Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• FAZAL MAHMOOD vs MUHAMMAD LATIF SETHI1980 PLD Rev. 53 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1980-04-23Read full judgment →
• FAZAL KARIM vs PROVINCE OF PUNJAB1980 PLC (C. S.) 539 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-03-16Read full judgment →
• FAZAL HUSSAIN SHAH vs SAKHI MUHAMMAD1980 PLD Azad J & K 43 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1979-08-17Read full judgment →
• FAZAL HAQ SHAH vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, LAHORE ETC_1980 PLC (C.S.) 637 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-08-17Read full judgment →
• FAZAL HALIM vs FATEH MUHAMMAD KHAN AND 4 OTHERS1980 PLD Peshawar 165 · Peshawar High Court · 1979-11-27Read full judgment →
• FAZAL DIN AND 2 OTHERS vs UMAR DIN AND 2 OTHERS1980 CLC 205 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-03Read full judgment →
• FAZAL DAD vs MUHAMMAD AZAM AND 2 others1980 CLC 1817 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1980-03-28Read full judgment →
• FAZAL AHMED vs SARKAR1980 P Cr. L J 696 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1980-01-16Read full judgment →
• FAZAL AHMAD vs BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB1980 PLC (C. S.) 538 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-05-04Read full judgment →
• FAZAL AHMAD AND OTHERS vs MASOOD AKHTAR SHAH ETC.1980 SCMR 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-05
  pre-emptioncourt-fee deficiencyrejection of plaintdue diligencevaluation of landspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding the rejection of plaints in pre-emption suits due to deficient court-fees. The petitioners had initially filed suits for pre-emption, but their plaints were rejected by the trial court under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for failure to make good the court-fee deficiency. While the District Judge remanded the cases for further investigation into valuation, the High Court modified this order, directing the trial court to specifically inquire whether the plaintiffs acted with due diligence and in good faith regarding the valuation and the procurement of revenue records. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in its directions. The Court held that the High Court's order was legally sound and equitable, as it provided an opportunity for the plaintiffs to justify the delay or seek extension for payment of court-fees. The Supreme Court affirmed that once a court identifies a deficiency in court-fees, it possesses the jurisdiction to address the matter in accordance with the law, and dismissed the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have the jurisdiction to address a deficiency in court-fees once the issue has been raised?
  • Is it legally permissible for a court to direct an inquiry into whether a plaintiff acted with due diligence and good faith regarding the valuation of a suit for court-fee purposes?
  • Can a trial court reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for failure to pay deficient court-fees after an opportunity to do so has been granted?
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• FAUJI FOUNDATION vs SHAMIMUR REHMAN1980 SCMR 924 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-29
  nationalizationmartial law regulationmala fideslacheswrit jurisdictionpublic interestlegislation validity
  Summary & questions settled

  The Fauji Foundation appealed a Sind High Court judgment that invalidated Martial Law Regulation No. 103 of 1971, which had nationalized and transferred the Rehmania Sugar Mills to the appellant. The High Court had declared the regulation void ab initio, citing personal mala fides of the then President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, Mr. Bhutto, and a lack of public interest in the acquisition. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether legislation can be struck down based on the alleged mala fides of its author, particularly when enacted by a martial law authority rather than a parliament. Additionally, the Court addressed whether the writ petition was barred by laches, given it was filed years after the regulation's promulgation and the plea of personal mala fides was introduced even later. Pending the final hearing, the Supreme Court suspended the High Court's judgment, maintaining the appellant's possession of the mill while imposing strict financial controls to protect the respondent's interests.

