Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Muhammad Rameez and 2 others vs The State and another2021 YLR 1173 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-28
  Qatl-e-Amdplea of alibiappreciation of evidencecriminal appealsentence enhancementocular accountdefense evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and revision arose from the conviction of the appellants for the murder of the deceased and attempted murder of the complainant under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellants challenged their conviction, arguing discrepancies in evidence and asserting a plea of alibi, supported by a confession from a third party, Naveed Iqbal, who claimed to have committed the crime. The complainant sought an enhancement of the sentence. The Islamabad High Court examined the ocular evidence, medical reports, and the defense's version. The Court held that the prosecution successfully established the appellants' guilt through consistent eyewitness testimony and corroborating evidence. Conversely, the Court rejected the defense's version as an afterthought, noting that the failure to produce the allegedly injured party, Touheed Iqbal, severely undermined the credibility of the defense. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and life imprisonment, and dismissed the revision petition, finding no grounds for sentence enhancement. The judgment reaffirmed that a defense plea lacking independent corroboration and failing to produce material witnesses cannot override credible prosecution evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the defense to produce a material witness mentioned in their version of events create an adverse inference under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the defense presents a confession by a third party that lacks independent corroboration?
  • Is a plea of alibi sufficient to overturn a conviction if it is not supported by credible evidence and is contradicted by the prosecution's ocular account?
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• Muhammad Rafique vs WAPDA and others2021 IHC 322 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-09-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs The State and another2021 YLR 328 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-21
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausefurther inquiryforged invoicependency of FIRscyber crime
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition filed by Muhammad Nawaz against the dismissal of his bail application by the Court of Sessions in a case arising from FIR No. 16 dated 11.06.2020 registered under sections 14 and 16 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, concerning a forged vehicle invoice advertised on OLX. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail when the offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and when investigation was complete. The Islamabad High Court held that since the offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is a rule and refusal an exception, and mere pendency of other FIRs does not warrant refusing bail unless resulting in conviction. The court laid down the principles that non-prohibitory offences strongly favor bail, the pendency of other unconvicted FIRs is immaterial, and a case where the origin of a forgery remains undetermined warrants further inquiry under Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, leading to the acceptance of the bail petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when the alleged offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does the mere pendency of other criminal cases of a similar nature constitute a sufficient ground for the refusal of post-arrest bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the question of who actually forged the vehicle invoice remains undetermined during investigation?
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• Muhammad Nafees and another vs The State2021 P Cr. L J 631 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-11-25
  narcotic possessionsafe transmissionchain of custodybenefit of doubtcriminal appealnarcotic substances actsample parcels
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants under sections 9(c) and 15 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of narcotics. The appellants were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment by the Special Court (CNS), Islamabad. The core legal question before the High Court was whether the prosecution successfully established the safe and unbroken chain of custody for the recovered narcotic samples from the point of recovery to their receipt at the National Institute of Health (NIH) laboratory. Upon review, the Court found a significant discrepancy: while the prosecution claimed the samples were dispatched on May 16, 2018, the NIH report indicated receipt on May 17, 2018, with no explanation provided for this delay or the intervening custody. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove an unbroken chain of safe transmission. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellants were acquitted by extending the benefit of the doubt. The judgment reaffirms the principle that in narcotic cases, establishing an unbroken, secure chain of custody is mandatory for a valid conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is the prosecution required to establish an unbroken chain of custody for narcotic samples from the point of recovery to the laboratory?
  • Does a discrepancy between the dispatch date and the receipt date of narcotic samples at a laboratory constitute a fatal flaw in the prosecution's case?
  • What is the legal consequence when the prosecution fails to prove the safe transmission of recovered narcotic samples?
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• Muhammad Naeem vs Sameul2021 IHC 236 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naeem vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2021 IHC 228 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-29
  constitutional petitionalternative remedypremature petitionstatutory remedyEmployees Old-Age Benefit Institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Islamabad High Court through a constitutional petition filed by Muhammad Naeem against the Federation of Pakistan and others. The core legal question addressed is whether a constitutional petition can be maintained when an adequate and efficacious statutory remedy is available under the governing law. The court held that the petition is premature as the petitioner had not exhausted the statutory remedy provided under the law, while directing the competent authority to decide the petitioner's grievance expeditiously. The key principle laid down is that extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under the law cannot be invoked directly when an efficacious alternative statutory remedy remains unexhausted and pending before the competent adjudicating authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when an adequate statutory remedy is provided under the law?
  • Is a petition considered premature if no final order has been passed by the competent adjudicating authority?
  • Can the High Court direct the competent authority to expedite the adjudication of a pending grievance?
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• Muhammad Multazim Raza Khan vs Muhammad Ayub Khan and 2 others2021 CLD 892 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Masood Chishti vs Chairman, National Accountability Bureau2021 IHC 4 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Maroof vs The State and 04 others2021 IHC 338, 2022 YLR 478 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-10-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khawer Hasan vs Additional District Judge, Islamabad (West)2021 YLR 1458 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jehangir vs The State and 2 others2021 MLD 468 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-07
  appeal against acquittaldouble presumption of innocencebenefit of doubtcriminal appealmedical evidencewitness credibilityplea of alibi
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of respondents in a criminal case involving charges under Sections 324, 337-A(ii), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal was perverse or based on a misreading of evidence, thereby warranting appellate interference. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The court found the eyewitness testimonies unreliable due to significant contradictions regarding the victim's transport to the hospital and the witnesses' presence at the scene. Furthermore, the medical evidence was deemed doubtful following a medical board's opinion that conflicted with the initial medico-legal report. The court reaffirmed the principle that in an appeal against acquittal, the accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence. Consequently, appellate courts should not interfere with an acquittal unless the judgment is shown to be perverse, arbitrary, or suffering from grave errors of law or fact. The court emphasized that the burden of proof remains on the prosecution, regardless of the accused's failed defense pleas.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of appellate interference in a judgment of acquittal?
  • Does the failure of an accused to prove a plea of alibi shift the burden of proof from the prosecution?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment if it is not perverse or arbitrary?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of right for an accused in criminal proceedings?
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• Muhammad Javed Ahmed & 3 others vs O.G.D.C.L., etc2021 IHC 204 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jan vs The State and another2021 P Cr. L J 1380 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-07
  post-arrest bailprinciple of consistencyfurther inquiryrobberyfundamental rightsspeedy trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for post-arrest bail in a case involving robbery and theft (FIR No. 413/2019) registered under sections 392 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail after arrest, given that co-accused had already been granted bail and no recovery was effected from the petitioner. The court held that the petitioner is entitled to the grant of bail. The ratio of the decision rests on the principle of consistency, noting that co-accused facing similar allegations had already been released on bail, and the investigation was complete. Furthermore, the court emphasized that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, and mere involvement in other criminal cases does not disentitle an accused to bail if the case warrants further inquiry. The court established that where there is a slight tilt toward granting bail, it should be preferred over indefinite incarceration, as liberty is a precious constitutional right, and the petitioner's case fell within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail on the principle of consistency if co-accused facing similar allegations have already been granted bail?
  • Does mere involvement in other criminal cases disentitle an accused to the grant of bail?
  • Can bail be withheld as a form of punishment before the conclusion of a trial?
  • Does the absence of recovery from an accused constitute a ground for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Jalal vs State and anotherPLJ 2021 Cr.C. 978 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-07
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substancesborderline caseconscious knowledgecharas recoveryControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of 1.1 kg of charas from his possession during a vehicle search. The petitioner contended that he lacked conscious knowledge of the narcotics carried by co-accused passengers and argued that the quantity recovered from him constituted a borderline case. The prosecution opposed the bail, citing the dismissal of bail applications for co-accused individuals and asserting the petitioner's conscious knowledge of the contraband. Upon review, the Court observed that while the recovery fell under the ambit of Section 9-C, the specific quantity recovered from the petitioner was a borderline case. The Court held that the question of the petitioner's conscious knowledge regarding the narcotics recovered from the co-accused remained a matter for trial determination. Distinguishing the petitioner's case from that of his co-accused, the Court allowed the petition and granted post-arrest bail, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds, emphasizing the discretionary nature of bail in borderline narcotic recovery cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of 1.1 kg of charas constitute a borderline case for the purpose of granting post-arrest bail under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Is the determination of 'conscious knowledge' regarding the possession of narcotics by co-accused a matter to be decided at the trial stage rather than at the bail stage?
