Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Samina Qasim Tarar and another vs The State and another2021 MLD 278 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-01Read full judgment →
• Samia Khan vs Federal Board Of Intermediate And Secondary Education, Islamabad2021 MLD 1815 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-08Read full judgment →
• Sami Ullah vs The State and another2021 IHC 186, 2022 PCRLJ 1739 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-29
  plea of insanityunsoundness of mindlegal insanity vs medical insanitymurder referenceburden of proofmental capacity to stand trial
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Sami Ullah, preferred an appeal against his conviction and death sentence handed down by the trial court under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for the murder of his pregnant wife. The Islamabad High Court also considered a murder reference for confirmation of the sentence. During the trial, the appellant pleaded guilty but raised a defense of unsoundness of mind under section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and argued that mandatory procedures under sections 464 and 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 were not followed. The core legal questions involved distinguishing between legal insanity at the time of the offense and mental capacity to stand trial, and evaluating the burden of proof for the defense of insanity. The High Court dismissed the appeals, confirmed the death sentence, and answered the murder reference in the affirmative, holding that the appellant failed to discharge the heavy onus of proving legal insanity under section 84, and that the provisions of Chapter XXXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 regarding trial capacity are distinct from the substantive defense of insanity.

  Questions settled

  • What is the distinction between legal insanity under section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 and the procedures for determining incapacity to stand trial under Chapter XXXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Upon whom lies the burden of proving the exception of unsoundness of mind under section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • Whether the failure to observe procedures under sections 464 and 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 vitiates a trial where the accused fails to establish cognitive impairment at the time of the offense?
  • Does the mere existence of medical insanity or depressive illness exempt an accused from criminal liability without establishing complete cognitive impairment of legal insanity?
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• Sambu Construction Co. Ltd vs Laraib Energy Limited and others2021 CLC 1914, 2022 [M] CLR 711, 2022 PCTLR 780 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-26
  bank guaranteeinterim injunctionirrevocable and unconditional guaranteeegregious fraudirretrievable injusticeperformance securitycontractual dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Additional District Judge, Islamabad, dismissing an application for an interim injunction to restrain the encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee. The appellant, Sambu Construction Co. Ltd., sought to prevent respondent No. 1 from encashing a performance security guarantee following disputes over liquidated damages and the appellant's refusal to enhance the guarantee's value. The core legal question was whether the court should restrain the encashment of an irrevocable and unconditional bank guarantee based on underlying contractual disputes. The High Court held that such guarantees constitute independent, autonomous contracts between the bank and the beneficiary, separate from the underlying commercial contract. The court affirmed the dismissal of the injunction, holding that judicial interference is restricted to two narrow exceptions: clear evidence of egregious fraud or the demonstration of irretrievable injustice. Finding neither exception satisfied, the court ruled that contractual disputes regarding performance or indemnity do not justify restraining a bank from honoring its unconditional payment obligation, as the appellant has an adequate remedy in seeking damages through a civil suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court restrain the encashment of an irrevocable and unconditional bank guarantee due to a dispute in the underlying contract?
  • What are the specific exceptions under which a court may grant an injunction to restrain the encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee?
  • Does the mere allegation of fraud without material particulars satisfy the requirement for restraining the encashment of a bank guarantee?
  • Is the potential for a future money decree an adequate remedy that precludes a finding of irretrievable injustice in the context of bank guarantee encashment?
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• Salman Ahmad Gill vs Sheikh Basit Hameed, etc2021 IHC 160 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-17Read full judgment →
• Salahuddin vs The State through S.H.O2022 YLR 949 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-28
  post-arrest bailabsconsionidentification paradeconfession to policetentative assessmentcommon intentionfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case involving charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, arising from an alleged firing incident upon a police party. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite being nominated in the FIR and having remained a fugitive for four years. The court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, finding that the prosecution's case relied primarily on an inadmissible confession made by a co-accused to police, and noting that the complainant failed to identify the petitioner during the identification parade. Furthermore, the court determined that the allegation of ineffective firing did not preclude the grant of bail, as the issue of common intention required trial evidence. The court affirmed the principle that absconsion alone does not disentitle an accused to bail if the merits of the case otherwise support it, and reiterated that bail should not be withheld as punishment, especially when investigation is complete and the accused is not required for further proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a confession made by a co-accused to a police officer admissible evidence against an accused person?
  • Does the mere fact of absconsion automatically disentitle an accused person to the grant of bail?
  • Should bail be withheld as a form of punishment before the conclusion of a trial?
  • What is the scope of a court's assessment of evidence when deciding a bail application?
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• Sajjad and another vs Muhammad Younas Khilji and 2 others2021 MLD 1864 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-29Read full judgment →
• Sajida Shahzad vs Federation of Pakistan and others2021 IHC 302 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-11-30Read full judgment →
• Sajid Iqbal vs Pakistan Software Export Limited, etc2021 IHC 252 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-07
  constitutional petitionmaster and servantdismissal from servicemaintainabilityreinstatementnon-statutory bodydamages
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging his dismissal from service by the Pakistan Software Export Board Limited. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against a company not established by statute and whose employees' terms and conditions are not governed by statutory rules, and whether reinstatement can be sought in a master and servant relationship. The Court held that the respondent Company was not established through a statute and its employment terms are not governed by statutory rules, placing the relationship strictly in the domain of master and servant. The Court concluded that reinstatement cannot be sought in such cases and the sole remedy for wrongful removal is a suit for damages. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as not maintainable, affirming the principle that employment matters of non-statutory bodies governed by the rule of master and servant do not fall within the scope of constitutional jurisdiction for seeking reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against a company not established by a statute?
  • Does the principle of master and servant apply when the terms and conditions of a company's employees are not governed by statutory rules?
  • Can an employee seek reinstatement in service in the case of a master and servant relationship?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for an employee wrongfully removed from service under a master and servant relationship?
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• Saif Ur Rehman Khan vs Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2021 IHC 288, 2022 CLD 1460 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-26Read full judgment →
• Sahibzada Nisar Ahmad Jan vs Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. (SNGPL), Islamabad through its General Mangers2021 CLC 851, 2021 IHC 12 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-20Read full judgment →
• Sahibzada Fazal Wahid vs Customs Appellate Tribunal and 3 othersPTCL 2021 CL. 675, 2021 PTD 991 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-14Read full judgment →
• Saeed Ur Rehman vs Secretary To The Government Of Pakistan, Ministry Of Religious Affairs And Interfaith Harmony, Islamabad and 3 others2021 CLC 1979 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-24Read full judgment →
• Saeed Muhammad vs Muhammad Itnran and another2021 YLR 2388, 2021 KLR Criminal Cases 89 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-08
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailjudicial consistencyCOVID-19 pandemicduty rostertentative assessmentforum shopping
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to the respondents by Additional Sessions Judges in a murder case. The petitioner contended that the bail orders violated the principle of consistency established in The State through Advocate-General N.W.F.P. v. Zubair (PLD 1986 SC 173), arguing that successive bail applications should have been heard by the same judge. The core legal question was whether the assignment of bail applications to different judges during the COVID-19 pandemic, due to duty rosters, constituted a violation of settled law regarding forum-shopping and consistency. The Court held that the administrative exigencies created by the pandemic justified the departure from the Zubair principle, as the duty judges acted within the scope of their authority when the original judges were unavailable. Furthermore, the Court found no perversity in the exercise of judicial discretion regarding the grant of bail. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, reiterating that bail cancellation requires strong, exceptional grounds, and directed the trial court to conclude the proceedings expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Does the assignment of bail applications to different judges due to COVID-19 duty rosters violate the principle of consistency established in the Zubair case?
  • What are the specific grounds required for the cancellation of bail under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a court required to conduct a deep appreciation of evidence at the bail stage?
  • Can a subsequent bail application be heard by a different judge if the original judge is unavailable due to administrative exigencies?
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• Sadia Arif vs Adnan Shahid, etc2021 IHC 114 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-23Read full judgment →
• Sadia Arif vs Adnan Shahid and 2 others2021 YLR 1753 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-22
  Khuladissolution of marriagesubsequent talaqdower and dowryfamily suitmaintenance allowancewithdrawal of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner wife challenged concurrent judgments of the lower courts whereby her family suit for dissolution of marriage by way of Khula, recovery of dower, dowry articles, and past maintenance was partially decreed, granting Khula and monthly maintenance while dismissing her other claims. The core legal questions involved whether a suit can be withdrawn to substitute a court-decreed Khula with a subsequent talaq, and whether concurrent factual findings regarding dower, dowry articles, and maintenance warranted constitutional interference. The Islamabad High Court held that once a marriage is dissolved by a competent court through a decree of Khula, a subsequent pronouncement of talaq by the husband is of no legal effect, and a completed suit cannot be withdrawn post-decree. The Court reaffirmed that Khula is irrevocable and unappealable except under specific statutory conditions, and upheld the concurrent findings of the lower forums regarding the denial of unsubstantiated dower and dowry claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can a family suit be permitted to be withdrawn to the extent of Khula after a decree of dissolution of marriage has already been passed?