  Questions settled

  • Can legislation be struck down by a court on the ground of the mala fides of its author?
  • Does legislation enacted by a martial law administrator stand on the same footing as legislation passed by a parliament regarding judicial review?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained when the plea of personal mala fides is introduced through an amendment years after the cause of action accrued?
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• FATER KHAN vs MUHAMMAD Z1AUR RAHMAN AND 3 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 47 · Lahore High Court · 1979-04-22Read full judgment →
• FATEH SHER KHAN vs HOME SECRETARY, PUNJAB AND OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 381 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-02-23Read full judgment →
• FARRUKH JAVAID KAZI vs CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, RAWALPINDI AND ANOTHER1980 PLC (C. S.) 400ss · Federal Service Tribunal · 1980-07-21Read full judgment →
• FAROOQ vs MESSRS EASTERN BANKING CORPORATION LTD., KARACHI. AND ANOTHER1980 PLD Karachi 115 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-10
  wrongful dishonour of chequedamages for dishonourbanker's lientrader vs non-trader damagessufficiency of fundsnegotiable instruments
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil suit was instituted by the sole proprietor of Yasmeen Plastic Industries against a bank (subsequently taken over by the National Bank of Pakistan under Ordinance No. 30 of 1973) claiming damages of Rs. 1,00,000 for the alleged wrongful dishonour of a cheque despite sufficient funds. The core legal questions revolved around whether the plaintiff's cheque was wrongfully dishonoured due to insufficient funds or justifiable bank retention, whether a banker's lien under Section 171 of the Contract Act applied, and the measure of damages applicable for the dishonour of a customer's cheque under Section 31 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove sufficient funds in the account at the time of presentation, that the bank's return of the cheque was justified, and that the bank had no valid lien under Section 171 of the Contract Act over the credit balance. The Court laid down that under Section 31 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a trader is entitled to substantial damages without proof of actual special loss for wrongful dishonour, whereas a non-trader must plead and prove special damages to recover more than nominal damages.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bank is justified in returning a cheque when the drawer's account lacks sufficient funds to cover the same?
  • Does a banker have a lien under Section 171 of the Contract Act, 1872 over a customer's credit balance for unreturned bank guarantees?
  • Can a trader recover substantial damages for the wrongful dishonour of a cheque without pleading and proving actual special loss?
  • Whether the legal principles governing the award of damages for dishonour of cheques under Section 31 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 align with English common law?
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• FARMEEDA JAHAN BEGUM vs VARINDAMAL1980 CLC 604 · Sindh High Court · 1978-01-20
  ejectmentdefault in rentbona fide personal requirementconcurrent findingssecond appealtenant eviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from concurrent decisions of the lower courts dismissing the appellant landlord's ejectment application against the respondent tenant on the grounds of default in rent, bona fide personal requirement, and damage to the building. The core legal questions involved whether the failure to continue paying advance yearly rent constituted default and whether the appellant established a bona fide personal requirement for the premises under the relevant rent restriction law. The High Court held that the tenancy agreement stipulated advance yearly rent only for the first two years, after which monthly payment applied, hence no default occurred; furthermore, the appellant's claim of personal requirement was uncorroborated, inconsistent with pleadings, and motivated by mala fides arising from disputes over unauthorized construction. The court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset in second appeal merely because a different view of the evidence is possible. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to pay subsequent rent on a yearly advance basis amount to a default in rent when the agreement stipulates advance payment only for the initial period?
  • Can a landlord claim bona fide personal requirement on grounds not pleaded in the original ejectment application?
  • Is a landlord occupying another residential building required to prove that such building is unsuitable for their needs to obtain possession for personal use?
  • Under what circumstances can a court in a second appeal interfere with concurrent findings of fact rendered by the lower courts?
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• FARMAN ALI KHAN AND OTHERS vs YUSUF ALI KHAN, BARRISTERATLAW AND OTHERS1980 CLC 1944 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-08Read full judgment →
• FAQIR MUHAMMAD vs MESSRS RASHID TEXTILE MILLS LTD. AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-15
  labour lawwrongful dismissalinquiry reportquestions of factlacheswrit jurisdictionindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the dismissal of an employee, Faqir Muhammad, from Rashid Textile Mills Limited following allegations of willful property damage. After an inquiry, the petitioner was dismissed, and his subsequent challenge under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was rejected by the Labour Court. The Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed his appeal in limine, finding that the petitioner's claim—that he was not supplied with the inquiry report and connected documents—was factually incorrect and contradicted by the record. The Sind High Court upheld this finding and further noted that the writ petition suffered from laches, having been filed over a year after the impugned order. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner failed to raise any question of law, relying solely on the same factual assertions previously rejected by the lower forums. The Supreme Court held that since no question of law was presented for consideration, there were no grounds to grant leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the finality of the concurrent findings of fact made by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts and tribunals?
  • Does the failure to raise a question of law preclude the grant of leave to appeal?
  • Can a writ petition be dismissed on the ground of laches if filed after a significant delay?
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• FAQIR MUHAMMAD MALIK AND ANOTHER vs MRS. MAQSOODA MALIK AND ANOTHER1980 PLD Karachi 430 · Sindh High Court · 1979-12-12Read full judgment →
• FAQIR ALI SHAH vs Sh. NAZIR HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER1980 PLD Lahore 335 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-22Read full judgment →
• FAIZ BA KHSH vs Mst. SAKINA1980 CLC 1989 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1979-12-14Read full judgment →
• ESSO PAKISTAN FERTILIZER COMPANY LTD. KARACHI THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR1980 CLC 84 · Sindh High Court · 1979-04-17Read full judgment →
• ELDER SARDAR FEROZ KHAN vs THE SYNOD OF THE UNITED PRESPHYTERIAN1980 CLC 726 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-06Read full judgment →
• EKHLAS AHMAD vs DAE HEALTH LABORATORIES LTD., LONDON AND ANOTHER1980 SCMR 625 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-20
  trade mark registrationdeceptive similarityinfringementphonetic similarityvisual similarityopposition proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which had accepted the respondents' appeal against the Order of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks. The petitioner had applied for the registration of the trade mark 'VEST' for a hair-removing cream, which was opposed by the respondents on the ground that it was deceptively similar to their registered trade mark 'VEET' used for an identical product. The Assistant Registrar dismissed the opposition, but the High Court reversed this decision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the proposed trade mark was barred under Section 10(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The Court held that when determining deceptive similarity, factors such as visual and phonetic similarity, the nature of the goods, the target customers, and surrounding circumstances must be considered. Since the respondents produced evidence of long-standing reputation and the petitioner failed to lead any evidence, and given the strong visual and phonetic similarity between 'VEET' and 'VEST', the Court dismissed the petition, finding a clear likelihood of confusion.

