Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• PROVINCE OF PUNJAB vs FAZAL HAQ1980 PLC (C. S.) 581 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-06-28Read full judgment →
• PROVINCE OF PUNJAB vs AZMATULLAH1980 SCMR 932 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-11
  ejectmentdefault in rentrequisition of propertystriking off defencerent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the Province of Punjab against orders directing the ejectment of the petitioner from a building housing a government-managed school. The respondent landlord had sought ejectment on grounds of personal need and default in rent, leading to a rent controller order for rent deposit. Subsequently, the provincial government requisitioned the property under the Punjab Requisitioning of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1956, prompting the rent controller to initially dismiss the ejectment application as infructuous, though this dismissal was later reversed on appeal and the case remanded. Meanwhile, the rent controller struck off the petitioner's defence for non-compliance with the initial rent deposit order, resulting in successive dismissals of the petitioner's appeals and second appeals by the lower forums and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the initial rent deposit order lapsed upon the temporary dismissal of the ejectment petition. The Supreme Court held that the prior default in complying with the rent deposit order occurred before the dismissal, rendering the petitioner's contention meritless. The petition was dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings against the petitioner while granting a brief extension for possession given the educational nature of the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order for the deposit of rent passed under rent restriction laws lapse when an ejectment application is temporarily dismissed and later remanded?
  • Can a tenant's defence be struck off for non-compliance with a rent deposit order occurring prior to the dismissal of an ejectment petition?
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• PROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH COLLECTOR, DISTRICT Sheikhupura vs ABDUL HAQUE1980 CLC 563 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-11Read full judgment →
• PROVINCE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER vs ABDUL HAQUE1980 CLC 465 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-10Read full judgment →
• PROVINCE OF PUNJAB AND 3 OTHERS s vs MUHAMMAD AKRAM1980 CLC 1571 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-01Read full judgment →
• PROS. ANIS AHMAD SHEIKH vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, EDUCATION DEPARTMENT1980 PLC (C. S.) 504 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-02-27Read full judgment →
• PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY OF PAKISTAN, KARACHI vs P. & 0. AND B. I.1980 PLD Karachi 412 · Sindh High Court · 1980-03-09Read full judgment →
• Pir SULTAN AHMED vs Haji ABDUL HAMEED AND ANOTHER1980 PLD Karachi 294 · Sindh High Court · 1979-11-12Read full judgment →
• Pir NIAZ MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1980 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-05
  pre-arrest bailbail before arrestnon-prosecutionabsence of petitionerpublic servantcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by a public servant facing criminal charges under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947, following the refusal of pre-arrest bail by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question concerns the maintainability and prosecution of a bail before arrest petition when the petitioner fails to make a personal appearance before the court. The Supreme Court held that the personal presence of the petitioner is an essential procedural requirement in all cases seeking pre-arrest bail. Since the petitioner was absent without providing any valid justification—notwithstanding the absence of their Advocate-on-Record due to a family bereavement—the Court dismissed the petition for non-prosecution. The key principle laid down is that an accused seeking pre-arrest bail must personally attend the court hearings, and failure to do so without sufficient cause warrants the dismissal of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is the personal presence of the petitioner a mandatory requirement in hearings for pre-arrest bail?
  • Can a petition for pre-arrest bail be dismissed for non-prosecution when the accused is absent without a valid explanation?
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• Pir MOHAMMAD YASIN CHISHTI vs COMMISSIONER, MULTAN DIVISION, MULTAN1980 PLC (C. S.) 203 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-08-20Read full judgment →
• PIONEER STEEL MILLS Lm., LAHORE vs TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN1980 CLC 1734 · Sindh High Court · 1980-02-23Read full judgment →
• PERVEZ BUTT vs GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB THROUH HOME SECRETARY, PUNJAB, LAHORE1980 P Cr. L J 599 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-09Read full judgment →
• PERVAIZ UR RAHMAN vs MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN ETC.1980 P Cr. L J 3 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-12Read full judgment →
• PENINSULAR & ORIENTAL STEAM NEVIGATION Co. vs PFIZER LABORATORIES LTD., KARACHI AND 2 OTHERS1980 CLC 1972 · Sindh High Court · 1980-01-12
  limitation periodtime requisitecertified copiescopying agencySind Civil Courts Rulessecond appealcomputation of time
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal challenges the dismissal of an appeal as time-barred by the First Appellate Court. The core legal question concerns the computation of the time requisite for obtaining certified copies of a judgment under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908, specifically when delays arise from the Copying Agency's failure to adhere to the Sind Civil Courts Rules. The Court held that the appeal was filed within time, setting aside the impugned judgment and remanding the matter for decision on merits. The Court established that where the Copying Agency is negligent in performing its duties—such as failing to communicate estimated costs or failing to post a list of ready copies on the notice board—the applicant cannot be penalized for the resulting delay. Consequently, the entire period from the date of the application for certified copies until the date of their actual delivery must be excluded from the computation of the limitation period, as the delay is attributable to the office's default rather than the applicant's negligence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the Copying Agency to notify an applicant of the readiness of certified copies allow for the exclusion of the entire period until delivery under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is the time spent waiting for the Copying Agency to estimate costs and prepare copies considered time requisite under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can an appellant be penalized for delays in obtaining certified copies when the Copying Agency fails to comply with the notice requirements prescribed by the Sind Civil Courts Rules?
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• Peerzada RAFIQ AHMAD vs Chaudhry ABDUL REHMAN1980 SCMR 772 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-11
  ejectmentpersonal needbona fide requirementenhancement of rentlandlord and tenantrent controllereviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld the decision of the Additional District Judge granting ejectment of the tenant from a residential house on the ground of the landlord's personal bona fide requirement. The Rent Controller had initially dismissed the landlord's ejectment application, holding that the true intention was to enhance the rent, as the rent had been increased incrementally over time. The Additional District Judge reversed this order, finding that the landlord independently proved his genuine personal need, which finding was maintained by the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, maintaining the eviction order. The Court affirmed the legal principle that a demand for higher rent or previous rent increases does not by itself undermine a landlord's claim of personal bona fide requirement if the factum of personal bona fide requirement is independently established by evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Does a demand for higher rent by itself negate a landlord's claim of personal bona fide requirement for ejectment of a tenant if personal requirement is independently proved?
