Mst. RUKHSANA SAJID Versus State

MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, J.--- The petitioner, Mst. Rukhsana Bibi wife of Liaqat Ali, was booked in Crime No. 11/2020, lodged at police station ANF, District Lahore on 21.02.2022 under sections 9(c) and 15 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 ("the CNSA"). After investigation and regular trial, the learned Judge, Special Court CNS, Lahore convicted the petitioner under section 9(c) of the CNSA through judgement dated 24.01.2024 and sentenced her to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 500,000/- and in default whereof to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months with benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C. She assailed her conviction and sentence before the Lahore High Court, Lahore by means of Criminal Appeal No. 29977/2024 which also remained unsuccessful, hence the present petition for leave to appeal.

2.Briefly, case of the prosecution as per written statement (Ex.PA/1) is that on 20.02.2022, an information through secret source was received by high-ups that Liaqat Ali and Rukhsana Bibi, who both are husband and wife, are involved in narcotics business and they have concealed a huge quantity of narcotics in their residing house situated at Block-A, House No. 55/3, Defense Garden Housing Society, Kamahan Road, Lahore and they will supply the said narcotics to their specific customer while availing the opportunity; upon such information and on the instructions of high-ups while adopting due course of law, raided the said house, where petitioner was found present and on her pointation 51.600 kilograms charas were recovered.

3.We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the available record which reveals that the entire case of prosecution rests upon an uncorroborated " spy information " which has no legal sanctity. The record is completely silent as regards any formal disclosure statement made by the petitioner having been recorded either under section 161 Cr.P.C or before a Magistrate. It is admitted feature of the case that petitioner is a married woman whose husband Liaqat Ali was admittedly not present at the time of raid. There is not an iota of evidence that the petitioner was running the alleged drug business or that she had any dominion or control over the recovered substance. Mere presence of a wife in the matrimonial home where contraband is allegedly recovered does not, by itself, attract the mischief of section 9(c) of the CNSA. It is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice that women in our society constitute the most depressed and vulnerable segment and they are implicated in criminal cases on the basis of mere relationship with the real accused without any independent evidence of their guilt.

4.We are in agreement with the learned Special Prosecutor, ANF that as per principle of Matrimonial Agency a husband and wife are considered agents of each other, but it can only be considered in the conduct of their marital affairs. This principle implies that the actions of one spouse can bind the other, particularly in matters related to the family and household. It is primarily a civil law principle governing contractual liability for household expenses and does not extend to criminal liability. Marriage alone does not create a general agency relationship between husband and wife. However, an implied agency of necessity arises from the marital relationship and the husband's duty to maintain his wife is a principle recognized in both Muslim personal law and common-law traditions. This principle protects the wife's right to maintenance and ensures domestic harmony by allowing her to run the household without constant explicit authorization. This principle of matrimonial agency has absolutely no application to criminal liability. It is strictly limited to civil contractual obligation that too to protect the rights of wife.

5.Similarly, there exists no provision in any penal statute which fastens criminal liability upon a wife merely by reason of her matrimonial association with the alleged offender. Criminal liability, under our jurisprudence, is inherently personal and attaches only where the elements of actus reus and mens rea are independently established against the accused. In the social fabric of Pakistan-where women, particularly within domestic settings, often occupy positions shaped by dependency, obedience, and limited autonomy-the danger of unjust attribution of criminality becomes all the more pronounced. It is not uncommon that a wife, by reason of social conditioning or familial pressures, is placed in proximity to acts without any conscious participation therein. To extend the doctrine of matrimonial agency into the realm of criminal law would be to convert a protective civil principle into a punitive tool, thereby undermining the guarantees of dignity, liberty, and due process enshrined in Articles 4, 9 and 10 of the Constitution. There is no concept of vicarious criminal liability arising merely from the bond of marriage. A spouse cannot be held liable for the acts of the other in the absence of clear, cogent and independent evidence demonstrating intentional cogent, participation, facilitation, or conscious complicity.

6.Equally, while the historical presumption that a wife acts under the coercion of her husband may, in certain circumstances, still hold evidentiary relevance, it must be applied with caution and sensitivity to contemporary realities. Pakistani society presents a complex duality: on the one hand, many women continue to face coercion, economic dependence, and social constraints; on the other, they are increasingly asserting autonomy and agency. The law cannot proceed on rigid assumptions of either subservience or independence. Where evidence reveals that a woman acted under compulsion, fear, or lack of volition, the benefit of doubt must lean in her favour, consistent with the settled principle that doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused. Conversely, where it is affirmatively established that she acted freely, with knowledge and intent, she cannot claim immunity merely by virtue of her marital status. Even in offences such as those contemplated under sections 494 and 496 P.P.C., liability must rest upon proof of conscious and voluntary involvement. The Court, therefore, must strike a careful balance-ensuring that women are neither unjustly ensnared in criminal proceedings due to their marital status nor placed beyond the reach of law where culpability is clearly made out.

7.While considering the case in hand on the touchstone of the above principles of law, we are of the considered view that the prosecution case is full of lacunae i.e., absence of independent witnesses; absence of alleged disclosure; no evidence of exclusive or conscious possession by the petitioner and abscondence of her husband. The evidence presented does not meet the requisite standard of proof necessary for a conviction. Consequently, this petition is converted into an appeal and allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment. The petitioner is acquitted of the charges levelled against her and she is ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

JK/R-3/SC Appeal allowed.