  • What is the legal effect of a husband's subsequent pronouncement of talaq after a marriage has already been dissolved by a court through Khula?
  • Does an appeal lie against a decree of dissolution of marriage passed on the basis of Khula under the West Pakistan Family Courts Ordinance, 1964?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact regarding the recovery of dower and dowry articles open to interference in constitutional jurisdiction when left unsubstantiated by evidence?
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• Saad Sumair vs National Accountability Bureau (NAB) through its2021 [M] CLR 1582, 2022 KLR Crimimal Cases 1, 2022 PLD Islamabad 371 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-07
  pre-arrest bailNational Accountability Bureaubenami transactionwhite-collar crimefundamental rightsconstitutional jurisdictionabuse of powerfinance facility
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition before the Islamabad High Court sought pre-arrest bail in an inquiry conducted by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) regarding a fraudulent finance facility and benami shareholding in a private company. The core legal question was whether NAB had sufficient incriminating material and a legitimate state purpose to arrest the petitioner, and whether the inquiry complied with statutory preconditions and overriding laws. The court held that NAB failed to establish a prima facie case of corruption, noting that the finance facility was fully secured by mortgage-backed property whose value exceeded the loan amount, the transaction was not shown to be benami, and the arrest power appeared to be used as a coercive tool to secure a plea bargain. The court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, establishing that the exercise of arrest powers in white-collar crimes must be strictly scrutinized against fundamental rights, and that executive authorities cannot bypass statutory bars under the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 2017 and Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can exercise constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to grant pre-arrest bail in cases under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the power of arrest under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 permit the arrest of an accused without sufficient incriminating material and a legitimate state purpose?
  • Can the National Accountability Bureau initiate proceedings regarding a benami transaction or regulated corporate activity without complying with the overriding provisions and statutory bars of special laws like the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 2017 and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997?
  • Does using the threat of arrest to coerce an accused into a plea bargain violate the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
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• Riaz Akbar and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 4 others2021 [M] CLR 1451, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 541 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-24
  contractual employmentregularization of servicewrit jurisdictiontermination of servicevested rightconstitutional petitionefflux of time
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a writ petition challenging their termination and seeking reinstatement and regularization of their services as employees of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra. The core legal question was whether contract employees, whose employment contracts expired by efflux of time, possess a vested right to regularization or reinstatement, and whether the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction is the appropriate forum to adjudicate such employment disputes. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners, having accepted employment on a purely contractual basis, had no vested right to remain in service or to be regularized upon the expiry of their contracts. The Court affirmed the principle that contractual employees have no automatic right to regularization unless specifically provided for by law. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is generally not available for purely contractual employment matters, as the appropriate remedy for such employees, in cases of alleged wrongful termination, lies in filing a civil suit for damages for breach of contract rather than seeking reinstatement through a writ petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contract employee have a vested right to be regularized upon the expiry of their contract?
  • Can a contract employee invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to seek reinstatement?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a contract employee alleging wrongful termination?
  • Does the expiry of a contract by efflux of time entitle an employee to remain in service?
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• Reliance It Solutions (Pvt.) Ltd. Through Authorized Representative vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others2021 MLD 1846, 2022 [M] CLR 985, 2022 PCTLR 565 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-05-05Read full judgment →
• Reginald Chude Bjekwe, Nigerian National vs The State and another2021 MLD 2028 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-22
  post-arrest bailprinciple of consistencyfurther inquiryalternate punishmentsforged passportemigration offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under sections 420, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sections 18(b) and 22(b) of the Emigration Ordinance 1979, involving allegations of presenting a forged United Nations passport and ID card. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner makes out a case for further inquiry and is entitled to bail on the principle of consistency and when alternate punishments are provided. The Islamabad High Court accepted the petition and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner. The court held that since a co-accused placed at a higher footing had already been released on bail, the petitioner was entitled to the same relief under the principle of consistency. Furthermore, the court established that where a statute provides for alternate punishments of imprisonment or fine, the lesser punishment is considered for the purpose of bail, bringing the case within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, especially when investigation is complete, the trial has not progressed significantly, and no expert report confirming the forgery has yet been received.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail on the principle of consistency when a co-accused attributed a more prominent role has already been released on bail?
  • Does the provision of alternate punishments of imprisonment or fine in a statute make a case one of further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Whether bail can be withheld indefinitely when the investigation is complete, challan has been submitted, and the trial has not made substantial progress?
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• Rasool Khan and 29 others vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Information and Technology and 2 others2021 PLC (C.S.) 14 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-03-03
  pensionary benefitsdepartmental employeesstatutory protectioncivil servantsPTCLservice conditionsconstitutional jurisdictionequal protection of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns writ petitions filed by retired employees of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) who were originally employees of the T&T Department. The core legal question is whether these 'departmental employees,' despite their transfer to PTCL, are entitled to pensionary benefits, including periodic increases, medical allowances, and other retirement benefits, at the same rates announced by the Federal Government for civil servants. The Court held that while these employees ceased to be civil servants upon transfer, their terms and conditions of service were statutorily protected by Section 9 of the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act, 1991, and Sections 35 and 36 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996. Consequently, the Court ruled that these employees are entitled to the same pensionary and retirement benefits as civil servants. The key principle laid down is that the statutory protection of service terms prevents the employer from varying benefits to the disadvantage of transferred employees, and that equality before the law requires similarly placed employees to receive the same benefits as those granted to others in previous judicial precedents.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees transferred from the T&T Department to PTCL entitled to the same pension increases as federal civil servants?
  • Does the loss of civil servant status upon transfer to a corporate entity deprive employees of their protected pensionary benefits?
  • Can employees of PTCL who were hired after the enactment of the 1991 Act invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court regarding service terms?
  • Are the retirement benefits of transferred departmental employees protected against adverse variation by the employer?
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• Rashid Minhas vs National Accountability Bureau through Chairman, Islamabad and another2021 YLR 1072 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-13
  Mudaraba scamcorruption and corrupt practiceswhite-collar crimesentencing proportionalitycriminal appealaccountability courtfraudulent inducement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals and a writ petition challenging an Accountability Court judgment that convicted Rashid Minhas for corruption and corrupt practices under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, while acquitting co-accused Abdul Rehman. The core legal questions addressed whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant’s guilt regarding a Mudaraba investment scam and whether the sentence imposed warranted reduction. The Court held that the prosecution provided overwhelming evidence, including admitted agreements and banking records, proving the appellant fraudulently induced the public to invest in non-existent Mudaraba businesses while impersonating company directors. The Court upheld the conviction and the acquittal of the co-accused, finding no evidence of the latter's involvement. Regarding sentencing, the Court affirmed that punishment must be proportionate to the gravity of the offense (culpae poenae par esto). It laid down the principle that while sentencing should be reformative, white-collar crimes involving massive public deception and impersonation merit strict deterrence, precluding leniency or sentence reduction, particularly when the convict fails to justify the misappropriated funds or demonstrate mitigating circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sentence for corruption and corrupt practices can be reduced when the convict has served a substantial portion of the imprisonment?
  • Does the principle of proportionality in sentencing require that punishment for white-collar fraud be lenient if the offender is a first-time convict?
  • Can an accused be convicted of corruption under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, based on admitted documents and banking records despite the absence of direct evidence of company authorization?
  • Is the acquittal of a co-accused justified when the prosecution fails to produce evidence of their specific role or mens rea in the commission of the crime?
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• Rashid Mehmood Chaudhry vs Ministry Of Science And Technology and another2021 PLC (C.S.) 351 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-09
  writ petitionappointment processlook-after chargeDepartmental Selection Committeescrapping of recruitmentPakistan Halal Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking a direction to the respondents to issue him an appointment letter for the post of Director (Admin and Finance) (BS-19) against the Punjab quota in the Pakistan Halal Authority, following a competitive process initiated by an advertisement dated 15.01.2019. The respondents contended that the recruitment process was rightly scrapped because it exceeded the 120-day completion limit prescribed by the Establishment Division's office memorandum, and because the Director General, Pakistan Halal Authority, who chaired the Departmental Selection Committee, was holding office merely on a look-after charge basis and lacked the authority to make appointment recommendations. The core legal question was whether the scraping of the recruitment process and initiation of a fresh process were justified. The court held that while exceeding the 120-day recruitment window alone might not justify scrapping the process, the participation of an officer holding a look-after charge as the chairman of the Departmental Selection Committee violated government policy and rendered the recommendations illegal. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an officer holding a post on a look-after charge basis chair a Departmental Selection Committee to make appointment recommendations?
  • Does exceeding the prescribed 120-day time limit for finalizing recruitment provide a valid ground to scrap a recruitment process?
  • Does a candidate acquire a vested right to appointment merely by participating in and being shortlisted during a recruitment process that is subsequently scrapped?