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• PARVEZ ASLAM MIAN MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs SYNTHETIC CHEMICAL CO. LTD., KARACHI AND ANOTHER1980 PLD Karachi 401 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-19
  temporary injunctionwinding upcompany managementpublic policypublic holidayminority shareholdersinternal management rulepreamble interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for a temporary injunction restraining the defendant company from implementing a special resolution passed at an extraordinary general meeting for the company's winding up. The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, contended that the resolution was ultra vires the Economic Reforms Order 1972, contrary to public policy, and illegal because the meeting was held on a declared public holiday and pendente lite. The Court held that a company's preamble cannot control its substantive provisions, that holding a meeting on a public holiday is not prohibited by law or inherently mala fide, and that the doctrine of public policy cannot be arbitrarily extended. The Court further noted that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case or irreparable loss, as the company's shares were already worthless due to continuous losses. The application was dismissed, holding that courts will not interfere in internal corporate management absent fraud, illegality, or ultra vires acts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a company hold an extraordinary general meeting on a day declared as a public holiday?
  • Does the preamble of a statute control or restrict its substantive operative provisions?
  • Can a court interfere in the internal management of a company on the ground that a special resolution is oppressive to minority shareholders?
  • Whether the doctrine of public policy can be extended by courts to cover corporate resolutions not previously recognized under the law?
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• PAPU BUTANI vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 771 · Sindh High Court · 1979-12-07Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN vs MESSRS M. A. AZIZ & SONS1980 PLD Lahore 422 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-31Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN vs MESSRS A. ISMAIL JEE & SONS LID.1980 CLC 1522 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-06Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN vs MAHMOODUL HASSAN IQBAL1980 PLC (C. S.) 647 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1975-09-23Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY. MINISTRY OF FUEL, POWER AND NATURAL1980 PLD Karachi 105 · Sindh High Court · 1979-05-21Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN RAILWAY BOARD vs ABDUL WAHABKHAN1980 PLC (C. S.) 312 · Sindh High Court · 1979-12-22Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN NATIONAL OILS LTD. AND ANOTHERs vs SATTAR MUHAMMAD1980 SCMR 686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-08
  mandatory injunctionright of accesshighway frontagepublic nuisancespecial damagesunauthorized constructioneasement rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil suit for a mandatory injunction filed by the respondent against the appellants, seeking the removal of a petrol pump constructed in front of his property, alleging it blocked his access to the highway and caused financial loss. The core legal question was whether the respondent possessed a right of frontage or access to the highway and whether the appellants’ unauthorized construction, which deviated from the sanctioned location, entitled the respondent to seek its demolition and damages. The Supreme Court held that the appellants’ construction was illegal, having been erected at a location different from the one sanctioned by authorities. The Court affirmed the principle that an owner of land adjoining a public highway holds a private right of access, and an illegal act causing special damage to an individual provides an independent cause of action for relief. Consequently, the Court upheld the order for the demolition of the petrol pump but set aside the High Court's award of damages, noting that the lower courts had not decreed such relief and the quantum was disputed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an owner of land adjoining a public highway have a private right of access to the highway?
  • Can a property owner seek the removal of an illegally constructed structure that causes special damage to their property?
  • Is an owner entitled to damages for loss of business caused by an illegal structure if such damages were not decreed by the trial or appellate courts?
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• PAKISTAN INVESTMENT LTD. vs PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Karachi 275 · Sindh High Court · 1979-12-09
  central excise dutyexcisable servicesvires of statutehotel and restaurant servicesenemy propertybank guaranteeliability of transferee
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil suit seeking recovery of money, declaration, and injunction regarding the levy and recovery of central excise duty on services provided by a hotel and restaurant under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The core legal questions involve whether the imposition of excise duty on hotel and restaurant services via amendments introduced by the Finance Ordinance, 1970 is ultra vires the Constitution, and whether a subsequent purchaser of a running hotel concern is liable to pay the outstanding excise duty arrears incurred by the previous management. The court held that the term 'duties of excise' in the constitutional provisions is flexible and wide enough to cover taxation on services, making the Finance Ordinance, 1970 intra vires. Furthermore, the court held that the purchaser of a running business with all its assets and liabilities, having also voluntarily furnished a bank guarantee for the arrears, is bound to pay the outstanding dues. The suit was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the levy of excise duty on services rendered by hotels and restaurants under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 is ultra vires of the Constitution?
  • Whether a subsequent purchaser of a hotel business is liable to pay outstanding arrears of central excise duty incurred by the previous management?
  • Is a bank guarantee furnished by the transferee of a business for the payment of tax arrears legally enforceable?
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• PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES AND 4 OTHERS vs ALLAH DITTA BUGTI1980 SCMR 855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-25
  deputationlientemporary injunctionreversionmaster and servantservice lawpublic servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a High Court judgment upholding lower court orders that granted a temporary injunction in favor of the respondent. The respondent, originally a government servant on deputation to Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), had his services dispensed with and was directed to report back to his parent department, the Government of Baluchistan. The core legal question is whether a deputationist holding a substantive permanent post and a subsisting lien in his parent government department can challenge his repatriation or obtain an injunction restraining his reversion. The Supreme Court held that the respondent undisputedly held a lien in the Small Industries Directorate of the Government of Baluchistan and could not simultaneously hold a permanent position in PIA under fundamental service rules. Consequently, the lower courts erred in granting temporary injunctions against his reversion. The appeal was accepted and the lower orders were set aside, with the observation that the respondent's apprehension of non-acceptance by his parent department was unfounded.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant hold two or more permanent posts substantively at the same time?