  Questions settled

  • What factors must be considered when determining whether a proposed trade mark so nearly resembles an existing registered trade mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion under the Trade Marks Act 1940?
  • Does the failure of an applicant to lead evidence or file affidavits in opposition proceedings affect the determination of deceptive similarity under Section 10(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1940?
  • Can visual and phonetic similarity between two marks for identical products, such as 'VEET' and 'VEST', justify the refusal of registration under the Trade Marks Act 1940?
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• EJAZ AHMED MALIK vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 1129 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1980-05-02Read full judgment →
• EHSAN ELAHI MALIK vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 186 · Sindh High Court · 1979-10-19Read full judgment →
• EASTERN COMPANY (PRIVATE) LTD., LAHORE AND 2 OTHERS vs Mst. GUL BEGUM1980 PLD Lahore 69 · Lahore High Court · 1979-03-25
  winding upprovisional liquidatorreceiver appointmentintra-court appealstatutory jurisdictionCompanies ActLaw Reforms Ordinancecompany management
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal challenged an order appointing a Receiver in winding-up proceedings under the Companies Act. The primary legal questions were whether an Intra-Court Appeal is maintainable against such an interlocutory order given the restrictions in the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972, and whether a Court possesses the authority to appoint a Receiver to manage a company's business during winding-up proceedings. The Court held that the appeal is maintainable because the jurisdiction exercised under the Companies Act is statutory, not original civil jurisdiction, rendering the bar in the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that it possesses inherent powers to appoint a Receiver to protect company assets and conduct business operations when necessary, as the Companies Act does not prohibit such appointments. The key principle established is that the High Court’s jurisdiction under the Companies Act is statutory, and the Court retains the power to appoint a Receiver to preserve assets and manage business affairs during winding-up, distinct from the appointment of a Provisional Liquidator.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by a Single Judge in winding-up proceedings under the Companies Act?
  • Does the High Court have the power to appoint a Receiver during winding-up proceedings to conduct the business of a company?
  • Does the bar on appeals against interlocutory orders in the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 apply to proceedings under the Companies Act?
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• EASTERN BANK LTD. vs THE EXCISE & TAXATION OFFICER, KARACHI AND 21980 CLC 1959 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• DR. Syed WARIS ALI TIRMIZI vs Mst. LIAQAT BEGUM1980 SCMR 601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-17
  evictiondefault in rentirregular payment of rentburden of prooflandlord and tenantsecond appealmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Sind High Court which had reversed the lower courts' orders and allowed an eviction application filed by the respondent landlord against the petitioner tenant on the ground of default in rent payment. The core legal question concerned whether a landlord's acceptance of rent at irregular or long intervals establishes an implied agreement or practice condoning delay, thereby shielding the tenant from eviction for default. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that a landlord accepts rent at irregular intervals does not by itself prove an agreement to alter the terms of tenancy or excuse monthly defaults, and the burden of proving such an agreement lies heavily on the tenant. The Court laid down the principle that a landlord's failure to collect rent regularly or acceptance of lump-sum payments does not automatically negate default under rent restriction laws unless a clear, binding modification of the tenancy terms is properly pleaded and strictly proved.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere acceptance of rent at irregular intervals by a landlord establish an agreement to alter the monthly payment terms?
  • Where a tenant consistently pays rent in lump sums at long intervals, does this fact alone absolve the tenant from liability for default?
  • Can a High Court in second appeal interfere with concurrent findings of fact that are based on a misreading of evidence and an erroneous view of the law?
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• DR. Raja MANZOOR ELAHI vs NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER PROVINCE THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF N.W. F. P., PESHAWAR1980 PLD Peshawar 81 · Peshawar High Court · 1979-12-01
  civil servantscompulsory retirementjurisdictionconstitutional petitionservice tribunalouster of jurisdictionmala fides
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant retired from service by the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province under Section 13(i) of the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants Act 1973, challenged his retirement before the Peshawar High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The petitioner contended that the retirement was premature, without jurisdiction, and vitiated by mala fides. The High Court examined whether it possessed jurisdiction to entertain the petition in light of Article 212 of the Constitution and the establishment of the Service Tribunal under the North-West Frontier Province Service Tribunals Act 1974. The Court held that Article 212 of the Constitution explicitly ousts the jurisdiction of all other courts, including the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199, in matters relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants. The Court further clarified that even where an order is alleged to be without jurisdiction or mala fide, the appropriate forum for redress is the Service Tribunal and not the High Court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to entertain a service matter where a Service Tribunal has been established?
  • Can an order of retirement alleged to be mala fide or without jurisdiction be challenged directly in the High Court instead of the Service Tribunal?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 override the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 in matters relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants?
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• DR. NOOR AHMED vs SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SIND, HEALTH &1980 PLC (C. S.) 529 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1979-06-04Read full judgment →
• DR. NEK MUHAMMAD vs Mian MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND ANOTHER1980 CLC 290 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-09Read full judgment →
• DR. MUHAMMAD MEMON vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF SIND, HEALTH1980 PLC (C. S.) 369 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1979-06-05Read full judgment →
• DR. Mirza MASUD BAIG vs DR. BUSHRA1980 SCMR 726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-18
  minor custodywelfare of minorseducational expensesvisitation rightsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the father challenging a High Court arrangement concerning the custody and education of his two minor sons as boarders at Aitchison College. The core legal question revolved around the custody of the minors and the financial feasibility of maintaining their expensive boarding education in light of the father's changed financial circumstances, balanced against the paramount consideration of the welfare of the minors. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal by modifying the previous arrangement based on a consensus reached between the parties. The Court held that the custody of the minors shall remain with the mother, who undertook to bear their educational expenses, while the father was absolved from boarding and educational costs and granted visitation rights and custody during alternate Sundays and half of the summer, winter, and Eid holidays. The key principle laid down is that custody and educational arrangements for minors may be adjusted by the court in the best welfare of the children, taking into account changed financial realities of the parents.