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• Raja Shaukat Aziz Bhatti vs Election Commission Of Pakistan and another2021 MLD 1616 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-28Read full judgment →
• Raja Mazhar Abbas vs Federation of Pakistan through M_o Defence, Rawalpindi & 03 others2021 IHC 82 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Raja Fida Hussain Hafeez vs Deputy Director-I, Estate Management2021 PTD 1710, 2022 [M] CLR 683, 2022 PCTLR 751 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-05-03Read full judgment →
• Rafaqat Khan (alias Bobi) vs The State2021 MLD 738 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-26
  narcotics recoverychain of custodyfalsus in uno falsus in omnibuscriminal appealbenefit of doubtdelay in chemical analysiscontradictory testimonies
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Special Court (CNS), Islamabad, convicting the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, and sentencing him to one year rigorous imprisonment with a fine. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proved the recovery of narcotics beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in view of material discrepancies in the testimonies of recovery witnesses, a six-day delay in transmitting the sample parcel to the chemical examiner in violation of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, and a competing defense plea of false implication. The Islamabad High Court held that glaring flaws and omissions in the statements of recovery witnesses break the chain of events and that, pursuant to the rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, unreliable witness testimony cannot be salvaged by piecemeal acceptance. The court laid down the principle that deliberate falsehoods by witnesses on material aspects require discarding their testimony entirely, and that a complete, flawless chain of custody and events is mandatory to sustain a narcotics conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether material contradictions and omissions in the statements of recovery witnesses can be overlooked by applying the principle of sifting grain from the chaff?
  • Does a delay of six days in transmitting a sample parcel to the office of the Chemical Examiner violate the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001?
  • Is the rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus an integral part of criminal jurisprudence in Pakistan?
  • Can a conviction under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997 be sustained when the prosecution fails to establish a complete and flawless chain of events?
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• Qazi Zaheer Ahmad vs Federal Ombudsman Secretariat For Protection2021 PLC (C.S.) 839 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-13
  workplace harassmentfederal ombudsmancompromise agreementconstitutional jurisdictionouster clauseinquiry committeejurisdictional defect
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged proceedings pending before the Federal Ombudsman for Protection Against Harassment at Workplace, Islamabad, arising from a harassment complaint. The petitioner contended that a prior compromise agreement reached before the Inquiry Committee barred the complainant from pursuing the matter before the Ombudsman, and that the proceedings suffered from jurisdictional defects. The core legal question concerned whether a compromise agreement reached during informal counseling before an Inquiry Committee bars a complainant from subsequently approaching the Federal Ombudsman upon an alleged breach of assurances, and the extent of the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 199 in light of ouster clauses. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the compromise agreement was conditional and that the complainant retained the right to re-initiate her complaint upon an alleged breach of undertakings. The Court laid down that under the Protection against Harassment at the Workplace Act, 2010, an employee has the option to approach either the Inquiry Committee or the Ombudsman, and constitutional courts will exercise judicial review over proceedings before an Ombudsman only in cases of jurisdictional defect, coram non judice, mala fides, or violation of fundamental rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does a compromise agreement reached before an Inquiry Committee bar a complainant from subsequently pursuing a harassment complaint before the Federal Ombudsman?
  • Whether an employee has the option to file a harassment complaint either before the Inquiry Committee or the Federal Ombudsman under the Protection against Harassment at the Workplace Act, 2010?
  • Under what circumstances can a constitutional court exercise jurisdiction in relation to proceedings pending before an Ombudsman in view of Section 18 of the Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013?
  • Does a subsequent disciplinary action following a workplace harassment compromise amount to reprisal and victimization falling within the jurisdiction of the Federal Ombudsman?
  Read full judgment →
• Prof. Zahid Baig Mirza vs Capital Development Authority through Chairman2023 [M] CLR 8, 2022 PLD Islamabad 398 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-01-11Read full judgment →
• PKP Exploration Limited and others vs Federal Board Of Revenue through Chairman and others2021 PTD 1644 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-18Read full judgment →
• PKP Exploration Limited and another vs Federal Board of Revenue through its Chairman, etc2021 PCTLR 1526, 2022 [M] CLR 58 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-18Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Pakistan2021 IHC 116 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-02
  collective bargaining agentunfair labour practicesindividual grievancebonus policyjurisdictional defectlocus standiindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges orders passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission, which set aside a bonus policy of the petitioner company and directed payment of bonuses in accordance with Standing Order 10-C of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The core legal question was whether a Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) has the locus standi to initiate proceedings before the Commission regarding individual grievances of workmen concerning rights guaranteed under law, specifically alleging unfair labour practices under Section 31 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Court held that the Commission lacked jurisdiction because the grievance related to individual rights under the Standing Orders Ordinance, which must be pursued under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, not Section 31. The Court established that a CBA cannot bypass the mandatory individual grievance procedure prescribed by law to enforce rights guaranteed to individual workmen. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside for jurisdictional defects, while the petitioner was held to its voluntary statement withdrawing the contested clauses of its bonus policy.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Collective Bargaining Agent have the authority to initiate proceedings before the National Industrial Relations Commission for individual grievances of workmen?
  • Can a grievance regarding the enforcement of rights guaranteed under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 be adjudicated as an unfair labour practice under Section 31 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • What is the mandatory procedure for a workman to agitate an individual grievance regarding rights guaranteed by law under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Does the breach of a statutory provision like Standing Order 10-C of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 automatically constitute an unfair labour practice?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Federation Of Pakistan2021 CLC 159 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-14
  delegation of powersjurisdictionshow-cause noticePEMRA Ordinanceultra viresstatutory interpretationcorum non judice
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a show-cause notice and a subsequent penalty order issued by a Regional General Manager of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) against the petitioner, a telecommunication company. The petitioner contended that the respondent lacked the jurisdiction to issue the notice or impose the fine, arguing that the authority to initiate penal proceedings under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, and its associated regulations, had not been validly delegated to the officer in question. The core legal question was whether an officer could exercise penal powers without a specific, written delegation of authority from the PEMRA Authority as required by the statute. The Court held that the impugned notice and order were void ab initio and corum non judice because the respondent failed to produce any general or special order delegating the necessary powers. The Court affirmed the principle that rules and regulations are subservient to the parent statute and that statutory delegation of power must be strictly complied with for an officer to assume jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a regulatory officer initiate penal proceedings without a specific, written delegation of power from the parent authority?
  • Does a regulation granting penal powers to an officer override the delegation requirements of the parent statute?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained against a show-cause notice issued by an authority lacking jurisdiction?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Ch. Muhammad Yousaf2021 PLC (C.S.) 989, 2022 [M] CLR 1381 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-07
  pensionary benefitstermination of servicemisconductcivil service regulationsforfeiture of past servicestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal was filed by the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited challenging a Single Judge's order directing the grant of pensionary benefits to respondent No. 1. The respondent's services were terminated in 1978 under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, following disciplinary action. Prior to this, he had resigned from Pakistan Railways to immediately join the appellant's predecessor department. The core legal questions were whether the respondent's resignation from Pakistan Railways to join the appellant counted as continuous service for pension under Civil Service Regulation No. 418, and whether his subsequent 'termination' for misconduct barred him from receiving pensionary benefits under Section 19(3) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Regulation 418, resignation to take up another qualifying appointment does not forfeit past service. Furthermore, since 'termination' is not a major penalty listed under Rule 4 of the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, and is distinct from 'dismissal' or 'removal', any ambiguity in the termination order must be strictly construed in favor of the employee.

  Questions settled

  • Does a resignation from one public service appointment to immediately take up another qualifying appointment entail forfeiture of past service under Civil Service Regulation No. 418?
  • Whether the term 'termination' used in a disciplinary order can be equated with 'dismissal' or 'removal' from service to deny pensionary benefits under Section 19(3) of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • How should ambiguities in disciplinary penalty orders using non-statutory terms like 'termination' be interpreted in service law?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited through Authorized Person2021 PTD 2074 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-11Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Sugar Mills Association and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2021 IHC 294 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Sugar Mills Association (Psma), Islamabad through Secretary2021 [M] C L R 90, 2021 P C T L R 39, 2021 PLD Islamabad 55 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-08-18
  Inquiry CommissionRules of BusinessOfficial GazetteProcedural irregularityPublic importanceSugar crisisWrit jurisdictionAdministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants challenged the constitution of an Inquiry Commission formed to probe sugar price hikes, citing procedural irregularities including the failure to publish notifications in the official gazette until after the report was submitted, the improper initiation of the summary by the Interior Division instead of the Cabinet Division, and the unauthorized addition of a member. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal. While the Court expressed strong disapproval of the government’s disregard for the Rules of Business and statutory requirements, it held that these procedural lapses did not render the Commission’s proceedings coram non judice or void. Relying on the principle that statutory requirements for gazette notification are often directory rather than mandatory in the absence of demonstrated prejudice, the Court ruled that the public interest in investigating an essential commodity crisis outweighed technical procedural defects. The judgment established that while strict adherence to the Rules of Business and statutory notification requirements is expected, administrative negligence does not automatically invalidate an inquiry commission’s findings, particularly when the commission acts in the public interest.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to publish a notification in the official gazette until after an inquiry commission submits its report render the proceedings coram non judice?