  • Does a government servant on substantive appointment to a permanent post acquire a lien on that post?
  • Whether a court can grant a temporary injunction restraining an employer from reverting a deputationist employee who holds a subsisting lien in his parent department?
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• PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, KAR. vs COMMISSIONER41 TAX 44 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT & INVESTMENT CORPORATION LTD., KARACHI vs MEHBOOB INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI AND 10 OTHERS1980 CLC 249 · Sindh High Court · 1979-08-12
  foreign currency loanrate of exchangecurrency devaluationmaturity date rulerecovery of debtequitable mortgage
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff, Pakistan Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation Ltd., brought a suit under Order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the recovery of an outstanding loan granted in foreign currency (Deutsche Marks) to the defendants. Following the devaluation of the Pakistani Rupee, the plaintiff amended its plaint to substantially increase the claimed amount, arguing that the conversion of the foreign currency debt into Pakistani Rupees should be calculated at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of actual payment. The defendants contended that the conversion rate must be based on the exchange rate on the dates the instalments fell due or when the entire loan was recalled. The Sindh High Court examined domestic and foreign precedents, rejecting the American 'date of action' rule in favor of the established 'maturity date' rule. The Court held that where a debt is payable in foreign currency, it must be converted into local currency at the rate of exchange prevailing when the debt became due. Since the plaintiff had exercised its option to recall the entire loan prior to devaluation, the entire debt became due at that time, and subsequent devaluation could not enhance the defendants' liability.

  Questions settled

  • At what rate of exchange should a debt expressed in foreign currency be converted into Pakistani Rupees for the purpose of a recovery suit?
  • Does the subsequent devaluation of the local currency affect the liability of a debtor if the entire loan was recalled before such devaluation occurred?
  • Whether the rate of exchange for converting a foreign currency debt is determined as of the date of actual payment or the date the debt became due?
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• PAKISTAN ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD., KARACHI vs THE PRESIDING OFFICER, SIND LABOUR COURT No, V, KARACHI AND 6 OTHERS1980 CLC 508 · Sindh High Court · 1979-03-21Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN ENGINEERING Co. LTD. vs MUHAMMAD NAZIR KHAN1980 PLD Lahore 82 · Lahore High Court · 1974-10-15Read full judgment →
• PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER vs REH M DAD AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 574 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-23
  land acquisitioncompensationmarket valuepotential valuelimitationcondonation of delaycantonment area
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the Government of Pakistan against the judgment of the Administrative Civil Judge, Gujrat, which had enhanced the compensation awarded to the respondents for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The appellants argued that the land was agricultural and the Collector's initial valuation was correct, whereas the respondents contended that the land's potential commercial use within the Cantonment area justified the enhanced rate. The High Court first addressed a 52-day delay in filing the appeal, holding that the government enjoys no special preference under limitation laws and must explain each day of delay. On the merits, the Court held that under Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, compensation must be determined based on market value, which is not restricted to the land's current classification or actual use but must account for its potential future uses. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal on both the grounds of limitation and merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the government is entitled to any special preference or indulgence when seeking condonation of delay under the Limitation Act?
  • Should the market value of acquired land under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 be determined solely by its current agricultural classification or by its potential future uses?
  • Does the location of land within a Cantonment area affect its valuation for compensation even if it is classified as agricultural?
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• PAHLAJ RAI vs THE STATE1980 PLD Rev. 35 · Sindh Revenue Board · 1978-08-23Read full judgment →
• P. W. R., LAHORE vs SARFRAZ KHAN1980 CLC 541 · Lahore High Court · 1973-05-08
  arbitration agreementrevocation of arbitratorbias of arbitratoraffidavit evidencecross-examinationcivil revisionappointment of arbitrator
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition arose from a dispute between the Pakistan Western Railway and a contractor, Sarfraz Khan, regarding an arbitration agreement. The respondent sought revocation of the Chief Engineer's authority as arbitrator, alleging bias, threats, and improper conduct. The Civil Judge, relying on an un-rebutted affidavit from the respondent, revoked the arbitrator's authority and ordered the appointment of a new one. The petitioner challenged this, arguing they were denied the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent or produce oral evidence, and that the Court lacked jurisdiction to appoint a new arbitrator, as that power vested in the Vice-Chairman. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that under Order XIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the Court has discretion to decide matters via affidavit. Since the petitioner failed to request cross-examination or file a counter-affidavit despite being given the opportunity, they could not later claim prejudice. Furthermore, the Court affirmed its authority under Section 12(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 to appoint a new arbitrator upon the revocation of the previous one's authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court decide an application for the revocation of an arbitrator's authority based solely on affidavits?
  • Is a party entitled to cross-examine a deponent who has filed an affidavit if no specific request for such cross-examination was made to the court?
  • Does a court have the jurisdiction to appoint a new arbitrator after revoking the authority of the original arbitrator?
  • Does the power to appoint an arbitrator vested in an authority by an agreement persist after the court has revoked the authority of an initially appointed arbitrator?