  Questions settled

  • Can custody and educational arrangements for minors be modified based on the changed financial circumstances of the father?
  • Is the welfare of the minor considered the primary and most important consideration in custody matters?
  • Can parents mutually agree to modify custody and visitation terms before the Supreme Court?
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• DR. MAHMOOD vs CHIEF-SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 530 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1979-06-04Read full judgment →
• DR. H. K. MAHTAB vs INCOME TAX OFFICER41 TAX 136 · Orissa High Court · 1977-05-16Read full judgment →
• DR. BASHIR AHMAD vs DR. SHAUKAT RAZA KHAN AND OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 17 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1979-10-10Read full judgment →
• DR. ATHAR ALI SIDDIQI vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (LANDS), SIND AND 41980 CLC 1898 · Sindh High Court · 1979-06-10Read full judgment →
• DR. ABDUL MAJID MEMON vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF SIND, HEALTH1980 PLC (C. S.) 371 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1979-06-05Read full judgment →
• DR. ABDUS SALAM vs SECRETARY, EDUCATION AND OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 627 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1979-04-14Read full judgment →
• DR. ABDUL MAJEED MEMON vs HEALTH SECRETARY AND 25 OTHERS1980 PLC (C. S.) 617 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1979-06-05Read full judgment →
• DR. ABDUL MAJEED MEMON vs GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND ANOTHER1980 SCMR 897 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-17
  non-practising allowanceservice tribunalmedical officersinterpretation of notificationsteaching institutionscivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arose against the majority decision of the Sind Service Tribunal, Karachi, which dismissed the appellant's appeal regarding entitlement to a non-practising allowance. The appellant, serving as a Medical Officer in the Medico-legal Section at Liaquat Medical College Hospital, Hyderabad, claimed the allowance pursuant to a Health Department Notification dated 6 April 1966. The central legal question was whether the phrase 'all posts of Medical Officers' in Item 7 of the Notification encompassed the appellant's position, despite the deletion of Item 17 (which explicitly mentioned posts incharge of medico-legal work) by a subsequent notification. The Supreme Court held that the words 'all posts of Medical Officers' explicitly included every Medical Officer serving in any section or department of the specified institutions. The Court concluded that Item 17 had been deleted merely as surplusage, as Item 7 already covered the appellant's post. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the majority decision of the Tribunal, allowed the appeal with costs, and affirmed the appellant's entitlement to the non-practising allowance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the expression 'all posts of Medical Officers' in a service notification cover medical officers serving in any section or department of a designated teaching hospital?
  • Whether the deletion of a specific item from a notification disentitles an officer when another comprehensive provision in the same notification continues to cover their post?
  • Can a general clause in a service notification granting allowances be restricted without express statutory or administrative words of exclusion?
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• DR. ABDUL MAJEED MEMON vs CIVIL SURGEON, HYDERABAD1980 PLC (C. S.) 560 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1979-04-14Read full judgment →
• DOST MUHAMMAD vs HAQ NAWAZ AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-21
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptioncontiguityvendeeco-plaintiffabandonment of claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a pre-emption dispute over agricultural land in Dera Ismail Khan. The core legal questions were whether the abandonment of a claim by a co-plaintiff with a superior right of pre-emption defeats the claim of a co-plaintiff with an inferior right under the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, and whether a vendee’s loss of contiguous land ownership post-suit but pre-decree affects their defense against a pre-emption claim. The Supreme Court held that the abandonment of a claim by a superior pre-emptor does not deprive the remaining pre-emptor of their right to pre-empt, nor does it invalidate the suit. Furthermore, the Court held that the statutory provisions regarding the loss of a right by a pre-emptor prior to a decree do not apply to the alienation of property by vendees. The Court affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the petitioner's claim, establishing that a vendee's loss of contiguous land status after the suit does not automatically grant a pre-emptor the right to succeed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the abandonment of a claim by a pre-emptor of a higher class defeat the right of a co-plaintiff of a lower class to pre-empt a sale?
  • Does the loss of contiguous land ownership by a vendee after the filing of a pre-emption suit but before the final decree entitle the pre-emptor to succeed?
  • Does Section 16 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1905 apply to the alienation of property by vendees?
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• DOST MUHAMMAD vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, MULTAN ETC.1980 PLC (C. S.) 611 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1976-11-07Read full judgment →
• DIYAR KHAN (REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS) vs SHER FARZAND AND ANOTHER1980 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-29
  pre-emptioncontiguityexemption from pre-emptionfindings of factmarket valuelocal commissioner report
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption matter filed by a vendee-defendant challenging the dismissal of his regular second appeal by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal questions involve the establishment of the right of pre-emption based on contiguity, the statutory exemption of a house from pre-emption under the relevant pre-emption law, and the evidentiary value of a local Commissioner's report regarding market value and improvements. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioner stand concluded by concurrent findings of fact regarding the ownership of contiguous property by both respondents, the lack of proof supporting the allegation of forgery regarding the tax register entry, and the admission of the actual price paid, rendering the Commissioner's report unnecessary. The petition was accordingly dismissed, reaffirming that concurrent factual findings will not be interfered with in leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the ownership of contiguous property can be re-examined in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does a house qualify for exemption from pre-emption under section 5(c) of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act 1950 when evidence establishes the vendee owned another house?
  • Is it necessary to examine a local Commissioner's report on market value when the vendee admits the actual price paid for the suit property?
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• DIRECTORGENERAL, PAKISTAN COAST GUARDS ETC. Petiti oners vs ABRAMJEE1980 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-08-08
  smugglingcustoms seizureimport prohibitionCoast Guard authorityimport permitCustoms Act 1969Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves six petitions challenging a consolidated judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which had quashed orders by Customs Authorities regarding the seizure of allegedly smuggled cars. The High Court had ruled the seizures illegal, reasoning that Coast Guard officers lacked the authority to seize such goods and that cars were not prohibited items under a specific 1973 notification issued by the Central Board of Revenue. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the High Court failed to consider relevant provisions of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, and subsequent notifications under that Act which explicitly listed cars as prohibited goods requiring import permits. Furthermore, the Supreme Court highlighted that a 1973 notification by the Central Board of Revenue had indeed empowered Coast Guard officers of specific ranks to perform the functions of Customs officers. Consequently, the High Court's judgment appeared to proceed on a misconception of law regarding both the authority of the seizing officers and the prohibited status of the imported vehicles.

  Questions settled

  • Can officers of the Pakistan Coast Guards be empowered to perform the functions of Customs officers for the seizure of goods?
  • Are cars considered prohibited goods under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950 when imported without a valid permit?
  • Does a notification under the Customs Act 1969 regarding prohibited items exhaustively define all import prohibitions, or must notifications under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950 also be considered?
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• DILSHAD AHMAD vs THE STATE ETC.1980 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-27
  supardariinterim custodynatural justiceex parte ordercriminal revisionproperty custodyMagistrate's powers
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a dispute over the interim custody (supardari) of a truck, initially granted to the respondent by a Magistrate. Following the petitioner's unsuccessful revision against this order, the petitioner subsequently moved the Magistrate to cancel the respondent's custody, alleging a spurious bank guarantee. The Magistrate, without issuing notice to the respondent, cancelled the supardari and transferred the truck to the petitioner. The High Court set aside this order, citing the lack of notice and opportunity for the respondent to be heard, and directed the vehicle be kept in the Malkhana pending police investigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal, holding that the High Court correctly quashed the Magistrate's order for violating the principles of natural justice. The Court affirmed that an order transferring custody cannot be passed ex parte. Additionally, the Court ruled that because the petitioner had previously acquiesced to a revision order denying his eligibility for custody, he was precluded from re-litigating his entitlement to the truck's possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate cancel a supardari order and transfer property custody without issuing notice to the current supardar?
  • Does a failure to challenge a prior revision order regarding custody preclude a party from re-litigating their entitlement to that custody?
  • Is an ex parte order cancelling a supardari legally sustainable?
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• DILBAR HUSSAIN vs PROVINCE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-28
  service tribunalresignationpolice constableleave to appealsubstantial question of lawpublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Police Constable, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Service Tribunal regarding the acceptance of his resignation. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's resignation was voluntary or coerced by departmental authorities, and whether the case involved a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the contentions raised questions of pure fact rather than any substantial question of law of public importance, and that the Service Tribunal had properly examined the evidence to conclude the resignation was voluntary and tendered to avoid pending disciplinary proceedings. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with factual determinations of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution unless a substantial question of law of public importance is involved.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the Supreme Court under Article 212 of the Constitution against an order of the Service Tribunal without a substantial question of law of public importance?
  • Whether the question of whether a resignation was voluntary or coerced is a question of fact or law?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the factual findings of the Service Tribunal regarding a voluntary resignation?
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• DILAWAR HUSSAIN vs YAR GUL AND 5 OTHERS1980 CLC 1491 · Lahore High Court · 1979-08-12Read full judgment →
• DHOLO vs PHOTO1980 PLD Rev. 31 · Sindh Revenue Board · 1976-12-13Read full judgment →
• DHANI BUX vs THE STATE1980 P Cr. L J 1087 · Sindh High Court · 1979-11-13Read full judgment →
• DEVRAJ vs THE STATE1980 PLD Karachi 246 · Sindh High Court · 1979-09-30
  culpable homicidegrievous hurtlathi blowjudicial confessionapprehension at spotaltercationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The prosecution alleged that the appellant struck the deceased with a lathi on the head following an altercation, resulting in the deceased's death. The core legal question was whether the act constituted murder or a lesser offence, given the absence of prior enmity and the nature of the assault. The Court held that while the ocular and circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's apprehension at the scene, conclusively proved his involvement, the circumstances—specifically that the fatal injury was a single blow inflicted during a sudden altercation—negated the requisite intent for murder. Consequently, the Court altered the conviction from Section 302 to Section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing the sentence to five years of rigorous imprisonment. The judgment reaffirms that where a single blow is struck in the heat of an altercation without premeditation, the offence typically falls under causing grievous hurt rather than murder.

