Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Pearl Continental Hotels National Labour vs National Industrial Relations2022 IHC 226 · Islamabad High Court
  constitutional jurisdictionalternative remedywrit petitionIndustrial Relations ActNational Industrial Relations CommissionCollective Bargaining Agentmaintainabilityreferendum proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging an order passed by an 'Authorized Officer' of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) that halted referendum proceedings for the determination of a Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA). The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction when an alternative statutory remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The Court held that the order of the Authorized Officer, who exercised delegated powers of a Member of the Commission, is appealable before the Full Bench of the Commission under Section 58 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing the principle that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, particularly when a special statute provides an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy. The Court emphasized that litigants must exhaust available statutory forums before approaching the High Court, as bypassing these forums undermines the legislative intent behind creating specialized adjudicatory bodies.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against an order of an Authorized Officer of the National Industrial Relations Commission when an appeal lies to the Full Bench of the Commission?
  • Does the order of an Authorized Officer, acting under delegated powers of a Member of the Commission, constitute an order appealable under Section 58 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Should the High Court exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 when an adequate statutory remedy is available and the relevant forum is functional?
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• Parvaiz Akhter Bhatti and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division, Islamabad and 5 others2022 PLC (C.S.) 1035 · Islamabad High Court
  Public sector companyCorporate governanceMaster and servant doctrineWrit jurisdictionIndependent directorConflict of interestAppointment legality
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple writ petitions challenging the appointments of the Chairman, Managing Director, and Board of Directors of the Pakistan Television Corporation (PTVC), along with amendments to PTVC service rules and the termination of certain employees. The core legal questions involve whether these appointments complied with the Companies Act, 2017 and Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013, and whether the PTVC service rules are statutory, thereby allowing judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court held that the appointments of the Chairman and several Directors were illegal due to failure to select candidates from the SECP data bank, conflicts of interest, and non-compliance with fit and proper criteria. Conversely, the appointment of the Managing Director and other staff was upheld. Regarding service rules, the Court ruled that PTVC rules are non-statutory, invoking the Master and Servant doctrine, thus rendering petitions regarding internal service conditions non-maintainable. The key principle laid down is that public sector companies must strictly adhere to statutory appointment procedures and transparency requirements, and that internal service rules of such corporations are generally not enforceable via writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of a Chairman and Directors of a public sector company without selecting from the SECP data bank is illegal?
  • Does the Master and Servant doctrine apply to the service rules of the Pakistan Television Corporation?
  • Can the High Court interfere in the internal service conditions of a public sector company under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Whether a person with a conflict of interest or pecuniary interest in a public sector company is eligible to be appointed as a Director?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited Through GM (Regulatory2022 MLD 1914 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-08-26Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf through its Secretary General Mr Asad Umer vs The Election Commission of Pakistan, through its Chief Election Commissioner & another2022 IHC 182 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-06-14Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf through its Secretary General Mr Asad Umar vs Speaker of the National Assembly of Pakistan through its Secretary National Assembly Sectt. & 126 others2022 IHC 214 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-09-06Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Services Limited vs Full Bench, Nationa Industrial Relations2022 IHC 228 · Islamabad High Court
  trans-provincial establishmentindustry-wise trade unioncollective bargaining agentreferendumwrit of certiorariprospective operation of judgmentlocus standi of employerNational Industrial Relations Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment disposes of four writ petitions challenging orders passed by the Full Bench and Single Member of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) regarding the registration of industry-wise trade unions and the holding of a referendum for determining the Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) in Pearl Continental Hotels. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner-company, Pakistan Services Limited, is a trans-provincial establishment, whether the Registrar of Trade Unions (RTU) possessed jurisdiction to register industry-wise trade unions, and whether the rule of law laid down in Chevron Pakistan Lubricants (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan applies retrospectively. The Islamabad High Court held that the petitioner-company is indeed a trans-provincial establishment operating a chain of hotels across multiple provinces with its head office in the Islamabad Capital Territory. The court further held that while subsequent jurisprudence establishes that the NIRC—not the RTU—has exclusive jurisdiction to register industry-wise trade unions, that legal interpretation operates prospectively and cannot be applied retrospectively to invalidate past registrations that constitute closed transactions. Finally, the court ruled that employers lack locus standi to challenge the registration of trade unions under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. Consequently, all writ petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer has the locus standi to challenge the registration of a trade union or an industry-wise trade union under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Whether the rule of law laid down regarding the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission to register industry-wise trade unions applies retrospectively to past registrations?
  • Whether a company operating hotels across multiple provinces qualifies as a trans-provincial establishment under Section 2(xxxii) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Whether a High Court can issue a writ of certiorari to interfere with concurrent factual findings of lower tribunals in the absence of a patent jurisdictional error?
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• Pakistan Muslim League (N) through Parliamentary Party Leader in Senate2022 PLD Islamabad 64 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-10-01Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Engineering Council through its Chairman & 3 others vs Federal2022 IHC 284 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-12-06Read full judgment →
• Nouman Mushtaq vs The State2022 MLD 905 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-06-22
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substancesborderline caseFSL reportfurther inquiryspeedy trialfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a post-arrest bail application under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, filed by the petitioner, Nauman Mushtaq, who was charged under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged possession of 1350 grams of charas. The core legal questions were whether the recovery of 1350 grams of narcotics constitutes a 'borderline case' warranting bail, and whether the absence of a Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report makes the case one of further inquiry. The Court held that the recovery of 1350 grams of charas falls within the borderline criteria established by precedent, and the non-availability of the FSL report renders the case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial, noting the lack of trial progress due to COVID-19. Consequently, the Court granted post-arrest bail, establishing the principle that borderline quantities of narcotics and the absence of FSL reports are valid grounds for bail in narcotic cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of 1350 grams of charas qualify as a borderline case for the purpose of granting bail under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Does the non-availability of a Forensic Science Laboratory report regarding recovered narcotics make a case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the delay in trial proceedings due to external factors like a pandemic justify the grant of bail to an accused person?
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• Nazma Bibi vs Full Bench of NIRC & another2022 IHC 244 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-10-18
  termination in simplicitorindustrial relationsreinstatementcriminal incarcerationjusticiable reasonslabor court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional petition filed by the petitioner, a Telex Operator employed by the respondent Bank, assailing the judgment of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission which had allowed the bank's appeal and set aside the Labour Court's reinstatement order. The core legal question concerns the validity and justiciability of an employer's order of termination in simplicitor issued on the ground of the employee's incarceration and inability to keep the post vacant, while dropping parallel disciplinary proceedings. The Islamabad High Court held that under the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the reasons given for termination in simplicitor are justiciable and must be sufficient, valid, and appropriate. The Court found that since the petitioner was released on bail within seven months, the post remained vacant, and she was subsequently acquitted, the stated reason for termination was neither sufficient nor valid. The petition was allowed, and the Commission's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Are the reasons given by an employer for termination in simplicitor justiciable?
  • Can an employer terminate an employee in simplicitor due to incarceration when the post remains vacant and the employee is subsequently released on bail and acquitted?