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• OSMAN GHANI vs WAPDA1980 PLC (C. S.) 326 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1975-11-25Read full judgment →
• ORISSA FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, ORISSA41 TAX 117 · Orissa High CourtRead full judgment →
• N/A vs N/A1980 PLD Lahore 206 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• NUSRAT JEHAN BEGUM vs KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND 2 OTHERSPLD 1980 Karachi, 146 · Sindh High Court · 1979-09-25Read full judgment →
• NURA ETC. vs Mst. SAHIB BIBI ETC.1980 CLC 1617 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-20Read full judgment →
• NOWSHERWAN KHAN vs SHER ZAMIN AND 2 OTHERS1980 CLC 1096 · Peshawar High Court · 1979-12-18Read full judgment →
• NOOR MUHAMMAD vs SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, SIND1980 CLC 1258 · Sindh High Court · 1978-08-07Read full judgment →
• NOOR MUHAMMAD NASIR vs PROVINCE OF PUNJAB1980 PLC (C. S.) 501 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-02-03Read full judgment →
• NOOR MUHAMMAD AND 3' OTHERS vs Mst. KANIZ FATIMA AND 8 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 471 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-11Read full judgment →
• NOOR HASSAN AND ANOTHER vs TUFAIL AHMAD AND ANOTHER1980 SCMR 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-18
  easementperpetual injunctionrevisional jurisdictionproperty disputeconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 14th March 1978, which set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts and allowed the respondent's civil suit for perpetual injunction regarding the use and repair of the roof of a shop. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners had acquired a prescriptive right of easement over the roof of the respondent's shop, preventing the respondent from making repairs or further constructions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court rightly exercised its revisional jurisdiction to correct erroneous factual findings regarding the non-existence of a superstructure and the lack of a validly established right of easement. The key principle laid down is that the long-term use of a roof as a passage or the presence of a projecting structure does not, without legal foundation or proof in title deeds, restrict an owner's right to repair or raise further constructions on their property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the use of a shop's roof as a passage for twenty years create a right of easement preventing the shop owner from making repairs or constructions?
  • Can a claim of easement over another's property be sustained without support from title deeds or settlement records?
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• NOOR DIN vs AMAR ALI1980 CLC 1785 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1977-04-24Read full judgment →
• NOOR AU vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND 2 OTHERS1980 CLC 2192 · Sindh High Court · 1979-03-16Read full judgment →
• NOOR ALI SHAH AND ANOTHER vs Mst. BIBI FATIMAH AND ANOTHER1980 P Cr. L J 1186 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1980-05-26Read full judgment →
• NOOR AHMAD vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB, IRRIGATION1980 PLC (C. S.) 579 (1) · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-01-23Read full judgment →
• NIZAMUDDIN vs NASIR UDDIN1980 CLC 831 · Sindh High Court · 1978-08-07Read full judgment →
• NISAR ALI vs DEPUTY DIRECTOR, HOUSING & PHYSICAL PLANNING DIVISION, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1980 PLC (C.S.) 217 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-27Read full judgment →
• NISAR ALI KHAN vs INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE AND OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 569 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-05-11Read full judgment →
• NISAR AHMAD KHAWAJA vs MUHAMMAD USMAN MUHAMMAD KHAN WASAN1980 SCMR 723 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-21
  contempt of courtjudicial respectunconditional apologymagistratefactual inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a contempt application filed against an Additional City Magistrate for allegedly making derogatory remarks regarding the Supreme Court during the proceedings of a criminal case under section 447 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerned whether the respondent magistrate made the attributed contemptuous remarks undermining the authority and dignity of the superior court. The Supreme Court observed that the allegations were met with a direct denial by the respondent, who asserted the application was a consequence of his refusal to entertain delaying tactics. The Court noted that in light of the respondent's unconditional and unqualified apology and his expressed respect for the judiciary, no useful purpose would be served by conducting a factual inquiry into the conflicting assertions. Consequently, the Court held that no further action was warranted. The key principle laid down is that while presiding officers of judicial institutions must show due respect to superior courts, contempt proceedings may not be pursued when the respondent tenders an unconditional apology and the allegations involve disputed questions of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contempt proceedings should be pursued when the allegations of disrespectful remarks against a superior court are met with a direct factual denial?
  • Does an unconditional and unqualified apology by a judicial officer suffice to close contempt proceedings where factual controversy exists?
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• NISAR AHMAD AND ANOTHER vs HABIB BANK LTD., LAHORE1980 CLC 981 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-20
  regular first appealstriking off defencememorandum of addressrecovery suitnon-perusal of recordex parte decreecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  Habib Bank Limited filed a recovery suit against the appellants and others. The trial court struck off the defence of the appellants under Order VIII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for allegedly failing to file a memorandum of address for service, and subsequently decreed the suit. The appellants filed a Regular First Appeal. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in striking off the defence and decreeing the suit based on a factual error regarding the non-filing of the memorandum of address. The Lahore High Court held that the trial court's finding that no memorandum of address had been filed was factually incorrect, as the record showed it was filed more than a year prior, and that a judgment based on a non-perusal of the record is unsustainable. Furthermore, pronouncing judgment under Order VIII, Rule 10 does not mean decreeing a suit ipse dixit without proof. The appellate court set aside the impugned judgment and decree, allowing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can strike off a defendant's defence for failure to file a memorandum of address when the address has in fact already been placed on the judicial record?
  • Does the power of a court to pronounce judgment against a party under Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 permit decreeing a suit without requiring proof?
  • Is a judgment and decree sustainable when it is based on a mistaken factual premise resulting from a non-perusal of the court record?
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• NIAZ MUHAMMAD vs Sh. ABDUR RASHID AND ANOTHER1980 SCMR 904 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-09
  property resumptionauction defaultservice of noticeGeneral Clauses ActSettlement Schemeconstitutional petitiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging the resumption of property by the Settlement Department. The petitioner, a successful auction bidder for a shop, failed to pay the balance price within the stipulated time. The core legal questions were whether the notice of resumption served on the petitioner’s minor son was legally defective and whether the petitioner could challenge the subsequent transfer of the property to a third party despite being in default. The Supreme Court held that the resumption was lawful, noting that under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act 1897, the presumption of service applies where notice is properly addressed and dispatched. The Court further held that the petitioner’s failure to pay the admitted balance, despite receiving notice, justified the resumption. The principle laid down is that a defaulting transferee cannot enlarge the time for payment by merely raising a controversy over the amount due, and the existence of a pending application by a third party precludes the defaulting party from claiming the benefit of time-extension schemes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the service of a notice on a minor son of the addressee satisfy the requirements of service under the General Clauses Act 1897?