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• Muhammad Isfahan alias Kaka vs The State2021 IHC 180 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-12
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlinvestigation authorityC.I.A. stafffurther inquiryprocedural illegalityPolice Rules 1934
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regarding an offense under Section 9-C, Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997. The core legal question was whether the Criminal Investigation Agency (C.I.A.) staff possesses the legal authority to investigate a cognizable offense and register an FIR without specific authorization from the relevant police authorities. The Court held that C.I.A. personnel lack independent authority to investigate such cases unless specifically entrusted by the Officer-in-Charge of the police station. As the investigation was conducted without such authorization, the case against the petitioner constitutes a matter of 'further inquiry.' The Court affirmed that C.I.A. staff are not a police station and cannot initiate investigations on their own motion. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that a police officer who is a complainant or witness should not also act as the Investigating Officer. Given the procedural illegality, the petitioner's lack of criminal record, and the prolonged incarceration without trial conclusion, the Court granted post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Criminal Investigation Agency (C.I.A.) staff have the independent authority to investigate a cognizable offense without authorization from the Officer-in-Charge of the police station?
  • Can a police officer who acts as a complainant or witness in a case also serve as the Investigating Officer?
  • Does an investigation conducted by unauthorized C.I.A. personnel constitute grounds for treating a case as one of 'further inquiry' for the purpose of bail?
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• Muhammad Imran Khan vs District Judge, Islamabad-West, etc2021 IHC 166 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Imran and another vs Multan and 5 others2021 MLD 1313 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat vs The State and another2021 IHC 16, 2021 PCRLJ 1096, 2022 KLR Criminal Cases 377 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-20
  post-arrest bailcross versionfurther inquirysudden flare upfatal injurySection 497 CrPCdetermination of aggressor
  Summary & questions settled

  This post-arrest bail petition was filed by the petitioner in a case registered under Sections 302, 324, 337-F(vi), 337-F(i), 337-F(v), 337-A(ii), 337-A(i), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a registered cross-version. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to concession of post-arrest bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground of further inquiry in a sudden clash involving counter-versions where both sides sustained injuries and the fatal blow was not attributed to the petitioner. The High Court observed that the occurrence was an outcome of a sudden flare-up between relatives, both parties received injuries, and the post-mortem report established that the deceased died from a severe head injury not attributed to the petitioner, whose alleged arm injury was not reflected in the medical record. Holding that determining the aggressor party in counter-version cases warrants further inquiry, the High Court allowed the petition and granted bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when cross-versions exist and the question of which party was the aggressor remains to be determined by the trial court?
  • Does the non-attribution of the fatal injury to an accused in a murder case involving counter-versions justify the grant of post-arrest bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether bail can be granted under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when medical evidence and post-mortem reports contradict the specific role and injury attributed to the accused in the FIR?
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• Muhammad Fayyaz & others vs Arshad Mehmood & others2021 IHC 94 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Farooq Mughal vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Professional and Technical Training, Islamabad and 2 others2021 PLJ Islamabad 76, 2021 CLC 132 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Faheem vs The National Industrial Relations Commission, etc2021 IHC 248 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-07Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ehsan Shah vs State and anotherPLJ 2021 Cr.C. 991 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-27
  Qatl-e-Amdcircumstantial evidenceburden of proofhomicide vs suicideante-mortem injuriesstrangulationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal against a conviction for the murder of the appellant's wife and a criminal revision seeking enhancement of the sentence. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the charge of Qatl-e-Amd beyond reasonable doubt, given the defense's plea of suicide. The Court held that the conviction was sound, dismissing both the appeal and the revision. The ratio established that where a death occurs in a private house under the exclusive presence of the accused, the burden shifts to the accused under Article 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, to explain the circumstances of the death. The Court emphasized that circumstantial evidence, including medical reports confirming ante-mortem injuries and strangulation, alongside the recovery of incriminating items, was sufficient to establish guilt. The principle laid down is that when an accused claims a specific defense like suicide in a private setting, they must provide convincing evidence, and mere denial is insufficient to negate strong circumstantial evidence of homicide.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone in a murder case?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused when a death occurs within their private residence?
  • Is a failure to explain the circumstances of a death in one's own home a corroborative factor in proving guilt?
  • What is the evidentiary value of medical reports confirming ante-mortem injuries in cases of alleged suicide?
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• Muhammad Bilal Sheikh and others vs Accountability Court No. 1, Islamabad and 7 others2021 P Cr. L J 1609 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-20
  National Accountability Ordinancefreezing of assetsbank accountscaution letterSection 23 NAOSection 12 NAOaccountability court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the distinction between the freezing of assets under Section 12 and the prohibition of transfers under Section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The petitioners, facing investigation by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), challenged the freezing of their bank accounts following "caution" letters issued by NAB under Section 23. The core legal question was whether a caution letter under Section 23 effectively freezes an account, thereby preventing all withdrawals, or if it merely voids specific transfers or charges. The Court held that Section 12 and Section 23 are distinct; Section 12 requires a specific order to freeze assets, whereas Section 23 operates by law to void transfers or charges but does not render an account inoperative for legitimate personal expenses. The Court established that where NAB has knowledge of assets, it should invoke Section 12 to freeze them, subject to judicial validation. Consequently, the Court allowed the petitioners to withdraw funds for personal sustenance, provided they submit affidavits confirming the funds are for personal use, emphasizing that the State cannot deprive citizens of legitimate means of living during protracted investigations.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal distinction between a freezing order under Section 12 and a caution letter under Section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does a caution letter issued under Section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, automatically freeze a bank account and prevent all withdrawals?
  • Can the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) use Section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, as a substitute for a formal freezing order under Section 12 when the assets are known?
  • Are bank accounts subject to a caution letter under Section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, operational for legitimate personal expenses?
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• Muhammad Azhar Ul Islam Zafar vs Pakistan Engineering Council and others2021 IHC 326 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-11-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azad vs Malik Zahoor Ahmed2021 IHC 324 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-10-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Attiq and another vs The State and another2021 P Cr. L J 1209 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-31
  post-arrest bailrapefurther inquirydelayed FIRmedical evidencecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from FIR No. 693, registered under Section 376-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning allegations of rape. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail despite the heinous nature of the alleged offence, given the evidentiary gaps and procedural delays. The Court held that the petitioners were entitled to bail, finding that the prosecution's case required further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court noted significant, unexplained delays in reporting the incident, the absence of medical evidence of struggle or violence, and the lack of forensic reports (DNA/semen analysis) to corroborate the allegations. Furthermore, the investigation was complete, and the petitioners were no longer required for investigative purposes. The Court established the principle that the mere heinousness of an offence does not justify refusing bail, as bail is not a form of punishment. Unjustified incarceration cannot be remedied if the accused is ultimately acquitted, whereas the trial process can address any mistaken relief granted at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the heinous nature of an offence alone justify the refusal of bail?
  • Can bail be granted when the investigation is complete and the accused is no longer required for further investigation?
  • Is a case of 'further inquiry' made out under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when medical evidence fails to corroborate allegations of sexual assault?
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• Muhammad Attiq and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 888 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-31
  post-arrest bailrapefurther inquirydelay in FIRmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  Through the instant petition, the petitioners sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 376-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 given the inordinate delay in reporting the FIR, lack of corroborative medical evidence showing signs of struggle or violence, absence of DNA or semen analysis reports, and non-recovery of any incriminating material. The Islamabad High Court accepted the petition and admitted the petitioners to post-arrest bail. The court held that mere heinousness of an offence is not sufficient to deny bail, that bail cannot be withheld as a punishment, and that a tentative assessment of the record revealed sufficient grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mere heinousness of an offence is sufficient to deny post-arrest bail?