  • Does the scope of inquiry by a competent forum regarding termination in simplicitor extend to determining whether the employer's stated reasons are explicit, clear, enough, and valid?
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• Nauman Hussain vs The State and another2022 MLD 958 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-09-20
  post-arrest bailsexual abuseprohibitory clausenon-bailable offensesrepetition of offensecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, who is accused of offenses under sections 377 and 377-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving allegations of sexual abuse and blackmailing a minor. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the delay in the FIR, the medical report findings, and whether the offense fell within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that although the offense under section 377-B does not fall within the prohibitory clause, bail is not an absolute right. The Court determined that the petitioner's potential for repeating the offense—specifically the sharing of illicit videos—constituted a valid ground for refusal. Furthermore, the Court clarified that under section 377-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, actual physical penetration is not a prerequisite for the offense of sexual abuse. Consequently, the bail petition was dismissed, and the trial court was directed to conclude proceedings within two months.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offense under section 377-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is actual physical penetration required to constitute the offense of sexual abuse under section 377-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can bail be refused for an offense outside the prohibitory clause if there is a likelihood of the accused repeating the offense?
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• Nauman Atta vs Mst. Amna Hassan & others2022 IHC 168 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-19Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority through Chairman vs Saqlain Mehdi and another2022 PLC (C.S.) 175 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-29
  intra court appealregularizationcontractual employmentstatutory regulationssuppression of factsdiscretionary reliefcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal was filed by the National Highway Authority (NHA) challenging a Single Judge's decision that directed the implementation of an order passed by the President of the National Highway Council (NHC)/Federal Minister for Communications. The order had directed the regularization and promotion of the respondents to BS-18 with retrospective effect from their initial contract appointments. The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal, arguing that the NHA Administrative Regulations 2002 provided an alternative right of appeal. The High Court held that because these regulations were non-statutory and meant for internal management, they did not bar the intra-court appeal under the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972. On the merits, the Court found that the respondents had suppressed material facts, specifically the dismissal of their previous regularization claims by the Federal Service Tribunal and the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court held that the respondents had no vested right to retrospective regularization or promotion to BS-18, set aside the impugned judgment, and dismissed the writ petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether regulations made by a statutory body without the approval of the Federal Government are statutory in nature so as to bar an intra-court appeal under the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972?
  • Does a contractual employee have a vested right to demand retrospective regularization of service from the date of their initial contract appointment?
  • Can a petitioner invoke the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution if they have suppressed material facts regarding prior litigation on the same subject matter?
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• Naeem-ur-Rehman vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry2022 KLR Labour & Service Cases 55 · Islamabad High Court
  quo warrantostatutory bodyWorkers Welfare Fundultra viresappointment criteriadeputationservice rulesjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the appointment of respondent No.3 as Secretary of the Workers Welfare Fund (WWF) by the Federal Government, alleging it was ultra vires. The core legal questions concerned whether the Federal Government possessed the authority to make such an appointment and whether the appointee satisfied the prescribed eligibility criteria. The Court held that the appointment was without lawful authority. It ruled that the WWF is an independent statutory body and, pursuant to Section 8 of the Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971, the Governing Body—not the Federal Government—is the competent authority to appoint the Secretary, with the Federal Government’s role limited to providing prior approval. Additionally, the Court found the appointee ineligible due to lacking the required educational qualifications and grade level. The judgment established that rules framed under an Ordinance cannot override the explicit provisions of the parent statute, and that statutory bodies cannot be treated as mere attached departments of the Federal Government. Consequently, the appointment was set aside, and the Governing Body was directed to initiate a fresh, lawful selection process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have the legal authority to unilaterally appoint the Secretary of the Workers Welfare Fund?
  • Can rules framed under an Ordinance override the explicit provisions of the parent statute?
  • Is a statutory body created under an Ordinance considered an attached department of the Federal Government for the purpose of appointment powers?
  • Does a petitioner's personal interest in a public office render a quo warranto petition non-maintainable?
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• Naeem Haider Panjutha, Advocate vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior & 11 others2022 IHC 146 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-04-18Read full judgment →
• Naeem Anwar vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Textile and others2022 PLC (C.S.) 646 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-24
  statutory appointmentmerit listNational Tariff Commissionlegitimate expectationrole of advisorreasoned decisionpublic officeselection committee
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant writ petition challenged the appointment of respondent No. 3 as a Member of the National Tariff Commission (N.T.C.) made in disregard of the merit list prepared by the Selection Committee, wherein the petitioner ranked higher. The core legal question was whether the appointing authority could select a candidate lower on the merit list without recording valid, contemporaneous reasons and whether an Advisor to the Prime Minister could lawfully participate in or influence the selection process for statutory posts. The Islamabad High Court held that while the appointing authority is not strictly bound to appoint the topmost candidate, bypassing a more meritorious candidate requires strong, sustainable, and contemporaneous reasons, and that an Advisor to the Prime Minister has no role under the law or the Rules of Business, 1973, in interviewing or recommending candidates for statutory appointments. The appointment of respondent No. 3 was accordingly set aside. The key principles laid down are that merit must be respected in public appointments, appointing authorities cannot arbitrarily prefer lower-ranked candidates without reasoned justification, and executive interference by unauthorized advisors in statutory selection processes is void and without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointing authority is bound to appoint the candidate ranked at the top of the merit list prepared by a selection committee?
  • Does the Federal Government need to record reasons when choosing a candidate lower on the merit list over one ranked higher?
  • Whether an Advisor to the Prime Minister has any legal mandate under the Rules of Business, 1973, to interview or recommend candidates for statutory appointments?
  • What is the legal effect of an unauthorized intervention by an executive advisor in a statutory selection and appointment process?
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• Nadeem Qayyum and others vs The State2022 YLR 1290 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-10-06
  murdercircumstantial evidencelast seen evidenceextra-judicial confessionjudicial confessionpolice custodydiscovery of factcommon intentionreduction of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  Criminal appeal by three appellants challenging their convictions under Sections 302(b), 201, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and a criminal revision by the complainant seeking enhancement of sentence to capital punishment. The prosecution alleged that the appellants murdered the deceased and concealed his body in a gunny bag dumped into a well. The Islamabad High Court examined the evidentiary value of judicial confessions recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, extra-judicial confessions, recoveries under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and circumstantial last seen evidence. The Court held the judicial confessions inadmissible because the Executive Magistrate failed to inform the appellants they would not be returned to police custody and subsequently remanded them back to the police. However, the Court upheld the convictions based on reliable circumstantial evidence, including unbroken last seen testimony, discovery of the corpse upon the prime appellant's disclosure, and separate recoveries of the deceased’s belongings from each appellant. Ruling that these circumstances established common intention, the Court partly allowed the appeal by reducing the sentence of life imprisonment to the period already undergone (over twelve and a half years), and dismissed the revision petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a Magistrate to assure an accused that he will not be remanded back to police custody render a confession under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 inadmissible?