  Questions settled

  • Does a single lathi blow inflicted during a sudden altercation without premeditation constitute murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What are the mandatory procedural requirements for a Magistrate to record a valid judicial confession under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an identification parade necessary when an accused is apprehended at the scene of the crime by eyewitnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DIR vs Haji WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN1980 CLC 1647 · Peshawar High Court · 1980-03-14Read full judgment →
• Department vs Assessee41 TAX 1 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1978-03-13Read full judgment →
• DAYA vs MUHAMMAD SALEEM AND 2 OTHERS1980 P Cr. L J 1263 · Sindh High Court · 1980-04-28Read full judgment →
• DAWOOD vs HUSEIN EBRAHIM FOUNDATION AND 9 OTHERS1980 CLC 1161 · Sindh High Court · 1978-07-01Read full judgment →
• DAWOOD vs ABDUL GHANI1980 PLD Karachi 269 · Sindh High Court · 1979-05-29Read full judgment →
• DAULAT AND OTHERSs vs THE STATE1980 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-06
  criminal appealocular evidenceperjuryhostile witnesssudden fightcorroborationacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from convictions under sections 302, 324, 326, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a violent clash between two parties. The core legal question was whether the prosecution’s ocular evidence, which was riddled with contradictions, material discrepancies, and instances of deliberate perjury, could sustain convictions in the absence of independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the ocular evidence was inherently unreliable, as the witnesses falsely denied the existence of a mutual fight and the injuries sustained by the accused party. The Court emphasized that when eye-witnesses commit preconcerted perjury to suppress the true origin of an occurrence, their testimony cannot be accepted without strong, independent corroboration, which was entirely absent in this case. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial and appellate courts erred in relying on lower court statements of witnesses who had been improperly declared hostile. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, ruling that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on ocular evidence when the witnesses have committed preconcerted perjury regarding the origin of the occurrence?
  • Is it permissible for a court to rely on the lower court statements of witnesses under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the witnesses were improperly declared hostile?
  • Does the failure of prosecution witnesses to admit injuries sustained by the accused party in a mutual fight render their testimony unreliable without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• DARWESH M. ARBEY, ADVOCATE vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE LAW SECRETARY AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 206 · Lahore High Court · 1977-06-02Read full judgment →
• CRESCENT TEXTILE MILLS LTD., LYALLPUR vs THE MEMBER, CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE (CENTRAL EXCISE), ISLAMABAD AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-21
  excise dutyassessable valuewholesale cash pricestatutory interpretationtax assessmentcontractual specificationsCentral Excises and Salt Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the assessment of excise duty on two different qualities of cloth manufactured by the appellant. The appellant had supplied two distinct qualities of cloth, designated as T.C. 2 No. 1 and T.C. 2 No. 2, to different government departments at varying prices. The Excise Department, however, assessed both qualities at identical rates, disregarding the specifications and price differentials stipulated in the supply contracts. The core legal question was whether the Department could impose uniform excise duty rates on goods of different qualities, contrary to the statutory requirement for determining value based on 'like kind and quality.' The Supreme Court held that the assessment for the second quality was without lawful authority, as the authorities failed to consider the distinct technical specifications and contractual prices. The Court established that under Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, the Department is legally obligated to determine whether goods are of 'like kind and quality' before applying uniform assessment rates, and cannot ignore evidence of distinct specifications.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 require the Excise Department to determine if goods are of 'like kind and quality' before assessing uniform excise duty?
  • Can the Excise Department ignore contractual specifications and price differences when determining the assessable value of manufactured goods?
  • Is an assessment of excise duty based on identical rates for goods of demonstrably different qualities legally sustainable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  Read full judgment →
• CONFORCE LTD., LAHORE vs PAKISTAN THROUGH SEBRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Karachi 443 · Sindh High Court · 1980-03-31Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, ZONE-A, LAHORE vs STANDARD LEATHER42 TAX 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-14
  sales taxsuppressed incomemartial law regulationassessmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions arise from an order of the High Court Lahore relating to tax references under the Sales Tax Act 1951. The respondent assessee had filed a nil return for the assessment year 1964-65 and statements of suppressed income under Martial Law Regulation No. 32. The Sales Tax Officer rejected the respondent's plea that the case was covered by the Martial Law Regulation proceedings and made an assessment under Section 10(3) of the Sales Tax Act 1951. Upon appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal reversed the assessment order and extended the benefit of the Board's circular. The High Court answered the referred question in the affirmative in favor of the assessee. The Supreme Court examined the matter and found that the High Court correctly held the case to be covered by the relevant circular provisions. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's view and dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee's sales tax returns should be accepted in view of the Board's circular?
  • Does a proceeding taken under Martial Law Regulation No. 32 cover an assessment made under the Sales Tax Act 1951?
  Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, RAWALPINDI ZONE, RAWALPINDI vs IJAZ OIL42 TAX 88 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, RAWALPINDI ZONE vs POTHOWAR OIL MILLS, GUJJAR KHAN42 TAX 158 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, LAHORE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, LAHORE42 TAX 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-19
  sales taxexemptionshammer workfoundry workquestion of factreference proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves civil petitions for special leave to appeal against orders of the High Court regarding whether motor car springs and kerosene oil stoves are products of hammer work or foundry and therefore exempt from sales tax under specific government notifications. The core legal question is whether the manufacturing process of a particular article constitutes a question of law or a question of fact. The Supreme Court held that the determination of the process used for manufacturing an article is purely a question of fact and not a question of law capable of being agitated in reference proceedings before the High Court. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact by the Tribunal regarding manufacturing processes cannot be interfered with as questions of law in reference proceedings, leading to the dismissal of the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of what process is used for the manufacture of a particular article is a question of fact or a question of law?
  • Are motor car springs products of hammer work entitled to sales tax exemption?
  • Are kerosene oil stoves products of foundry and hammer work entitled to sales tax exemption?
  Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX/SALES TAX, ZONE-A, LAHORE vs KAUSAR ICE42 TAX 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-17
  sales taxvested rightretrospective legislationdelegated legislationexemption notification
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the assessment of sales tax for the assessment year 1959-60. The core legal question was whether a subsequent notification reducing the tax exemption limit could be applied retrospectively to take away an accrued vested right of an assessee whose assessment period commenced prior to the notification. The Supreme Court held that a right that has already accrued cannot be taken away by giving retrospective effect to delegated legislation, affirming that the assessee was governed by the earlier notification under which its turnover was exempt. The key principle laid down is that delegated legislation cannot operate retrospectively to impair or divest vested rights accrued under prior statutory notifications.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a right that has already accrued can be taken away by giving retrospective effect to delegated legislation?
  • Does a subsequent notification reducing the tax exemption limit apply to an assessment year commencing prior to such notification?
  Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, ORISSA vs J.N. BHOWMICK41 TAX 85 · Orissa High Court · 1976-01-04Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE ZONE LAHORE vs NASIR A. SHEIKH42 TAX 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-02
  dividend incomestatutory exemptiontax assessmentdeductible expensesgross dividendincome tax law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a tax dispute concerning the computation of dividend income for the assessment year 1967-68. The core legal question was whether statutory exemptions under Section 4(3)(xv) of the Income Tax Act should be deducted from the gross dividend income before or after accounting for deductible expenses, such as interest. The Income Tax Officer had denied the exemption because the respondent had incurred a net loss, but the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ruled that the statutory exemption must be excluded from gross dividend receipts before applying other provisions to determine net income. The Lahore High Court affirmed this interpretation. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, noting that the High Court's interpretation aligned with established precedent. The Court upheld the principle that statutory exemptions provided under the Income Tax Act are intended to exclude specific portions of income from the total income calculation entirely, requiring that such exemptions be applied to gross receipts prior to the calculation of net income or loss.