  • Can the Federal Government's failure to strictly adhere to the Rules of Business regarding the moving of a summary by the correct Division be condoned in the exercise of writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the Federal Government possess the inherent power to add members to an Inquiry Commission after it has been duly constituted?
  • Is the requirement for publishing a notification in the official gazette mandatory or directory when the statute does not explicitly provide consequences for non-compliance?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Services Limited vs Registrar Trade Unions and others2021 IHC 276 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-06
  industry-wise trade unionRegistrar Trade UnionsNational Industrial Relations Commissiontrade union registrationcancellation of registrationprospective effecttrans-provincial establishmentIndustrial Relations Act 2012
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed by Pakistan Services Limited impugned the order dated 30.04.2018 passed by the Registrar Trade Unions dismissing the petitioner's application for the cancellation of the registration of Pearl Continental Hotels National Labour Union and Pearl Continental Hotels Staff Union as industry-wise trade unions. The core legal question was whether the Registrar Trade Unions possessed the jurisdiction to register or cancel the registration of industry-wise trade unions under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, or whether such power exclusively vested in the National Industrial Relations Commission pursuant to the interpretation in Chevron Pakistan Lubricants (Private) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan. The court held that while the power to register and cancel industry-wise trade unions exclusively vests in the National Industrial Relations Commission under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, the prior registrations and orders passed by the Registrar Trade Unions under earlier regulations (such as Regulation 10 of the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 2016) were not without jurisdiction ab initio, and the rule laid down in Chevron's case applies prospectively rather than retrospectively. The petition was disposed of with the observation that the impugned order would not prejudice the petitioner's pending appeal before the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power to register and cancel industry-wise trade unions exclusively vest in the National Industrial Relations Commission under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Do prior registrations of industry-wise trade unions by the Registrar Trade Unions under Regulation 10 of the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 2016 become unlawful retrospectively after the judgment in Chevron Pakistan Lubricants' case?
  • Does the Registrar Trade Union have the jurisdiction to entertain an application for the cancellation of an industry-wise trade union?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Real Estate Investment And Management Company (Pvt.) Limited2021 CLD 518, 2021 CLC 488 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-10
  performance guaranteeinterim injunctionarbitration proceedingsspecific performancecivil revision petitionirreparable lossconstruction contract
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a civil revision petition impugning an order passed by the Civil Court which allowed respondent No. 1's application for an interim injunction, directing the parties to maintain status quo at the project site and restraining the petitioner from encashment of a performance guarantee during pending arbitration proceedings. The core legal questions involved the legality of restraining the encashment of an unconditional performance guarantee and whether a service/construction contract could be negatively enforced by way of an injunction. The Islamabad High Court held that an irrevocable and unconditional performance guarantee operates independently of the underlying contract, and courts cannot interfere with its encashment unless exceptional circumstances like fraud or irretrievable injustice are demonstrated, particularly when the beneficiary is made the sole judge of default. Furthermore, the Court held that a construction contract cannot be specifically enforced under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and consequently, no injunction can be granted to prevent its breach under Section 56(f) of the Act. The High Court laid down the principle that unconditional bank guarantees must be honoured free from judicial interference, and temporary injunctions cannot be granted where the alleged loss is ascertainable and measurable in monetary terms.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court restrain the encashment of an unconditional and irrevocable performance guarantee pending arbitration proceedings?
  • Whether a construction or service contract can be specifically enforced or negatively enforced by means of an injunction under the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  • Is a loss that is ascertainable and measurable in terms of money considered an irreparable loss for the grant of a temporary injunction?
  • Does the pendency of arbitration proceedings affect the unconditional right of a beneficiary to invoke a performance guarantee where the beneficiary is made the sole and final judge of default?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Oilfields Ltd vs Federation Of Pakistan and others2022 PTD 413, PTCL 2022 CL. 503, 2022 [M] CLR 841, 2022 PCTLR 897 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-11-18
  tax assessmentamendment of assessmentshow-cause noticewrit jurisdictionappellate tribunalfiscal lawsub judice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns writ petitions challenging show-cause notices issued by tax authorities to the petitioner, an oil exploration company, for further amendment of assessment orders for tax years 2005 and 2006. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner Inland Revenue possesses the authority to issue further notices for amending assessments when the previous assessment orders are already pending adjudication before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. The court held that while Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, permits the amendment and further amendment of assessment orders, this power is subject to specific statutory limitations. Specifically, the court ruled that under Section 122(5AA), the Commissioner is barred from amending or further amending an assessment order regarding any subject matter currently in dispute before an appellate forum. Consequently, because the previous amendments were under active appeal, the impugned notices were found to be legally unsustainable. The court established the principle that the power to amend assessments is not absolute and is expressly restricted where the subject matter is sub judice before an appellate authority.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances is a writ petition maintainable against a show-cause notice issued by tax authorities?
  • Does the Commissioner Inland Revenue have the power to further amend an assessment order if the subject matter is already pending in an appeal?
  • What are the statutory limitations on the Commissioner's power to amend or further amend assessment orders under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Oilfields Limited vs Government Holding (Pvt.) Limited and others2021 CLC 2114 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-05Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Air Lines Corporation vs M/s Malikcrete Enterprises2021 IHC 320 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-09-14Read full judgment →
• Pak Qatar Family Takaful Ltd vs President of Pakistan & 02 others2021 IHC 102 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-10Read full judgment →
• Overseas Pakistanis Foundation vs Messrs Joint Management (Pvt.)2021 CLC 1689 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-15Read full judgment →
• Omer Waqas Qureshi and another vs Additional Sessions Judge, Islamabad East and 2 others2021 P Cr. L J 1265 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-19
  Ex-officio Justice of Peacepolice reportcognizable offenceregistration of FIRquasi-judicial powersconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition impugned an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge acting as Ex-officio Justice of Peace, whereby an application under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for registration of a first information report regarding alleged forgery and fraudulent transfer of a commercial plot was disposed of with directions for forensic analysis of documents prior to FIR registration. The core legal question was whether the Ex-officio Justice of Peace could legally issue directions contrary to or without evaluating a solicited police report that concluded no cognizable offence was made out and that the disputed property transfer had already been revoked. The Islamabad High Court held that while powers of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace are quasi-judicial, once a police report is requisitioned, it cannot be ignored or brushed aside without assigning tangible reasons. The Court laid down the principle that discarding a police report without analysis or explicit reasoning renders the order legally unsustainable, particularly when the underlying grievance has been resolved by revocation of the disputed transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Ex-officio Justice of Peace is required to provide tangible reasons when passing an order contrary to a solicited police report?
  • Can an Ex-officio Justice of Peace ignore or fail to evaluate a police report requisitioned during the proceedings on an application under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Are the functions performed by an Ex-officio Justice of Peace under section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 executive, administrative, or quasi-judicial in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Oil and Gas Oil And Gas Development Company Limited, Ogdcl, Islamabad2021 PTD 1124 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-21Read full judgment →
• Oil And Gas Development Company Limited vs Admore Gas (Pvt.) Limited2021 CLC 1465, 2022 [M] CLR 696, 2022 PCTLR 764 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-25Read full judgment →
• Nosheen Naz, etc vs The State etc2021 IHC 98 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-08
  post-arrest bailjudicial proprietyfresh ground for bailSection 164 statementinnocence declarationtrial court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail petition filed by three accused persons, Nosheen Naz, Sikandar Waseem, and Mohsin Waseem, who had previously been denied bail by the court of first instance. The petitioners sought bail before the High Court on the fresh ground that they were declared innocent following a statement recorded by the alleged abductee under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court declined to entertain the petition on its merits. The Court held that, as a matter of judicial propriety, when a fresh ground for bail arises, the petitioners must first approach the court of first instance rather than the High Court. The Court reasoned that commenting on the merits of the new evidence at this stage could prejudice the case of either party. Consequently, the petition was disposed of with the direction that the petitioners should move the trial court to consider the fresh ground.

  Questions settled

  • Should a bail petition based on a fresh ground be filed directly in the High Court or the court of first instance?
  • Does a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a valid fresh ground for seeking bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Additional Sessions Judge (GBV Court), Islamabad2021 P Cr. L J 904 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-03
  deletion of chargespeaking orderright to fair trialalteration of chargeconstitutional petitionsodomysexual abuse
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition impugned the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing the petitioner's application for transfer of the case to the Sessions Court and the deletion of an offence under Section 377-B of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether a trial court can delete a charge or decline to add an offence recommended during investigation without a speaking order, without hearing the prosecution and complainant, and without assigning reasons. The Islamabad High Court held that orders deleting charges or deciding controversies must be speaking orders containing proper reasoning, and that failing to afford a hearing violates principles of natural justice and fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Court set aside the impugned orders and directed the trial court to decide the matter afresh through a speaking order after hearing all concerned parties, while noting the trial court's statutory competence under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to alter or add to charges at any stage before judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can delete an offence from a charge sheet without providing a speaking order and without hearing the prosecution and the complainant?