  • Can an information or disclosure made by an accused in police custody leading to the discovery of a dead body be proved under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 if the location was not previously known to anyone?
  • Whether subsequent pointation of an already discovered crime scene by co-accused qualifies as a discovery of fact under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on circumstantial evidence consisting of proximity of last seen evidence coupled with recoveries of the deceased's belongings from the accused without relying on an inadmissible judicial confession?
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• Nabeel Farooq vs Mst. Anum Hussain and others2022 IHC 40 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-15Read full judgment →
• M/s. Telematics Master (Pvt.) Ltd through Chief Operating Officer vs M/s.2022 MLD 1961 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-14Read full judgment →
• M/s. Sieyuan-Neie-Naeem & Company through duly Authorized Office vs2022 PLJ Islamabad 16 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited vs Federation of Pakistan throughPTCL 2022 CL. 202, 2022 PTD 1574 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-11-08
  tax auditincome taxsales taxfederal exciseFBR directivessectoral auditdiscretionary powersconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves constitutional petitions impugning notices for tax audits issued under section 177(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and section 46 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005. The core legal questions relate to whether the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) can issue binding directives forcing Commissioners to undertake sectoral audits, whether the Commissioner's power to select a taxpayer for audit under section 177(1) is independent of FBR's powers under section 214C, and whether audit selection under section 25 of the Sales Tax Act is a two-stage process. The Islamabad High Court held that FBR lacks the authority under section 206 or any other provision to direct Commissioners to conduct sectoral audits or fetter their independent discretion under section 177(1), rendering audit notices issued pursuant to such FBR directives unlawful and void. The Court further held that the Commissioner's audit selection powers under section 177(1) are independent of FBR's powers under section 214C, and that section 25 of the Sales Tax Act does not mandate a rigid two-stage process requiring prior scrutiny before issuing an audit notice. The key principles laid down emphasize that statutory discretions vested in tax authorities cannot be controlled or usurped by external directives, and audit selection notices based on extraneous FBR instructions are liable to be set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Board of Revenue can issue binding directives to Commissioners to initiate sectoral audits under section 177(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Are the audit selection powers of the Commissioner under section 177(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 independent of the powers of the Federal Board of Revenue under section 214C?
  • Does section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 contemplate a mandatory two-stage process where record must be summoned and scrutinized before an audit notice can be issued?
  • Whether an audit notice issued by a Commissioner in compliance with an unlawful directive of the Federal Board of Revenue is liable to be set aside?
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• M/s. Alamdar Tahawar & Nasir (Private) Limited through Manager vs2022 PLJ Islamabad 180 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Akbar & Zakria Pipes (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan throughPTCL 2022 CL. 174 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s Samba Bank Ltd vs M/s Hotel Hill View Limited2022 IHC 3 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-01-11Read full judgment →
• M/s Paracha Molding Works vs Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority and2022 IHC 162 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-17Read full judgment →
• M/s Naseem & Company and others vs Capital Development Authority2022 [M] CLR 1177 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s Khyber Tobacco Company Limited vs The Federal Board of Revenue2022 IHC 160, 2025 PTD 297 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-20Read full judgment →
• M/s Federal Bank for Co-Operatives vs Commissioner of Income Tax,2022 [M] CLR 18 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Islamabad through Authorized Attorney2022 PLC 115 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-06
  writ petitionworkmanindustrial relationsdismissal from serviceNIRCconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenges the concurrent orders passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) upholding the reinstatement of the respondent employee, who was dismissed from service by the petitioner bank following disciplinary proceedings. The core legal questions involve whether the respondent qualified as a workman under the applicable statute, whether the grievance petition was maintainable, and whether the lower forums committed any jurisdictional or legal error warranting interference under constitutional jurisdiction. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the respondent fell within the definition of a workman, that the concurrent findings of fact by the NIRC forums were supported by evidence, and that no jurisdictional defect or patent legal error existed. The Court also emphasized that the principles of natural justice and audi alteram partem had been violated during the departmental proceedings. The key principle laid down is that the High Court, in exercising its supervisory writ jurisdiction, will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by inferior tribunals unless there is a patent legal defect, jurisdictional error, or misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee serving as an officiating branch manager falls within the definition of a workman under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the National Industrial Relations Commission in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does the failure to issue a proper charge sheet and show-cause notice prior to dismissal violate the principle of audi alteram partem?
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• Munsibdar vs S.H.O Police Station Tarnol, Islamabad and 3 Others2022 IHC 92 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-17Read full judgment →
• MumtazHussain shah and others vs Capital Development Authority, etc2022 IHC 178 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaman vs Federation of Pakistan and 4 others2022 IHC 150 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zahid vs The State and another2022 YLR 2176 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-01-19
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequehabitual offenderabscondenceprohibitory clausecompromise deedrepetition of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 489-F, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning a dishonoured cheque. The investigation revealed the petitioner had absconded for eleven months and was nominated in eight separate FIRs, including four for similar offences. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite his history of similar offences and previous abscondence, even if the offence did not strictly fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the concession of bail is not a universal rule and is subject to exceptions, including the likelihood of the accused absconding or repeating the offence. Finding that the petitioner’s history of multiple similar FIRs indicated a strong apprehension of repetition, and noting the aggravating factor of using a dishonoured cheque to secure bail in a separate judicial proceeding, the Court dismissed the petition. The judgment reaffirms that the established exceptions to the general rule of bail are applicable where the accused’s conduct suggests a pattern of criminal activity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of bail in offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, constitute an absolute rule?
  • Can a history of multiple similar FIRs for dishonoured cheques justify the refusal of bail on the grounds of potential repetition of the offence?
  • Does the issuance of a cheque to secure bail in another case, which is subsequently dishonoured, constitute an aggravating circumstance for bail adjudication?
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• Muhammad Yasir Mehmood vs Syed Sibt-e-Haider Zaidi and another2022 YLR 1046 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-29
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationdishonour of chequemala fideinvestigative processcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent in a case involving the dishonour of a cheque under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the respondent was entitled to pre-arrest bail despite the admitted issuance and dishonour of the cheque, and the absence of demonstrated mala fide on the part of the complainant. The Islamabad High Court held that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy requiring the demonstration of mala fide, ulterior motive, or abuse of process, which were absent in this case. The Court emphasized that investigation is not limited to mere recovery of items but includes collecting evidence and verifying circumstances, which requires the accused's physical custody. Consequently, the Court cancelled the pre-arrest bail, ruling that the accused failed to establish the necessary legal grounds for such protection. The judgment reaffirms the principle that anticipatory bail cannot be used to subvert investigative processes or as a substitute for post-arrest bail in ordinary criminal cases.

  Questions settled

  • Is the absence of a need for recovery from an accused a sufficient ground for granting pre-arrest bail?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted in the absence of demonstrated mala fide or ulterior motive?
  • Does the investigation of a criminal offence solely consist of effecting recovery from the accused?
  • Is pre-arrest bail a substitute for post-arrest bail in ordinary criminal cases?
