Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- Mehar GUL MUHAMMAD vs MEHRAN ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY`1979 SCMR 374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court of Sind, which challenged the repatriation of the petitioner, an engineer, from the Mehran University of Engineering and Technology back to his parent department, the Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation. The core legal question was whether a deputationist has a vested right to be permanently absorbed by the borrowing institution in the absence of a formal agreement or undertaking, and whether the borrowing institution can be compelled to retain him. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a borrowing institution has the absolute right to return a deputationist to his parent department at any time and cannot be legally compelled to retain him. The Court further observed that informal internal endorsements or expressions of intent by university officials do not constitute a binding commitment for permanent absorption. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a borrowing institution be legally compelled to retain a deputationist if it no longer requires his services?
- Does an internal administrative endorsement expressing a desire to accommodate an employee constitute a binding legal commitment for permanent absorption?
- Can a deputationist claim a vested right to permanent absorption in the borrowing department without a formal written agreement or undertaking?
- MEHAR DIN vs NAZAR HUSSAIN AND 3 Other1979 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order refusing to cancel the bail of respondents accused of murder. The petitioner sought cancellation primarily on grounds that the respondents were threatening witnesses and that a co-accused, who was a principal offender, remained an absconder whose arrest required the cancellation of the respondents' bail. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that allegations of witness intimidation were vague, unsupported by police reports, and denied by counter-affidavits. Regarding the abscondence of the co-accused, the Court held that co-accused cannot be penalized or have their bail cancelled based on the assumption that they are harboring an absconder without cogent material or evidence. Furthermore, the Court observed that the apprehension of an absconder is a police duty, not a ground to cancel the bail of others. Finally, the Court noted that arguments regarding vicarious liability under Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, had been previously rejected by the High Court in an order that was not challenged, and thus could not be re-litigated.
Questions settled- Can the bail of co-accused be cancelled solely on the ground that a principal accused remains an absconder?
- Is the failure of the police to apprehend an absconding co-accused a valid ground to cancel the bail of other co-accused?
- Can allegations of witness intimidation justify the cancellation of bail if they are vague and unsupported by police reports?
- MBSSRS JANNA T TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs SIND LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL,1979 PLD Karachi 725 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These constitutional petitions challenged the Labour Appellate Tribunal's refusal to exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1968, regarding appellate orders passed by the Labour Court. The core legal questions were whether the Tribunal's revisional power extends to appellate orders of the Labour Court and whether a private party has the right to file a revision application under this provision. The Court held that while the Tribunal's revisional jurisdiction is broad and extends to all orders of the Labour Court, including appellate orders, the statute does not confer a right upon aggrieved parties to invoke this jurisdiction. The Court established that Section 38(3-a) is strictly limited to the Tribunal’s suo motu exercise of power. Consequently, the Court ruled that revision applications filed by private parties are misconceived and not permissible under the Ordinance. The petitions were dismissed as the Court found no merit in the petitioners' challenge to the underlying labour proceedings.
Questions settled- Does the revisional jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal under Section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1968 extend to appellate orders passed by a Labour Court?
- Can a private party file a revision application before the Labour Appellate Tribunal under Section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1968?
- Is the exercise of revisional power under Section 38(3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1968 limited to suo motu action by the Tribunal?
- MASOOD ALI KHAN vs MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND ANOTHERPLD 1979 Quetta 84 . · Balochistan High Court · 1978-12-20Read full judgment →
- MASEH ULLAH AND Another vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 21979 SCMR 369 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the decisions of the Settlement Commissioner and Deputy Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of surplus land attached to a property. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, who had already been transferred a portion of the property along with three times the plinth area under settlement laws, were entitled to additional surplus land, or whether such surplus land should be transferred to a non-transferee occupant. The Court held that the petitioners had received their full entitlement under the relevant settlement laws and that the surplus land was correctly allocated to the non-transferee occupant based on the applicable Central Government Order. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that zoning regulations from the Improvement Trust could override established settlement laws, noting that the cited zoning scheme was not sanctioned. The key principle laid down is that settlement entitlements are strictly governed by the specific settlement laws and prescribed plinth area ratios, which cannot be superseded by unsanctioned municipal zoning letters or claims to additional land beyond the statutory entitlement.
Questions settled- Can municipal zoning letters override statutory entitlements regarding the transfer of surplus land under settlement laws?
- Is a non-transferee occupant entitled to the transfer of surplus land attached to a house if the primary transferee has already received their entitlement of three times the plinth area?
- Does the transfer of surplus land under the Central Government Order dated 22-10-1962 depend on the sanctioned status of local improvement schemes?
- MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR, ZONE `D' AND Other vs MUHAMMAD NIAZ1979 PLD Supreme Court 921 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal was filed by the Martial Law Administrator against a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had declared the proposed trial of the respondent before a Summary Military Court for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 to be illegal. The High Court had held that scheduled offences under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958 were triable exclusively by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, and that Martial Law Orders could not apply to ordinary offences unless committed while resisting Martial Law. During the pendency of the appeal, the Deputy Attorney-General for Pakistan stated that the authorities had decided to try the respondent under the ordinary law, specifically the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appeal had become infructuous. The Court disposed of the appeal, observing that the broad legal propositions laid down by the High Court were prima facie open to exception and must be confined to the individual case of the respondent.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal becomes infructuous when the state decides to try the accused under the ordinary law instead of a Military Court?
- Whether the broad legal findings of a High Court regarding the jurisdiction of Military Courts should be confined to the individual case when the main appeal is disposed of as infructuous?
- MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR, ZONE `B' AND 2 Others vs SATTAR GUL AND ANOTHER1979 SCMR 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-24Read full judgment →
- MAQSOOD AHMED vs SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION, RAWALPINDI AND1979 PLC (C. S. T.) 135 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1979-01-12Read full judgment →
- MANZOOR.UL-HAQUE SAAJID vs THE STATE1979 PLD Lahore 682 · Lahore High Court · 1979-02-19Read full judgment →
- MANZOOR SHAH vs THE STATE1979 PLD Lahore 526 · Lahore High Court · 1979-01-13Read full judgment →
- MANZOOR HUSSAIN AND Another vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 593 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- MANZOOR HASSAN vs PAKISTAN AND Other1979 SCMR 349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute regarding the refund of a customs duty rebate granted to the petitioner, a firm engaged in exporting cotton bags. The petitioner had received a rebate based on specific cloth specifications (16s/16s, 48 x 52 and 21s/21s, 60 x 60). However, authorities subsequently discovered that the cloth actually used was of a different, lower specification (14s/14s, 40 x 40), leading to a demand for the refund of the rebate. After unsuccessful appeals to the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs and the Federal Government, and a dismissed writ petition in the High Court, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the court could interfere with the factual determination regarding the specifications of the cloth used. The Supreme Court held that the dispute involved a determination of a question of fact—specifically whether the cloth used matched the specifications for which the rebate was granted—which could not be adjudicated at the leave-to-appeal stage. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that disputed questions of fact are generally outside the scope of such appellate review.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court interfere with a determination of a question of fact during a petition for leave to appeal?
- Is a dispute regarding the actual specifications of goods used for a customs rebate considered a question of fact?
- MANZOOR AND ANOTHER vs HAKIM KHAN1979 CLC 276 · Lahore High Court · 1976-05-31Read full judgment →
- MANZOOR ALIM ETC. vs Mst. GHULAM KUBRA ETC.S1979 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the execution of a pre-emption decree involving three sets of competing pre-emptors. The trial court consolidated three separate suits and decreed them with specific conditions regarding payment priority and timelines. The first and second sets of pre-emptors were deemed to have superior rights over the third set (the petitioners). The core legal question was whether the first set of pre-emptors had complied with the conditions of the decree, thereby rendering the petitioners' subsequent claim for execution invalid. The Supreme Court held that the first set of pre-emptors had indeed fulfilled the payment requirements within the stipulated time, as the court found the full amount was effectively deposited. The Court further held that a subsequent withdrawal of funds by one set of pre-emptors, occurring after the deadline and after the funds had already been adjusted towards the decree, did not invalidate the compliance of the first set of pre-emptors. Consequently, the petitioners had no right to execute their decree, as their right was contingent upon the failure of the prior pre-emptors to comply.
Questions settled- Does the withdrawal of funds by one set of pre-emptors after the deadline for payment affect the validity of a decree already complied with by another set of pre-emptors?
- Can a subsequent set of pre-emptors execute a decree when the prior set of pre-emptors has already fulfilled the conditions of the decree?
- Does the automatic adjustment of deposited funds towards a decretal amount constitute compliance with a conditional decree?
- MANZOOR Alias MUJAN AND Another vs THE STATE1979 PLD Karachi 276 · Sindh High Court · 1978-08-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal concerns the convictions of two appellants, Manzoor and Gul, for murder and related offences. The appellants challenged their convictions under sections 302, 325, and 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and section 13-E of the Arms Ordinance. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eyewitness testimony, the applicability of the right of private defence, and the evidentiary value of a ballistic expert's report submitted without supporting reasons or expert testimony. The Court held that the eyewitness testimony was reliable and sufficient to sustain the convictions, despite minor discrepancies. It rejected the plea of private defence, noting that the appellants were the aggressors and the victims were unarmed. Crucially, the Court ruled that while section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the reception of expert reports without calling the expert, such reports are merely opinions and lack probative weight if they do not contain the underlying reasons for the conclusion. Consequently, the Court excluded the flawed ballistic report but upheld the convictions based on the corroborated ocular evidence and other recoveries.
Questions settled- Does the amendment to Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 relieve the prosecution of the duty to provide reasons for a ballistic expert's opinion?
- Can a court rely on an expert report submitted under Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if it lacks the underlying reasoning for the conclusion?
- Is the right of private defence available to an accused who initiates a confrontation with an unarmed victim?
- To what extent can an appellate court reconstruct the prosecution's case when eyewitness testimony contains minor discrepancies?
- MANZOOR AHMAD vs CHAIRMAN, MILITARY COURT, ]LAHOREPLD 1979 Lahore 711(1) · Lahore High Court · 1978-10-29Read full judgment →
- MANNU KHAN vs ATA MUHAMMAD AND 2 OTHERS1979 CLC 550 · Lahore High Court · 1979-03-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition and regular second appeal involve distinct legal matters concerning procedural compliance and civil court jurisdiction. In the first matter, the petitioner challenged an order dismissing his application to examine witnesses due to a delayed list and an unattested affidavit, which the Lahore High Court set aside, holding that procedural rules should not trap litigants and technical omissions can be cured under sections 151 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. In the second matter, the appellants challenged the rejection of their plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding a suit challenging a jamabandi entry and a notification under the Auqaf (Federal Control) Act 1976. The High Court dismissed the second appeal, holding that civil court jurisdiction is barred by section 172 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967 and sections 11, 12, 13, and 21 of the Auqaf (Federal Control) Act 1976, and that the suit was also barred by limitation.
Questions settled- Can a court dismiss a party's witness list solely on the ground of an unattested affidavit when illness is pleaded as a cause for delay?
- Does section 172 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967 bar the jurisdiction of civil courts regarding the correction of entries in the jamabandi?
- Does the Auqaf (Federal Control) Act 1976 bar the jurisdiction of civil courts to question the validity of a notification issued under the Act?
- Is a plaint liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the suit is barred by time and by law?
