zeeshan Durrani Versus State
Inam Ullah Khan, J .--- Through this single judgment, this court is intending to decide the instant as well as connected Appeal No. 924-P/2025 titled Muhammad Imran v. The State and another and connected Criminal Revision No. 210-P/2025 titled Muhammad Imran v. The State and another as all these matters are arising out of one and the same judgment dated 18.09.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-XXI, Peshawar delivered in case FIR No. 114 dated 26.01.2024 under sections 302/324/114 P.P.C registered at Police Station Shahpur, Peshawar, whereby, the respondent/accused Shahzad was acquitted of the charge while the appellant Zeeshan Durrani was convicted and sentenced as under:
Under section 302 (b) P.P.C as Tazir to death penalty and be hanged from neck till death subject to confirmation by the worthy Peshawar High Court, Peshawar. The convict is also to pay compensation of Rs.10,00,000/- (rupees ten lac) to the LRs of the deceased Umar Wali within the meaning of section 544-A Cr.P.C. recoverable as arrears of land revenue and, in default whereof, to suffer simple imprisonment for six months.
Under section 324 P.P.C to simple imprisonment for three years. Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C is extended in favour of the appellant.
2.As per the prosecution case, reflected in the murasila , on 26.01.2024, complainant Muhammad Imran, reported the occurrence at Lady Reading Hospital (LRH), Peshawar stating that he, along with his brother-in-law, Umar Wali (since deceased), was present in his hujra when accused Zeeshan and Shahzed, both armed with deadly weapons, arrived there; that accused Shahzed instigated co-accused Zeeshan to fire at them, whereupon Zeeshan started firing as a result of which Umar Wali received firearm injuries while the complainant remained unhurt; that motive assigned in the FIR is that accused Zeeshan, a drug addict, had been pressuring the deceased to associate with him; that the accused were charged for the commission of the offence hence, the present FIR.
3.It is pertinent to note that soon after the occurrence, the accused went into hiding and proceedings under section 512 Cr.P.C. were initiated against them however, it was upon their arrest that complete challan was submitted to the court. Provisions of section 265-C Cr.P.C. were complied with and, the appellant along with acquitted co-accused was charge sheeted, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In order to prove its claim, the prosecution produced and examined as many as 10 witnesses. After closure of prosecution evidence, statements of the appellant along with co-accused were recorded under section 342 Cr.P.C., wherein they posed innocence. The accused declined to be examined on oath as required under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C.; however, they opted to produce evidence in their defence. Accordingly, Bilal Khan was produced and examined as DW-1. The learned trial Court, after full-fledged trial, acquitted the co-accused Shahzad while convicted the appellant vide the impugned judgment hence, the instant appeal.
4.Arguments heard and record scanned through.
5.After receiving firearm injuries, the injured was immediately taken to the hospital where, the complainant reported the incident. The medical officer examined the injured, prepared the injury sheet, and issued his medico-legal certificate. On the following day, the injured succumbed to his injuries, and consequently, the offence under Section 302 P.P.C was added to the case. After receiving copy of the FIR, the Investigating Officer visited the place of occurrence and, on the pointation of the complainant, prepared the site plan. During spot inspection, blood through cotton was collected from the place of the deceased. The Investigating Officer also recovered 05 empties of 7.62 bore from the scene, which were sealed. Soon after the incident, the accused absconded and remained in hiding. After their arrest, they led the police to the place of occurrence and pointed out certain relevant spots, which were recorded in the investigation proceedings. It is important to note that about two months after the incident, three persons, Bilal, Yaseen, and Furqan, appeared before the competent court and recorded their statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C., in which they blamed the complainant and tried to clear the accused. Later, the Investigating Officer also recorded their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. during the investigation. After completion of the trial and examining all the evidence, the learned trial court found the respondent/accused Shahzad, not guilty and acquitted him however, the appellant was found guilty of the charged offence and was convicted and sentenced through the impugned judgment.
