Pakistan Case Law
1972 SCMR 251

GULZAR BEGUM vs Mst. SAIRAH BIBI

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Citation1972 SCMR 251
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1972 S. A. O. No. 92 of 1969 C. P. S. L. A. No. 104 of 1972
Date1972-06-23
Judge(s)Hamoodur Rahman, C. J. and Waheeduddin Ahmad
Authored byWaheeduddin Ahmad
ResultAppeal accepted
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

This matter arose from an eviction dispute concerning evacuee property transferred to the respondent under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The respondent filed a suit for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent, asserting that a notice under Section 30 of the Act had been served on the appellant. The appellant denied service of the notice, thereby rebutting the presumption of service. The Rent Controller framed preliminary issues regarding the validity of the notice and the status of the Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.). The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where a tenant denies service of notice on oath, the presumption of service is rebutted. Consequently, the trial court must compare the disputed signature with admitted signatures and provide the landlord an opportunity to produce the postman to prove delivery and signature. The Court set aside the trial court's order and remanded the case for a fresh decision in accordance with these directions.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • How can a tenant rebut the presumption of service of a statutory notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • What procedure must a trial court follow to determine the validity of service when a tenant denies receiving a notice and signing the acknowledgment due?
  • Is the testimony of a postman or a comparison of signatures necessary to prove service of notice if the recipient denies their signature on the acknowledgment receipt?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Section 30, Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958
evictionevacuee propertystatutory noticedenial of servicerebuttal of presumptionhandwriting comparisonremand

ORDER

1. WAHEEDUDDIN AHMAD, J.-The dispute between the parties in respect of property No. C/95, Khata Bulaqi Shah, Gumti Bazar Lahore. This was an evacuee property which was transferred to the respondent on the 24th February 1960. The respondent who is alleged to have given a notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, filed a suit for eviction on the ground that the appellant has failed and neglected to pay the rent. The Rent Controller framed two preliminary issues namely :-

(i) whether the respondent has served a valid notice upon the appellant as required under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and

(ii) whether P. T. O. Dated the 24th February 1960, has ceased to be operative. If so, from which date and with what effect from these proceedings.

2. By consent of the parties, the petition is treated as an appeal. The record of the lower Courts has been summoned and has been perused.

3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we are' satisfied that in the present case, the appellant has rebutted the presumption by appearing in Court and by denying the service of the notice. In these circumstances, the trial Court should have got the signature of the appellant compared with the signature on the admitted documents. It should have further given an opportunity to the respondent to produce the postman to prove that the notice and the acknowledgement due was offered to the appellant for service and that she signed it. In view of this, the learned trial Court has failed to approach the matter in accordance with law and has fallen into an error. We would, therefore, set aside the order of the learned trial Court dated the 13th September 1968 and remand the case back to him for decision of the case in the light of the above observation.

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