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• Muhammad Yasir Khan Durrani vs The State and another2022 IHC 30 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-09
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausepending FIRsabsconsionSection 489-F
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail by the petitioner, Muhammad Yasir Khan Durrani, regarding an FIR registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the issuance of dishonoured cheques. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail for an offence that does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, especially considering allegations of prior absconsion and the existence of other pending FIRs. The court held that because the offence carries a maximum punishment of three years, it falls outside the prohibitory clause, making the grant of bail the rule rather than the exception. The court established that the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive, as punishment is reserved for post-conviction. It further clarified that the mere existence of other pending FIRs, absent any prior conviction, is insufficient grounds to deny bail, and that the risk of irreparable harm from wrongful incarceration outweighs the potential risks of granting bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the existence of other pending FIRs against an accused sufficient ground to refuse post-arrest bail?
  • What is the primary objective of the court when considering a bail application?
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• Muhammad Tariq vs Muhammad Ibrahim and another2022 PCRLJ 1393 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-01-12
  forgerypower of attorneySection 476 Cr.P.C.pending civil litigationprosecutionjudicial discretionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order passed by the Additional District Judge, which dismissed the petitioner's application under Section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the prosecution of the opposing party for allegedly filing a forged power of attorney in a pending civil suit. The core legal question was whether a court should initiate criminal proceedings for document forgery while the underlying civil litigation is still pending. The High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the trial court possesses the discretion to determine whether to initiate such proceedings. The Court emphasized that prosecution under Section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is intended to serve the public interest rather than settle private grudges. It established that parallel criminal inquiries into the authenticity of documents during pending civil litigation are generally discouraged, as the trial court is the proper forum to evaluate evidence. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that such prosecution should not be forced upon a trial court unless the forgery is patent on the face of the record and requires no further investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party initiate criminal proceedings for forgery of a document filed in a pending civil suit while that suit is still ongoing?
  • Is a trial court's discretion to refuse an application under Section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, subject to interference by a supervisory court?
  • What is the primary purpose of initiating prosecution under Section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Tanveer Ahmad vs Ex-Officio Justice of Peace/Additional2022 PLJ Islamabad 102 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Tanveer Ahmad vs Ex-Officio Justice Of Peace/Additional2022 IHC 26 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Tahir Qureshi vs The State and another2022 IHC 42 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-21
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausenon-prohibitory offencepre-trial incarceration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Muhammad Tahir Qureshi seeking post-arrest bail in FIR No. 696 of 2021 registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Golra Sharif, Islamabad, concerning the dishonor of a cheque. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for post-arrest bail where the alleged offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the petitioner had already spent a significant period in incarceration. The Islamabad High Court held that since the offence under Section 489-F does not fall within the prohibitory clause, grant of bail is the general rule and refusal is an exception, and keeping the accused behind bars for an extended period when the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive would cause irreparable harm. The court admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail, establishing the principle that pre-trial incarceration should not be used as a form of anticipatory punishment, particularly in non-prohibitory offences.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether pre-trial incarceration can be used as a punitive or preventive measure?
  • Is bail a rule and refusal an exception for offences falling outside the prohibitory clause?
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• Muhammad Siddique vs Additional District Magistrate (Rural),& 5 others2022 IHC 58 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-25Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahzad vs Muhammad Shahbaz and another2022 PCRLJ 1442 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-02
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationmurdermiscarriage of justicenon-reading of evidencejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal petition filed under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent by the Additional Sessions Judge. The respondent was accused in an FIR involving murder charges. The core legal question was whether the lower court exercised its discretion correctly in granting pre-arrest bail despite the presence of incriminating material, including witness statements and call detail records linking the accused to the crime. The High Court held that the lower court's order was legally unsustainable as it failed to consider the available prosecution evidence and lacked proper reasoning. The Court emphasized that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy intended to protect against malice and false accusation, not a substitute for post-arrest bail. Finding that the lower court's decision was based on a non-reading of the material and resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the High Court set aside the impugned order and recalled the bail, establishing that bail cancellation is warranted when an order is patently illegal, factually incorrect, or ignores material evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Under what specific circumstances can a court cancel a previously granted pre-arrest bail?
  • Is pre-arrest bail a substitute for post-arrest bail in cases involving capital punishment?
  • Does a bail-granting order that lacks sufficient reasoning and ignores material evidence constitute a miscarriage of justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahbaz Shabeer vs Additional Sessions Judge and others2022 PLJ Islamabad 200 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-08-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahban vs The State & another2022 IHC 70 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-21
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausehabitual offendertentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a criminal miscellaneous petition filed by the petitioner, Muhammad Shahban, seeking post-arrest bail in FIR No. 515 dated 16.09.2021 registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Bhara Kahu, Islamabad, concerning the dishonor of a cheque worth Rs. 15,00,000/-. The core legal question involves determining whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail when the offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and considering his involvement in other similar cases. The Islamabad High Court held that since the punishment for the offense is up to three years, falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C., and given that the petitioner has been incarcerated for about six months without likelihood of further investigative utility, he is entitled to bail upon furnishing surety bonds. The key principle laid down is that where an offense falls outside the prohibitory clause and continuous incarceration serves no purpose, post-arrest bail should generally be granted unless exceptional circumstances like evading process or recent repetition of offenses are established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when the charged offense carries a sentence that does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does prior involvement in other criminal cases automatically disentitle an accused from receiving post-arrest bail for an offense outside the prohibitory clause?
  • What is the effect of the completion of investigation and submission of challan on the continued incarceration of an accused awaiting trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sami Ullah vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2022 PLJ Islamabad 137 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed vs Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited &2022 IHC 100 · Islamabad High Court
  writ jurisdictionPTCLnatural justicedue processtermination of servicereinstatementaudi alteram partemconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the termination of the petitioner, a former employee of the erstwhile T&T Department, from service with the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) on grounds of unauthorized absence. The core legal questions were whether the PTCL is a 'person' amenable to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, and whether the petitioner, as a transferred employee, was entitled to statutory protection against arbitrary removal without due process. The Court held that employees transferred from the T&T Department to the PTCL enjoy protected terms and conditions of service under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996, and the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act, 1991. Consequently, the PTCL is a 'person' performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, making the petition maintainable. The Court ruled that the petitioner’s removal without a show-cause notice or disciplinary proceedings violated the principles of natural justice, specifically the maxim audi alteram partem, and fundamental rights to due process and fair trial. The termination order was set aside, and the petitioner was reinstated.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited a 'person' amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are the terms and conditions of service of employees transferred from the erstwhile T&T Department to the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited protected by law?
