Pakistan Case LawNANI GOPAL KAR CHOWDHURY Versus MESSRS SURRIDGE AND BEECHENO
This matter involves an employment dispute where the petitioner challenged his removal from service by a legal firm, Messrs Surridge and Beecheno. The core legal questions are whether a legal firm qualifies as a 'shop' or 'commercial establishment' under labour laws, whether the petitioner attained permanent status after the expiry of his probationary period, and whether his removal without a charge-sheet or inquiry was lawful. The court held that a legal firm falls within the definition of a commercial establishment, rendering the application under the labour laws competent, and that the petitioner's removal without inquiry was illegal. The court's final order disposed of the petition by refusing reinstatement in its discretion and instead directing the second party to pay full termination benefits, including notice pay, compensation, unpaid wages, and earned leave salary within one month. The court laid down the principle that a legal firm providing services for fees constitutes a commercial establishment under the relevant shops and establishments legislation, and a probationer whose job is of a clerical nature becomes permanent by operation of law upon the expiry of the probationary period.
- Whether a legal firm providing services for fees qualifies as a commercial establishment under the East Pakistan Shops and Establishments Act?
- Does an employee performing clerical duties become permanent upon the expiry of their probationary period under the East Pakistan Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act 1965?
- Is the removal of a permanent worker without a charge-sheet and an inquiry legally valid?
- Can the court award termination benefits in lieu of reinstatement as a matter of discretion?
DECISION
For convenience of discussion I take up all the 3 points together.
It is submitted by the second party that the Standing Orders Act, 1965 has got no application in this case. Messrs Surridge and Beecheno is a legal firm. Definition of "Shop" is wide enough to include a legal firm where services arc rendered to clients on payment of fees. It is not necessary that a shop is always to‑deal in commodities. To cite an hypothetical case, a cycle repairing establishment is also a shop. Definition of shop includes also a premises where services are rendered to customers. So, a legal firm's notice may come within the definition of a "Shop". Then again, legal advice and legal assistance are rendered on payment of fees. The business of a legal firm is, therefore, or a commercial nature. So, a legal firm can very well come under the definition of a "Commercial Establishment" as defined in the East Pakistan Shops and Establishments Act, 1965. Section 1 of the East Pakistan Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965, says that it shall apply to every shop or commercial establishment to which the East Bengal Shops and Establishments Act applies that being the position of law I am of opinion that this application under section 25 of the Standing. Orders Act, 1965 is quite competent.
There is no doubt that the petitioner is a worker as defined in the Standing Orders act, 1965. His job was of clerical nature, Necessarily under the Act, on the expiry of his period of proba tion for 6 months, the petitioner became permanent. The petitioner's length of service is over 1 years. He has been removed from the service without giving any opportunity to explain his conduct. Whatever the allegations be against the petitioner there was no charge‑sheet, there was no enquiry and there was absolutely no opportunity for the petitioner to explain anything. That being so, the removal of the petitioner from service is apparently illegal and invalid. It is said that on the prayer of the petitioner his probationary period was extended. No paper has, however, been produced to show that the petitioner ever prayed for extension of the period of his probation. On the other hand, the petitioner categorically avers in his application that he was serving under the second party with the entire satisfaction of his superiors. The petitioner has prayed alternatively for termination benefits. The order for re‑instatement being a matter for discretion of the Court. I am not, in the circumstances of the case, inclined to thrust the petitioner on the second party by way of re‑instatement, rather I am inclined to give full termi nation benefits to the petitioner in this case.
In giving the benefits to the petitioner I have considered the opinion of both the learned Members in this regard, who are also in c3mplete agreement with my views.
The petitioner will therefore, get the following benefits from the second party
and
The second party do pay up the amounts indicated above to the first party petitioner within one month from this date.
Judges on this bench
- Md. Nurul Huda24 judgments
- M. A. Sabur56 judgments