  • Does an inordinate and unexplained delay in reporting the FIR make out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the absence of corroborative medical evidence and DNA reports a ground for grant of bail in a rape case?
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• Muhammad Ashraf Malik and others vs Judge Accountability Court No. III, Islamabad and 3 others2021 P Cr. L J 953 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-05-19
  proclaimed offenderattachment of propertywrit jurisdictionalternate remedyaccountability courtlimitationCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three writ petitions challenging orders passed by an Accountability Court attaching properties belonging to a proclaimed offender, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. The petitioners, claiming various interests in the attached properties—including purchase agreements, family settlements, and leasehold rights—contended that the attachment process was procedurally flawed under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to challenge these attachments, despite the availability of a statutory remedy. The Court held that the petitions were not maintainable because Section 88(6-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 provides a specific, adequate, and efficacious remedy for any person claiming an interest in attached property to file objections before the trial court. The Court established that the existence of this statutory remedy precludes the invocation of writ jurisdiction, even if the petitioners argue that their remedy might be time-barred, as the trial court is the competent forum to adjudicate both the merits of the claims and the issue of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person claiming interest in property attached under Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bypass the statutory remedy to file a writ petition?
  • Does the existence of an alternate remedy under Section 88(6-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar the maintainability of a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is the question of limitation regarding an objection to property attachment a valid ground to bypass the trial court and invoke writ jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Ashraf Chheena through L.Rs. and others vs Mst. Rehana Bibi2022 YLR 704 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-10-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashar Halim Quraishi vs Ex-Officio Justice Of Peace_Additional Sessions Judge, East Islamabad and 3 others2022 PCr. LJ 534, 2022 [M] CLR 650 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-01-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin and another vs Ministry Of Interior, through Secretary, Government of Pakistan and 2 others2021 [M] C L R 902, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 615 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-11-10
  Chairman NADRAappointment criteriadiscretionselection committeeage limitmalicequo warrantopolicy matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of a batch of constitutional petitions challenging the appointment of Usman Yousaf Mubin as Chairman of the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) for a three-year term. The core legal questions revolved around whether the fixation of the maximum age limit of 55 years and the subsequent alteration of internal scoring criteria by the Selection Committee after receiving applications vitiated the appointment process, and whether the appointment violated the provisions of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000. The Islamabad High Court held that the Federal Government is the competent authority to determine appointment criteria under the NADRA Ordinance in the absence of framed rules, provided such discretion is structured and exercised reasonably. The Court ruled that the fixation of the upper age limit had attained finality through earlier binding litigation and that the adjustment of internal evaluation marks to align with the advertisement was a valid policy prerogative of the Selection Board devoid of established malice. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, and the appointment was upheld as legally valid.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Government possesses the authority to fix an upper age limit for the appointment of the Chairman NADRA under the NADRA Ordinance, 2000?
  • Can the internal assessment and scoring criteria for shortlisting candidates be altered by a selection committee after the initiation of the recruitment process?
  • Does the absence of statutory rules framed under Section 44 of the NADRA Ordinance, 2000 render the appointment of the Chairman NADRA unconstitutional?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere in policy matters regarding executive appointments in the absence of proven mala fides or violation of fundamental rights?
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• Muhammad Ameen vs Mst. ShaziaSaleem, etc2021 IHC 140 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali Junejo vs The State2022 MLD 58 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-07
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clauseprinciple of consistencyfraudulent allotmentfurther inquirydocumentary evidenceanticipatory detention
  Summary & questions settled

  In this criminal matter, the petitioners sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 420, 468, 471, 477-A, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, relating to allegations of fraudulent allotment of plots and procedural irregularities. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail when the offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, investigation was complete, and co-accused had already been granted bail. The Islamabad High Court held that since the offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause, grant of bail was the rule and refusal the exception, and that the petitioners were further entitled to bail on the principle of consistency as well as on the ground that the case rested on documentary evidence already in the prosecution's possession. The court laid down the principle that mere heinousness of an offence does not justify withholding bail where the case falls outside the prohibitory limb and no exceptional circumstances exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted as a rule when an offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the principle of consistency apply when co-accused facing similar allegations have already been granted bail?
  • Can bail be refused solely on the ground of the heinousness of the alleged offence?
  • Does the pendency of a case involving documentary evidence already in the custody of the prosecution warrant the continued incarceration of an accused?
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• Muhammad Akram Nadeem vs Chairman, Arbitration Council/ADLG2021 IHC 132 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akhtar vs Col. (Retd.) Muhammad Asif Zaman, etc2021 IHC 232 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ahmad vs The State, etc2021 IHC 154 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-08
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausestatutory barbail as punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition filed by the accused-petitioner Muhammad Ahmad in respect of F.I.R. No. 314 dated 18.07.2019, registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Golra Shareef, Islamabad, concerning the dishonour of a cheque issued for the return of lease money. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail when the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the investigation is complete. The Islamabad High Court accepted the petition and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner. The court held that since the offence carries a maximum punishment of three years and does not fall within the prohibitory limb of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and further investigation is not required, withholding bail would amount to keeping the accused behind bars as a measure of punishment, which is impermissible. The key principle laid down is that in offences not falling within the prohibitory clause, grant of bail is the rule and refusal is an exception, and bail cannot be used as a strategy for punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail should be granted when the offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be withheld as a measure of punishment during the pendency of a trial?
  • Is continuous detention justified when the investigation has already been completed and no further recovery or investigation is required?
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• Muhammad Ahmad Khan and others vs Secretary to The Government Of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others2021 PLJ Islamabad 247 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Afan vs International Islamic University Islamabad, etc2021 IHC 250 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-06Read full judgment →
• Mubeen Ahmed vs The State and another2021 PLD Islamabad 431 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-30
  post-arrest bailsexual abuseprohibitory clausechild protectionSection 377Acriminal law amendmenttentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought post-arrest bail for an accused charged under Section 377B of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for sexual abuse of a minor. The petitioner argued that the medical evidence showed no signs of violence, the FIR was delayed, and the complainant had a motive of personal enmity. Conversely, the State contended that the offence of sexual abuse under Section 377A does not require penetration or physical injury, and that the legislative intent behind the 2018 amendment to Section 377B was to categorize such offences as non-bailable and within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court held that the offence of sexual abuse is distinct from traditional offences requiring intercourse, and that the legislative intent is to protect vulnerable children. Finding sufficient material connecting the petitioner to the offence, including the victim's statement and the mother's eyewitness account, the Court dismissed the bail petition, emphasizing that the prohibitory clause of Section 497 applies, and that the absence of physical injury does not negate the commission of the offence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offence of sexual abuse under Section 377A of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 require the consummation of sexual intercourse or physical violence?
  • Does the offence of sexual abuse under Section 377B of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Is the testimony of a child victim admissible in cases of sexual abuse where there is no background of grudge between the parties?
  • Can the delay in reporting an offence of sexual abuse be considered a ground for granting bail in light of the victim's vulnerability?
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• Mst. Um-e-Kalsoom, etc vs Additional District Judge, etc2021 IHC 106 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shagzana Walayat vs Mst. Shabanam Tabassum and others2021 CLC 1761 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-05-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Samina Naz and others vs Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and others2021 PLJ Islamabad 202, 2021 PLD Islamabad 187 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-31Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rukhsana Bangash vs Chairman, National Accountability Bureau2021 P Cr. L J 1813 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-20
  National Accountability BureauCall-up noticePre-arrest bailSelf-incriminationDue processProcedural fairnessSummons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition challenging call-up notices issued by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and a request for pre-arrest bail. The core legal question was whether the impugned notices complied with the procedural safeguards established by the superior courts regarding the NAB's power to summon individuals. The court held that the notices were legally deficient as they failed to provide necessary details, such as the nature of allegations and the capacity in which the petitioner was summoned. Consequently, the court set aside the notices. Regarding the bail plea, the court noted the NAB prosecutor's assurance that there was no immediate intention to arrest the petitioner, thus disposing of the bail request without a formal order. The key principle laid down is that NAB, when exercising its power to call for information under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999, must act reasonably and fairly, ensuring that call-up notices explicitly state the allegations, the identity of the complainant, the specific documents required, and the capacity of the person summoned, to avoid harassment and ensure due process.