- MANJHI vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 393 · Sindh High Court · 1978-02-11Read full judgment →
- MANAGING DIRECTOR, M. C. P. AND 3 Other vs AUTHORITY UNDER PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT, HYDERABAD AND 3 OTHERS1979 PLC 388 · Labour Court · 1979-07-09Read full judgment →
- MANAGER, WORKSHOP, M. C. P., JUMSHORO, HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER vs KHAN ALAM1979 PLC 384 · Labour Court · 1979-07-18Read full judgment →
- MANAGER, GOVERNMENT PRINTING & STATIONERY PRESS, PESHAWAR AND 21979 PLD Supreme Court 981 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-06-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the N.-W. F. P. Service Tribunal, Peshawar, which dismissed the appellants' appeal against the District Judge's order affirming the civil court's decree in favor of respondent Sadiq Ali. The respondent, a Foreman in the Government Printing Press, Peshawar, had been compulsorily retired from service by the Controller, Government Printing and Stationery Department, N.-W. F. P., following disciplinary proceedings under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960. The core legal question was whether the Controller was the competent authority under the relevant rules to take disciplinary action and impose the penalty of compulsory retirement on the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the Controller was not the appointing or competent authority and lacked jurisdiction to pass the impugned retirement order, as the powers continued to vest in the successor to the Superintendent, Government Press, Lahore, under the transitional provisions of the Province of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that orders passed without jurisdiction by an incompetent authority are a nullity in law.
Questions settled- Whether the Controller of Government Printing and Stationery Department is the competent authority to take disciplinary action against an employee of the Government Printing Press, Peshawar?
- What is the effect of the dissolution of the Province of West Pakistan on the continuity of disciplinary jurisdiction over civil servants under the Province of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970?
- Can an order of compulsory retirement passed by an officer who is not the appointing or competent authority be sustained in law?
- MANAGER, D. D. T. FACTORY vs WORKERS UNION1979 PLC 55 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1978-07-07Read full judgment →
- MANAGEMENT, D. D. T. FACTORY vs FACTORY UNION1979 PLC 47 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1978-06-07Read full judgment →
- MAMOO vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 866 · Sindh High Court · 1978-07-24Read full judgment →
- MALQOK vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 234 · Sindh High Court · 1978-07-29Read full judgment →
- MALLAH AND 7 OTHERS vs ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER_COLLECTOR, FAISALABAD AND 2 OTHERS1979 CLC 400 · Lahore High Court · 1979-04-23Read full judgment →
- MALIR CANTONMENT BOARD vs RUSTOM KHAN AND ANOTHER1979 PLC 463 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1979-05-28Read full judgment →
- Malik RAHIM BAKHSH vs MEMBER (REVENUE ESTT.) BOARD OF REVENUE, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1979 PLC (C. S. T.) 122 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
- Malik NISAR HUSSAIN vs ALLAH DIWAYA AND 9 OTHERS1979 CLC 245 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-20Read full judgment →
- Malik MUSHTAQ ANWAR vs DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, LAHORE AND 2 Others1979 P Cr. L J 658 · Lahore High Court · 1979-03-09Read full judgment →
- Malik MUHAMMAD AKRAM vs The STATE1979 SCMR 56 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant pre-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was accused of abetting offences under sections 148, 302, 307, 363, 366, 109, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was not present at the scene of the crime and to whom no overt act was attributed, was entitled to pre-arrest bail despite allegations of instigation. The Supreme Court observed that the investigating officer had expressed an opinion that the petitioner was innocent and falsely implicated, noting significant discrepancies in witness statements regarding the alleged instigation. Consequently, the Court held that the case required further inquiry. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, granting the petitioner pre-arrest bail, subject to the condition that he joins the investigation. The key principle laid down is that where the investigation suggests innocence and there is an absence of overt acts or presence at the crime scene, a case for further inquiry is established, warranting the concession of pre-arrest bail.
Questions settled- Is a petitioner entitled to pre-arrest bail when the investigating officer has opined that the petitioner is innocent and falsely implicated?
- Does the absence of an overt act or presence at the scene of the crime constitute a ground for further inquiry in a bail application?
- Can bail before arrest be granted to an accused person alleged to have instigated a crime without specific details of the instigation?
- Malik HAMID SARFARAZ vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN A&D ANOTHER1979 PLD Supreme Court 991 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of a constitutional petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution challenging the detention of Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan under Martial Law Order 12. Prior to arguing the merits, petitioner's counsel raised preliminary objections regarding Bench composition, regional representation, and the qualification of the Attorney-General (who also held the portfolio of Law Minister) to appear before the Court. The Supreme Court rejected all preliminary objections, holding that the constitution of Benches is the exclusive privilege and duty of the Chief Justice, and litigants cannot choose their Bench. The Court strongly condemned regional or parochial insinuations against judges, affirming that judges are bound by their oath to perform even-handed justice without fear or favour. Additionally, the Court held that under Article 100 of the Constitution, the Attorney-General retains his right of audience and does not lose status by undertaking additional legal duties or portfolios assigned by the Federal Government. The petition was ultimately disposed of as withdrawn upon counsel's request.
Questions settled- Does a litigant or counsel have the right to request a Bench of their own choice or object to a Bench on regional grounds?
- Does the Attorney-General for Pakistan lose his right of audience under Article 100 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by holding the additional portfolio of Law Minister?
- Are the statutory disabilities placed on a Supreme Court Judge under Article 207 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 applicable to the Attorney-General for Pakistan?
- Malik GHULAM JILANI vs THE PROVINCE OF PUNJAB AND Other1979 PLD Lahore 564 · Lahore High Court · 1979-04-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This intra-court appeal arose from the dismissal in limine of a constitutional petition filed by the appellant challenging the authority of the Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, to act as the President of Pakistan and dispose of a mercy petition filed on behalf of a condemned prisoner, Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The core legal questions involved whether the assumption of the office of the President under President's Order No. 13 of 1978 was valid under the doctrine of necessity, whether the appointment could be challenged collaterally rather than through quo warranto, and whether the appellant had the right to question the executive authority in such proceedings. The Lahore High Court held that the appeal was barred by res judicata, that the President's Succession Order No. 13 of 1978 was a valid legislative measure justified under the state necessity doctrine following the resignation of the former President, that the de facto doctrine protects the official acts of the holder of the office, and that the appointment of the President cannot be challenged collaterally. The court laid down principles regarding the non-collateral attack on de facto constitutional authorities and the validity of extra-constitutional measures under the law of necessity.