  • Can a defaulting auction purchaser challenge the transfer of property to a third party after the property has been validly resumed?
  • Does the mere pendency of an application by a third party for the transfer of property prevent a defaulting transferee from curing their default?
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• NIAZ HUSSAIN ETC. vs THE STATE ETC.1980 P Cr. L J 682 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-20Read full judgment →
• NIAZ DIL KHAN vs NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE TEROUGH CHIEF1980 SCMR 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-09
  compulsory retirementmisconductservice tribunalcompetent authoritydispensing with inquiryappellate jurisdictionservice record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal order that upheld the compulsory retirement of a Tehsildar. The petitioner had been charged with misconduct for failing to consign 468 mutations to the record for approximately three years. The core legal questions addressed were whether the punishment order was passed by the competent authority (the Governor), whether the punishment was vitiated by considering extraneous factors (service record) not part of the charge, whether the Tribunal erred in maintaining the punishment after exonerating the petitioner of corruption, and whether the decision to dispense with a formal inquiry required recorded reasons. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the record indicated the competent authority had indeed passed the order. The Court rejected the argument that dispensing with an inquiry requires the recording of specific reasons in the absence of a rule mandating such a condition. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Tribunal correctly exercised its appellate jurisdiction to review the propriety of the punishment, finding no legal error in the proceedings or the classification of the petitioner's conduct as misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the decision to dispense with a formal inquiry in disciplinary proceedings require the recording of specific reasons by the competent authority?
  • Can an order of punishment be challenged on the basis that the competent authority merely gave 'consent' rather than passing the order itself?
  • Is the failure to consign official mutations to the record for an extended period considered misconduct for a civil servant?
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• NIAZ ALI vs THE STATE1980 SCMR 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-06
  retracted judicial confessionextra-judicial confessionmurderappellate jurisdictionstandard of proofcorroborationrecovery witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the double murder of his brother and sister-in-law under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court and the High Court had relied upon a retracted judicial confession, an alleged extra-judicial confession before a witness, and the recovery of incriminating articles. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained in the absence of dependable corroborative evidence when prosecution witnesses, including the recovery mashir, did not support the prosecution case, and the extra-judicial confession was unreliable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the conviction was based on no legal evidence, as the retracted judicial confession lacked valid corroboration, the extra-judicial confession was not credible, and the recovery witness had disowned the recovery memos. The Court laid down the principle that conjectures, suspicion, and moral conviction cannot take the place of legal proof, and a conviction must rest upon legal grounds established by admissible legal testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on a retracted judicial confession without independent and reliable corroboration?
  • Whether moral conviction and suspicion can take the place of legal proof in a criminal trial?
  • Can the testimony of an extra-judicial confession be relied upon when material contradictions exist between the witness and the investigating officer?
  • What is the evidentiary value of recovery memos when the attesting mashir totally repudiates the prosecution case?
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• NIAMAT ALI vs THE DEPUTY SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND OTHERs1980 SCMR 634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-17
  special leave to appealevacuee propertytransfer of propertysettlement schemeauction salewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his writ petition, which challenged the rejection of his claim for the transfer of a burnt-down evacuee shop site. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the transfer of the site under Settlement Scheme No. VIII read with Scheme No. VI after raising new construction post-fire, despite failing to establish prior possession or construction before the crucial date of 1961, and after the property had already been auctioned to a third party. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to establish his entitlement, as his construction was not raised before the crucial date, the property had already been disposed of by auction, and he had unauthorizedly occupied the site. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the petitioner was rightly non-suited and the High Court's order was unexceptionable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a claimant is entitled to the transfer of an evacuee site under Settlement Scheme No. VIII where construction was raised after the crucial date?
  • Can an unauthorized occupant claim transfer of a site that has already been validly auctioned and disposed of?
  • Whether the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition regarding the refusal of transfer of evacuee property warrants interference when the claimant lacks legal entitlement?
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• NIAMAT ALI vs COMMISSIONER, LAHORE DIVISION, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1980 PLC (C. S.) 28 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1978-05-06Read full judgment →
• NEW PUNJAB SOAP FACTORY, SARGODHA INSAF SOAP FACTORY, SARGODA42 TAX 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-18
  sales taxraw material exemptionstatutory interpretationleave to appealtax liabilityfinished goods exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, manufacturers of washing soap, challenged the imposition of sales tax on imported raw materials used in their production process. Following a notification abolishing sales tax on finished washing soap, the Sales Tax Officer demanded tax on the raw materials consumed. While the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ruled that locally sourced raw materials were exempt, it upheld the levy on imported raw materials. The Lahore High Court affirmed this decision, relying on the precedent set in Noorani Cotton Corporation vs. The Sales Tax Officer, Lyallpur. The petitioners sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court's reliance on Noorani Cotton Corporation was misplaced and citing conflicting jurisprudence. The Supreme Court observed that the judgment of Akram, J. in Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. H. Mohammad Hassan & Co. appeared to support the petitioners' contention, creating a conflict requiring further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the proper construction of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, regarding tax liability on raw materials after the exemption of finished products constitutes a significant question of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether imported raw materials used in the manufacture of finished goods are subject to sales tax when the finished goods themselves have been granted a sales tax exemption?
  • Does the exemption of a finished product from sales tax automatically extend to the raw materials used in its production under the Sales Tax Act 1951?