  Questions settled

  • Should statutory exemptions on dividend income be applied to gross dividend receipts before or after calculating deductible expenses?
  • Does the statutory exemption under Section 4(3)(xv) of the Income Tax Act exclude a portion of dividend income from the total income calculation entirely?
  Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE ZONE LAHORE vs CHOUDHRI42 TAX 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-03
  income taxrejection of accountsstock registerassessment yearleave to appealreference to high court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which answered a reference question in the negative. The respondent firm's book version of accounts for the assessment year 1962-63 was rejected by the Income Tax Officer due to the absence of a stock register and unverifiable sales lists, leading to an estimated profit rate and a modest addition to income. Subsequent appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal resulted in partial relief and affirmation respectively. The High Court, upon an application under the Income Tax Act, addressed the question of law concerning the rejection of account books and decided it directly, finding the Tribunal's conclusions inconsistent. The Supreme Court of Pakistan evaluated the arguments and concurred with the High Court's assessment that the factual circumstances did not justify interference or the granting of leave to appeal, as no question of public importance was involved. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case there was evidence or material before the Appellate Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the account books were liable to be rejected under the proviso of Section 13 of the Income Tax Act?
  • Can the High Court proceed to decide a question of law directly upon an application under sub-section (2) of Section 66 of the Income Tax Act due to a change in the law?
  • Does the non-maintenance of a stock register alone constitute a sufficient ground for the Income Tax Officer to reject an assessee's accounts?
  Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE vs SH. FEROZE DIN ALLAH BAKHSH, M.42 TAX 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-12
  partnership registrationminor partnerincome tax registrationbenefits of partnershippartnership agreementgenuine firm
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions arose from the rejection of applications for registration and renewal of registration under Section 26-A of the Income Tax Act by firms whose partnership documents included a minor as a partner. The Income Tax Officers had treated such firms as not genuine, a view reversed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and subsequently upheld by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the Lahore High Court, following the Full Bench ruling in Messrs Ithad Textile Mills Multan vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax West Pakistan Lahore. The core legal question was whether the inclusion of a minor in a partnership agreement renders the firm invalid or non-genuine for the purposes of registration under the Income Tax Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the department's petitions, holding that the inclusion of a minor does not invalidate the partnership. The Court laid down the principle that where a partnership is constituted by adult partners, the inclusion of a minor does not invalidate the firm; rather, the document must be construed as admitting the minor to the benefits of the partnership pursuant to Section 30 of the Partnership Act, 1932.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inclusion of a minor as a partner in a partnership deed invalidate the partnership for the purpose of registration under Section 26-A of the Income Tax Act?
  • How is a partnership agreement containing a minor partner to be construed under the Partnership Act, 1932?
  • Can a partnership firm including a minor be considered a genuine firm entitled to registration?
  Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, KARACHI vs MOOSA OMAR & CO. LTD.41 TAX 19 · Sindh High Court · 1979-03-05Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, KARACHI (WEST), KARACHI vs S. A. REHMAN42 TAX 147 · Sindh High Court · 1979-03-25Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, KARACHI (EAST), KARACHI vs AZAM41 TAX 154 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY CITY-II vs T. C. DOLWANI41 TAX 98 · Bombay High Court · 1976-11-21Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs R. C. CHAPMAN41 TAX 73 · Sindh High Court · 1978-01-31Read full judgment →
• COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX , LAHORE ZONE, LAHORE vs SALEEM SAIGOL, LAHORE41 TAX 179 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• COMMISSIOMER, INCOME TAX, KARACHI vs A. RAZAK H. K, DADA41 TAX 10 · Sindh High Court · 1979-06-18Read full judgment →
• COLONY THAL TEXTILE MILLS LTD., MIANWALI vs ASSISTANT COLLECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE AND LAND CUSTOMS, FAISALABAD AND ANOTHER1980 PLD Lahore 377 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-02
  excise dutymanufacture and productionexemption notificationvested rightwithdrawal of exemptiontax collection
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges the action of the Central Excise authorities seeking to collect excise duty on stocks of cotton yarn and man-made fibre yarn held by the petitioner company at midnight between 27th and 28th June 1979. The core legal question is whether goods manufactured and produced during a period when they were exempt from excise duty can be subjected to duty upon the subsequent withdrawal of the exemption while still lying in the manufacturer's premises. The Lahore High Court held that excise duty is attracted solely at the stage of production and manufacture of goods and is independent of their subsequent disposal or removal. Following Supreme Court precedents, the court ruled that stocks produced prior to the withdrawal of the exemption continue to remain exempt, regardless of whether they were still in the manufacturer's premises at the time the exemption was superseded. The key principle laid down is that the method and timing of collecting a tax or duty are mere accidents of administration and do not alter the incidence of excise duty, which attaches strictly at the time of manufacture or production.