6.The learned trial Court carefully examined all the facts and circumstances of the case and assessed the statements of the witnesses. After properly considering the evidence, it concluded that the appellant had committed the offence and therefore convicted and sentenced him. While hearing appeal, this Court is duty bound to examine whether the findings of the trial Court are supported by the evidence on record; whether the evidence was appreciated in its correct legal perspective; and whether the prosecution proved its case through reliable and trustworthy material. The role of this Court is not simply to agree or disagree with the trial Court, but to ensure that the conviction is based on solid and reliable evidence, and not on assumptions. It is admitted that the prosecution case mainly depends upon the statement of a single eye-witness. However, it is a settled principle of law that conviction can be based on the testimony of a single witness, even in a murder case, if that witness is found to be truthful and trustworthy. The law does not require a large number of witnesses; rather, it requires that the evidence be credible and convincing. If the sole witness appears natural, consistent, and remains firm during cross-examination, his testimony can be sufficient for conviction. However, where the death penalty has been awarded, the evidence must be examined with great care. The appellate Court must carefully re-evaluate the entire record to ensure that no reasonable doubt has been overlooked. Since human life is involved, the evidence must be weighed very carefully, and the conclusions must be clear and free from uncertainty therefore, to properly decide whether the trial Court was justified in convicting the appellant and awarding the death sentence, this Court finds it necessary to re-examine the statements of the witnesses and review the entire evidence again so that no miscarriage of justice has occurred.
7.To properly understand the special circumstances of this case, we consider it necessary to re-examine not only the statements of the prosecution witnesses but also the delayed statements of Bilal, Yasir, and Furqan recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and to assess their value and effect on the case of the appellant. It is not disputed that the incident took place inside the Hujra of the complainant. According to the prosecution, the complainant and the deceased were present there at the relevant time. The allegation is that the accused, armed with weapon, entered the Hujra and started firing as a result, the deceased sustained firearm injuries while the complainant remained unharmed. To determine whether the incident occurred in the manner alleged, we carefully examined the testimony of the complainant (PW-9). He gave a detailed account of the occurrence, how both of them were present in the Hujra, how the accused arrived armed, how he fired shots, how the deceased was injured, and how the injured was immediately taken to the hospital where the matter was reported to the police. He was thoroughly cross-examined on all important points. The key question is whether this cross-examination weakened his version or created serious doubts about the prosecution case. It is an admitted fact that the matter was reported promptly. The injured was taken to the hospital in critical condition and examined without delay. The scribe of the FIR (PW-2) confirmed that he was present at the hospital and that priority was given to medical treatment thereafter, recorded the report of the complainant. He also confirmed that the deceased was unconscious at that time. The medical officer (PW-7) stated that although the injured could utter a few words, he was confused and unable to speak coherently. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the injured could speak, he should have lodged the report himself instead of the complainant, however, this argument is not convincing as the medical evidence clearly shows that the injured was not mentally fit to give a proper statement. Furthermore, if the complainant had actually been the attacker, as claimed by the defence, it would be unnatural for the injured, while still conscious, to remain silent and not name the real culprit. The fact that he did not make any such accusation against the complainant seriously damage the defence version. The circumstances also show that it was the complainant who immediately took the injured to the hospital and reported the matter. If he had been the assailant, it would be highly unlikely for him to take the injured to public hospital and expose himself to immediate suspicion, especially when, according to the defence, other persons like Bilal were present and aware of the incident therefore, the prompt reporting of the crime, the medical evidence regarding the condition of the injured, and the consistent statement of the complainant together support his testimony. No major contradiction or improvement has been pointed out to make his evidence unreliable. It is true that the complainant is related to the deceased, but mere relationship is not a reason to reject a witness. The correct approach is to examine such evidence carefully. If, after careful scrutiny, the testimony appears natural, consistent, and trustworthy, it can form the basis of conviction even in a murder case. The learned trial Court carefully evaluated the evidence of the complainant and found him to be truthful and reliable. After independently reviewing the record, we find no strong reason to disagree with that conclusion.