  • Is an order deleting a charge or deciding a controversy in its entirety required to contain detailed reasons?
  • Can a trial court alter or add to any charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Do orders that are sketchy and devoid of reasons violate the principles of natural justice and fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Nishat Chunian Power Limited through Managing Director and others vs Federation Of Pakistan through Ministry of Water and Power Islamabad and 2 others2021 CLC 959 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-14Read full judgment →
• Nisar Khan Khattak vs Haji Adam, Director General (Admin), Pemra2021 PLC (C.S.) 140 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-24
  quo warrantopublic officestatutory ruleslachesprovincial quotaservice regulationsmalafides
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the appointment and subsequent promotion of respondent No.1 as General Manager and Director General (Admin) in the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), alleging violations of service regulations regarding experience relaxation and provincial quotas. The core legal questions involved whether a writ of quo warranto is maintainable against employees of PEMRA, whether PEMRA service regulations are statutory, and whether the petition suffered from laches and mala fides. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that PEMRA service regulations are non-statutory framed for internal consumption, its employees do not hold public offices for the purpose of a writ of quo warranto, and the petition was barred by the doctrine of laches as well as tainted with mala fides and personal grievances. The key principles laid down are that writ of quo warranto requires the office in question to be a substantive public office involving the exercise of sovereign functions, and internal service regulations of autonomous statutory bodies like PEMRA are non-statutory.

  Questions settled

  • Does the post of General Manager in the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority constitute a public office for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are the service regulations of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority statutory or non-statutory in nature?
  • Whether a constitutional petition seeking a writ of quo warranto filed after an unexplained delay of four years is barred by the doctrine of laches?
  • Can a writ of quo warranto be entertained when the petitioner is found to be acting with mala fides and personal grudges?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisaar Bibi vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary of Interior, Islamabad and 7 others2021 YLR 2334 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-23Read full judgment →
• Nestle Pakistan Limited vs The Registrar Trade Unions and others2021 PLC 59, 2022 [M] CLR 1433 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-01
  trade union registrationcancellation of registrationindustrial relationsmembership thresholdlocus standi of employercontinuing obligationIndustrial Relations Act 2012
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal challenged a judgment dismissing a writ petition against the Registrar Trade Unions' (R.T.U.) refusal to cancel the registration of a trade union. The appellant, an employer, sought cancellation under Section 11 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, arguing the union failed to maintain the mandatory one-fifth membership threshold required by Section 8(2)(b) of the Act. The R.T.U. had previously dismissed the application, citing that the union's registration was sub judice in other proceedings. The Court held that the R.T.U. erred by failing to address the merits of the membership requirement, noting that the one-fifth membership threshold is a continuing obligation, not merely a condition for initial registration. The Court clarified that an employer has the locus standi to seek cancellation of a trade union's registration for non-compliance with statutory requirements. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the R.T.U. to conduct a factual inquiry into whether the union currently meets the statutory membership threshold, directing a decision within two weeks.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employer have the locus standi to file an application for the cancellation of a trade union's registration under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Is the requirement of having one-fifth of the total number of workmen as members a continuing obligation for a trade union after its initial registration?
  • Can the Registrar Trade Unions dismiss an application for cancellation of a trade union's registration solely because the validity of the initial registration is sub judice in other proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad vs The State2021 IHC 148 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-31
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlrecovery of charasprohibitory clausecompetency of investigationchemical examiner report
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal miscellaneous petition filed by the petitioner, Nazar Muhammad, seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 9-C and 15 of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 2482 grams of charas from his possession. The core legal questions involve the competency of the CIA staff to conduct the investigation and whether the petitioner is entitled to bail given the heavy recovery falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Islamabad High Court held that the investigation was duly authorized, the recovered quantity fell within the prohibitory clause carrying severe penalties, and the positive Chemical Examiner report further disentitled the petitioner to bail. The court dismissed the post-arrest bail petition while directing the trial court to conclude the trial within four months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the CIA staff is competent to conduct an investigation under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997 upon proper authorization?
  • Does the recovery of 2482 grams of charas fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to disentitle an accused from post-arrest bail?
  • Whether a positive report from the Chemical Examiner regarding the recovered narcotic substance constitutes sufficient grounds to deny post-arrest bail at a tentative assessment stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Naveed Hayat Malik and 3 others vs The State and another2021 PLD Islamabad 255 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-04
  post-arrest bailterrorismAnti-Terrorism Act 1997hostage-takingjudicial independencepublic servantbail discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought post-arrest bail for lawyers accused of attacking the Islamabad High Court, holding the Chief Justice hostage, and disrupting judicial proceedings. The core legal question was whether these actions constituted terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and whether the petitioners were entitled to bail. The court held that the act of coercing or intimidating a judge—defined as a public servant—from performing their lawful duties constitutes an act of terrorism under Section 6(1) and 6(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Consequently, the offences were non-bailable under the Act. However, the court exercised its discretion to grant bail to the petitioner, noting that the investigation was concluded, no further recovery was required, and the petitioner was a senior member of the Bar. The court reaffirmed the principle that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment and that unjustified incarceration cannot be remedied if the accused is eventually acquitted. The petition was allowed, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of coercing or intimidating a judge from performing their duties constitute terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Is a judge considered a public servant for the purposes of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Can bail be granted in a case involving offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, if the investigation is complete and no further recovery is required?
  • Is bail to be withheld as a form of punishment for the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Naushad Hussain Shah and 2 others vs IESCO through Chairman and 112021 PLJ Islamabad 125 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Naushaad Hussain Shah and 2 others vs IESCO through Chairman IESCO2021 YLR 1852 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-16Read full judgment →
• Nasir Naveed through Attorney vs National Defence University, Islamabad2021 MLD 1280 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-29Read full judgment →
• Nasir Khan vs Capital Development Authority, etc2021 IHC 234 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-13Read full judgment →
• Naseer Ahmed vs Director General, Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, Islamabad and 2 others2021 PLJ Islamabad 304 · Islamabad High Court
  sunset clausecoram non judicelack of jurisdictionretrospective applicationNational Industrial Relations Commissionpromotion move over
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by an employee of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation challenging orders of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which upheld the reversal of his move-over/promotion. The petitioner originally obtained a favorable promotion order from the Labour Court, Islamabad, on 06.12.2010. The core legal question was whether an order passed by the Labour Court after the expiration of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 under its sunset clause (on 30.04.2010) was valid or coram non judice. The High Court held that orders passed by the Labour Court after the sunset date and prior to subsequent legislation were passed without jurisdiction and were coram non judice. The court further held that the retrospective application of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 does not validate past orders passed without jurisdiction by a court lacking competence at the time, as retrospective operation applies only to pending cases. Finding no legal error in the NIRC's decisions, the High Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order passed by a Labour Court after the expiry of the statutory sunset clause of the governing law valid or coram non judice?
  • Does the retrospective operation of a subsequent enactment validate an order previously passed by a court without jurisdiction?
  • Can a judgment passed by a forum lacking jurisdiction due to the lapse of enabling legislation be implemented?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseem Bibi vs Gull Faraz and anotherPLJ 2021 Cr.C. 1217, 2021 PLD Islamabad 120 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-18
  post-arrest bailpregnant accusedjudicial discretionQatl-e-Amdprohibitory clausewelfare of child
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a pregnant woman, sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving the death of her minor son. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, despite the heinous nature of the alleged offense and the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was entitled to bail due to her advanced pregnancy. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, emphasizing that the heinousness of an offense does not automatically preclude the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail, particularly when incarceration is not punitive. Relying on the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Mst. Nusrat v. The State, the Court underscored the Islamic legal principle regarding the protection of the rights of an unborn or suckling child. Consequently, the Court granted the petition, releasing the accused on bail solely on the ground of her eight-month pregnancy, prioritizing the welfare of the unborn child over the gravity of the allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the heinous nature of an offense automatically preclude the grant of bail?
  • Is a pregnant woman entitled to bail based on the principles of Islamic jurisprudence regarding the welfare of an unborn child?