  Questions settled

  • What specific information must be included in a call-up notice issued by the National Accountability Bureau to ensure it meets legal requirements?
  • Does the National Accountability Bureau have the authority to compel an accused person to provide evidence against themselves?
  • Under what circumstances can a court dispose of a pre-arrest bail petition without passing a formal confirmation order?
  • Is the power of the National Accountability Bureau to call for information subject to the principles of reasonableness and fairness?
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• Mst. Murshida Khatoon vs Ch. Abdul Rehman Sahi and another2021 MLD 15 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-08-06Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mehwish Mumtaz vs The State2021 IHC 336 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-12
  pre-arrest bailanonymous complaintcustodial interrogationdocumentary evidenceFIA recruitmentfundamental rightsfair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought pre-arrest bail in a case registered under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, involving allegations of cheating and forgery in Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) recruitment examinations. The core legal question concerned the validity of initiating criminal proceedings based on an anonymous complaint and the necessity of custodial interrogation when the investigation relies primarily on documentary evidence. The Court held that the proceedings, initiated on an anonymous complaint, violated the Federal Investigation Agency (Inquiries & Investigations) Rules 2002 and established Standard Operating Procedures. Furthermore, as the petitioner had already joined the investigation and the prosecution’s case rested on documentary evidence already in possession of the authorities, custodial detention was deemed unnecessary. The Court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, emphasizing that pre-arrest bail serves as a check on police power and that arbitrary arrest, absent sufficient incriminating material, infringes upon fundamental rights to liberty and fair trial. The decision underscores that where documentary evidence is secured, custodial interrogation is not required.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be validly initiated by the Federal Investigation Agency based solely on an anonymous complaint?
  • Is custodial interrogation necessary when the prosecution's case relies entirely on documentary evidence already in the possession of the investigating agency?
  • Does the failure to follow internal Standard Operating Procedures regarding anonymous complaints invalidate the basis for an arrest?
  • When should a court grant pre-arrest bail in cases involving documentary evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Maria Munir and another vs Ghulam Haider and 2 others2021 IHC 52 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Isbah Rashid vs Additional District Judge, Islamabad-West and 22021 [M] C L R 1424, 2021 CLC 1089 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-13
  family courtvisitation rightsinterim orderconstitutional petitionmaintainabilitycustody of children
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, impugning the orders passed by the Family Court and the Additional District Judge whereby the respondent-father was granted visitation rights to meet his minor daughter for half an hour once a month during the pendency of a family suit. The core legal questions involved were whether a Family Court has jurisdiction to pass an interim visitation order in a suit for maintenance and dower, and whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against an interlocutory order of the Family Court in view of the bar contained under Section 14(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964. The Islamabad High Court held that Family Courts possess jurisdiction over visitation rights under the Act, and that Section 14(3) explicitly bars appeals or revisions against interim orders, making a constitutional petition against such interlocutory orders unmaintainable as it circumvents legislative intent. The court further held that a natural father has an equal and inalienable right to see his minor children, which cannot be denied based on unsubstantiated health apprehensions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Family Court has the jurisdiction to fix a visitation schedule for a parent during the pendency of a suit for maintenance and dower?
  • Does Section 14(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 bar an appeal or revision against an interim order passed by a Family Court?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by a Family Court?
  • Can a real father be restrained from meeting his minor child on the grounds of health apprehensions raised by the mother?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hira Imtiaz and another vs The State and 2 others2021 P Cr. L J 1188 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-25
  quashment of FIRfree-will marriageabductionpubertyconstitutional petitionabuse of processmala fide FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 read with section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the quashment of an FIR registered under section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the alleged abduction of the first petitioner for forced marriage. The core legal questions involved whether an FIR for abduction can be sustained when the alleged abductee is a Muslim female of seventeen years who has attained puberty, contracted a valid free-will marriage, and repeatedly stated before a judicial magistrate that she was not abducted, and whether continuation of such proceedings constitutes an abuse of the court's process. The Islamabad High Court held that the marriage was valid under Islamic law since the female was of sound mind, had attained puberty, and gave free consent, and that the impugned FIR was lodged with mala fide intent after concealment of material facts. Consequently, the court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR, laying down the principle that an FIR lacking probability of conviction and filed maliciously to harass a lawfully married couple is liable to be quashed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an FIR under section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be quashed when the alleged abductee contracts a free-will marriage and states before a magistrate that no abduction took place?
  • Does a seventeen-year-old Muslim female who has attained puberty possess the capacity to contract a valid marriage under Islamic law?
  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent powers under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash an FIR where there is no probability of conviction?
  • Whether an alternative remedy under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bars the filing of a constitutional petition for quashment of a mala fide FIR?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hassan Jan and 8 others vs Mst. Bushra Zubair and 3 others2021 MLD 1689 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-05-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Anwar Bibi vs Mst. Maroof Jan etc2021 IHC 136 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-29Read full judgment →
• Ms. Shazia Akbar Ghalzai, etc vs Additional District Judge etc2021 MLD 817, 2021 PLJ Islamabad 110, 2021 IHC 62 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-02Read full judgment →
• Ms. Sara Bibi vs Muhammad Saleem and others2021 PLD Islamabad 236 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-19
  specific performanceoral agreement to selllis pendenspendente lite transferdiscretionary reliefreadiness and willingnessequitable relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two connected Regular First Appeals (R.F.A. Nos.78/2013 and 26/2016) impugning a consolidated judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court, Islamabad, which had decreed a suit for specific performance of an oral agreement to sell coupled with permanent injunction and a suit for cancellation of a registered sale deed. The core legal questions pertained to whether the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance despite failing to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness, failing to deposit the balance consideration, altering the essential terms of the agreement, and whether subsequent purchasers pendente lite were bound by the doctrine of lis pendens. The Islamabad High Court held that specific performance is an equitable and discretionary remedy, and the plaintiff's failure to deposit the balance sale consideration, coupled with a variance from the original pleadings and inequitable conduct, disentitled him to a decree for specific performance. The Court further held that transfers made during the pendency of a suit are hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, rendering them subservient to the final decree. The appeals were allowed, the trial court's decree was set aside, and the suit for specific performance was dismissed with a direction to refund the earnest money.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell is entitled to discretionary relief despite failing to deposit the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time?
  • Does a material variance between the plaintiff's pleadings and evidence regarding the terms of an agreement disentitle them to specific performance?
  • How does the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 affect a property transferred during the pendency of a suit, regardless of the transferee's lack of notice?
  • Whether time can be considered of the essence in commercial real estate transactions where property values rise rapidly?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms Shahnaz Butt vs Islamabad Bar Association through its President, etc2021 [M] C L R 195, 2021 KLR Civil Cases 135, 2021 PLD Islamabad 169, PLJ · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-16Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Zeenia Sam vs Abdul Karim Niazi and others2021 MLD 1983 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-29Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Nusrat Rasheed and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M_0 Education and others2021 PLC (C.S.) 777, 2021 [M] C L R 532 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-11
  deputationrepatriation of deputationistspermanent absorptionwedlock policycivil servants lienrecruitment rulesfederal directorate of education
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment from the Islamabad High Court addresses a cluster of constitutional petitions filed by teachers serving on deputation in the Federal Directorate of Education (F.D.E.) challenging their repatriation orders to their respective parent departments. The core legal questions involve whether deputationists have a vested right to permanent absorption or to continue indefinitely under the wedlock policy, whether an initial selection process is mandatory for deputation, and whether their lien with parent departments terminates upon the issuance of No Objection Certificates for absorption. Dismissing the petitions, the court held that deputation is a temporary administrative arrangement, that a deputationist has no vested right to remain on deputation or demand absorption, and that the wedlock policy or a provisional rule exemption does not override recruitment rules or prevent repatriation. Furthermore, the court ruled that a deputationist's lien remains intact until formal permanent confirmation in the borrowing department, and unauthorized deputation beyond the maximum permissible period creates a wasteful burden on the exchequer.