8.The Investigating Officer (PW-8) explained the steps he took during the investigation. He stated that after receiving the FIR, he visited the place of occurrence and prepared the site plan on the pointation of the complainant. During inspection of the spot, he collected blood through cotton and recovered five empties of 7.62 before from the scene. These recoveries support the case of the prosecution about the place and manner of the incident. He further stated that about two months after the incident, three persons Yaseen, Bilal, and Furqan recorded their statements before the Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and later, their statements were also recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The Investigating Officer confirmed that he looked into this aspect and produced these witnesses before the Magistrate for recording their statements. However, the real issue is not simply that these statements were recorded, but what value they have and whether they weaken the prosecution case. It is an admitted fact that the incident took place on 26.01.2024, while their statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. were recorded after about two months, and those under Section 161 Cr.P.C. after nearly six months, but no satisfactory explanation for this long delay has been given. The complainant and the deceased were known to these witnesses. If they had truly seen the incident as later claimed, their silence for such a long time seriously affects their credibility. It is also important that out of these witnesses, only Bilal appeared before the trial Court as defence witness (DW-1). The others did not appear in court, so their conduct must therefore be examined in light of the surrounding circumstances. Bilal claimed that he and others shifted the injured to the hospital. If this were true, it raises a natural question: why did he not report the matter to the police, especially if, as claimed by the defence, the complainant was the real attacker. Moreover, if he had actually taken the injured to the hospital, his name would normally have appeared in the inquest report or in the post-mortem papers. The absence of his name in those documents weakens his claim. Learned counsel for the appellant also pointed out that the medico-legal certificate initially mentioned the time of examination as 6:58 p.m., which was later changed to 7:58 p.m., arguing that this change was made to hide delay. Even if it is assumed that there was some correction in the time, it does not support the defence case. If Bilal was present at the hospital earlier and the complainant was not there, he had clear opportunity to report the matter and name the complainant as the attacker, but he remained silent. This silence, followed by recording of statement after two months, reduces the reliability of his version. Regarding lighting conditions, the Investigating Officer stated that he prepared the site plan with the help of available light and torch. The incident occurred inside the Hujra of complainant, and the parties knew each other. Considering their close distance at the time of firing and prior acquaintance, the chance of mistaken identity is very low. When the testimony of Bilal is compared with the prompt reporting of the incident, the medical evidence, the recoveries from the spot, and the unexplained delay in giving his statement, his version does not appear trustworthy. The delayed statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C., without any proper explanation and without supporting conduct at the relevant time, cannot override a consistent and supported prosecution case. On overall examination of the record, it is clear that the defence story, introduced after a long delay, does not make the innocence of the appellant and does not create reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. The prosecution witnesses, when considered together, have remained consistent on all important aspects of the incident. The complainant has clearly proved his presence at the scene. The prompt lodging of the FIR and the direct naming of the accused reduce the chances of false implication or consultation. The record also shows that it was the complainant who shifted the injured to the hospital. His presence there is confirmed by the scribe of the FIR and by the medical officer who examined the injured and prepared the medico-legal certificate. These independent pieces of evidence support the version of the complainant. When all these facts are considered together, it becomes clear that the prosecution has successfully connected the appellant with the offence. The complainant has convincingly proved both his presence at the scene and his role in taking the injured to the hospital. The defence argued that although firing was allegedly directed at both the deceased and the complainant, and the complainant remained unharmed. However, the mere fact that he was not injured does not make his testimony false. It cannot be assumed that every person present at the scene must suffer injuries. Although the motive suggested by the prosecution may not be fully clear, but it cannot be said that the complainant was necessarily the main target therefore, his survival does not weaken the prosecution case or reduce the credibility of his eye-witness account. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex court titled Muhammad Ijaz v. The State (2023 SCMR 1375) wherein, it has held as under: -
These prosecution witnesses were residents of the same locality, therefore, their presence at the place of occurrence was natural. These prosecution witnesses were subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the defence but nothing favourable to the petitioner or adverse to the prosecution could be brought on record.
9.The medical evidence, when read together with the eye-witness account, further supports the prosecution case. The deceased received two firearm injuries. The defence argued that, considering the distance between the parties, there should have been no charring marks on the body. However, the presence of charring on one injury shows that at least one shot was fired from close range, while the other may have been fired from a slightly longer distance. This difference does not contradict the prosecution story. Instead, it fits naturally with what can happen during a sudden firing incident, where shots may be fired from different distances within a short time. It is a settled principle that medical evidence mainly serves to confirm or support the direct evidence. When there is a reliable and confidence-inspiring eye-witness account, medical evidence is considered corroborative. In this case, the medical evidence is consistent with the eye-witness version and further strengthen its truthfulness. In similar circumstances, we derive wisdom from the judgment of the apex Court titled Aqil v. The State , (2023 SCMR 831) , which reads as follows: -
The medical evidence available on the record further corroborates the ocular account so far as the nature, time, locale and impact of the injuries on the person of the deceased and injured is concerned. Even otherwise, it is settled law that where ocular evidence is found trustworthy and confidence inspiring, the same is given preference over medical evidence and the same alone is sufficient to sustain conviction of an accused.