  • Can a court grant bail to an accused charged under the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 based on humanitarian grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Najm-us-Saqib vs Minhaaj Saqib & 04 others2021 IHC 84 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-03Read full judgment →
• Najeeb Ullah vs The State2021 P Cr. L J 18 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-07-09
  narcotic substancesjuvenile offendersentencing leniencyfirst-time offendercriminal appealrehabilitationrestorative justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a conviction under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, where the appellant was sentenced to ten months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine for the possession of 1100 grams of charas. The core legal question concerned whether a lenient view regarding sentencing is warranted for a first-time offender who was a juvenile at the time of the offense. The Court upheld the conviction, finding no material contradictions in the prosecution's evidence. However, exercising judicial discretion, the Court modified the sentence. The ratio established is that while the conviction remains valid, a first-time offender, particularly one who was a juvenile at the time of the occurrence, deserves a lenient sentencing approach to facilitate rehabilitation and avoid the stigma of incarceration. The Court held that the sentence should be reduced to the period already undergone, emphasizing the state's obligation to protect juveniles in accordance with international conventions and the principles of restorative justice, rather than purely retributive punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a first-time offender who was a juvenile at the time of the offense is entitled to a reduction in sentence to the period already undergone?
  • Can a court reduce a sentence for a narcotics offense based on the offender's age and status as a first-time offender?
  • Does the sentencing of a juvenile offender require consideration of international conventions and rules regarding the protection of children?
  Read full judgment →
• Najeeb Mehmood vs Capital Development Authority through Chairman2021 YLR 631, 2021 PLJ Islamabad 8 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-11-18Read full judgment →
• Naeem Akhtar Khokhar, etc vs Mohammad Rauf, etc2021 IHC 60, 2021 CLC 2031 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-12Read full judgment →
• Nadia Asghar (Advocate) and another vs National Defence University2021 MLD 382 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-15Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Basit Khan vs Director General, Intelligence Bureau, Islamabad2021 PLC (C.S.) 931 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-19
  sacked employees reinstatementreversion from postcivil servantsjurisdiction barcasus omissusintra court appealterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated Intra Court Appeal challenges the dismissal of writ petitions filed by employees of the Intelligence Bureau seeking appointment as Assistant Directors and gross monthly emoluments under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010. The core legal questions involve whether civil servants who were merely reverted to lower posts rather than dismissed, removed, or terminated are covered under the Reinstatement Act, and whether writ petitions relating to their terms and conditions of service are barred under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Islamabad High Court held that the Reinstatement Act applies exclusively to employees who were dismissed, removed, or terminated, and does not cover cases of mere reversion, which constitutes a casus omissus that courts cannot supply. The Court further held that the appellants, being civil servants, were barred by Article 212 of the Constitution from invoking writ jurisdiction regarding their service matters. The appeals were accordingly dismissed with costs, affirming the principle that beneficial legislation cannot be extended to circumstances not expressly contemplated by its text.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 apply to civil servants who were reverted to lower posts rather than dismissed, removed, or terminated?
  • Can courts supply language to include unmentioned categories in a statute under the doctrine of casus omissus?
  • Are writ petitions by civil servants concerning their terms and conditions of service barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Basit Khan vs Director General, Intelligence Bureau, etc2021 IHC 6 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-19
  sacked employees reinstatementreversion from postcivil servantsjurisdiction barintra court appealcasus omissusterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated Intra Court Appeal challenges the dismissal of writ petitions filed by employees seeking benefits under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether civil servants who were merely reverted to lower posts rather than being dismissed, removed, or terminated from service fall within the scope of the Reinstatement Act, 2010, and whether their service dispute was barred under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Islamabad High Court held that the Reinstatement Act applies exclusively to employees who were dismissed, removed, or terminated, and does not cover employees subjected to reversion, a matter not provided for in the statute due to casus omissus. Furthermore, the court held that as civil servants, their service matters fell outside the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 212 of the Constitution. The appeals were accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees who were reverted to lower posts rather than dismissed, removed, or terminated fall within the definition of sacked employees under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010?
  • Can courts supply missing language in a statute under the doctrine of casus omissus?
  • Are service disputes of civil servants barred from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s Muslim Industry and others vs Director General T.O, Regulator of Trade2021 IHC 296 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-10-05Read full judgment →
• M/s Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited vs Inland Revenue Officer,2021 IHC 122 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-19Read full judgment →
• M/s Federal Bank for Co-Operatives vs Commissioner of Income Tax,2021 P C T L R 1503 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s Dewan Cement Ltd vs Full Bench of National Industrial Relations2021 IHC 282 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-09-21Read full judgment →
• M/s Ahmed & Kamran Traders (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan & 052021 IHC 34 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Musawar Kamal vs Secretary, Ministry Of Petroleum And Natural Resources, Government Of Pakistan and 5 others2021 CLC 337 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-19Read full judgment →
• Muneer Khan and another vs The State and another2022 MLD 157 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-16
  CCTV footageadmissibility of evidencevehicle theftmodern devicescriminal appealrecovery of stolen propertyQanun-e-Shahadat Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for the theft of a motor vehicle under Sections 381-A, 411, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question concerned the admissibility and evidentiary value of CCTV footage used to identify the accused, given the absence of direct ocular testimony. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction. The Court held that CCTV footage is admissible under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, which permits evidence derived from modern devices. The Court established that for such footage to be admissible, the prosecution must examine the person who extracted or prepared the footage to prove its authenticity. Since the prosecution witness who copied the footage onto a USB drive was examined and withstood cross-examination, and because the appellants subsequently led to the recovery of the stolen vehicle, the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment reinforces that modern digital evidence, when properly authenticated, serves as a valid basis for criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is CCTV footage admissible as evidence in criminal trials under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • What is the requirement for proving the genuineness of CCTV footage in a criminal trial?
  • Does the recovery of stolen property following identification via CCTV footage corroborate the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Munawar Sultan and others vs Defence Housing Authority and others2021 IHC 272 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-28Read full judgment →
• Mukhtair Ahmed vs The State2021 YLR 416 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-07-30
  narcotic substancerepresentative samplechemical analysisburden of proofsentencing guidelinescriminal appealrecovery of narcotics
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment sentence imposed by the trial court under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged possession of 285 kilograms of charas. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the quantity of narcotics recovered, given that samples were taken from each packet rather than from every individual slab contained within those packets, and whether the trial court's method of calculating weight based on averages was legally permissible. The Court held that the prosecution failed to comply with the mandatory guidelines established in Ameer Zeb v. The State (PLD 2012 SC 380), which requires a separate sample from every individual slab or container to establish the nature of the substance. Consequently, the Court found that only the quantity actually sampled and tested (2,260 grams) could be attributed to the appellant. The key principle laid down is that where narcotic substances are recovered in multiple units, failure to sample each individual unit renders it unsafe to rely on the prosecution's claim regarding the total weight, necessitating that only the tested quantity be considered for sentencing.

  Questions settled

  • Is a sample taken from a packet containing multiple slabs considered a representative sample of all slabs within that packet?
  • Can a trial court determine the weight of recovered narcotics by averaging the weight of slabs when individual slabs were not weighed separately?
  • If samples are not taken from every individual slab of a recovered narcotic substance, what quantity of the substance can be legally attributed to the accused?
  • Does the failure to sample every individual slab of a narcotic substance violate the guidelines set forth in Ameer Zeb v. The State?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zia Ud Din vs Ghaffar Khan and 2 others2021 MLD 872 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs Additional District And Sessions Judge-VII, (West)2021 YLR 43 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-11Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasir vs Additional District Judge, Islamabad-West etc2021 IHC 164 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasir vs Additional District Judge, Islamabad-West and others2021 L R 1676 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin vs Additional District Judge-VII, West, Islamabad and others2022 MLD 186 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob vs Hydro-Carbon Development Institute Of Pakistan2021 PLC (C.S.) 740 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-11-08
  disciplinary proceedingsstatutory rulesefficiency and disciplinenatural justiceright to fair hearingcharge sheetservice lawwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged a disciplinary order imposing a minor penalty of withholding annual increments on the petitioner, an employee of the Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (H.D.I.P.). The core legal question was whether the disciplinary proceedings complied with the mandatory procedural requirements of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, specifically the obligation to frame a charge and communicate it alongside a statement of allegations, and the right to a personal hearing. The Court held that the disciplinary proceedings were fundamentally flawed due to the failure to provide the petitioner with a charge sheet and statement of allegations, which are mandatory prerequisites under Rule 6(1) of the E&D Rules. Consequently, the Court set aside the original penalty order and the subsequent appellate order, which was found to be unreasoned. The judgment establishes that strict adherence to procedural safeguards in disciplinary inquiries is essential to ensure a reasonable opportunity of defense, and non-compliance renders such proceedings a nullity. The Court also affirmed that technical omissions in a prayer clause should not prevent the granting of relief when the substance of the petition warrants it.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement to frame a charge and communicate a statement of allegations under Rule 6(1) of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 mandatory?
  • Does the failure to provide a charge sheet and statement of allegations in disciplinary proceedings vitiate the resulting penalty order?
  • Can a court grant relief regarding an appellate order even if it is not explicitly mentioned in the prayer clause of a writ petition?
  • Are the disciplinary proceedings of the Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan governed by the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 in the absence of specific internal regulations?