Questions settled- Can the assumption of the office of the President under President's Order No. 13 of 1978 be challenged in collateral proceedings?
- Whether the Chief Martial Law Administrator validly assumed the office of the President under the doctrine of necessity following the resignation of the former President?
- Does a petitioner filing a mercy petition for a condemned prisoner have the locus standi to challenge the de jure authority of the pardoning authority in writ jurisdiction?
- Are the official acts of a de facto holder of a constitutional office protected from collateral invalidation under public policy and convenience?
- Malik ABDUL QAYYUM ETC vs PUNJAB PROVINCE ETC.1979 PLD Lahore 853 · Lahore High Court · 1978-09-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two regular first appeals challenging the compensation awarded for land acquired by the government for the extension of the Lahore airport. The core legal question was determining the true market value of the acquired land at the time of the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The appellants contended that the valuation was insufficient, arguing the land possessed potential for residential use. The Court held that where land is used for agricultural purposes but possesses potential for residential development—evidenced by its location within municipal limits and proximity to developing colonies—the market value should be determined by calculating the mean between the average price of agricultural land and the average price of land intended for residential purposes in the area. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, awarding compensation at the rates claimed by the appellants, alongside statutory solatium and interest. Claims for severance damages and crop compensation were rejected due to insufficient evidence. The principle established is that in the absence of precise comparable sales, the mean value approach provides a fair measure for determining market value for land with dual-use potential.
Questions settled- How should the market value of land be determined when it is currently used for agriculture but possesses potential for residential development?
- Is an owner entitled to compensation for severance of holdings under the Land Acquisition Act without providing evidence of the specific damage sustained?
- Can a court award compensation for standing crops in land acquisition proceedings in the absence of evidence regarding the area covered by such crops?
- MAJOR-GENERAL (R) NASIRULLAH KHAN BABAR- Petitioner vs CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF AND ANOTHER1979 PLD Peshawar 23 · Peshawar High Court · 1978-12-15Read full judgment →
- Major ATTIQUE AHMAD AND Another vs THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1979 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the allotment of evacuee land to a local respondent. The appellants, claiming entitlement to the land based on their status as displaced persons, argued that the land was improperly allotted to the respondent, who was not a claimant. The core legal question was whether the land was available for transfer to the appellants and whether the prior allotment to the respondent was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation laws, specifically the Pakistan Rehabilitation Ordinance 1948 and subsequent legislation, did not distinguish between refugees and locals regarding land allotment. Consequently, the allotment to the respondent was valid and the land was not available for transfer to the appellants. The Court affirmed that the appellants possessed no vested right to any specific property, only a general beneficial right to seek allotment against their entitlements. The principle laid down is that where land has been validly allotted under existing schemes, it ceases to be available for transfer, and claimants cannot displace prior valid allottees to satisfy their own claims.
Questions settled- Does the Pakistan Rehabilitation Ordinance 1948 distinguish between refugees and locals regarding the allotment of evacuee land?
- Can a claimant displaced person demand the allotment of specific land that has already been validly allotted to another party?
- Does a claimant possess a vested right to a specific piece of evacuee property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
- Is land that has been validly allotted to a local considered available for transfer to other claimants?
- MAHMUDUL HASSAN TAJKI AND Another vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 923 · Sindh High Court · 1979-08-25Read full judgment →
- MAHMOOD vs MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE (REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS)AND 21979 CLC 539 · Lahore High Court · 1979-04-23Read full judgment →
- MAHMOOD SHAH AND Other vs ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Other1979 PLD Lahore 886 · Lahore High Court · 1978-10-16Read full judgment →
- MAHMOOD HASSAN vs CHAIRMAN, SUMMARY MILITARY COURT, LAHORE AND 21979 PLD Lahore 470 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- MAHMOOD ALAM vs SHAMS UN NISA BEGUM AND 2 Other1979 PLD Lahore 176 · Lahore High Court · 1978-10-21Read full judgment →
- MAHMOOD ALAM KHAN vs CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR, Etc.1979 PLD Lahore 53 · Lahore High Court · 1978-05-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition challenged the detention of a businessman, arrested on March 1, 1978, and detained for three months under C.M.L.O. 12 read with C.M.L.O. No. 33, on grounds of acting prejudicially to Martial Law purposes or national security. The petitioner had a history of criminal cases, including past convictions and acquittals, with several cases pending or under investigation. The core legal question was whether past convictions for ordinary crimes, or pending investigations/adjudications for similar offenses, could justify detention under Martial Law Orders without evidence of current prejudicial activity. The High Court held that the nature of offenses (theft, cheating) in pending cases did not indicate actions prejudicial to Martial Law. It was emphasized that detention under C.M.L.O. 12 required a finding of guilt for offenses contemplated by the Order, not merely past or unproven allegations. The court set aside the detention order, accepting the petition and ordering the petitioner's release.
Questions settled- Can a detention order under Chief Martial Law Order 12 be maintained based solely on a history of ordinary criminal offenses or pending investigations?
- Does a detention order under Chief Martial Law Order 12 require a finding of guilt for actions prejudicial to Martial Law purposes?
- Are ordinary criminal offenses like theft or cheating considered prejudicial to the purpose of Martial Law or national security for the purpose of detention under Chief Martial Law Order 12?
- Can a person be detained under Chief Martial Law Order 12 without evidence of current prejudicial activity?
