first day of the month, meaning the tenant's tender was valid and no default occurred. Furthermore, the Court held that the concurrent findings on personal requirement were vitiated because the lower courts ignored crucial surrounding circumstances—specifically the landlord's sale of another nearby house and lack of explanation for timing—rendering the claim doubtful. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the ejectment orders were set aside.
Questions settled- From which date does the 60-day period for tendering rent begin to run under section 13(2)(i) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 in the case of a monthly tenancy?
- Does the use of a residential building as an 'Otak' or sitting place for visitors constitute a non-residential use under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- Can concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide personal requirement be interfered with in second appeal if material circumstances are ignored by the lower courts?
- Does a landlord's failure to utilize or retain a previously owned nearby house affect the bona fides of a subsequent ejectment application for personal requirement?
- MUHAMMAD UMAR vs Mst. AIYSHA AZIZ1981 SC MR 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises out of eviction proceedings initiated by the respondent-landlord against the appellant-tenant in Karachi. The Rent Controller ordered the deposit of tentative rent, which the appellant failed to deposit within the stipulated time, causing a delay of three days. The Rent Controller struck off the appellant's defence and ordered eviction, rejecting the appellant's plea of illness since he ran a hotel and could have arranged for the deposit through employees. Although the Additional District Judge set aside this order, the High Court allowed the landlord's appeal ex parte and subsequently dismissed the tenant's restoration application, finding proper service and rejecting the tenant's false plea regarding postal delivery dates. Upon a petition for leave, the Supreme Court evaluated the sufficiency of notice and the merits of the default. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to justify the delay in depositing the rent and that his plea of personal illness was inadequate given that he operated a business establishment. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, with a four-month grace period granted to hand over vacant possession.
Questions settled- Whether personal illness of a tenant operating a business constitutes sufficient ground to excuse a delay in depositing tentative rent?
- Whether an ex parte order of the High Court should be set aside when the appellant's plea regarding delayed postal notice is found to be false?
- Does a tenant running a commercial establishment bear the burden of ensuring timely rent deposit through employees if the tenant falls ill?