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• Muhammad Waseem vs The State, etc2021 IHC 110 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-15
  post-arrest bailborderline quantityheroin recoverychemical analysis delayfirst offenderbail as punishmentfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking bail in a narcotics case registered under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question revolves around whether the accused is entitled to post-arrest bail where the recovered quantity of heroin (1180 grams) falls on the marginal or borderline side of the statutory threshold, compounded by a delay in sending the sample for chemical analysis and the fact that the accused is a first offender. The Islamabad High Court allowed the petition, holding that the borderline quantity of the narcotic substance, coupled with an unexplained delay of six days in transmitting the sample for chemical analysis and the completion of the investigation, made the case one of further inquiry. The court laid down the principles that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, that recovery marginally exceeding the lower threshold creates a borderline case warranting further inquiry, and that procedural lapses by the police in transmitting chemical samples within the stipulated period can tilt the case in favor of granting bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when the recovered quantity of narcotics falls on the marginal side of the borderline criteria?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending a narcotic sample for chemical analysis make the case one of further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be withheld as a punishment when the investigation is complete and the accused is no longer required for further probe?
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• Muhammad Usman Haider vs The State and another2021 P Cr. L J 1128 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-31
  murdercircumstantial evidencelast seen evidenceextra-judicial confessionbenefit of the doubtweapon recoverycriminal appealconviction set aside
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal appeal and criminal revision against a trial court judgment whereby the appellant was convicted under section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment with compensation under section 544-A(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence, including last-seen evidence, an extra-judicial confession, and weapon recovery, in an unwitnessed murder case. The Islamabad High Court held that the prosecution's evidence, comprising delayed last-seen statements, a fragile extra-judicial confession, and doubtful weapon recovery, failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence connecting the accused to the crime. The court reiterated that circumstantial evidence must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and that any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, the appellant was acquitted on the benefit of the doubt, and the revision for sentence enhancement was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether uncorroborated last-seen evidence with delayed reporting can form the basis of a capital conviction?
  • What evidentiary value does an extra-judicial confession hold in the absence of independent corroboration?
  • Can a positive forensic ballistic report alone sustain a murder conviction when the recovery of the weapon and crime empties is doubtful?
  • What is the standard of proof required in cases resting entirely on circumstantial evidence to ensure a safe conviction?
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• Muhammad Usman Haider vs State and anotherPLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 461 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-31
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidenceextra-judicial confessionbenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder convictionrecovery of weapon
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal question was whether the circumstantial evidence presented—comprising last-seen testimony, an alleged extra-judicial confession, and the recovery of a weapon—was sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Islamabad High Court held that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed. The court observed that the "last seen" witnesses were unreliable due to an unexplained, inordinate delay in recording their statements. Furthermore, the extra-judicial confession was deemed a weak, fragile piece of evidence lacking corroboration, and the recovery of the crime weapon was rendered doubtful by contradictory police testimony and the accessibility of the recovery site to the public. Emphasizing that circumstantial evidence must form an unbroken chain pointing solely to the accused's guilt, the court ruled that the prosecution failed to meet the required standard of proof. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and dismissed the related revision petition for sentence enhancement, reaffirming that the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in recording witness statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render their testimony unreliable?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence if the chain of events is incomplete?
  • Is an extra-judicial confession sufficient to support a conviction in the absence of corroborative evidence?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon at the instance of an accused prove guilt if the recovery site was accessible to the public and police testimony regarding the recovery is contradictory?
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• Muhammad Touseeq Danial Bhatti vs Ayesha Naeem and 2 others2021 [M] C L R 871, 2021 PLJ Islamabad 172, 2021 MLD 337 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-08-25
  interim maintenancefamily courtconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionminor maintenanceinterlocutory orderfinancial status
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an interim maintenance order passed by a Family Court, which fixed monthly maintenance for a minor. The petitioner argued that the amount was excessive given his limited income and that the order lacked proper reasoning. The core legal question concerned the maintainability of a writ petition against an interlocutory order of a Family Court and the principles governing the fixation of interim maintenance. The Court held that interim maintenance orders are generally not subject to constitutional jurisdiction unless they are coram non judice, without jurisdiction, or based on mala fides. Factual disputes regarding a party's income cannot be resolved through writ jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that interim maintenance is a tentative assessment intended to alleviate the financial hardship of minors. It established comprehensive guidelines for Family Courts, mandating that interim maintenance be fixed based on the father's documented financial status, avoiding exorbitant amounts that might impede the right to defense, and ensuring the timely disposal of maintenance suits within the statutory six-month period prescribed by law.

  Questions settled

  • Is an interim maintenance order passed by a Family Court subject to constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199?
  • Can a High Court resolve factual disputes regarding a father's income in a writ petition against an interim maintenance order?
  • What principles must a Family Court follow when fixing interim maintenance to ensure it is not exorbitant?
  • Does the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 bar appeals or revisions against interim maintenance orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Touraib vs Muhammad Taimoor Khan and another2021 P Cr. L J 1050 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-04
  bail cancellationjuvenile offenderpre-arrest bailbeneficial legislationheinous offencejuvenile justice system
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition was filed under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted by the Additional Sessions Judge to the respondent, a juvenile accused of offences under sections 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question revolved around whether pre-arrest bail was rightly granted to a juvenile accused under the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018, particularly concerning the interpretation of beneficial legislation regarding juvenile custody and bail provisions. The Islamabad High Court held that the Additional Sessions Judge acted in accordance with the mandate of the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018, which is a beneficial legislation designed to protect juveniles and prevent their detention in police stations or jails. The court established that the provisions of the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018 provide specific safeguards for juveniles regarding arrest and custody, prioritizing release on bail or handing over custody to guardians, and that the impugned bail order required no interference. Consequently, the petition for cancellation of bail was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail granted to a juvenile accused of an offence under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 should be cancelled under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • How are the bail provisions under section 6 of the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018 to be construed in relation to juvenile offenders?
  • Does the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018 prohibit the detention of juvenile accused persons in police custody or jails under any circumstances?
  • What constitutes a heinous, major, or minor offence under the definitions provided in the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tahir Masood and 5 others vs Chairman, State Life Insurance2021 IHC 138, 2021 PLJ Islamabad 261, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 439 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-19
  territorial jurisdictiondominant object testsalary fixationstatutory corporationconstitutional petitionfederal government jurisdictionservice regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Islamabad High Court challenging the fixation of salary of the petitioners by respondent No.1, State Life Insurance Corporation, following their promotion to Grade-9 in 2009. The petitioners contended that their real salary decreased upon promotion and alleged discrimination under Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution, as subsequently promoted employees received higher salaries under a new collective bargaining agreement. The respondents raised preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the petition due to a lack of territorial jurisdiction. The core legal question centered on whether the Islamabad High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to adjudicate a grievance against a federal statutory corporation headquartered in Karachi, where the petitioners were based outside Islamabad and the impugned salary fixation order was passed at the head office. The court held that while federal entities with countrywide operations have ubiquitous presence, a High Court only gains jurisdiction if the impugned order creates a legal effect or causes a grievance to an aggrieved person within its territorial jurisdiction. Since the petitioners were posted outside Islamabad and not affected locally, the petition was dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • What is the test for determining the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution in relation to a federal statutory corporation?
  • Does the determination of territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution depend on Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • When does a High Court possess jurisdiction to entertain a petition against an order passed by a federal entity headquartered outside its territorial limits?
  • Does the mere hierarchical control of a regional office located within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court vest it with jurisdiction when the aggrieved person and the impugned order are based elsewhere?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tahir Bashir vs State and anotherPLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 204 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-15
  post-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustprohibitory clausemaster and servantbail as rulemisappropriation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 408 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving allegations of criminal breach of trust by an employee regarding a sum of money entrusted for deposit. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the offence and the status of the investigation. The Islamabad High Court held that the offence under Section 408, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, carries a maximum punishment of seven years, thereby falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the court affirmed the principle that in cases falling outside the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. Finding that the investigation was complete, the petitioner had no prior criminal record, and further incarceration would serve no useful purpose, the court admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail, emphasizing that this was a tentative assessment not intended to influence the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offence under Section 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception for offences falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the completion of investigation and lack of criminal record justify the grant of post-arrest bail in a non-prohibitory offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tahir Abbasi vs Prime Minister of Pakistan and others2021 IHC 308 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-11-23
  service matterwrit jurisdictionArticle 212 barterms and conditions of servicepromotion prospectsFederal Service Tribunalmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns intra-court appeals against a judgment dismissing writ petitions filed by civil servants challenging a notification that altered their promotion prospects. The appellants contended that the notification, which merged certain cadres and introduced new qualification requirements, was detrimental to their service interests. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to adjudicate such a challenge, or whether the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdictional domain of the Federal Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Court held that the writ petitions were not maintainable. It affirmed that where a notification or rule adversely affects the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant, it constitutes an 'order' for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Consequently, the High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain such challenges, even when they are premised on alleged violations of fundamental rights or claims of mala fides, as the exclusive remedy lies before the Federal Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to challenge service rules or notifications affecting a civil servant's promotion prospects?