10.Regarding motive, it is true that the prosecution has not presented very strong or convincing evidence explaining the exact reason behind the crime. The motive suggested is somewhat weak however, it is settled that when there is clear and reliable direct evidence, the absence or weakness of motive alone is not enough to acquit an accused in a murder case. Human behavior is complex, and sometimes crimes are committed due to personal grudges or emotions that are not fully known to others. The issue of motive can become important at the stage of sentencing. Even if it does not affect the finding of guilt, it may help the Court decide whether the death penalty is appropriate or whether lesser punishment would meet the ends of justice therefore, the key question before this Court is whether the sentence awarded by the trial Court is in accordance with law and whether the reasons given justify imposing the death penalty. There is no dispute that the deceased suffered firearm injuries and later died because of them. As already discussed, the eye-witness and medical evidence clearly prove that the appellant committed the offence however, the matter does not end with conviction; the correctness of the sentence must also be examined. It has come on record that the deceased and the appellant knew each other and were on friendly terms. According to the complainant, they used to sit together and smoke. The motive suggested was that the complainant objected the frequent visit of the appellant to the deceased, which allegedly led to tension and finally to the incident. If this is accepted, it appears that any grievance was mainly between the complainant and the appellant, not directly with the deceased. The exact cause of the dispute and what immediately led to the firing are not fully clear. In this sense, the motive remains uncertain. It is well established that where motive is weak or not clearly proved, and where the incident does not appear to be the result of clear preplanning, such factors may not change the conviction but can be considered while deciding the sentence. The evidence justifies maintaining the conviction under Section 302 P.P.C, the important question is whether this case deserves the death penalty. Considering all the circumstances, the relationship between the parties, the lack of a strong and clear motive, and the surrounding facts of the case, this Court is of the view that the death sentence awarded by the trial Court appears somewhat harsh. In our opinion, the case does not fall within the category of the rarest of rare cases that require the extreme penalty. Although the sentence cannot be called completely unjustified, it does not fully align with the overall circumstances of the case. The trial Court did not properly consider the exact nature of the dispute and the surrounding factors while awarding the death sentence. Accordingly, the instant criminal appeal is partially allowed and, while maintaining the conviction of the appellant under section 302(b) P.P.C, his sentence of death is reduced to imprisonment for life whereas, the remaining portion of the judgment shall remain intact.
11.The Murder Reference No. 18- P/2025 is answered in negative .
12.Now diverting to Criminal Revision No. 210-P/2025 titled Muhammad Imran v. The State and another , whereby, the petitioner/complainant seeks enhancement of the compensation etc. awarded to the appellant/convict. However, as this Court has partly allowed the appeal of the respondent/accused by reducing his conviction from death to imprisonment for life , so the instant criminal revision has become infructuous and is accordingly dismissed.
13.Now diverting to Criminal Appeal No. 924-P/2025 titled Muhammad Imran v. The State and another , whereby, the petitioner/complainant had challenged the acquittal of the respondent/accused Shahzad. Record shows that the role assigned to the respondent/accused Shahzad was only that he made a lalkara at the time of the incident. The actual firing, which caused the death of the deceased, was attributed to the co-accused, who has already been convicted. A mere lalkara , without clear proof that the accused actively helped, encouraged, or planned the offence, is not enough to hold him responsible for murder. Simply shouting something at the scene, without independent evidence showing participation, does not prove common intention or liability under Section 34 P.P.C. There is no material on record to show that the two accused had any prior planning or consultation before the incident. No such conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the surrounding circumstances. The fact that the appellant did not fire any shot further weakens the suggestion of a prior meeting of minds or a joint plan. It also reduces the possibility of premeditation. The prosecution did not produce any independent evidence to support the allegation of lalkara . In the absence of such corroboration, the allegation remains doubtful and unproven therefore, the learned trial Court rightly gave the benefit of doubt to the respondent/accused. Since this is an appeal against acquittal, it is important to note that the principles governing such an appeal are different from those in an appeal against conviction. It is well settled that once a person has been acquitted by a competent court, the presumption of innocence in his favour becomes even stronger. An appellate court can interfere with an acquittal only if there are very strong and exceptional reasons however, in the instant case, no such exceptional circumstances have been shown that would justify interfering with the acquittal. It is a basic principle of criminal law that an accused is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Once acquitted, this presumption is reinforced, often described as a double presumption of innocence therefore, in the absence of strong and convincing reasons, which are clearly not present here, there is no justification to disturb the acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the apex court titled Al-Haaj Malik Muhammad Ashraf v. Javed Akhtar and another (2025 SCMR 787), wherein, it has been held as under:
It is a well-settled principle that an acquitted accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence. An appellate court should exercise restraint in overturning an acquittal unless the judgment is manifestly perverse, arbitrary, or suffers from a glaring misreading or non-reading of material evidence, which is not evident in the present case. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Mansha Kausar v. Muhammad Asghar and others (2003 SCMR 477).
14.The cumulative effect of what has been stated above, leads this Court to an irresistible conclusion that the impugned judgment to the extent of respondent/accused Shahzad is well reasoned, which do not call for interference. The instant Criminal Appeal No. 924-P/2025 titled Muhammad Imran v. The State and another , being bereft of merit, is dismissed.
JK/104/P Order accordingly.
Judges on this bench
- Sahibzada Asadullah280 judgments
- Inam Ullah Khan21 judgments