- MAHMOOD AKHTAR vs PUNJAB URBAN TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND PUNJAB1979 PLC 315 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1978-08-24Read full judgment →
- MAHBOOBURRAHMAN AND Other vs MESSRS KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY1979 PLC 260 · National Industrial Relations CommissionRead full judgment →
- MAHBOOB KHAN vs THE STATE1979 PLD Lahore 691 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal revision petition challenges the trial court's order refusing to summon two eye-witnesses as court witnesses after the prosecution abandoned them as 'won over'. The core legal question is whether a trial court should exercise its discretion under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon prosecution-abandoned witnesses as court witnesses, rather than compelling the defence to call them as defence witnesses. The court held that the trial court erred in declining the request. It reasoned that the administration of justice requires even-handedness, and forcing the defence to call such witnesses prejudices them, as they may be denied the right to cross-examine if the witness supports the prosecution. The court established the principle that when the prosecution abandons material eye-witnesses, the court has an onerous duty to examine them as court witnesses if requested by the defence. Judicial discretion under Section 540 must be exercised according to reason and justice, not arbitrarily, to ensure the truth is uncovered regardless of which party the evidence favors.
Questions settled- Is a trial court obligated to summon as court witnesses those eye-witnesses whom the prosecution has abandoned as won over?
- Does the refusal to examine prosecution-abandoned witnesses as court witnesses cause prejudice to the defence?
- What are the limits of judicial discretion under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the summoning of witnesses?
- M. P. A. INC. HOUSTON, U. S. A. AND Another Plaintiff vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND 2 Other1979 PLD Karachi 453 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- M. H. JAN MUHAMMAD vs SECOND SIND LABOUR COURT, KARACHI AND 31979 PLC 22 · Sindh High Court · 1978-08-16Read full judgment →
- M. G. HASSAN AND 4 Others vs Sheikh RIAZUL HAQ AND 5 Other1979 SCMR 15 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-04-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a civil revision petition as incompetent. The underlying dispute arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell property, wherein the trial court permitted the plaintiffs to amend their plaint under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to include a prayer for mesne profits. The High Court, relying on precedent, held that an order allowing an amendment of a plaint does not constitute a "case decided" under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, thus rendering the revision petition incompetent. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, noting that mesne profits may be awarded even without a specific prayer, rendering limitation arguments regarding such a claim largely irrelevant. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that amendments aimed at avoiding multiplicity of litigation should be allowed provided they do not prejudice vested legal rights or fundamentally alter the suit's nature. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that the amendment was rightly allowed and the trial court's order was unexceptionable.
Questions settled- Does an order allowing an amendment of a plaint constitute a 'case decided' under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can a court award mesne profits even if there is no specific prayer for them in the plaint?
- Is an amendment to a plaint seeking mesne profits permissible if it avoids multiplicity of litigation and does not prejudice the defendant's vested rights?
- M. D. SALEEM vs DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAY,1979 PLC 336 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1978-10-28Read full judgment →
- M. C. P. EMPLOYEES' UNION, SHALIMAR WORKSHOP vs AFZAL BHATTI, AREA1979 PLC 13 · National Industrial Relations CommissionRead full judgment →
- M. AYUB vs INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, SIND, KARACHI AND 3 OTHERS1979 PLC (C.S.T.) 35 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1977-04-04Read full judgment →
- LIAQUAT ALI vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 365 · Sindh High Court · 1978-11-28Read full judgment →
- LIAQAT HAYAT KHAN ETC vs FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION, Etc.1979 PLD Lahore 825 · Lahore High Court · 1978-02-17Read full judgment →
- LATIF HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 167 · Sindh High Court · 1978-08-29Read full judgment →
- LAL KHAN vs LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR, SARGODHA AND ANOTHERP L , D 1979 Lahore 735 · Lahore High Court · 1979-02-25Read full judgment →
- LAL CHAND AND Another vs THE STATE1979 PLD Karachi 13 · Sindh High Court · 1978-08-15Read full judgment →
- LAL BUX AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 915 · Sindh High Court · 1979-03-03Read full judgment →
- LAHORE MILK BOARD, KOTLAKHPAT vs AND ANOTHER1979 PLD Lahore 788 · Lahore High Court · 1975-09-17Read full judgment →
- LABOUR UNION vs ADAMJI PAPER MILLS1979 PLC 66 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1978-11-03Read full judgment →
- KOURO AND 5 Others vs THE STATE-1979 P Cr. L J 253 · Sindh High Court · 1979-01-30Read full judgment →
- KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs SHAUKAT AND 2 OTHERSs1979 P Cr. L J 244 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-02Read full judgment →
- KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF, LAHORE AND 31979 SCMR 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the decision of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's revision petition and upheld the District Judge's order refusing to implead the petitioner as a party to an appeal. The core legal question is whether a person in possession of a part of the suit land is a necessary party to an appeal arising out of temporary injunction proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts rightly refused to implead the petitioner in the appellate proceedings concerning a temporary injunction, as the appellate court could effectively adjudicate the matter without him, noting that his separate application to be impleaded as a party before the trial court was still pending adjudication. The key principle laid down is that a party whose possession is not affected by a temporary injunction and whose application to be impleaded is pending before the trial court is not a necessary party to an interlocutory appeal arising from such injunction proceedings.
Questions settled- Is a person in possession of a part of the suit land a necessary party in an appeal arising out of an application for a temporary injunction?
- Can an appellate court effectually adjudicate upon a temporary injunction matter without adding a third party whose pending application for impleadment is before the trial court?
- KHUSHI MUHAMMAD ETC. vs SHASHU ETC.1979 CLC 433 · Lahore High Court · 1979-02-25Read full judgment →
- KHUSHI MUHAMMAD AND 5 Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER-1979 P Cr. L J 271 · Lahore High Court · 1978-10-30Read full judgment →
- KHUSHI MUHAMMAD AND 4 Others vs THE STATE1979 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-10-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a petition for quashment of criminal proceedings. The petitioners were charged under Section 201, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for allegedly urging a driver to flee after he struck and killed a police constable. The petitioners argued that the sole prosecution witness regarding their involvement had exonerated them, rendering further prosecution an abuse of the court's process. The Supreme Court considered whether the inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, should be invoked when an alternative statutory remedy exists. The Court held that Section 561-A is not an alternative or additional jurisdiction but is reserved for cases where no other procedure is available. Noting the introduction of Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which empowers a Magistrate to acquit an accused at any stage if the charge is groundless, the Court ruled that the petitioners must first exhaust this specific remedy before the trial Magistrate. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, directing the trial Magistrate to consider the petitioners' acquittal under Section 249-A.