  • Can an employee be removed from service for unauthorized absence without the issuance of a show-cause notice or disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Raziq vs The State and 2 others2022 PCRLJ 1145 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-01-20
  bail applicationtransfer of caseSessions Judge jurisdictionAdditional Sessions JudgeCode of Criminal Procedurejudicial power
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an order by the Acting District and Sessions Judge transferring pending bail applications from one Additional Sessions Judge to another. The core legal question was whether a Sessions Judge possesses the authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to transfer a bail application once it has been entrusted to an Additional Sessions Judge. The Court held that the Sessions Judge lacks the jurisdiction to transfer a bail application after it has been entrusted. Consequently, the impugned transfer order was set aside as being without lawful authority. The Court established that while a Sessions Judge may initially entrust cases or urgent applications to Additional Sessions Judges under Sections 17(4) and 193(2), the power to transfer under Section 528(1A) does not extend to bail applications once entrusted. The authority to transfer such matters rests with the High Court under Section 526 or Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, or Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Sessions Judge have the power to transfer a bail application from one Additional Sessions Judge to another?
  • Can a Sessions Judge recall or withdraw a bail application once it has been entrusted to an Additional Sessions Judge?
  • Under what provision can a High Court transfer a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique and another vs Tasadaq Hussain and another2022 MLD 1232 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-22
  Illegal Dispossession Actadditional evidenceSection 540 CrPCfair trialsummary proceedingslocal commissiondelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged orders from the Additional Sessions Judge, Islamabad, which dismissed their application for additional evidence under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and rejected objections to a local commission report in a case filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow additional evidence at a late stage in summary proceedings. The court held that the trial court’s decision was correct, emphasizing that Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, cannot be invoked to allow a party to fill omissions or improve the quality of previously tendered evidence. The court affirmed that proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, are summary in nature, requiring expeditious disposal to avoid protracted trials. The key principle laid down is that while courts have the power to summon witnesses or take documents for a just decision, such discretion must be exercised judicially to ensure a fair trial under Article 10-A, Constitution of Pakistan 1973, without permitting parties to use such provisions to cause undue delay or re-litigate concluded matters.

  Questions settled

  • Can an application under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, be used to fill omissions in evidence or improve a party's case?
  • Are proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, summary in nature?
  • Does the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A, Constitution of Pakistan 1973, require the timely disposal of cases under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique and another vs Director General, Federal2022 [M] CLR 526 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Qayyum vs Federal Service Tribunal and another2022 IHC 86 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-31Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Qaseem vs Mst. Farida Khan and others2022 CLC 1670 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-07-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Noman Khan vs The State and another2022 YLR 1368 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-06
  post-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustprohibitory clauseconfession to policefurther inquiryfundamental rightsinadmissible evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving allegations of criminal breach of trust regarding a vehicle. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the lack of independent evidence, the inadmissibility of a confession made to police, and the fact that the alleged offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, emphasizing that in non-bailable offences not falling within the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. The Court further held that a confession made to a police officer is inadmissible under Article 38 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and that mere involvement in other criminal cases, without conviction, does not disentitle an accused to bail. The principle established is that liberty is a fundamental right, and bail should be granted in such cases unless exceptional circumstances exist.

  Questions settled

  • Is a confession made to a police officer admissible as evidence against an accused person?
  • Does the mere involvement of an accused in other criminal cases, without conviction, disentitle them to the grant of bail?
  • Is the grant of bail the rule or the exception for offences that do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an accused be denied bail solely on the basis of a confession made to the police when no other independent evidence is available?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Additional District Judge, etc2022 IHC 50 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naeem Khan vs The Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary2022 IHC 136 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mustansar Khan vs The State, etc2022 IHC 172 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mussawar Abbasi vs Lubna Manzoor & Another2022 IHC 38 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Musawar Abbasi vs The State and another2022 IHC 198, PLJ 2022 Cr.C. 1484 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-06-20
  pre-arrest bailcancellation of bailcriminal breach of trustcontractual disputeentrustment of propertyspecific performancemens rea
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent in a case involving an alleged criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a failure to transfer land after receiving payment constitutes criminal breach of trust or merely a civil contractual dispute. The court held that the dispute was essentially civil in nature, governed by the Contract Act, 1872 and the Specific Relief Act, 1877, rather than criminal law. It reasoned that the payment of money for land purchase does not constitute 'entrustment' as required by Section 405 and Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as there was no requirement to retain and return the specific funds. Furthermore, the court emphasized that bail cancellation requires strong and exceptional grounds, such as misuse of liberty or interference with evidence, which were not demonstrated here. The principle laid down is that contractual breaches, absent a clear element of entrustment and mens rea, do not satisfy the criteria for criminal breach of trust.

  Questions settled

  • Does a breach of a contract for the sale of land constitute the offense of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What is the legal distinction between the payment of money for a transaction and the entrustment of property?
  • What are the established grounds for the cancellation of bail once it has been granted by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Can a dispute arising from a breach of an agreement to sell be treated as a criminal matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Musawar Abbasi vs State and anotherPLJ 2022 Cr.C. 1484 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-06-20
  pre-arrest bailcancellation of bailcriminal breach of trustentrustmentcivil liabilityspecific performancecontractual dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent in a case involving an alleged criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a failure to transfer land after receiving payment pursuant to a verbal agreement constitutes 'criminal breach of trust' under Section 406, and whether the bail order should be recalled. The Court held that the transaction was a civil matter governed by the Contract Act 1872 and the Specific Relief Act 1877, rather than a criminal offence. It reasoned that the payment of money for a land purchase does not constitute 'entrustment' as required for criminal breach of trust, as the money was not to be preserved or returned but utilized for a purpose. The Court affirmed that breach of a contract is not synonymous with criminal breach of trust. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the bail order was illegal or that the respondent had misused the concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to transfer property after receiving payment under an agreement to sell constitute criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is there a legal distinction between the payment of money for a purpose and the 'entrustment' of property required for the offence of criminal breach of trust?
  • What are the established grounds for the cancellation of bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a breach of a contract be equated with criminal breach of trust without evidence of mens rea and clear entrustment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mudasar vs The State2022 IHC 108 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-14
  criminal revision petitionsurety bondforfeiture of suretyjumped bailabsconding accusedpenalty reductionCNSA
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this criminal revision petition, the petitioner assailed an order passed by the learned Judge, Special Court (CNS), Islamabad, whereby a penalty of Rs.300,000/- was imposed upon him as a surety for an accused who jumped bail. The core legal questions involved the legality of the forfeiture of the surety bond and the imposition of penalty upon the surety's failure to produce the absconding accused. The court held that all necessary procedural steps for the forfeiture of the bail bond under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 had been duly complied with, and that no lenient view should be taken in matters of sureties to prevent accused persons from absconding. The court laid down the principle that while courts must avoid undue leniency that encourages absconding, a balance must be maintained to prevent undue severity that discourages individuals from acting as sureties, and found no illegality in the impugned order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a penalty can be imposed upon a surety when the accused jumps bail and fails to appear before the trial court?
