FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against interim orders passed by the Lahore High Court directing the payment of Secretariat Allowance to the respondents pending the decision of their writ petitions, which orders followed a previous direction of the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether leave to appeal should be granted against interim orders where the petitions were also barred by time and lacked satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that it was not inclined to grant leave to interfere with the impugned interim orders due to the delay and unsatisfactory explanation. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will decline to grant leave to appeal against interim orders when the petition is time-barred and no sufficient cause for condonation of delay is shown.
- Whether leave to appeal can be granted against interim orders when the petition is barred by time?
- Is an unsatisfactory explanation for delay sufficient to condone the time bar in filing a civil petition for leave to appeal?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere with interim orders passed by the High Court directing payment of Secretariat Allowance under such circumstances?
ORDER
MANZOOR HUSSAIN SIAL, J.---By this order we propose to dispose of Civil Petitions Nos. 461, 462, 463 and 464 of 1994, as they arise out of similar facts and raise identical legal point therein.
2.The petitioners seek leave to appeal against similar orders passed by the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court (Multan Bench) directing the petitioners to pay Secretariat Allowance to the respondents pending decision of the writ petitions filed by them.
3.The orders impugned were passed by the learned Single Judge in the Lahore High Court on the strength of the direction made by this Court to the petitioners for payment of Secretariat Allowance in Federation of Pakistan v. Abdur Rehman (C.P.No, 165 of 1994).
3. All the above noted petitions not only impugned interim orders but are barred by time for over 18 days. The explanation tendered for condonation of delay is hardly satisfactory.
We are, therefore, not inclined to grant leave in these petitions so as to call for interference in the impugned orders and dismiss these petitions.
Judges on this bench
- Manzoor Hussain Sial807 judgments