  • Can a civil servant bypass the Federal Service Tribunal by alleging that a service notification violates their fundamental rights?
  • Should a notification affecting the terms and conditions of service be treated as a final order for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shoaib vs The State2021 IHC 152 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-29
  superdariinterim custodynarcoticsvehicle ownershipMotor Vehicles Ordinancecase property
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an order passed by the Special Court, CNS, Islamabad, which dismissed the appellant's application for the superdari (custody) of a vehicle seized by the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) in connection with an FIR registered under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the appellant, claiming ownership through an open transfer letter rather than formal registration, was entitled to the interim custody of the vehicle used in the commission of a narcotics offense. The Court held that the appellant failed to establish legal ownership as defined under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, because the vehicle remained registered in the name of a third party. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the application, emphasizing that the first condition for superdari is establishing valid ownership. The key principle laid down is that for the purpose of superdari, an 'owner' must be the person in whose name the vehicle is registered under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, and mere possession of an open transfer letter does not constitute valid title.

  Questions settled

  • Who qualifies as an 'owner' of a vehicle for the purpose of claiming superdari under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance 1965?
  • Does an open transfer letter constitute valid proof of ownership for the release of a vehicle on superdari?
  • Can a person claim superdari of a vehicle seized in a narcotics case if the vehicle is not registered in their name?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sher vs The State, etcPLJ 2021 Cr.C. 1117, 2021 IHC 200 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-28
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsborderline criteriachemical analysis delayfurther inquiryrecovery of charas
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case registered under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997, involving the alleged recovery of 1340 grams of charas. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail given the quantity of narcotics recovered, the delay in sending samples for chemical analysis, and the completion of the investigation. The Court held that the petitioner is entitled to bail. It reasoned that the recovered quantity falls within the 'borderline' criteria between clauses (b) and (c) of the Act, and the four-day delay in transmitting the sample for chemical analysis—exceeding the 72-hour requirement—constitutes a lapse making the case one of further inquiry. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that bail should not be withheld as punishment, and the completion of the investigation renders further incarceration unnecessary. The key principle established is that procedural lapses in chemical analysis and the 'borderline' nature of narcotic quantities, combined with the completion of investigation, warrant the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in sending narcotic samples for chemical analysis beyond 72 hours make a case one of further inquiry?
  • Is the recovery of 1340 grams of charas considered a borderline case for the purpose of bail under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997?
  • Can bail be withheld as a form of punishment when the investigation is complete?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shawaiz Abbasi, etc vs The State, etc2021 YLR 1342, PLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 905, 2021 IHC 56 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-22
  pre-arrest bailanticipatory bailhurt casesshajjah-i-hashimahshajjah-i-mudihahrecovery of crime weapontentative assessmentcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition filed by the petitioners seeking pre-arrest bail in F.I.R No. 272 dated 05.06.2020 registered at Police Station Bhara Kahu, Islamabad, under sections 337-A(i), 337-A(ii), 337-A(iii), 337-F, and 148/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved whether the petitioners, who were specifically nominated with active roles of causing blunt weapon injuries resulting in bone exposure corroborated by medical evidence and requiring recovery of crime weapons, are entitled to the extraordinary concession of pre-arrest bail. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary equitable remedy not meant to be granted in every routine criminal case or where tentative assessment of the record links the accused to prima facie charges warranting custody and recovery. The key principles laid down include that anticipatory bail cannot be used to subvert investigative processes, that specific roles corroborated by medical reports defeat claims of mala fide at the pre-arrest stage, and that the necessity of recovering crime weapons justifies refusing pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person specifically nominated for causing blunt weapon injuries corroborated by medical reports is entitled to pre-arrest bail?
  • Is pre-arrest bail an ordinary or extraordinary remedy meant to protect innocent persons from false implication and abuse of process?
  • Does the necessity of recovering crime weapons such as an iron rod and cudgel justify the refusal of pre-arrest bail?
  • Can the question of which party was the aggressor in a cross-version case be determined at the pre-arrest bail stage without recording evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shakir vs Additional District Judge, Islamabad-West, etc2021 CLC 809, 2021 [M] C L R 1023, 2021 PLJ Islamabad 23 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-11-20
  maintenance allowancefamily courtfinancial capacityminor childrenremandwrit petitionMuslim personal law
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenges the concurrent judgments of the Senior Civil Judge and the Additional District Judge, which partially decreed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance for minor children. The core legal question was whether the maintenance amount fixed by the lower courts was determined in accordance with the father’s actual financial capacity and the evidence on record. The High Court set aside the impugned judgments and remanded the case for a fresh decision, holding that the lower courts failed to properly assess the father's financial status and the mother's independent income. The Court established that under Section 17-A(4) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, it is a mandatory obligation for Family Courts to determine the father's financial capability, including his earnings and assets, before fixing maintenance. The judgment emphasizes that maintenance must be commensurate with the father's means and the children's needs, and that courts must rely on concrete evidence rather than arbitrary figures. The matter was remanded to ensure a proper inquiry into the parties' respective financial positions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Family Court required to determine the financial status of a father before fixing the quantum of maintenance?
  • Does the independent income of a mother impact the determination of maintenance for minor children?
  • Can a court fix maintenance without concrete evidence of the father's financial capability?
  • What is the scope of a father's obligation to maintain his children under Muslim Personal Law?
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• Muhammad Shafiq vs Muhammad Ijaz Abbasi and another2021 YLR 370 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-02
  criminal breach of trustagreement to sellearnest moneyappeal against acquittalcivil disputeentrustment of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondent by the trial court under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, in a case involving an alleged criminal breach of trust arising from a defaulted agreement to sell a plot and the non-return of earnest money. The core legal question was whether the payment of advance or earnest money pursuant to an agreement to sell constitutes 'entrustment' of property so as to attract criminal liability under Section 406, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, or if the matter is purely civil in nature. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that payment of earnest money or part sale consideration in an agreement to sell does not amount to entrustment under Section 405 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and that a breach of contract gives rise to civil remedies under the Contract Act, 1872 and the Specific Relief Act, 1877, rather than criminal prosecution. The court laid down the principle that mere breach of a promise or contract does not ipso facto constitute criminal breach of trust, and criminal proceedings cannot be used to settle civil disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the payment of earnest money or part sale consideration under an agreement to sell constitute 'entrustment' of property for the purposes of criminal breach of trust under Section 406, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • Can a mere breach of a contract or agreement to sell be made the basis for criminal prosecution under Section 406, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to establish the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 405, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • Under what circumstances will an appellate court interfere with a well-reasoned judgment of acquittal passed by a trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sarfaraz Siyal vs Fazal Hussain Khan2021 CLC 867, 2021 IHC 10 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sajjad vs The State2021 IHC 214 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-05-18
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlrecovery of charasprohibitory clausecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Sajjad, sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 4,800 grams of charas from a vehicle in his possession. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to post-arrest bail given the large quantity of narcotics recovered, which falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the bail petition, holding that a tentative assessment of the record revealed reasonable grounds connecting the accused to the commission of an offense punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or up to fourteen years, thereby barring the extension of bail. The court laid down the principle that where a commercial or huge quantity of narcotics is recovered from an accused and supported by positive chemical examiner reports within the statutory period, bail cannot be granted, and the matter must proceed to trial within a stipulated timeframe.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused from whom a huge quantity of charas is recovered is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does an offense carrying a sentence of death or imprisonment for life fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Can bail be granted when the chemical examiner's report confirming the recovered substance as narcotics is positive and submitted within the statutory period?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rizwan Arshad and others vs Hafiz Abdul Sattar and another2021 IHC 266, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 270 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-02
  age relaxationcivil service appointmentfederal government servantprovincial government servantstatutory interpretationintra-court appealpublic employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal challenged a judgment setting aside the appointment of the appellant as an Assistant Scientific Officer (BPS-16) at the National Institute of Health (NIH). The core legal question was whether the appellant, a provincial government servant, was entitled to a ten-year age relaxation under federal rules intended for federal government servants, in addition to a general five-year relaxation. The court held that the appointment was unlawful because the ten-year age relaxation provided under the Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1993, is restricted exclusively to federal government servants who have completed two years of continuous service in the federal government. The court affirmed that statutory rules granting age relaxation to "government servants" must be interpreted restrictively within the context of the specific government (federal or provincial) to which the rules apply. Consequently, the appellant, being a provincial employee, could not claim the benefit of federal age relaxation rules, and the NIH's grant of such relaxation was unauthorized and invalid.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ten-year age relaxation under the Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1993 apply to provincial government servants?
  • Can a provincial government servant claim the benefit of age relaxation rules specifically framed for federal government servants?
  • Is an autonomous body like the National Institute of Health bound by the age relaxation policies it explicitly references in its recruitment advertisements?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rashid Khan vs Shakil Akhtar Khan, etc2021 IHC 104 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-09Read full judgment →