  Questions settled

  • Does a government servant on deputation acquire a vested right to permanent absorption in the borrowing department upon the issuance of a No Objection Certificate by the parent department?
  • Whether a deputationist can claim an indefinite extension of their deputation tenure under the wedlock policy or the proviso to Rule 20A of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973?
  • Does the lien of a deputationist with their parent department terminate upon the mere initiation of absorption proceedings or is formal confirmation required?
  • Can a borrowing department appoint or absorb a deputationist against a post that, under the relevant recruitment rules, is specifically reserved for initial appointment or promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Nusrat Rasheed and another vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Education and 2 others2021 PLC (C.S.) 777 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-11
  deputationrepatriationwedlock policyvested rightcivil serviceabsorptionrecruitment ruleslien
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenged the repatriation orders issued by the Federal Directorate of Education (FDE) to various deputationist teachers, who sought permanent absorption into the FDE based on the 'wedlock policy' and previously issued No Objection Certificates (NOCs). The core legal question was whether these deputationists acquired a vested right to absorption after serving beyond the maximum five-year deputation period. The Court held that deputationists have no vested right to remain on deputation indefinitely or to be absorbed into the borrowing department. The Court emphasized that deputation is a temporary administrative arrangement, and the wedlock policy cannot override statutory recruitment rules or the necessity of a transparent selection process. The holding established that repatriation is lawful when the borrowing department no longer requires the services or when the maximum deputation period has expired. Furthermore, the Court clarified that a deputationist's lien with their parent department remains intact until they are formally confirmed in the borrowing department, and appointments on deputation to posts reserved for promotion or initial appointment are illegal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a deputationist acquire a vested right to be absorbed into the borrowing department after serving beyond the maximum deputation period?
  • Can the 'wedlock policy' be invoked to prevent the repatriation of a deputationist to their parent department?
  • Is a selection process mandatory for an appointment on deputation?
  • Does a deputationist's lien with their parent department terminate upon the issuance of a No Objection Certificate (NOC) for absorption?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Faryal Talpur vs Arslan Taj, Mpa through Provincial Assembly of Sindh2021 PLJ Islamabad 291 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mohammad Riaz vs The State, etc2021 IHC 210 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-05-06
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsborderline criteriachemical analysis delayfurther inquirycriminal procedurebail as punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, filed by an accused charged under Section 9(C) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997, following the recovery of 1210 grams of heroin. The core legal questions addressed were whether the quantity recovered qualified as a "borderline" case, whether a nine-day delay in transmitting samples for chemical analysis warranted bail, and whether prior criminal involvement without conviction precluded relief. The Court held that the petition should be allowed. It determined that the quantity of 1210 grams fell within the "borderline" criteria, and the failure to transmit samples within the mandatory 72-hour period rendered the case one of "further inquiry." Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed the principle that bail should not be withheld as a punishment, and that prior involvement in other cases, absent conviction, does not automatically disentitle an accused from bail. Consequently, the petitioner was admitted to post-arrest bail, emphasizing that this was a tentative assessment for bail purposes only.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in transmitting narcotic samples for chemical analysis beyond 72 hours entitle an accused to post-arrest bail?
  • Is the recovery of 1210 grams of heroin considered a 'borderline' case for the purpose of granting bail under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997?
  • Does the mere involvement of an accused in other criminal cases without conviction disentitle them to the concession of bail?
  • Can bail be withheld as a form of punishment for an accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Mashkoor Khan vs The State & another2021 IHC 14 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-22
  post-arrest baildishonest issuance of chequesprohibitory clausecivil disputerecovery of moneySection 489-F PPCfair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding the alleged dishonest issuance of cheques. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail given that the offense under Section 489-F PPC carries a maximum sentence of three years and does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court allowed the bail petition, holding that the offense does not fall within the prohibitory limb of Section 497 CrPC, and that the prosecution failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances justifying continued incarceration. The Court affirmed that in non-bailable offenses not falling within the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. Furthermore, it reiterated that Section 489-F PPC is not a mechanism for debt recovery, which is a matter for civil proceedings under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and that courts must avoid presuming dishonest intent at the pre-trial stage to protect the right to a fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offense under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be utilized as a mechanism for the recovery of money?
  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception for offenses that do not fall within the prohibitory limb of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mishal vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2021 IHC 174 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-15Read full judgment →
• Misbah Musarrat Jaura vs The State and others2021 P Cr. L J 1648 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-22
  false informationquashing of proceedingsshow-cause noticemala fideabuse of processacquittalcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged criminal proceedings initiated under Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 against the petitioner following the acquittal of the accused in a prior case. The core legal question was whether proceedings for giving false information could be initiated against a complainant solely based on an acquittal, and whether such action requires a prior show-cause notice. The Court quashed the proceedings, holding that an acquittal under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not equate to the original information being false. The Court established the principle that information provided with a bona fide belief cannot be deemed false merely because it was not proven in court. Furthermore, the police are mandatorily required to issue a show-cause notice to the complainant before initiating proceedings under Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, to provide an opportunity for explanation. The failure to issue such notice, coupled with an unexplained delay of over a year, indicated mala fide intent and rendered the proceedings an abuse of process.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acquittal of an accused under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically render the complainant's original information false under Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is it mandatory for the police to issue a show-cause notice to a complainant before initiating proceedings under Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can proceedings under Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be initiated against a complainant if the information was lodged with a bona fide belief?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Nadeem Hafeez and another vs K.M.A. Import And Export Company2021 PLD Islamabad 49 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-11-18Read full judgment →
• Mir Nawaz and others vs Federal Government Employees Housing2021 IHC 314 · Islamabad High Court
  contingent employeesregularization of servicesmaster and servant principleconstitutional jurisdictionnon-statutory rulesintra court appealwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenged a single-judge decision dismissing a writ petition filed by contingent employees of the Federal Government Employees Housing Authority (FGEHA) seeking regularization of their services. The core legal question was whether the High Court has constitutional jurisdiction to entertain a petition for regularization by employees governed by non-statutory rules. The Court held that the appellants were appointed on a contingent basis, and their employment relationship was governed by the principle of 'master and servant,' as the FGEHA service regulations were non-statutory. Consequently, the Court ruled that the appellants had no vested right to regularization, and their grievances were not amenable to the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The principle laid down is that in the absence of a violation of statutory rules, employees governed by non-statutory terms cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction for employment disputes, as their remedy lies before a court of competent jurisdiction for damages, not for reinstatement or regularization. The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contingent employee have a vested right to claim regularization of service?
  • Is the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 available to employees governed by non-statutory rules?
  • Does the principle of 'master and servant' apply to employees of a government-owned organization lacking statutory service rules?
  • Can a High Court entertain a writ petition for regularization of services in the absence of a violation of statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Akbar Dhareeja vs Muhammad Ramzan Khokhar and others2021 CLC 1132 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-26Read full judgment →
• Metropolitan Corporation, Islamabad through Mayor vs Chairman C.D.A.2021 PLD Islamabad 144 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-23
  property taxmunicipal functionsimplied repeallocal governmenttax proposalgazette notificationdelegated legislationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment decides multiple writ petitions challenging demand notices issued by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) for the recovery of property tax in Islamabad. The petitioners contended that after the enactment of the Islamabad Capital Territory Local Government Act, 2015, the authority to levy and collect property tax vested exclusively in the Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad (MCI), and that the CDA's demand notices and the MCI's notification dated 17.12.2018 revising property tax were illegal. The High Court allowed the petitions, holding that section 15-A of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, which previously empowered the CDA to perform municipal functions and levy taxes, stood explicitly repealed by section 132 of the Act of 2015. Consequently, the CDA has no jurisdiction to impose or collect property tax. Furthermore, the Court declared the notification dated 17.12.2018 void as it was issued without previous publication of tax proposals, public objections, or official gazette publication, in violation of section 88 of the Act of 2015 and Article 10-A of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Capital Development Authority retains the power to levy and collect property tax in Islamabad after the enactment of the Islamabad Capital Territory Local Government Act, 2015?