  Questions settled

  • Whether excise duty can be levied on goods manufactured during a period of exemption when such goods are still lying in the manufacturer's premises after the exemption is withdrawn?
  • Is the levy of excise duty dependent upon the subsequent disposal or removal of the goods from the factory premises?
  • Does the method and time of collecting excise duty affect the core nature of the duty as being attracted by manufacture or production?
  Read full judgment →
• COLONY THAL TEXTILE MILLS LTD., ISMAILPUR, B HA KKA R vs ASSISTANT1980 CLC 1660 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-02Read full judgment →
• COL. ABID HUSSAIN vs THE COLLECTOR OF KARACHI1980 SCMR 795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-14
  land acquisitionmarket value determinationcompulsory acquisition chargespotential of landcompensation enhancementconversion charges
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the rejection of a claim for enhanced compensation for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The core legal question concerned the correct determination of the market value of the acquired land, specifically whether the potential of the land as a building site and the exclusion of conversion charges from comparable sales were properly considered by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by deducting conversion charges from the sale price of comparable land, as such charges actually enhance the land's potential. Emphasizing that the potential of the land must be considered in valuation, the Court set aside the lower judgments. It fixed the market value at Rs. 2 per sq. yd. and awarded the 15% compulsory acquisition charges under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The key principle laid down is that in determining market value, the potential use of the land must be evaluated, and arbitrary deductions from comparable sales that reflect development potential are impermissible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conversion charges can be deducted from the sale price of comparable land when determining market value for acquisition purposes?
  • Is the potential of land as a building site a relevant factor in determining market value under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • Does the failure to award 15% compulsory acquisition charges under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 constitute an error in law?
  Read full judgment →
• CoL,. ATTAURREHMAN vs AHMAD YAR KHAN AND 3 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 181 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-02Read full judgment →
• CHIRAGH DIN vs Mst. DAULAT BIBI1980 CLC 1863 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE vs Mst. NOORAN1980 CLC 378 · Sindh High Court · 1974-01-18
  wakf propertylimitation periodofficial gazettepublic wakfburial rightsstatutory interpretationwakf-ul-aulad
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the assumption of control over wakf properties by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf under the West Pakistan Wakf Properties Ordinance, 1959. The core legal questions concerned whether a petition filed under Section 7 of the Ordinance was time-barred, and whether certain residential houses and burial privileges within the shrine complex constituted private property or public wakf. The Court held that the petition was time-barred because the statutory period for filing a challenge commences from the date of the notification published in the official Gazette, as defined by the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, rather than from the date of personal knowledge. Furthermore, the Court ruled that once property is determined to be a public wakf, it cannot be partially excluded based on claims of private inheritance or exclusive burial rights. The judgment affirms that in a public wakf graveyard, no individual can claim exclusive or preferential burial rights, as such rights must be subject to common necessity and available space. Consequently, the lower court's order allowing the exclusion of houses and burial privileges was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a petition under Section 7 of the West Pakistan Wakf Properties Ordinance 1959 run from the date of the official Gazette notification or from the date of personal knowledge?
  • Can a petitioner claim private inheritance rights over property after abandoning a plea of Wakf-ul-Aulad?
  • Is it legally permissible to claim exclusive or preferential burial rights in a graveyard that has been declared a public wakf?
  • Does the definition of 'notification' under the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956 require publication in the official Gazette?
  Read full judgment →
• CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF, PUNJAB, LAHORE vs Mian ABDUL MARI)1980 CLC 651 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Chaudhury ABDUL AZIZ vs DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, SUKKUR1980 PLD Karachi 333 · Sindh High Court · 1980-01-28Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry SARDAR MASIH vs LA L MASIH1980 CLC 425 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-03Read full judgment →
• Chaudhri MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM HALEEM CHISHTI vs PAKISTAN COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND ANOTHER1980 SCMR 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-25
  master and servantdeclaratory suitwrongful terminationcivil servantstatutory corporationcompulsory retirementmaintainability of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former employee of the Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (PCSIR), sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his declaratory suit regarding his compulsory retirement. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, an employee of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act (later becoming a statutory corporation), could challenge his termination through a declaratory suit, or if his employment was governed by the general law of master and servant. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was not a civil servant and that his employment was governed by the law of master and servant. Consequently, the Court affirmed that a suit for declaratory relief against the termination of service was not maintainable; the only available remedy for wrongful termination in such cases is a claim for damages. The Court further noted that the petitioner failed to demonstrate the applicability of civil service rules to his employment, and that the order of retirement, issued on behalf of the Chairman, was valid. The petition was dismissed as devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for declaratory relief maintainable against the termination of service for an employee governed by the law of master and servant?
  • Can an employee of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act claim the protection of rules regulating civil services?
  • Does the law of master and servant limit an employee's remedy for wrongful termination to a claim for damages?
  Read full judgment →