  • Are necessary legal steps required to be followed prior to the forfeiture of a bail bond under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What considerations must a court keep in mind while determining the penalty for a surety who fails to produce an absconding accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khursheed Shinwari vs Federation of Pakistan and others2022 IHC 126 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khalid vs Mst. Shehnaz Begum and others2022 YLR 2402 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khalid Munir vs Nazar Sadiq and another2022 MLD 831 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-09-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Javed Iqbal Kasi vs Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary Law, Justice and Human Right Division, Islamabad and 4 others2022 PLC (C.S.) 607 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-08
  judicial allowanceFederal Service Tribunalterms and conditions of servicevested rightdiscriminationwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Member of the Federal Service Tribunal, filed a writ petition seeking a direction to the respondents to grant him judicial allowance from the date he assumed office, claiming discrimination and violation of fundamental rights. The core legal question was whether a member of the Federal Service Tribunal has a vested legal right to claim a special judicial allowance akin to judges of the superior and subordinate judiciary, and whether the denial of such allowance constitutes discrimination. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that members of the Service Tribunal are not judges of the judiciary and that the grant or withdrawal of allowances is the prerogative of the competent authority determining terms of appointment. The court laid down the principle that allowances paid to government employees are not protected under any statutory provision, an employee has no vested right to claim or maintain an allowance, and mere solitary instances or allowances drawn by other officials in different capacities do not establish a case of discrimination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a member of the Federal Service Tribunal is entitled to claim a judicial allowance as a matter of right?
  • Does the denial of a judicial allowance to a member of the Federal Service Tribunal constitute discrimination under the Constitution?
  • Does a government employee have a vested legal right for the payment or continuation of allowances?
  • Is the grant or withdrawal of an allowance the prerogative of the competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Qureshi vs Learned Rent Controller, Islamabad-West, etc2022 IHC 60, 2022 YLR 1972 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Qureshi vs Learned Rent Controller, Islamabad-West2022 [M] CLR 1009 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Qureshi vs Learned Rent Controller, Islamabad West and another2022 KLR Civil Cases 265 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Imran vs The State, etc2022 IHC 96 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-31
  pre-arrest bailcross-versionShajjah-i-Mudihahhead injurycriminal miscellaneous
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this criminal miscellaneous petition, the petitioner Muhammad Imran sought pre-arrest bail in a cross-version case registered under Section 337-A(ii)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Golra, Islamabad. The core legal question before the court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the extraordinary concession of pre-arrest bail, having been specifically assigned the role of causing a head injury classified as Shajjah-i-Mudihah with a blunt weapon. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition and recalled the ad-interim bail, holding that sufficient tangible evidence prima facie connected the petitioner to the alleged offense and that anticipatory bail cannot be granted to undermine the investigative process absent clear malafide. The court reiterated that pre-arrest bail is an equitable remedy meant to protect the innocent from false implication and abuse of law rather than a routine relief in the face of prima facie incriminating material and corroborative medical evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused specifically nominated with a role of causing a head injury supported by medical evidence is entitled to pre-arrest bail?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted in routine criminal cases without establishing clear malafide?
  • Is anticipatory bail permissible when it tends to subvert or undermine the investigative procedure and necessary arrest?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Imran vs Assistant Director, Reclamation and Proclamation, ICT, Islamabad and 3 others2022 PCRLJ 1838 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-08-24
  parolegood conduct prisonersexecutive discretionjudicial reviewrehabilitationlife imprisonmentstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a life convict, challenged the rejection of his application for release on parole by the competent authority. The core legal question was whether the executive authority exercised its discretion in accordance with the law when denying parole based on factors like the lack of compromise with the complainant and general concerns about recidivism. The Court held that while the grant of parole is a discretionary power vested in the Provincial Government under the Good Conduct Prisoners Probational Release Act, 1926, such discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The Court found that the authorities failed to properly evaluate the petitioner's conduct and antecedents as required by the Act and instead relied on extraneous considerations, such as the absence of a compromise with the complainant, which is not a statutory requirement. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the authorities to reconsider the application in accordance with the law. The judgment establishes that executive discretion regarding parole must be structured, reasonable, and strictly aligned with the statutory criteria provided in the Act and Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Is the discretion of the executive authority to grant or refuse parole absolute?
  • Can an authority reject a prisoner's application for parole based on the absence of a compromise with the complainant?
  • What are the mandatory parameters for the executive to consider when deciding on a prisoner's release on parole under the Good Conduct Prisoners Probational Release Act, 1926?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrar Khan vs Mian Muhammad Ramzan etc2022 IHC 202 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-20
  acquittalcriminal breach of trustdischarge of accusedfair trialFirst Information Reportinvestigation materialmens rea
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from an order passed by a Judicial Magistrate acquitting respondent No. 1 under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in a case registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for criminal breach of trust. The core legal question was whether the trial court could acquit an accused under Section 249-A solely relying on the contents of the First Information Report without considering the incriminating material collected by the prosecution during investigation. The Islamabad High Court held that an acquittal under Section 249-A cannot be based exclusively on the First Information Report; the trial court is under a legal obligation to examine all incriminating material collected by the prosecution, such as witness statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court laid down the principle that the power to acquit under Section 249-A is an exception, requiring rational reasons flowing from an analysis of the entire prosecution evidence and the applicable law, failing which the order violates the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, the acquittal order was set aside and the matter was remanded for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court rely solely on the contents of a First Information Report to acquit an accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is it mandatory for a court to consider the incriminating material collected during investigation before passing an order under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Do the principles relating to the presumption of double innocence apply to an order of acquittal under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the same manner as an acquittal after a full-fledged trial?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haleem Shah and 35 others vs Federal Government2022 PLC (C.S.) 412 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-12
  contract employmentregularization of servicesintra court appealmaster and servantwrit jurisdictionvested rightcivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenged a judgment dismissing a writ petition filed by contract employees of the Federal Government Employees Housing Authority, who sought regularization of their services after their contracts expired. The core legal question was whether contract employees, upon the expiry of their tenure by afflux of time, possess a vested right to regularization or continued employment. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that contract employees have no inherent or vested right to remain in service once their contract period expires. The Court emphasized that such employment is strictly governed by the specific terms and conditions of the appointment letter, which explicitly excluded any right to permanent retention. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that contract employees are not civil servants and cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction to force regularization. The key principle laid down is that where a contract of service expires by afflux of time, the employer is under no legal obligation to extend or regularize the service, and the appropriate remedy for any alleged breach of contract is a civil suit for damages, not a constitutional petition.

  Questions settled

  • Do contract employees possess a vested right to regularization upon the expiry of their contract period?
  • Can a court compel an employer to regularize or extend the service of a contract employee?
  • Is a contract employee entitled to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court for the regularization of their services?
  • Are contract employees considered civil servants governed by the rules framed under the Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Farooq vs The State2022 IHC 32 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-18
  post-arrest bailstatutory baildelay in trialprohibitory clausevehicle tamperingforgery
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail by an accused charged with offences under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving vehicle tampering and forgery. The petitioner sought statutory bail under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arguing that the trial had not concluded within one year of his arrest despite the prosecution's witnesses being police officials. The core legal question was whether the delay in trial could be attributed to the petitioner, thereby disentitling him to statutory bail. The court held that the delay was not caused by the petitioner's acts or omissions, noting that adjournments due to lawyer strikes, judicial closures, or the absence of co-accused cannot be attributed to the petitioner. Furthermore, the court affirmed that pending FIRs alone do not justify refusing bail. Consequently, the court granted bail, establishing that statutory bail rights under Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. are only forfeited if the accused actively orchestrates trial delays.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to statutory bail under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the trial is not concluded within one year?