Questions settled- Can the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked when an alternative statutory remedy is available?
- Does the power of a Magistrate to acquit an accused at any stage under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude the use of Section 561-A for the same purpose?
- Is the inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 an alternative or additional jurisdiction to the ordinary course of criminal procedure?
- KHUSHAL KHAN vs NAJABAT ALI ETC.S1979 SCMR 620 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to respondents in a murder case. The High Court had granted bail based on a discrepancy found in the certified copy of the First Information Report (F.I.R.) provided to it, which suggested the respondents were armed with lathis rather than hatchets. The petitioner contended that this order was based on a misreading of the F.I.R. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the High Court had not misread the document placed before it, as the certified copy indeed contained the discrepancy. However, it was discovered that the certified copy submitted by the respondents was forged. The Supreme Court held that since the High Court did not misread the evidence presented to it, leave to appeal was not warranted. Instead, the Court dismissed the petition while granting the petitioner liberty to move the High Court for cancellation of bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically citing the discovery of the forged document as a valid ground for such an application.
Questions settled- Can a bail order be challenged on the ground of misreading of evidence when the High Court relied on a forged document presented by the accused?
- Is the discovery of a forged document used to obtain bail a valid ground for an application for cancellation of bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does a High Court err in law if it grants bail based on a certified copy of an F.I.R. that is later discovered to be forged?
- KHURSHID vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 260 · Peshawar High Court · 1978-10-29Read full judgment →
- KHURSHID AHMAD KHAN vs ABU SAEED KHAN1979 PLD Lahore 877 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-19Read full judgment →
- KHUDA BUX AND 9 Other vs THE STATE Opponent1979 PLD Karachi 17 · Sindh High Court · 1978-08-05Read full judgment →
- KHUDA BAKHSH vs Mian FAZAL DIN AND 4 OTHERS1979 CLC 279 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-25Read full judgment →
- KHIAL AKBAR vs The State1979 PLD Quetta 96 · Balochistan High Court · 1979-01-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal miscellaneous application arose from a petition for post-arrest bail filed by Khial Akbar, a Sepoy in the Pishin Scouts accused of murdering a fellow Sepoy under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court's jurisdiction was ousted by the purported taking of cognizance by the Assistant Commissioner under the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968, whether a valid legal cognizance was established, and whether the prolonged detention without sufficient evidence or compliance with remand provisions justified granting bail. The Balochistan High Court held that the purported cognizance by the Assistant Commissioner was merely a camouflage and a mala fide attempt to oust the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, as referring a case for inquiry or investigation amounts to deferring or declining immediate cognizance. The Court further ruled that prior to valid cognizance under the Ordinance, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply, and prolonged incarceration without incriminating evidence or adherence to constitutional safeguards under Article 10 of the Constitution of Pakistan entitles the accused to bail. The petition was allowed and bail granted.
Questions settled- Whether an order by a Deputy Commissioner referring a case for inquiry or investigation constitutes the valid taking of cognizance under the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968?
- Does the taking of cognizance by the Deputy Commissioner under the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968, bar the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts and the High Court?
- Are the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to the investigation or inquiry of scheduled offences before the Deputy Commissioner takes formal cognizance?
- Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when continuously detained for months without any incriminating evidence being collected or a challan submitted?
- Does a Deputy Commissioner have the power to order an investigation into scheduled offences under the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968, after taking cognizance rather than referring the case to a tribunal?
- KHAQAN INDUSTRIES LTD. vs ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ETC.S1979 SCMR 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had challenged an order of the Central Government appointing an Inquiry Officer under the Companies Act to investigate the affairs of the petitioner-Company. The core legal questions concerned whether the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies was required to afford a hearing before reporting to the Government, whether subsection (6) of section 137 of the Companies Act applied instead of subsection (5), and whether pending civil litigation barred statutory inquiry proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the Registrar's actions properly fell under section 137(5) after seeking an explanation and documents, that no prior notice or hearing was mandated before submitting a report, and that civil litigation does not bar proceedings under the Companies Act. The petition was dismissed as meritless.
Questions settled- Whether the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies is required to afford an opportunity of being heard before submitting a report to the Central Government under section 137 of the Companies Act?
- Does the pendency of civil litigation between a company and a complainant operate as a bar to the initiation of inquiry proceedings under the Companies Act?
- When does subsection (6) of section 137 of the Companies Act apply as opposed to subsection (5)?
- KHANZADA MIR vs THB STATE1979 PLD Peshawar 215 · Peshawar High Court · 1979-07-20Read full judgment →
- KHAN MUHAMMAD vs SARDAR AMJAD FAROOQ KHAN ETC.S1979 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-02-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These are two petitions for review of a consolidated order dismissing civil petitions for special leave to appeal. The petitioner had filed a suit for possession of land by pre-emption, claiming that a transaction framed as an exchange was actually a sale designed to defeat his pre-emption rights. The trial court decreed the suit, but the District Judge reversed the decision and dismissed the suit upon re-evaluating the evidence and finding the plaintiff's witnesses untrustworthy. The High Court rejected the second appeal in limine, and the Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the leave petitions. In the review petitions, the core legal question involved whether the lower courts misread the evidence or erred in determining the true nature of the transaction. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent factual findings regarding the reliability of witnesses and the nature of the transaction as a genuine exchange rather than a sale were unassailable, and that no grounds for review were made out. The review petitions were accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a transaction embodied as an exchange can be treated as a sale for the purposes of pre-emption without sufficient proof?
- Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the credibility of witnesses be interfered with in second appeal or leave to appeal?
- What constitutes sufficient grounds for entertaining a review petition against an order dismissing a leave to appeal?