• DA WOOD vs ABDUL GHANI1980 CLC 1062 · Sindh High Court · 1979-05-29Read full judgment →
• CHAMAN MUHAMMAD vs WAPDA THROUGH GENERAL MANAGER AND PROJECT DIRECTOR, TARBELA DAM1980 PLC (C. S.) 275 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1978-10-07Read full judgment →
• Ch. ZAHID HUSSAIN AND OTHERSs vs DHARMOMAL AND OTHERS1980 SCMR 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-09
  evacuee propertyland settlementsuo motu revisionnecessary partiesallotmentcustodianremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arises from appeals regarding a land settlement dispute over agricultural land in the former State of Khairpur, originally allotted to displaced persons (appellants) in 1949. The Hindu owners (private respondents) applied under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957, seeking a declaration that they and the land were non-evacuee. Assistant Custodians ruled in their favor without impleading the allottee appellants. Subsequently, a reference was made to the Custodian for suo motu revision, which the Custodian declined to decide on merits based on an erroneous view that evacuee laws did not apply to Khairpur State. The High Court held that evacuee laws did apply, but refused to compel the Custodian to reopen the case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that once the Custodian entertained the suo motu reference and committed an error of law, the High Court erred in not remanding the case. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's orders, and remitted the case to the Custodian to decide on merits, laying down principles regarding necessary parties and the exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether allottees of land are necessary parties in proceedings before the Assistant Custodian to determine the evacuee character of the property?
  • Can the High Court decline to remand a case to the Custodian for decision on merits after correcting an error of law regarding the application of evacuee laws?
  • What are the primary considerations for the exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction by the Custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. ZAFARULLAH KHAN vs THE STATE1980 PLD Rev. 13 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1979-12-03Read full judgment →
• Ch. WALI MUHAMMAD vs NOOR AHMAD SHAH AND 7 OTHERS1980 CLC 859 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-16Read full judgment →
• Ch. RIFFAT HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER vs ASIF KHAN AND ANOTHER1980 PLD Lahore 626 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-27
  election petitionsummary dismissalverification of pleadingsprocedural defectCantonment Board electionstatutory interpretationamendment of pleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions challenged the summary dismissal of election petitions by an Enquiry Officer regarding Cantonment Board elections. The core legal question was whether Rule 72 of the Cantonments (Election and Election Petition) Rules, 1979, mandates the summary dismissal of an election petition for failure to verify or sign it, or whether the Enquiry Officer retains discretion to allow the rectification of such defects. The Court held that Rule 72 uses permissive language ("may"), rather than mandatory language ("shall"), and does not deprive the Enquiry Officer of the power to allow amendments. Because the Enquiry Officer is vested with the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, they possess the authority to allow the rectification of procedural defects, including omissions in signing or verification, to ensure the adjudication of substantial disputes. The key principle laid down is that procedural rules should be interpreted to advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it through technicalities, and courts should allow the amendment of pleadings to cure formal defects.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 72 of the Cantonments (Election and Election Petition) Rules, 1979, mandate the summary dismissal of an election petition for lack of verification?
  • Does an Enquiry Officer under the Cantonments (Election and Election Petition) Rules, 1979, have the power to allow the amendment of an election petition to cure defects in verification?
  • Should procedural rules in election petitions be interpreted as mandatory or directory when they use the word 'may'?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. REHMAT ALI vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, RAWALPINDI AND ANOTHER1980 SCMR 336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-27
  Displaced PersonsCompensation BookAuction PriceResumption of PropertyWrit JurisdictionSettlement SchemeDiscretionary Relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition concerning the disposal of a shop under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner, having purchased the shop in a 1960 auction, used a bogus Compensation Book for payment. Following the discovery of the fraud, the petitioner failed to pay the auction price despite notice in 1965, leading to the cancellation of the transfer and resumption of the property by the Settlement authorities. The property was later transferred to the respondent in 1974. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities were required to strictly adhere to procedural formalities, such as pasting acknowledgment due slips, to validate the cancellation of the transfer. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner's finding of fact regarding the service of the registered notice was sufficient. The Court further held that the petitioner’s long-standing indifference, failure to pay the price, and knowledge of the criminal proceedings regarding the bogus Compensation Book disentitled him to discretionary writ jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the procedural requirement of pasting an acknowledgment due slip in a file of basic importance if service of a registered notice is otherwise established?
  • Does a petitioner's failure to pay the auction price and long-standing indifference regarding property resumption disentitle them to discretionary writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a transfer of property be cancelled by Settlement authorities if the payment was made using a bogus Compensation Book?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. NOOR HUSSAIN AND 3 OTHERS vs THE SPECIAL COURT, MUZAFFARABAD1980 CLC 1528 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1979-07-07Read full judgment →
• Ch. NAZIR AHMAD vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB EDUCATION1980 PLC (C. S.) 293 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-01-06Read full judgment →
• Ch. NASIRUDDIN (REFRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS) AND 2 OTHERS vs MUEENUDDIN AND 2 OTHERS1980 PLD Lahore 417 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ch. NADIR KHAN vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB, HEALTH1980 PLC (C. S.) 287 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1980-01-06Read full judgment →
• Ch. MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE vs MESSRS MALIK COAL CORPORATION1980 CLC 657 · Lahore High Court · 1979-03-25Read full judgment →