  • Can delays in trial caused by the absence of a co-accused be attributed to the petitioner for the purpose of denying statutory bail?
  • Does the mere existence of pending FIRs against an accused constitute sufficient grounds to refuse the grant of bail?
  • What constitutes an act or omission by an accused sufficient to deprive them of their right to statutory bail under Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Faisal Vawda vs Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad2022 CLC 902 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir Dar vs Muhammad Shiraz2022 IHC 238 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-09-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs The State and another2022 MLD 312 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-05-07
  post-arrest bailsecond bail applicationfresh groundsprohibitory clausevehicle tamperingcar liftingcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks post-arrest bail for the petitioner accused of car lifting, vehicle tampering, and forgery under sections 467, 468, 471, 472, 411, and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner previously had bail applications dismissed by the trial courts and the High Court. In this second bail application, the petitioner argued that new evidence, including daily police diaries and a forensic laboratory report, constituted fresh grounds for relief. The Court held that the petitioner failed to establish fresh grounds, noting that the evidence relied upon was available during the previous bail hearing. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the Court affirmed that a subsequent bail application cannot be entertained on grounds that were available but not urged during an earlier dismissal on merits. Furthermore, the Court observed that the offences fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the petitioner was implicated in multiple similar criminal cases. Consequently, the bail petition was dismissed, establishing that grounds available at the time of a prior dismissal cannot be re-litigated in subsequent bail applications.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner file a second bail application based on evidence that was available but not presented during the first bail hearing?
  • Does the dismissal of a bail application on merits preclude the re-urging of grounds that existed at the time of the initial dismissal?
  • Can police diaries or statements be used as evidence to support a fresh ground for bail under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Khan Jadoon vs Wahid Mehmood2022 [M] CLR 1050 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-17Read full judgment →
• Mudassar Mukhtar vs The State and another2022 YLR 1281 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-28
  post-arrest bailtentative assessmentfurther inquiryQatl-e-amdJoint Investigation Teampolice firingcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, a police constable, was entitled to bail given that the Joint Investigation Team report and the challan under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 indicated he did not fire the fatal shots. The Islamabad High Court granted bail, holding that the petitioner had made out a case for further inquiry. The court reaffirmed the principle that bail is not to be withheld as punishment and that the incarceration of an innocent person cannot be adequately repaired. It emphasized that at the bail stage, the court must perform a tentative assessment of the record without prejudicing the trial. Finding that the investigation was complete and no incriminating evidence linked the petitioner to the deceased's death, the court concluded that continued detention was unjustified, thereby upholding the right to liberty.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court permitted to conduct a detailed evidentiary analysis during the hearing of a bail application?
  • Does the completion of an investigation and the absence of a requirement for further custody justify the grant of bail?
  • Can bail be withheld as a form of punishment for an accused charged with an offense punishable by death?
  • When does a case qualify for further inquiry under the law of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sobia Shaheen vs Muhammad Usman and another2022 PLJ Islamabad 154 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahida Perveen Through Her Legal Heirs and others vs Saeed Ahmed2022 IHC 216 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Saima Ijaz vs Higher Education Commission of Pakistan2022 IHC 94 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-03-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Bibi vs Additional Sessions Judge-Ii, (East) Islamabad and others2022 IHC 56 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Nazeer Bibi and another vs Higher Education Commission and another2022 IHC 210 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Nausheen Saeed vs The State and another2022 MLD 1373 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-06-08
  pre-arrest bailTikTok videoMargalla Hills National Parkmischief by firetentative assessmentforest firemala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in respect of FIR No. 402 registered at Police Station Kohsar, Islamabad, under Sections 435 and 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, Section 26 of the Forest Act 1927, Section 5 of the Islamabad Preservation of Landscape Ordinance 1966, Sections 11 and 19 of the Environment Protection Act 1997, and Section 26 of the Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance 1979, following a viral TikTok video showing her in front of a fire in the Margalla Hills National Park. The core legal question was whether sufficient incriminating evidence existed to sustain the charges and warrant the denial of pre-arrest bail, particularly regarding the ingredients of mischief by fire and the mandatory complaint requirement for Section 188. The Islamabad High Court held that the ingredients of Section 435 were not met prima facie, that Section 188 was not competently invoked without the requisite written complaint under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that the TikTok video alone constituted insufficient evidence. The court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, laying down the principle that pre-arrest bail may be confirmed where a case lacks sufficient incriminating evidence and appears founded on circumstances not satisfying the penal ingredients at a tentative assessment stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted when the primary evidence against the accused is a social media video lacking direct proof of active commission of the offense?
  • Whether an FIR under Section 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is legally sustainable without a written complaint from the concerned public servant under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What constitutes sufficient tentative assessment of evidence regarding property damage under Section 435 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naila Hameed vs Ejaz Mahmood and 2 others2022 MLD 920 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nabeela vs Raja Muhammad Musharaf Janjua& 5 others2022 IHC 164 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-04-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mumtaz Bibi vs Qasim and others2022 [M] CLR 388 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mumtaz Bibi vs Qasim and 4 others2022 PLD Islamabad 228 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-09
  child marriagemarriage validityconsent of minorpuberty and capacitystatutory interpretationconstitutional rights of childrenhabeas corpusminor custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the mother of a minor girl seeking her recovery from alleged abduction, where respondents claimed the minor had contracted a marriage. The core legal question was whether a minor under the age of 18 has the legal capacity to enter into a valid marriage contract, and whether such a contract is lawful in view of penal provisions criminalizing sexual conduct with children. The Islamabad High Court held that a marriage contract involving a party under the age of 18 is void ab initio as its object and consideration are unlawful, being directly forbidden by sections 375 and 377A of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and contrary to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and constitutional protections. The court laid down that biological age, not puberty, is the test for legal competence to marry, that child marriage contracts are void and unenforceable, and that custody of the minor must remain with her parents rather than an alleged adult spouse.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a minor under the age of 18 has the legal capacity to enter into a valid contract of marriage?
  • Does the attainment of puberty alone establish the legal competence of a female child to contract a marriage?
  • Is a marriage contract involving a child under the age of 18 void ab initio under Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872, due to unlawful object and consideration in light of penal provisions?
  • Whether the provisions of Sections 375 and 377A of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, override personal law regarding the permissible age of marriage and sexual consent?