  • What is the legal effect of failing to publish a tax revision notification in the official Gazette as required under the law?
  • Can a local government body validly levy or revise a tax without previous publication of the tax proposal and inviting public objections under the Islamabad Capital Territory Local Government Act, 2015?
  • How are conflicts of overlapping jurisdiction between an earlier special statute and a later local government statute resolved under the doctrine of implied repeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Tulip Project, Riverside through Chief Executive vs National Highway2022 PLD Islamabad 314 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-05-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Tecnimont SpA through Special Attorney vs Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and 3 othersPTCL 2021 CL. 371, 2020 PTD 1646 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-07-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Limited through Attorney vs Oil And Gas Regulatory Authority through Chairperson and 2 others2021 PLD Islamabad 378 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-23
  gas theftOGRA jurisdictionGas Utility Courtdoctrine of election of remediesstatutory interpretationregulated activitybilling and metering disputesres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority's (OGRA) jurisdiction to entertain complaints regarding gas theft, billing, and metering, arguing that the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016, ousted OGRA's authority. The Court examined the interplay between the OGRA Ordinance, 2002, and the 2016 Act. It held that while OGRA retains jurisdiction over 'regulated activities' under the 2002 Ordinance, the 2016 Act, being a later special statute, exclusively governs offences related to gas theft. Regarding overlapping areas like billing and metering, the Court established that while both forums may initially be accessible, the doctrine of election of remedies applies; once a party invokes the jurisdiction of the Gas Utility Court, they cannot re-agitate the matter before OGRA. Crucially, the Court ruled that the Gas Utility Court, being a judicial forum, holds superior authority, and its decrees prevail over OGRA’s administrative findings. Consequently, while OGRA may resolve initial consumer complaints, final adjudication on these specific disputes rests with the Gas Utility Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016, exclude the jurisdiction of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) to resolve consumer complaints regarding billing and metering?
  • Can a party pursue parallel proceedings before both the Gas Utility Court and OGRA for the same billing or metering dispute?
  • Does the decision of a Gas Utility Court prevail over the findings of OGRA in matters of overlapping jurisdiction?
  • Is the Gas Utility Court considered a court of law with the power to follow the Code of Civil Procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure, unlike the administrative forum of OGRA?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Spirit Industries (Private) Limited through authorized representative2021 PTD 647 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-12-03
  anti-dumping dutylimitation periodcondonation of delayspecial lawofficial gazette publicationconstructive noticecustoms duty
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an importer, challenged an appellate tribunal judgment dismissing its appeal against anti-dumping duty determinations as time-barred. The core legal questions revolved around whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to appeals under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, and whether publication of notices in the official gazette and newspapers constitutes sufficient notice to unregistered interested parties. The Islamabad High Court held that the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 is a special law, and by virtue of section 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1908, section 5 does not apply to appeals filed under section 70 of the 2015 Act, meaning delay cannot be condoned. Furthermore, official publication of notices in the gazette and newspapers serves as constructive notice to the public, invalidating claims of unawareness by unregistered parties. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is applicable to appeals filed under section 70 of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015?
  • Does the publication of investigation notices in the official Gazette and newspapers constitute sufficient notice to unregistered parties?
  • Can the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal condone a delay in filing an appeal when the governing special statute provides a strict limitation period without incorporating section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shifa International Hospital, Islamabad vs Director General, FIA, Islamabad and another2022 KLR Civil Cases 229, 2022 PCr. LJ 245, 2022 [M] CLR 980 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Opi Gas (Private) Limited vs Government Holding (Pvt.) Limited and others2021 MLD 1916 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-05
  constitutional jurisdictioncontractual disputearbitration clausealternative remedywrit of mandamusstate-owned enterprise
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this writ petition, the petitioner challenged a letter issued by respondent No.1 declining to further extend a Liquefied Petroleum Gas supply agreement beyond the extended term. The core legal question was whether the High Court, under its constitutional jurisdiction, could compel a state-owned enterprise to continue a contractual relationship or specifically enforce an expired commercial contract when an alternative remedy via arbitration was available. The Islamabad High Court held that the constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to enforce contractual obligations or to challenge the non-extension of an expired commercial contract, especially when the agreement contains an explicit arbitration clause providing an efficacious alternative remedy. The key principle laid down is that writ petitions are generally barred for the enforcement of purely contractual rights or for resolving disputes arising out of contracts containing arbitration clauses, leaving the aggrieved party to seek remedies through arbitration or damages.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution direct a state instrumentality to continue a contractual relationship after the expiry of the contract term?
  • Whether a writ petition is maintainable for the enforcement of rights under a contract that contains an arbitration clause?
  • Does the existence of an alternative and efficacious remedy like arbitration bar the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction in contractual matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Oil And Gas Development Company Ltd vs Messrs Admore Gaz2021 MLD 67 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khyber Tea And Food Company, Peshawar vs Collector Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Islamabad and others2021 PTD 879 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Industrial Development Bank Of Pakistan vs Messrs Blossom Towel2022 CLD 143, 2022 [M] CLR 914, 2022 PCTLR 1054 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-10-18Read full judgment →
• Messrs Federal Bank For Cooperatives, Islamabad vs Commissioner Of Income Tax, Companies Zone, Islamabad2021 PTD 1203 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-05
  tax referenceminimum taxspecial law vs general lawstatutory interpretationimplied repealtax exemptionnon-obstante clauseFederal Bank for Cooperatives
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference concerns the tax liability of the Federal Bank for Cooperatives under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether Section 80D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, which imposes a minimum tax, overrides the specific tax exemption granted to the Bank under Section 38 of the Federal Bank for Cooperatives Act, 1977. The Islamabad High Court held that the Federal Bank for Cooperatives Act, 1977, constitutes a special law designed as a standalone regulatory framework for the Bank, and its specific tax exemption clause prevails over the minimum tax provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The Court ruled that the Appellate Tribunal erred in its interpretation. The key principle laid down is that when two special laws conflict, the doctrine of implied repeal is not to be mechanically applied. Instead, courts must discern legislative intent through the purpose and policy of the statutes. Absent explicit legislative language overriding the specific exemption, the earlier special provision remains effective against subsequent general tax provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 80D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, override the tax exemption provided under Section 38 of the Federal Bank for Cooperatives Act, 1977?
  • Can the doctrine of implied repeal be mechanically applied to resolve conflicts between two special statutes?
  • How should courts interpret conflicting provisions between two special laws where both contain non-obstante clauses?
  • Does the absence of a provision pari materia to Section 54 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, indicate a lack of legislative intent to override prior special exemptions?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Fast Tracks through Sole Proprietor vs Federal Investigation Agency2021 CLC 1160 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-27
  Writ jurisdictionNatural justiceAudi alteram partemPublic procurementArbitrary exercise of powerContractual disputeAdministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the cancellation of a purchase order by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) after the petitioner had successfully supplied generators. The core legal question concerned whether the respondent could unilaterally cancel the contract and withhold payment without providing the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, and whether such action was arbitrary. The Court held that the impugned cancellation was illegal, noting that the goods had been duly received, verified, and entered into the respondents' stock register. The Court emphasized that the principle of natural justice, specifically audi alteram partem, must be read into all statutes, even where not expressly provided, whenever administrative proceedings affect a person's rights or property. Finding the respondents' actions characterized by mala fide, lack of transparency, and arbitrary exercise of power, the Court set aside the cancellation letter and directed the respondents to release the payment for the supplied goods. This judgment reinforces that administrative authorities cannot bypass fair hearing requirements in contractual matters involving public procurement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of natural justice apply to administrative decisions even when a statute does not explicitly require a hearing?
