Naqibullah Versus State

Sabit Ullah Khan, J.--- The petitioner, through the instant petition filed under Section 497 Cr.P.C., seeks the concession of post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 13 dated 01.02.2026, registered under Sections 302, 354, 337-L(1) and 34 P.P.C at Police Station Lakki City, District Lakki Marwat. The petitioner had earlier approached the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Lakki Marwat, for the same relief, however, his application was declined vide order dated 20.04.2026. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court.

2.Succinctly stated, the prosecution case as reflected in the FIR lodged on the basis of murasila is that on 01.02.2026 the complainant Muhammad Latif appeared before the police at DHQ Hospital Lakki Marwat along with the dead body of his brother Hamdullah Jan and injured ladies namely Mst. Nazar Bibi and Mst. Abida Bibi. It was disclosed that earlier on the same day the complainant party had gone to the house of Imam Ullah situated in village Abdul Khel. According to the prosecution, while some members of the complainant party entered the house, the complainant and the deceased remained standing in the courtyard. In the meanwhile, commotion was heard from inside the house whereafter the petitioner along with his co-accused persons allegedly emerged from the house armed with sticks and assaulted the complainant party. The prosecution has specifically attributed to the petitioner the act of inflicting stick blows upon the deceased. Motive behind the occurrence is stated to be a dispute relating to womenfolk.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is innocent and has falsely been implicated in the instant case due to ulterior motives and previous enmity. It was argued that there is considerable delay in lodging the FIR which has not been plausibly explained by the prosecution, thereby adversely affecting the authenticity and intrinsic worth of the prosecution version. Learned counsel further submitted that despite nomination of multiple accused persons, the deceased allegedly sustained only a solitary injury, rendering the attribution of a specific role to the petitioner doubtful and highly improbable. It was next argued that the medical evidence does not fully corroborate the ocular account furnished in the FIR and the possibility cannot be ruled out that the injury attributed to the petitioner may have been sustained due to a fall upon a hard surface rather than direct assault. Learned counsel further submitted that co-accused Sajid Khan has already been admitted to bail and the case of the present petitioner stands on identical footing; therefore, on the principle of consistency, the petitioner is equally entitled to the concession of bail. Reliance was also placed upon the plea of further inquiry within the contemplation of Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon Attique Ahmed Kamal v. The State (2010 SCMR 748), Muhammad Mushtaq v. The State (2012 YLR 1148) and Muhammad Zareen v. The State (2014 MLD 319) to contend that where the prosecution version suggests negligence, accident or doubtful intention, the accused becomes entitled to the concession of bail.

4.Conversely, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by learned counsel for the complainant vehemently opposed the petition and argued that the petitioner has been assigned a direct, active and specific role in the occurrence. It was submitted that the ocular account furnished in the FIR is confidence inspiring and finds due support from the medical evidence collected during investigation. Learned law officers maintained that no material contradiction or discrepancy exists in the prosecution case so as to bring the matter within the ambit of further inquiry. It was further argued that the offence alleged against the petitioner squarely falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, unless exceptional or extraordinary circumstances are shown to exist, concession of post-arrest bail cannot be extended as a matter of course. Learned counsel for the complainant further contended that the role attributed to co-accused Sajid Khan is distinguishable inasmuch as no specific injury had been assigned to him, whereas the present petitioner has specifically been nominated as the principal assailant responsible for causing injuries to the deceased.

5.I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have carefully gone through the available record with their able assistance.

6.Admittedly, the petitioner is specifically nominated in the FIR with a direct allegation of causing stick blows to the deceased during the occurrence. The law is well settled that at the stage of deciding a bail petition, the Court is not required to conduct a deeper appreciation of evidence or record definitive findings regarding guilt or innocence of the accused. The scope of inquiry at this stage is confined merely to a tentative assessment of the material available on the record in order to ascertain whether reasonable grounds exist connecting the accused with the commission of the alleged offence.

7.A tentative perusal of the FIR and statements collected during investigation prima facie reveals that the petitioner was present at the place of occurrence and actively participated in the commission of the offence. The prosecution story has been narrated in a straightforward and coherent manner and the petitioner has not been implicated through vague or omnibus allegations. The ocular account, at least tentatively, appears confidence inspiring and cannot be discarded merely on the basis of defence pleas which necessarily require deeper appreciation of evidence at the trial.