- KHAN AFSAR AND Others vs Mst. ELAHI KHANUM AND 5 Other1979 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition arises from a dispute over agricultural land originally transferred via a registered sale deed in 1909, which the original owner later claimed was fraudulently executed instead of a mortgage. The original transferees conceded this, rescinded the sale, and executed a registered mortgage deed in 1910. A third party subsequently filed a pre-emption suit, which resulted in a compromise acknowledging the owner's title and the valid mortgage. The Supreme Court considered whether long-standing revenue entries contrary to the registered mortgage could override it, whether a compromise deed reciting a pre-existing registered mortgage required compulsory registration, and whether the suit was within limitation. The Court held that revenue entries lost efficacy once the underlying sale deed was rescinded and replaced by a registered mortgage, that a compromise deed reciting an already registered transaction does not require separate registration, and that the suit was within the limitation period under Article 148 of the Limitation Act. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether long-standing revenue entries can override a registered mortgage deed executed after the rescission of an earlier sale?
- Does a compromise deed filed in court require compulsory registration when it merely recites an already existing registered mortgage deed?
- What is the applicable period of limitation for a suit relating to redeemed or mortgaged property under Article 148 of the Limitation Act?
- KHALILUR REHMAN vs This STATE1979 P Cr. L J 242 · Peshawar High Court · -Read full judgment →
- KHALILUR REHMAN vs THE STATE1979 PLD Peshawar 1 · Peshawar High Court · 1978-09-30Read full judgment →
- KHALIL UZ ZAMAN AND Another vs The STATE1979 SCMR 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which refused to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioners facing trial for offences under sections 302, 366, and 452 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail due to the delay in the trial proceedings and whether an affidavit claiming the alleged victim was the wife of the first petitioner constituted sufficient grounds for bail. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court exercised its discretion lawfully in refusing bail. The Court determined that the delay in trial was not sufficient to warrant bail, particularly given the State's assurance that the case would be heard within eight to nine months due to the appointment of additional judges. The key principle laid down is that the grant of bail on the ground of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, and the appellate court will not interfere unless the lower court acted illegally in exercising that discretion.
Questions settled- Is the refusal of bail by a High Court on the ground of delay in trial a matter of judicial discretion?
- Can an appellate court interfere with the refusal of bail if the lower court has not acted illegally?
- Does the availability of a new affidavit regarding the marital status of the victim provide sufficient grounds for a fresh bail application in the High Court?
- KHALIL UR REHMAN vs The STATE1979 SCMR 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court which had cancelled the post-arrest bail previously granted to the petitioner by the Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerns the propriety of cancelling bail in a murder case where a counter-version exists and is supported by contemporaneous medical evidence of injuries sustained by the accused party. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the High Court erred in miscalculating the delay in filing the private counter-complaint and in overlooking the medical evidence establishing foundational support for the counter-version. The Court ruled that the existence of a substantiated counter-version involving injuries to the accused party brings the case within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, justifying the grant of bail. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the bail granted by the Additional Sessions Judge.
Questions settled- Whether the existence of a counter-version supported by medical evidence justifies the grant of post-arrest bail for further inquiry?
- Can the High Court interfere with a discretionary order of the Sessions Court granting bail without sound legal grounds?
- Whether the mere delay in filing a private counter-complaint vitiates the evidentiary value of injuries sustained by the accused party at the time of the incident?
- KHALIL AHMAD vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 250 · Lahore High Court · 1979-02-16Read full judgment →
- KHALID MAJID vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 232 · Sindh High Court · 1978-02-14Read full judgment →
- Khalid MAHMOOD SPED vs RAZI ABBAS BOKHARI, JUDGE, FAMILY Court, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1979 PLD Lahore 217 · Lahore High Court · 1978-07-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by a Family Court in a suit for dissolution of marriage, wherein the petitioner sought to compel the personal attendance of the respondent (plaintiff) for pre-trial proceedings under the Family Courts Act, 1964. The petitioner argued that Section 10(3) of the Act mandates personal attendance of parties to facilitate reconciliation. The core legal question was whether the Family Courts Act, 1964 requires the personal attendance of a plaintiff at the pre-trial stage, and whether the absence of such personal attendance renders proceedings illegal. The Court held that the Family Courts Act does not contain a provision requiring a plaintiff to appear in person for pre-trial proceedings. It clarified that Section 10(3) is directory rather than mandatory regarding the mode of reconciliation and does not mandate personal attendance. Furthermore, the Court held that a party may be represented by a counsel, and the right of a counsel to appear is recognized by the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine.
Questions settled- Does Section 10(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 mandate the personal attendance of parties for pre-trial reconciliation?
- Is a plaintiff required by the Family Courts Act, 1964 to appear in person before a Family Court?
- Can a party to a family suit be represented by a counsel in the absence of personal attendance?
- Does the Family Courts Act, 1964 require the personal attendance of a plaintiff who is not a pardahnashin lady?
- KHALID MAHMOOD AND 6 Other vs Ch. GHULAM MUHAMMAD1979 PLD Lahore 675 · Lahore High Court · 1978-10-17Read full judgment →
- KHALID JAVAID MALIK vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1979 PLD Lahore 260 · Lahore High Court · 1978-11-18Read full judgment →
- KHALID FAROOQ AND 3 Others vs Hakim NAZAR MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER1979 SCMR 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-09-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was barred by 21 days. The core legal question was whether the erroneous advice given by local district court lawyers regarding the period of limitation, based on a local diary rather than standard legal works, constituted sufficient cause for condonation of delay under the law. The Supreme Court held that no sufficient cause was made out, observing that the petitioners failed to act with due diligence by consulting district lawyers instead of Supreme Court Advocates, and reiterated that ignorance of law is no excuse. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition as time-barred, holding that valuable rights accrued to the respondents by the efflux of time cannot be jeopardized by flimsy explanations for delay. The key principle laid down is that mistaken legal advice resulting from inadequate research by local practitioners does not constitute sufficient cause to condone a significant delay in filing a petition, particularly where due diligence is lacking.