  Read full judgment →
• NEMAT ULLAH BUTT vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB, EDUCATION1980 PLC (C. S.) 289 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-01-13Read full judgment →
• NEK MUHAMMAD vs THE HOME SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF SIND, KARACHI1980 P Cr. L J 141 · Sindh High Court · 1978-02-04Read full judgment →
• NEK ALAM vs THE STATENon1980 PLD Azad J & K 15 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1979-11-12Read full judgment →
• NEK ALAM vs THE STATE Non1980 P Cr. L J 699 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1979-11-12Read full judgment →
• NAZRA alias NAZIRA vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 264 · Lahore High Court · 1979-08-14Read full judgment →
• NAZIRUDDIN vs MUHAMMAD ALI1980 CLC 203 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-06Read full judgment →
• NAZIR HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1980 PLD Lahore 796 · Lahore High Court · 1980-09-15Read full judgment →
• NAZIR HUSSAIN SHAH vs THE STATE1980 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-02
  murder convictiondying declarationocular testimonyrecovery witnessesinvestigative negligencechance witnessesabscondence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant, who had absconded for three years during commitment proceedings, contested the reliability of eye-witnesses, the dying declaration, and the evidence of weapon recovery. The core legal questions concerned whether the eye-witnesses were 'chance witnesses,' the validity of the dying declaration, and whether the Investigating Officer's use of an eye-witness and a relative as recovery witnesses rendered the recovery evidence unreliable for corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the eye-witnesses were independent and reliable, not 'chance witnesses,' and that the dying declaration was credible, supported by medical certification. While the Court criticized the Investigating Officer for negligence in selecting recovery witnesses—which undermined the corroborative value of the recoveries—it ruled that the testimony of the Investigating Officer himself, combined with the other strong evidence, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The principle laid down is that while improper selection of recovery witnesses is a serious investigative lapse, it does not necessarily invalidate the conviction if the ocular testimony and dying declaration are otherwise credible and sufficient.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained if the recovery witnesses were improperly selected by the Investigating Officer?
  • Does the use of an eye-witness as a recovery witness invalidate the corroborative value of the recovery evidence?
  • Are eye-witnesses residing in the same locality as the place of occurrence considered 'chance witnesses'?
  • Is the testimony of an Investigating Officer sufficient to prove recoveries when the independent witnesses are challenged?
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• NAZIR ALI vs SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, THAL CANAL CIRCLE1980 PLC (C. S.) 89 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-09-04Read full judgment →
• NAZIR AHMAD vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 1124 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-29Read full judgment →
• NAZIR AHMAD vs MEMBER BOARD OF REVENUE ETC_1980 PLC (C. S.) 545(2) · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-04-16Read full judgment →
• NAZIR AHMAD SHAH vs SECRETARY, LG SW & RD AND OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 55 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-04-18Read full judgment →
• NAZIR AHMAD SHAH vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, MULTAN AND OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 228 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1977-06-05Read full judgment →
• NAZIR AHMAD JAN vs MANAGING DIRECTOR, FAUJI TEXTILE MILLS, JHELUM AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-18
  contempt of courtcompromise agreementcoercion and undue influenceemployment disputedismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a contempt petition filed under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, by a former employee seeking to initiate contempt proceedings against respondents for allegedly flouting an order of the Supreme Court dismissing a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The core legal question is whether contempt proceedings are maintainable when a party alleges that a subsequent compromise agreement settling all employment claims was executed under coercion and undue influence. The Supreme Court held that the petition is mala fide and that contempt proceedings are not the proper forum to challenge a compromise agreement allegedly executed under coercion. The Court laid down the principle that grievances regarding the validity of a compromise agreement executed voluntarily or under alleged coercion must be pursued through appropriate alternative remedies rather than invoking the contempt jurisdiction of the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contempt proceedings can be maintained to challenge a compromise agreement settling service claims?
  • Does a petition alleging execution of a compromise under coercion lie in contempt proceedings before the Supreme Court?
  • Can a party invoke contempt jurisdiction where an out-of-court settlement has been reached in full and final settlement of claims?
  Read full judgment →
• NAZIR AHMAD ETC. vs RIAZUL HAQ AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 931 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-10
  personal requirementevictiontenantlandlordconcurrent findingsspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by tenants against the High Court order dismissing their second appeal and maintaining the eviction order passed by the Additional District Judge on the ground of personal requirement of the landlords. The core legal question concerns the propriety of concurrent factual findings regarding personal bona fide need under rent laws. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court and the High Court were well-supported by the record and evidence, and no misreading or violation of legal principles was demonstrated to warrant interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed, granting the petitioners two months to vacate subject to the continuous payment of rent. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact on the question of personal requirement in rent matters unless a clear misreading of evidence or violation of law is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding personal requirement in rent matters?
  • What constitutes sufficient ground for interfering with a finding of personal use recorded by lower courts?
  • Whether a petition for special leave to appeal can be maintained against concurrent eviction orders without showing misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• NAZIR AHMAD AND 5 OTHERS vs CHIEF ENGINEER, IRRIGATION AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 128 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-08Read full judgment →
• NAZIM vs MESSRS HABIB BANK LTD., KARACHI AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 1185 · Sindh High Court · 1979-11-18
  civil revisionsummary suitleave to defendpromissory notehypothecationtriable issueunconditional leave
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 impugns an order of the Additional District Judge granting conditional leave to defend a summary suit filed by a bank for the recovery of money based on a promissory note, hypothecation agreement, and subsequent letters of instalment. The core legal question was whether the defendant had disclosed a plausible defence or raised substantial questions of fact and law entitling him to unconditional leave to defend the summary suit. The Sindh High Court held that where a defendant raises substantial triable issues regarding variation of the terms of the promissory note and potential absolution from liability, leave to defend ought to be granted, modifying the trial court's order of furnishing cash security to instead accept the defendant's written undertaking not to dispose of specific properties pending the suit. The key principle laid down is that where a defendant discloses a plausible defence involving triable issues of fact or law in a summary suit, leave to defend should be granted, and stringent security conditions can be substituted with appropriate property undertakings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a defendant in a summary suit is entitled to unconditional leave to defend when raising a plausible defence involving substantial questions of fact or law?
