MUHAMMAD KAZIM AND 2 OTHERS Versus DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, MULTAN

DECISION

The above‑cited three appeals have been filed against three separate orders dated, 6th May 1975 of similar contents passed by the learned Junior Labour Court, Multan, whereby the appellant's petitions under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 were dismissed. The appellant through their petitions preyed for setting aside the order of suspension from service passed against them on 6th August, 1972 in connection with the alleged criminal negligence on their part resulting in the sad incident of collision between 6 Dn. train (Tezrao) and 508 un. Goods Train at Railway Station Liaqatpur on 6th August, 1972. The learned lower Court has formed a view that as the appellant were suspended under the Departmental Rules of Service the criminal case having been pending against them in the criminal Court, the suspension order could not be set aside.

Muhammad Kazim and Muhammad Ashiq appellants pointsmen and Muhammad Hussain appellant is Ass1stant Station Master Liaqatpur. All the three officials are under suspension since 6Lh August, 1972 pending criminal trial against them under section 304, P. P. C. in the Court of Ass1stant Commissioner, Liaqatpur. It is urged on behalf of the Railway Department that under Article II of the North Western, Railway (P. W. R,) Personnel Manual a Railway servant once placed under suspension pending trial in a Court of Law cannot be re‑instated until judgment is delivered by the Court and on that score the appellants are to remain under suspension till the decision of the case against them. The aforesaid Article No. 11 reads as follows: ‑

A plain reading of the above provisions gives a clear impression that a railway servant shall be placed under suspension soon lie is arrested in a criminal case and may remain under suspension pending trial against him in the Court but in the event of his release on bail, the matter must be pal before the competent authority to decide whether he should continue to remain under suspension or could be allowed to resume duty pending decision of the Court. This is the only reasonable position which can be spelled out of the provisions of Article 11‑A. Because in the event of an accused person being released cm bail the gravity of the offences alleged against him prima facie stands mitigated and it gives rise to a reasonable ground to consider the case of the accused at departmental level to come to a fresh decision whether the official while being on bail can be usefully put to any official duty or not. This kind of consideration by the competent authority is a necessary step for deciding the fate of a railway servant in regard to the continuance or otherwise of his suspension from service, If no such step is taken and no fresh decision is made in this behalf by a competent authority then the Railway servant affected by this on consideration cannot be kept under suspension in conformity to Article 11‑A. This provision cannot be construed to mean that once a railway servant is placed under suspension in a criminal case pending trial in a Court of law he will continue under suspension indefinitely till the case is decided by the Court. By' putting such a construction on the said rule a railway servant can remain under suspension for a substantial period of his service is' the trial persist for years together for some unforeseen reasons. Article 11‑B, reproduced above prescribes a period of four months for suspension or any railway servant whose conduct is undergoing investigation on a charge calling for a penalty of dismissal or removal from service and after this period approval for the extension of his suspension period by competent authority is necessary. The learned counsel for the respondent tried to make distinction between the investigation and trial of a case and argued that the said period is provided in connection with an investigation of a charge and not the trial. But the argument has no substance inasmuch as investigation is only an initial stage of the case and final decision of criminal case always rests with the court concerned so the stage of investigation in a criminal case should not be regarded as the only stage of the criminal case for which suspension period of four months extendable to further periods should be regarded to have been prescribed under the rule. The reasonable interpreta tion of Article 11 as a whole would be that it is within the discretion of the competent railway authority to place a railway employee under suspension pending investigation or trial in a criminal case against him and to consider his case after normal intervals and to decide as to the extension of his suspension period or resumption of duty by him during the pendency of the case against him.

Two co‑accused of the present appellants were re‑instated in supersession of the order of their suspension by the learned Junior Labour Court, Multan, and an appeal filed on behalf of the Railway Department was dismissed by this Court vide order, dated 2nd December 1974, with the following observations:‑

The appellants in the present case have been under suspension for about three years. It is pretty long period during which their fate has been hanging in the balance without any final decision in their case. In such situation their cases were to be scrutinised under the relevant departmental rules to come to a decision by the competent authorities whether they should be put back to their duty during the pendency of original trial against them. In the absence of any such consideration or decision the appellants deserve to be put back to their duties without any further delay. Accordingly the suspension orders passed against the appellants on 6th August 1972 or on any subsequent date by the railway authorities are set aside and they are o directed to be put back to their duties within a period of one week pending criminal trial against them. The respondent railway Administration will pass suitable order in due course after the trial is concluded against the appellants. The appeal is accepted in all the three cases cited above by the present order. The file may be consigned.