Questions settled- Whether erroneous legal advice given by local district court lawyers constitutes sufficient cause for condoning a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
- Does ignorance of the law excuse a party from complying with the prescribed period of limitation?
- Can a valuable right accrued to respondents by the efflux of time be jeopardized by a flimsy explanation for delay?
- KHAIR MUHAMMAD vs CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION, ISLAMABAD, RAWALPINDI AND 2 Other1979 PLD Karachi 210 · Sindh High Court · 1978-02-15Read full judgment →
- KHADIM ALI TAHIR vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 758 (1) · Lahore High Court · 1978-03-31Read full judgment →
- Kazi NIZAMUDDIN vs THE STATE1979 PLD Karachi 294 · Sindh High Court · 1978-11-03Read full judgment →
- KAURA vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 521 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This review petition challenged a High Court order that had directed the registration of a second First Information Report (FIR) regarding the same murder occurrence. The core legal question was whether Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 permits the registration of multiple FIRs for a single cognizable offence. The Court held that Section 154 contemplates only one FIR for an occurrence, as the primary purpose of an FIR is to set the law in motion. Subsequent information regarding the same incident, even if it offers a divergent version or implicates different suspects, constitutes part of the investigation process and must be recorded as statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, rather than as a new FIR. The Court emphasized that police officers are duty-bound to investigate the true facts and identify culprits based on the initial FIR, and they cannot be compelled to register a second FIR for the same transaction. Consequently, the Court recalled the previous order and dismissed the writ petition.
Questions settled- Can a second First Information Report be registered for the same occurrence under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Should subsequent information regarding an occurrence already under investigation be recorded as a new FIR or as a statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Is a police officer required to register a second FIR if a complainant alleges a different version of events for the same crime?
- KARO Alias SULLEMAN vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 588 · Sindh High Court · 1978-07-28Read full judgment →
- KARAMAT ALI vs THE STATE AND Another1979 SCMR 438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-11-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court which cancelled the bail granted to the petitioner by the Sessions Judge in a murder case registered under section 302/34. The core legal question involves whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the grounds of delay in the commencement of the trial and parity of treatment with co-accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that delay per se is not a sufficient ground for granting bail unless it is unconscionable and amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. The key principle laid down is that while undue delay in trial can be a ground for bail, the delay must reach a level of being unconscionable or abusive of court process to warrant relief.
Questions settled- Whether delay per se in the commencement of a trial is a sufficient ground for the grant of bail?
- Does a petitioner have a right to bail on the ground of parity when the roles attributed to co-accused require factual inquiry?
- Under what circumstances does delay in trial constitute a ground for the grant of bail?
- KARAM AND OTHERS vs NOOR MUHAMMAD AND OTHERS1979 CLC 258 · Lahore High Court · 1975-11-26Read full judgment →
- KARACHI SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. vs MUHAMMAD ASLAM1979 PLD Karachi 635 · Sindh High Court · 1979-01-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 for the appointment of an arbitrator following a dispute over demurrage charges between a principal and a clearing agent. The core legal questions were whether the application was barred by limitation under Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908, and when the limitation period for such an application commences. The Court held that Article 181 applies to applications under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940. Crucially, the Court distinguished the commencement of limitation for Section 8 from Section 20, ruling that the right to apply under Section 8 accrues only upon the expiry of fifteen clear days after the service of a notice to concur in the appointment of an arbitrator, rather than when the underlying differences first arose. Furthermore, the Court determined that the question of whether the underlying claim itself was time-barred is a mixed question of law and fact to be decided by the arbitrator, not the Court. The application was deemed within time.
Questions settled- Does Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to applications filed under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
- When does the limitation period for an application to appoint an arbitrator under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 commence?
- Is the question of whether an underlying claim is time-barred a matter for the Court or the arbitrator to decide in proceedings under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
- KARACHI PORT TRUST vs USMAN1979 PLC 176 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1977-08-05Read full judgment →
- KARACHI DOCK LABOUR BOARD, KARACHI vs GUL BAHADUR AND ANOTHER1979 PLC 349 · Sindh High Court · 1978-11-24Read full judgment →
- KARACHI CRICKET ASSOCIATION vs SECRETARY, EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF SIND And 4 Other1979 SCMR 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-07Read full judgment →
- KALA KHAN AND Others vs MISRI KHAN AND Other1979 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-03-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought a review of the Supreme Court's majority judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 1977, which had set aside their acquittal by the Lahore High Court and restored the trial court's conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, sentencing the first petitioner to death and the second petitioner to imprisonment for life. The review was sought on grounds including non-consideration of defence evidence, erroneous appraisal of tainted evidence, a dissenting judge agreeing with the High Court, and entitlement to a lesser penalty under the doctrine of expectation of life. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the defence evidence had indeed been considered and that re-appraisal of evidence is outside the scope of review as it amounts to re-hearing the appeal. The Court further ruled that the majority decision prevails and that the doctrine of expectation of life does not apply to an erroneous order causing a grave miscarriage of justice, particularly where there is no inordinate delay in deciding the appeal.
Questions settled- Whether re-appreciation of evidence on merits is permissible within the scope of a review petition?
- Whether the existence of a dissenting judicial opinion on the bench constitutes a valid ground for review of a majority judgment?
- Does the doctrine of expectation of life apply to reduce a death sentence upon the reversal of an erroneous acquittal where there is no inordinate delay?
- KABEER ALI vs THE STATE1979 P Cr. L J 485 · Sindh High Court · 1979-02-18Read full judgment →
- K. M. SADIQ vs VOLKART (PAK.) LTD., KARACHI1979 CLC 291 · Lahore High Court · 1976-06-07Read full judgment →
- K. A. MARKER,DIRECTOR, A. D. MARKER & SONS, QUETTA vs WAPDA THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN, LAHORE1979 PLD Quetta 20 · Balochistan High Court · 1978-10-15Read full judgment →