8.The contention advanced by learned counsel regarding delay in registration of the FIR also does not persuade this Court at this stage. The record reflects that immediately after the occurrence the injured persons were shifted to hospital and subsequently the deceased succumbed to injuries. The prosecution has furnished explanation regarding the delay in the murasila report as well as in the registration of the FIR itself. The relevant column of the FIR further reflects that the distance between the place of occurrence and the police station was approximately 27/28 kilometers. In such circumstances, the delay highlighted by the defence cannot be regarded so abnormal or fatal as to render the entire prosecution case doubtful at this tentative stage.

9.The august Supreme Court of Pakistan in Ghazi Arab v. The State (2025 SCMR 1967) has authoritatively held that where delay in lodging the FIR stands reasonably explained through the contents of the FIR itself and surrounding circumstances, the same by itself would not constitute sufficient ground for grant of bail when incriminating material prima facie connects the accused with the commission of the offence. Whether such delay has been satisfactorily explained or whether it affects the intrinsic worth of the prosecution case are matters which squarely fall within the exclusive domain of the learned trial Court after recording of evidence.

10.Equally without force is the argument that the medical evidence contradicts the ocular account. At this preliminary stage, the medical evidence rather appears to lend support to the prosecution version regarding receipt of injuries by the deceased during the occurrence. The exact manner of infliction, nature of participation of each accused and the question whether the injury proved fatal due to direct assault or otherwise are all matters requiring deeper appreciation of evidence which cannot conclusively be adjudicated upon while deciding a bail petition.

11.Likewise, the plea of false implication raised on behalf of the petitioner pertains to disputed questions of fact requiring recording of evidence and full-fledged trial. Such plea, therefore, cannot be conclusively determined at the bail stage.

12.As regards the principle of consistency pressed into service by learned counsel for the petitioner, the same is not attracted in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. The record reveals that co-accused Sajid Khan was admitted to bail primarily on the ground that no specific injury had been attributed to him and his role was considered ancillary in nature. The case of the present petitioner, however, stands on an altogether different footing because a direct and active role of causing injuries to the deceased has specifically been assigned to him. It is by now a settled principle of law that the rule of consistency cannot be applied mechanically and each accused is to be considered according to the nature of allegations and incriminating material available against him.

13.The authorities relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the instant case. In above referred Attique Ahmed Kamal's case, the occurrence had taken place during aerial firing in a marriage procession where the prosecution failed to establish mensrea, motive or intentional targeting. Likewise, in Muhammad Mushtaq's case, the FIR itself disclosed accidental firing during a marriage ceremony and material contradictions existed in the ocular account. Similarly, in Muhammad Zareen's case, the prosecution version itself was that the firearm accidentally discharged while being checked by the accused. In all those cases, doubt regarding applicability of Section 302 P.P.C was found floating on the surface of the record.

14.Contrary thereto, in the present case the petitioner has been specifically nominated in the FIR with a direct and active role of causing stick blows to the deceased during the occurrence. The prosecution version does not depict an accidental or negligent act; rather, prima facie, it discloses a deliberate physical assault allegedly committed during a dispute between the parties. Motive has also specifically been disclosed in the FIR. Consequently, the ratio laid down in the aforementioned authorities is not attracted to the peculiar facts of the present case.

15.It may further be observed that the offence alleged against the petitioner squarely falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C. The settled law is that in offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life, concession of post-arrest bail is not to be extended as a matter of course unless the case falls within the recognized exceptions or calls for further inquiry within the meaning of Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.

16.In the present case, after tentative assessment of the material available on the record, this Court is of the considered view that sufficient grounds exist connecting the petitioner with the commission of the alleged offence. The pleas raised by the defence relate to disputed questions of fact which can only be conclusively determined after recording of evidence during trial. At this stage, no ground has been made out to bring the case of the petitioner within the ambit of further inquiry as envisaged under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.

17.For what has been discussed above, the instant petition, being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed. Needless to observe that any observation made herein is purely tentative in nature and shall not prejudice either party during the course of trial.

JK/26/P Petition dismissed.