  • Can an administrative authority unilaterally cancel a purchase order after the goods have been delivered and accepted?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against an arbitrary administrative action in a contractual matter involving public procurement?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Farmaceutics International through Proprietor vs Government Of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of National Health Services, Regulation and Coordination and 5 others2021 MLD 1267 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Exceed Private Limited vs Jamil Ahmed Khan and others2021 CLC 31 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-08-07Read full judgment →
• Messrs Dancom Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited vs Pakistan Telecommunication2021 PLJ Islamabad 370, 2021 MLD 1642, 2022 [M] CLR 745, 2022 PCTLR 824 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Az Business Linkers vs The Collector, Model Customs Collectorate2021 PTD 853 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Attock Refinery Limited and others vs The Collector Of Sales Tax2021 PTD (Trib.) 1680 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-01
  sales tax referenceshow-cause noticeomission of statutory provisiondefault surchargeSales Tax Act 1990Appellate Tribunal powersprinciples of fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This Sales Tax Reference was filed under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 before the Islamabad High Court against an order of the Customs, Central Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad. The primary legal question before the Court was whether a show-cause notice is legally sustainable if it fails to explicitly specify the governing provision, specifically Section 36 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The High Court answered in the affirmative, sustaining the validity of the show-cause notice. The Court laid down the principle that the jurisprudence on show-cause notices is governed by principles of fairness; mere omission or misstatement of a statutory provision within a show-cause notice does not invalidate it if the notice clearly communicates the allegations, consequences, and provides a fair opportunity to respond without causing prejudice. Additionally, the Court observed that under Section 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, default surcharge is automatic and mandatory upon tax default, whether willful or inadvertent, and the Appellate Tribunal lacks authority to create a window period waiving such surcharge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of the statutory provision under which a show-cause notice is issued render the notice invalid if the factual allegations and legal consequences are clearly conveyed?
  • Is the application of default surcharge under Section 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 automatic in cases of tax non-payment, regardless of whether the default was inadvertent or deliberate?
  • Does the Appellate Tribunal have statutory authority to grant a taxpayer a time window to pay principal tax liability without attracting a default surcharge?
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• Messrs Attock Gen Ltd. Refinery, P.O. Morgah, Rawalpindi through ChiefPTCL 2021 CL. 600, 2021 PTD 1088 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-08-06
  income tax referencepre-commencement expenditureset-off of lossesincome from other sourcestax auditbusiness lossIncome Tax Ordinance 2001
  Summary & questions settled

  This income tax reference arose from an order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which disallowed the applicant's claim to set off pre-commencement business expenses against interest income. The applicant, a company that had not yet commenced business operations, sought to deduct administrative and management expenses as business losses against its interest income. The core legal questions were whether such pre-commencement expenses could be set off against income from other sources and whether the selection of the applicant's tax matter for audit under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was lawful. The Court held that pre-commencement expenditure, as defined in Section 25 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, does not encompass administrative and management expenses. Furthermore, since the company had not commenced business, it could not claim business losses. The Court affirmed that interest income is classified as "Income from other sources" under Section 39, and the applicant failed to establish a legal basis for the claimed set-off. Additionally, the audit selection was deemed lawful. The Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, ruling against the applicant.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-commencement business expenses be set off against interest income classified as income from other sources?
  • Does the definition of pre-commencement expenditure under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 include administrative and management expenses?
  • Is the selection of a taxpayer for audit under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 lawful if conducted prior to the 2010 amendment?
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• Meena Munawar Khan vs Federation Of Pakistan and others2021 PTD 407 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-08-17
  import of vintage carscustoms duty exemptionImport Policy Ordertax exemptionvehicle releaseconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this writ petition, the petitioner sought a direction for the release of an imported used Classic Porsche 912 (Model 1966) detained at the Islamabad Dry Port. The core legal question was whether customs authorities could refuse to release a vintage vehicle imported pursuant to an exemption notification (SRO 833(1)/2018 dated 03.07.2018) on the ground that the Import Policy Order restricts the import of vehicles older than three years. The Islamabad High Court allowed the petition, holding that the Federal Government possesses statutory powers to grant exemptions and relaxations under relevant fiscal and trade laws, overriding conflicting general restrictions in the Import Policy Order. The court laid down the principle that statutory tax and duty exemptions issued by the Federal Government for vintage vehicles must be given full effect, and customs authorities cannot withhold release based on procedural gaps or general import restrictions when the specific exemption criteria are met.

  Questions settled

  • Can customs authorities refuse to release a vintage vehicle imported under an exemption notification on the ground that the Import Policy Order restricts vehicles older than three years?
  • Does the Federal Government have the power to relax prohibitions and restrictions under the Import Policy Order through a specific exemption notification?
  • Whether the provisions of Section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 override general restrictions contained in the Import Policy Order regarding the import of used vehicles?
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• MCB Bank Limited, Islamabad through authorized attorneys vs Rizwan Ali2021 IHC 286 · Islamabad High Court
  writ jurisdictionaudi alteram partemworkman definitionindustrial relationswrongful dismissalconcurrent findingsnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged concurrent orders passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), which had reinstated the respondent, a former bank employee, following his dismissal for alleged misconduct. The petitioner bank contended that the respondent was not a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, and that the grievance petition was time-barred. The core legal questions concerned the respondent's status as a workman and whether the bank’s dismissal process, which lacked a formal charge sheet or show-cause notice, violated the principle of audi alteram partem. The Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the respondent was not a workman or that the NIRC’s findings were erroneous. Emphasizing that writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is supervisory rather than appellate, the Court declined to interfere with concurrent findings of fact absent jurisdictional error or misreading of evidence. The Court affirmed that the failure to issue a charge sheet or show-cause notice constituted a violation of natural justice. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the bank was ordered to reinstate the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to issue a charge sheet or show-cause notice before dismissal violate the principle of audi alteram partem?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by a tribunal in the exercise of its constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding findings of fact?
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• Masood ur Rahman Abbasi vs The State, etc2021 IHC 292, 2022 PCr. LJ 439 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-12-16
  post-arrest bailcyber crimedefamationfair trialjudicial independenceperception of biasfreedom of speech
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal petition for post-arrest bail filed by Masood ur Rahman Abbasi against the State, arising from FIR No. 44 dated 30.06.2021 registered at Police Station Cyber Crime Circle, FIA, Islamabad, under sections 500, 505, 506, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and sections 10, 11, and 20 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given that the offences alleged prima facie lacked applicability, the complainant lacked locus standi, and the case involved criticism of the highest judicial officer, which raises concerns regarding due process, fair trial, and judicial impartiality. The Islamabad High Court held that the case warranted further inquiry and that the registration of the offence appeared to be an abuse of the law, emphasizing that to ensure a fair trial and avoid any perception of bias when an offence involves a judicial officer, the concession of bail should be extended. The petition was accordingly allowed, admitting the petitioner to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail should be granted when the offences mentioned in the FIR are prima facie not attracted and the case falls within the scope of further inquiry?
  • Does a criminal case involving allegations or criticism against a judicial officer necessitate the extension of bail to ensure a fair trial and uphold the perception of judicial impartiality?
  • Does a private citizen have the locus standi to file a complaint for person-specific offences allegedly committed against a constitutional office holder without personal injury or defamation suffered by the complainant?
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• Masood Jillani etc vs State and another2022 P Cr.L J 26, PLJ 2021 Cr.C. 1737 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-05-27
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausedocumentary evidencefurther inquiryconcession of bailfraudulent allotmentpre-trial incarceration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two post-arrest bail petitions filed by petitioners accused of fraudulent allotment of plots at the Capital Development Authority (CDA). The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail, given the nature of the offences and the status of the investigation. The court held that the petitioners were entitled to bail, accepting their petitions. The court reasoned that the offences charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that the investigation was already complete, with evidence being primarily documentary and in the prosecution's possession. Furthermore, the court noted the absence of risk regarding abscondance or tampering with evidence. The key principle laid down is that in non-bailable offences not falling within the prohibitory limb of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, applicable only in extraordinary circumstances such as risk of abscondance, tampering with evidence, repetition of the offence, or previous conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of bail in offences not falling within the prohibitory limb of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a rule or an exception?
  • Can bail be denied solely on the grounds of the heinous nature of an offence?
  • Is a confession made to a police officer admissible as evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Does the fact that a case depends entirely on documentary evidence already in the possession of the prosecution support the grant of bail?