  • Can a revisional court modify an order requiring cash security for leave to defend to an undertaking regarding immovable properties?
  • Does the acceptance of a letter of instalments and hypothecation vary the basic character of a demand promissory note in summary proceedings?
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• NAZIM vs MESSRS HABIB BANK LID. AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 2137 · Sindh High Court · 1979-11-18Read full judgment →
• NAZAR MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE AND 6 OTHERS1980 P Cr. L J 1026 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-11Read full judgment →
• NAZAR MUHAMMAD KHAN AND 11 Other vs THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT1980 PLC (C. S.) 79 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1978-10-10Read full judgment →
• NAZAR HUSSAIN vs Mst. GHULAM ZOHRA AND OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 122 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-05Read full judgment →
• NAZAR HUSSAIN SHAH vs SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, BAHAWALPUR ETC.1980 PLC (C. S.) 486 · Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunal · 1979-09-17Read full judgment →
• NAWAB DIN ETC. vs KHURSHID AHMAD ETC.1980 CLC 962 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-17Read full judgment →
• NAWAB DIN AND ANOTHER vs Mst. HASEEBUNNISA AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-07
  agreement of associationSettlement Scheme No. VIIIcancellation of transferarrears of land revenueconstitutional petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the cancellation of an agreement of association and subsequent transfer of a property under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in not remanding the case back to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner after finding the cancellation of the association agreement and subsequent transfer order to be illegal and without lawful authority. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that remanding the case would be an exercise in futility because, under the amended Settlement Scheme No. VIII, a transfer where 25% of the amount had been paid could not be cancelled or resumed; the only legal course was to recover any balance amount as arrears of land revenue. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the invalidity of the hasty cancellation and transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court should remand a case for fresh decision when the initial cancellation of an agreement of association was found to be illegal?
  • Can a property transfer be cancelled or resumed under Settlement Scheme No. VIII once 25 percent of the amount has been paid?
  • What is the only legal course available for recovering a balance amount under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  Read full judgment →
• NAWAB ALI ETC.s vs ALI MUHAMMAD ETC.1980 PLD Rev. 84 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1980-07-23Read full judgment →
• NAVEED RAUF vs BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, LAHORE THROUGH SECRETARY1980 CLC 1336 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-30Read full judgment →
• NAUROZE ALI vs INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, PUNJAB ETC_1980 PLC (C. S.) 535 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-03-30Read full judgment →
• NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. KARACHI DecreeHolder vs NAZIR AHMED1980 CLC 1794 · Sindh High Court · 1980-02-02
  execution proceedingslegal heirssubstantial representationMuslim personal lawnon-joinder of partiesdecree executionestate of deceased
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns objections filed under Section 47 and Order XXI, Rule 58, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, challenging execution proceedings against the estate of a deceased defendant. The core legal question was whether a decree obtained against a deceased Muslim defendant is valid and executable when only some, rather than all, legal heirs were brought on record during the suit. The Court held that the estate was substantially represented by the heirs who were impleaded, and the decree remained valid. The Court reasoned that the religious duty of Muslim heirs to discharge the deceased's debts from the estate supports the view that representation by one or more heirs is sufficient. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Law Reform Ordinance, 1972, amended the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to clarify that the non-joinder of legal heirs is of no legal consequence. Consequently, the objections were dismissed, and the execution proceedings were ordered to continue, affirming that the estate was properly represented and the decree was not defeated by the absence of all heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree against a deceased Muslim defendant be executed if only some legal heirs were brought on record?
  • Does the non-joinder of all legal heirs of a deceased defendant render a decree invalid?
  • Is the doctrine of substantial representation applicable to the estate of a deceased Muslim defendant?
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• NATIONAL BANK OF PA KISTAN vs MESSRS BRIGHT LEATHER WORKS AND 31980 CLC 1170 · Sindh High Court · 1979-11-12Read full judgment →
• NATHEY KHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN (Now PUNJAB)1980 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-10
  workmen's compensationdamages in tortnegligenceres ipsa loquiturlimitationbar of civil suitunregistered agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses whether an injured workman's civil suit for damages in tort against his employer is barred under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and whether the suit is within the period of limitation. The appellant, a railway employee, lost parts of his legs in a train accident and filed a suit for damages based on negligence, having previously drawn a compensation sum under protest and refused an unregistered settlement. The High Court had dismissed the suit, holding it barred by sections 3(5), 19, and 28 of the 1923 Act. The Supreme Court held that drawing a deposit without instituting a claim does not bar a civil suit under section 3(5)(a), that unregistered agreements do not satisfy section 28, and that section 19 only ousts civil jurisdiction for claims under the Act, not independent tort actions. However, the Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the appellant failed to prove the respondent's negligence and that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 22 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The key principle established is that a civil suit in tort is not barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act unless the statutory bars regarding self-instituted claims or registered agreements are strictly met, and a plaintiff in tort must affirmatively prove negligence.

  Questions settled

  • Does drawing a compensation sum deposited by an employer with the Commissioner amount to instituting a claim under section 3(5)(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 so as to bar a civil suit?
  • Is an agreement for compensation between an employer and a workman enforceable as a bar to a civil suit if it has not been registered under section 28 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923?
  • Does the ouster of civil court jurisdiction under section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 extend to a common law suit for damages in tort based on negligence?
  • When does the period of limitation begin to run for a personal injury suit based on negligence resulting in amputation under the Limitation Act, 1908?