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• Mst. Abida Zakir through attorney vs Raja Aman Ullah Khan and another2022 PLJ Islamabad 29 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-12-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Abida Zakir alias Aubaida Zakir through Attorney vs Raja Aman Ullah2022 PLD Islamabad 54 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-12-07Read full judgment →
• Ms. Sajida Islam vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Education and Professional Training, Pak-Secretariat, Islamabad and 3 others2022 PLC (C.S.) 135 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-04
  deputationrepatriationabsorptionlegitimate expectationpromissory estoppelcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the order of the Judge in Chambers upholding the repatriation of the appellant, a deputationist, from the Federal Directorate of Education to her parent department. The core legal questions involve whether a deputationist has a vested right to permanent absorption or legitimate expectation thereof, and whether repatriation can be ordered contrary to the terms of deputation and applicable policies. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, holding that deputation is a contract between the borrowing and lending departments, that a deputationist has no vested right to remain on deputation or seek permanent absorption, and that repatriation can be ordered at any time without notice if the borrowing department no longer requires their services. The court further held that explicit conditions in the deputation order barring absorption and the absence of clear representations preclude the application of the doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel. The key principles laid down affirm the absolute right of the borrowing department to repatriate a deputationist and the lack of any enforceable right to absorption.

  Questions settled

  • Does a deputationist have a vested right to permanent absorption in a borrowing department?
  • Can a borrowing department repatriate a deputationist to their parent department without notice?
  • Does the initiation of a process to consider absorption create a legal right for a deputationist to be absorbed?
  • Can the doctrine of legitimate expectation be invoked when the original deputation terms explicitly bar absorption?
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• Ms. Kinza Anwar Office Assistant HR, (NEPRA) vs Office of The Ombudsman2022 PLJ Islamabad 72, 2022 CLC 1477 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-04-05
  workplace harassmentinquiry committee compositionOmbudsman jurisdictionappellate powerswrit of certiorarialternative remedyProtection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the Ombudsman's order setting aside a disciplinary penalty imposed by NEPRA against Respondent No. 2 for workplace harassment. The Ombudsman had invalidated the inquiry committee's proceedings on the ground that two members were junior to the accused and subsequently assumed jurisdiction to conduct a fresh inquiry. The core legal questions were whether the 2010 Act requires committee members to be senior to the accused and whether the Ombudsman, while exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 6 of the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, can conduct a fresh inquiry. The Court held that Section 3(2) of the 2010 Act contains no seniority requirement for committee members. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Ombudsman’s appellate powers are restricted to confirming, setting aside, varying, or modifying the lower authority's decision. The Ombudsman cannot initiate a fresh inquiry while hearing an appeal, as that power is reserved for cases where the complaint is initially filed before the Ombudsman. The petition was allowed, and the matter remanded for a fresh appellate decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 3(2) of the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 require members of an inquiry committee to be senior in rank to the accused?
  • Can the Ombudsman, while hearing an appeal under Section 6 of the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, exercise the power to conduct a fresh inquiry?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against an order of the Ombudsman if the order suffers from a patent jurisdictional error, despite the availability of an alternative remedy?
  • Does the Ombudsman have suo moto powers to conduct an inquiry under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 in the absence of a complaint filed directly before the Ombudsman?
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• Mrs. Zeenat Salim vs Pakistan Naval Farms through Director and 3 others2022 PLD Islamabad 138 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-01-07Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Shamshad Butt vs Deputy Commissioner, CDA, Islamabad and others2022 IHC 188 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-06-24Read full judgment →
• Mr. Shah Muhammad Khan, etc vs Election Commission of Pakistan, etc2022 [M] CLR 604 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-11Read full judgment →
• Moulvi Iqbal Haider vs Federation of Pakistan and others2022 IHC 142 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-04-11Read full judgment →
• Mosharraf Ali Zaidi and others vs President of Pakistan, through the Secretary Presidential Secretariat, etc2022 IHC 130, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 1250 · Islamabad High Court
  constitutional petitioncolorable legislationsecurity of tenurestatutory autonomyjudicial reviewperson-specific legislationreading downHEC Chairperson
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the removal of the Chairperson of the Higher Education Commission (HEC) through executive notifications and subsequent legislative amendments to the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002. The core legal question was whether these amendments, which effectively curtailed the Chairperson's statutory tenure, constituted "colorable legislation" or impermissible person-specific legislation, and whether the executive removal was lawful. The Court held that the impugned notifications were issued without lawful authority. Applying the doctrine of "reading down," the Court interpreted the amendments as having prospective effect, thereby preserving the Chairperson's original four-year tenure. The judgment established that while the legislature is competent to enact laws, person-specific legislation is invalid unless supported by sufficient, objective justification. Without such justification, such laws may be declared ultra vires as "colorable legislation." Furthermore, the Court emphasized that statutory amendments should be interpreted to avoid undermining vested rights or security of tenure, ensuring that regulatory bodies like the HEC maintain their statutory autonomy and independence from improper executive interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can legislation be declared ultra vires if it is found to be 'person-specific' without sufficient justification?
  • Does the doctrine of 'colorable legislation' apply when a statute is ostensibly within legislative competence but in reality transgresses constitutional limits?
  • Can statutory amendments be 'read down' to preserve their constitutionality and avoid undermining vested rights?
  • Is the removal of a statutory office holder valid if the executive fails to establish the jurisdictional pre-conditions for such removal?
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• Mol Pakistan Oil and Gas Company vs The Islamabad Capital Territory2022 IHC 54 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mol Pakistan Oil and Gas Company through Authorized Officers vs The Islamabad Capital Territory Administration through Chief Commissioner and others2022 CLD 492 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-28Read full judgment →
• Mol Pakistan Oil and Gas Company through Authorized Officers vs The Islamabad Capital Territory Administration through Chief Commissioner and 4 others2022 PTD 737 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-02-28Read full judgment →
• Mol Pakistan Oil and Gas B.v vs Federal Board of Revenue, through Chairman, Islamabad and others2022 PTD 1624 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-09-22Read full judgment →
• Mohsin Ali Khan vs Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for Protection Against2022 CLC 1955 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-20Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Tanveer Ahmad vs Ex-Officio Justice of Peace/Additional2022 PCRLJ 1636 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-04-07
  registration of FIRtheftSection 22-A CrPCbona fide claim of rightcognizable offencematrimonial disputewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, which dismissed the petitioner's application under Section 22-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the registration of an FIR against his wife for the alleged theft of household items and a vehicle. The core legal question was whether the removal of property by a spouse from a residence registered in her name, where she held a bona fide claim of right, constitutes the offence of theft under Section 378, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court upheld the impugned order, dismissing the petition. The Court held that the essential elements of theft—specifically the dishonest removal of property from the possession of another without consent—were not met. Because the property was located in a residence registered to the accused and she possessed a bona fide claim of right over the items, the allegations failed to disclose a cognizable offence. The Court affirmed that a bona fide claim of right over property precludes a finding of theft.

  Questions settled

  • Does the removal of property by a spouse from a residence registered in her name constitute theft under Section 378, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a person be charged with theft if they have a bona fide claim of right over the property in question?
  • Is the registration of an FIR mandatory under Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, when the allegations do not disclose a cognizable offence?
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