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• Masood Alam Niazi vs Secretary, Ministry of Industries and Production and another2021 IHC 304 · Islamabad High Court
  writ petition maintainabilitymaster and servant principleservice rulesconstitutional jurisdictionUtility Stores Corporationnon-statutory rulesreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions were filed by employees of the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan (USCP) seeking reinstatement and back benefits following their acquittal in criminal proceedings. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition filed by an employee of the USCP regarding terms and conditions of service is maintainable. The court held that the petitions were not maintainable. The ratio of the decision is that the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Service Rules, 1981, were not framed by the Federal Government in exercise of statutory powers but by the Board of Directors of the USCP. Consequently, these rules are non-statutory in nature. The court affirmed that where service terms are not governed by statutory provisions, the relationship between the employer and employee is strictly governed by the principle of 'master and servant.' Therefore, the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 cannot be invoked for individual service grievances, and the petitioners must seek alternative remedies before a court of competent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable against the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan regarding an employee's terms and conditions of service?
  • Are the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Service Rules, 1981, considered statutory rules?
  • Does the principle of 'master and servant' apply to the employment relationship between the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan and its employees?
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• Maryam Begum (aka Ms. Moni) vs Fop through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and another2021 IHC 310 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-21Read full judgment →
• Maryam Begum (Aka Ms. Moni) vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and another2021 MLD 1543 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-21Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Khan and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2021 Cr.C. 1129, 2022 YLR 2064 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-20
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausefurther inquirydiplomatic consignmentliquor recoveryprohibition hadd order
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this criminal petition, the petitioners sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979, after being intercepted carrying bottles of liquor allegedly imported as a diplomatic consignment for the Sri Lankan High Commission. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioners, acting as driver and loader, made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether bail should be granted when the offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497. The Islamabad High Court accepted the petition and admitted the petitioners to bail, holding that offenses not falling within the prohibitory clause warrant the grant of bail as a rule and refusal as an exception, and that a tentative assessment of the record revealed a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The key principle laid down is that where an offense falls outside the prohibitory clause, the concession of bail must be favorably considered and denied only under exceptional circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted as a rule when an offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the transportation of a claimed diplomatic consignment of liquor by employees of a forwarding agency constitute a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What are the exceptional circumstances in which bail may be refused for offenses punishable with imprisonment for less than ten years?
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• Managing Director, Bank Of Khyber and 2 others vs Miss Iffat Nawaz and 22021 PLC 93 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-09
  National Industrial Relations Commissionworker definitiongrievance petitionjurisdiction of NIRCremoval from serviceremand orderbank employeewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed before the Islamabad High Court impugns a judgment of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (N.I.R.C.), which had set aside an order of a Member, N.I.R.C. and remanded a bank employee's grievance petition for a decision on merits. The core legal question was whether the respondent, an Officer Grade-III performing clearing duties at a bank, qualified as a 'worker' or 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, so as to give the N.I.R.C. jurisdiction to adjudicate her grievance against removal from service. The court examined statutory provisions regarding the definition of worker and the jurisdiction of the N.I.R.C. under the Act, focusing on the true nature of the employee's duties rather than her mere designation. The holding and key principle laid down affirm that job duties of a clerical nature bring an employee within the definition of a worker, and that remand orders by appellate forums on jurisdictional and merits determinations warrant judicial restraint.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Officer Grade-III performing clearing duties in a bank qualify as a worker under Section 2(xxxiii) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Whether the National Industrial Relations Commission has jurisdiction to adjudicate a grievance petition filed by a bank employee whose duties are clerical in nature?
  • Does a mere designation as an officer or clearing officer exclude an employee from the ambit of worker or workman?
  • Under what circumstances can a grievance petition be remanded by the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission for a decision on merits?
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• Malik Saif-ur-Rehman & another vs Faisal Naeem Khan & 02 others2021 IHC 130 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-08Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Younas vs Capital Development Authority through its2021 IHC 70 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Malik Moazzam Ali Kalru, Deputy Secretary National Assembly and another2021 PLJ Islamabad 255 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Majid Ali & another vs Capital Development Authority, etc2021 IHC 254 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-29Read full judgment →
• Mahum Shaukat and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2021 IHC 318 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-12-16Read full judgment →
• M. Fesal Vawda vs Election Commission of Pakistan & another2021 IHC 290 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-11-12Read full judgment →
• Kulsum Khaliq vs Inspector-General Of Police and others2022 PLD Islamabad 51, PLJ 2022 Cr.C. 655 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-11-26
  contempt of courtretired judgescandalizing the courtfreedom of criticismprivate citizenmaintainability of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  Ms. Kulsum Khaliq, an Advocate of the High Court, filed a constitutional petition under Article 204 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 read with sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003, seeking contempt proceedings against respondents Nos. 4 and 5 for allegedly scandalizing and character assassinating a former Chief Justice of Pakistan before the media. The core legal question was whether contempt proceedings can be initiated for criticism directed against a retired judge in his individual capacity. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that a judge upon retirement severs his connection with the judicial organ, attaining the status of a private citizen, and is no longer part of the 'Court' for the purposes of contempt law. The key principle laid down is that the power of contempt is meant to protect the due administration of justice and litigants during pending proceedings, not to protect individual or retired judges as private citizens, who must resort to ordinary legal remedies if maligned.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contempt proceedings can be initiated for criticism directed against a retired judge of a superior court?
  • Does a retired judge attain the status of a private citizen under the law of contempt?
  • What is the true scope and objective of exercising the power of contempt under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Is a petition for contempt maintainable when the alleged act does not interfere with the due administration of justice?
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• Khushdil Khan Malik vs The Accountant General Pakistan Revenues (Agpr)2021 PLC (C.S.) 399 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-07-29
  rejection of plaintOrder VII Rule 11civil servanthonorariumterms and conditions of servicejurisdiction of civil courtFederal Service Tribunalremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal was preferred against an order and decree of the Civil Judge, Islamabad-West, rejecting the appellant's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the premise that the subject matter fell within the terms and conditions of civil service and was barred by law. The appellant, a serving civil servant, filed a suit for declaration and recovery after the Accountant General Pakistan Revenues failed to disburse an honorarium of three months' basic pay sanctioned by the Federal Cabinet. The core legal questions were whether an honorarium constitutes part of the terms and conditions of service or 'pay' of a civil servant, and whether the Civil Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The High Court held that an honorarium is a voluntary reward or special incentive distinct from monthly pay and not included within the terms and conditions of service under the Civil Servants Act 1973. Furthermore, absent an adverse departmental order, no appeal lay before the Federal Service Tribunal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973. Consequently, the High Court set aside the rejection of the plaint and remanded the suit to the Civil Court for disposal on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an honorarium or special incentive granted to a government employee forms part of the 'pay' and 'terms and conditions of service' under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under Article 212 of the Constitution in a suit for recovery of an approved honorarium withheld by the Accountant General Pakistan Revenues?
  • Can an appeal be preferred before the Federal Service Tribunal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 in the absence of an adverse order passed by a departmental authority?
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• Khushdil Khan Malik vs Federation of Pakistan and two others2021 IHC 118 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-03
  civil servantdeputationtransfer and postingterms and conditions of servicejurisdiction of high courtservice tribunaloouster of jurisdictionrepatriation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional petition filed by a BS-20 civil servant challenging notifications regarding his transfer and repatriation to his parent department. The core legal questions addressed are whether a civil servant has a vested right to a particular post or deputation tenure, whether Section 10 of the Civil Servants Act 1973 applies to internal deputations of federal employees, and whether transfer disputes are barred by Article 212 of the Constitution. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that civil servants have no vested right to choose their posting, that internal federal employees cannot be appointed on deputation under Rule 20A(1) of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973, and that service-related transfer disputes fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal due to the constitutional ouster under Article 212.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a legal right to object to a transfer order or remain on deputation for a period of his own choice?
  • Can an employee already in the service of the Federal Government be appointed to another post within the Federal Government on a deputation basis under Rule 20A(1) of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973?
  • Does an order under Section 10 of the Civil Servants Act 1973 to transfer a civil servant fall within the scope of terms and conditions of service, thereby attracting the bar imposed by Article 212 of the Constitution?
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