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• NASRULLAH vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 5 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-04
  criminal revisionsupply of statementsSection 265-C Cr.P.C.defense witnessespolice diaryfair trialliberal construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order by an Additional Sessions Judge refusing to supply the accused with copies of statements of persons not cited as prosecution witnesses in the challan, but who appeared as defense witnesses. The core legal question was whether, under Section 265-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, an accused is entitled to copies of all statements recorded by the police during investigation, or only those of prosecution witnesses. The Court held that the accused is entitled to copies of statements of all witnesses recorded by the police under Sections 161, 164, and 172, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regardless of whether they are prosecution or defense witnesses. The Court reasoned that Section 265-C must be liberally construed to ensure the accused has full knowledge of the evidence, particularly following the abolition of commitment proceedings. The principle established is that the statutory right to receive copies of witness statements is not restricted to prosecution witnesses but extends to all witnesses whose statements were recorded during the investigation, provided they constitute substantive statements.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to copies of statements of defense witnesses recorded by the police under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the term 'all witnesses' in Section 265-C, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, include witnesses not cited in the challan?
  • Can statements recorded in a police diary under Section 172, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, be supplied to the accused if they are in substance statements under Section 161?
  Read full judgment →
• NASRULLAH KHAN AND ANOTHER vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, GUJRANWALA AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 435 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-20Read full judgment →
• NASIR AHMAD AND ANOTHER Convicts vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 57 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-29Read full judgment →
• NASEER AHMAD KHAN vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN1980 PLD Lahore 684 · Lahore High Court · 1980-05-25
  constitutional petitionacquisition of propertyevacuee propertyad hominem legislationseparation of powerslegislative sentencevalidity of ordinancejudicial power
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a displaced person, was transferred an evacuee house in Lahore under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 and issued a Permanent Transfer Deed. Subsequently, Martial Law Order No. 115 and the West Pakistan Acquisition of Property (Residence of Government Officials) Ordinance 1963 were issued to acquire this specific property for use as a residence for government officials, compensating the petitioner only the original transfer price. The petitioner challenged the validity of the Ordinance via a constitutional petition, contending that it was mala fide, targeted a single individual's property rather than enacting a general law, usurpation of judicial power, and provided inadequate compensation. The High Court held that law must be a rule of general application or based on reasonable classification. An legislative act targeted solely at confiscating or acquiring the property of a named individual constitutes an exercise of judicial power (a legislative sentence) rather than a valid law. The impugned Ordinance was declared unconstitutional and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Ordinance promulgated to acquire the property of a single named individual constitutes a valid law or an impermissible legislative sentence?
  • Can the legislature usurp judicial functions by directly passing orders that deprive a named citizen of property without judicial process?
  • Does a law violate equal protection principles if it targets a specific individual's property without a reasonable classification?
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• NASEEM SADIQ AND 2 OTHERS vs GHULAM GHAUSE1980 CLC 286 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-30Read full judgment →
• NASEEM SADIQ AND 2 OTHERS s vs GHULAM GHAUS1980 PLD Lahore 637 · Lahore High Court · 1980-05-06Read full judgment →
• NASAR IQBAL AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1980 PLD Lahore 639 · Lahore High Court · 1980-05-18Read full judgment →
• NAJMA BEG UM AND 4 OTHERS vs ABDUL REHMAN1980 PLD Lahore 324 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-17Read full judgment →
• NAJAMUL HAQUE vs THE CHIEF ENGINEER, PAKISTAN P. W. D., KARACHI AND ANOTHER1980 PLC (C. S.) 508 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1979-03-12Read full judgment →
• NOOR JEHAN vs THE STATE1980 PLD Peshawar 103 · Peshawar High Court · 1979-11-04
  unsound mindsanity of accusedtrial procedureincapacity to defendvitiated trialretrialmurder reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a conviction and death sentence for murder under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court violated section 465, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, by failing to properly try and determine the issue of the accused's unsoundness of mind and incapacity to make a defense, despite initial observations by the court suggesting the accused might be of unsound mind. The Court held that the trial was vitiated because the trial judge failed to conduct a formal inquiry into the accused's sanity as mandated by the statute. The key principle laid down is that when a court entertains doubts regarding an accused's sanity, it must not merely rely on observations or medical reports but must formally try the fact of such unsoundness by examining medical officers and other evidence to determine if the accused is capable of making a defense. Failure to record a specific finding on this capacity renders the subsequent conviction illegal, necessitating a retrial.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court's failure to formally try the issue of an accused's unsoundness of mind under section 465, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, vitiate the trial?
  • What is the correct procedure for a court to follow when it entertains doubts about the sanity of an accused person during trial?
  • Is a trial court's personal satisfaction regarding an accused's sanity sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 465, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, without a formal record of inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• NADIR SHAH vs THE STATE1980 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-20
  criminal breach of trustmisappropriationseparate chargesretrialacquittalenabling provisionsbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a cashier at Bannu Woollen Mills, faced seventeen trials for criminal breach of trust under section 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving various sums received between 1959 and 1963. The trial magistrate acquitted him in all cases, citing procedural defects under sections 222(2) and 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and general accounting discrepancies. The Peshawar High Court allowed the State's appeals, set aside the acquittals, and remanded the cases for retrial. On further appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the High Court acted legally in setting aside the acquittals. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of sections 222(2) and 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are enabling rather than mandatory, and their non-use does not warrant acquittal unless prejudice or a failure of justice is shown under section 225. Drawing a distinction between cases where amounts were eventually deposited and those where they were not, the Supreme Court partly accepted the appeals, restoring the acquittals on the basis of benefit of doubt for the first category, while upholding the remand for retrial in the second category.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions relating to the framing and combination of charges under sections 222(2) and 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are mandatory or merely enabling?
  • Does the failure to combine charges under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically vitiate a trial or warrant an acquittal without proof of prejudice?
  • Can an acquittal based on generalisations and without proper examination of evidence in criminal breach of trust cases be legally set aside?
  • What constitutes criminal breach of trust and dishonest misappropriation under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in cases involving temporary retention of funds?
  Read full judgment →
• NABI BUX vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KHAIRPUR AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 631 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1979-04-10Read full judgment →