Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Khursheed Ahmed vs Rent Controller, Islamabad (West) and another2021 YLR 2092 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-05-03Read full judgment →
• Khurram Shahzad vs Naseem Akhtar and 2 others2021 CLC 1300 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-29Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Rauf Segal vs Full Bench, National Industrial Relations2021 PLJ Islamabad 130, 2021 PLC 39 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-08-24
  bogus educational certificatemisconductshow-cause noticedisciplinary proceedingsunfair labour practicewrit of certioraripremature petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged orders of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) dismissing his petition against a show-cause notice issued by Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC). The show-cause notice called upon the petitioner to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for committing misconduct by submitting a bogus intermediate certificate to secure employment as a cargo assistant. The core legal questions involved whether an employer has the right to initiate disciplinary proceedings for misconduct regarding fake educational credentials, whether such initiation constitutes an unfair labour practice, and whether writ jurisdiction can be invoked prematurely against a mere show-cause notice or pending inquiry. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that an employer possesses the legal right to verify educational testimonials and initiate disciplinary proceedings for misconduct, which does not constitute an unfair labour practice under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Court laid down that challenging a show-cause notice or inquiry stage prematurely is unwarranted, and that obtaining qualifications subsequent to appointment does not cure the initial lack of eligibility.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the initiation of departmental disciplinary proceedings by an employer upon discovering a bogus educational certificate constitutes an unfair labour practice under the industrial relations laws?
  • Can a High Court interfere under its constitutional writ jurisdiction against a mere show-cause notice or during the pendency of a domestic inquiry before it culminates in a final order?
  • Does obtaining the prescribed educational qualifications subsequent to the date of appointment cure the initial lack of eligibility or render the appointment valid?
  • Whether an employee who secured employment on the basis of forged educational testimonials can claim protection or parity under Article 25 of the Constitution based on illegal favours extended to others?
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• Khalid ur Rehman and another vs The State & another2021 IHC 64 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-24
  post-arrest bailfamily disputefurther inquiryprohibitory clausebail as punishmentdelay in FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, arising from a family dispute involving property between brothers, their father, and mother. The core legal questions pertained to whether the delay in the FIR, delayed addition of a section, and the nature of the family dispute made the case one of further inquiry, and whether bail should be granted when investigation is complete and no risk of abscondence or tampering exists. The court held that the petitioners made out a case for further inquiry on a tentative assessment, noting that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, the petitioners have no criminal record, and the investigation is complete. The court laid down the principle that bail should not be refused as a punitive measure pending trial when none of the standard exceptions—such as risk of abscondance, tampering with evidence, or previous conviction—are attracted, and where unjustified incarceration cannot be compensated if the accused is ultimately acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be withheld as a punishment pending trial when the investigation is complete and the accused pose no risk of absconding or tampering with evidence?
  • Does the delayed addition of an offence section in the FIR and a family feud background constitute grounds for further inquiry warranting post-arrest bail?
  • Is bail to be denied solely on the basis of the seriousness of charges when none of the standard exceptions against granting bail are attracted?
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• Khalid Nadeem Kiyani vs I.G. Police, Islamabad and others2021 PLJ Islamabad 159, 2021 YLR 728 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-11-02Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood vs Additional District Judge, West Islamabad and 22021 PLJ Islamabad 162, 2021 MLD 264 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-11-10Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood and 128 others vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Information Technology and Telecom and others2021 PLC (C.S.) 1516 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-05-27
  pensionary benefitstransferred employeesstatutory protectionterms and conditions of servicePakistan Telecommunication Employees Trustwrit jurisdictionpension increase
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated petition concerns the entitlement of former employees of the Telegraph and Telephone Department, subsequently transferred to the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation and Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited, to pensionary benefits. The core legal question is whether the statutory protection afforded to these employees under Section 9 of the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act, 1991, and Sections 35 and 36 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, entitles them to receive pension increases periodically declared by the Federal Government for civil servants, or if such benefits were frozen at the time of transfer. The Court held that the statutory protection of terms and conditions of service is not dependent on the employees' status as civil servants. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the Court affirmed that these provisions guarantee that pensionary benefits cannot be varied to the employees' disadvantage. Consequently, the Court ruled that the petitioners are entitled to the same pension increases as those announced by the Federal Government for civil servants, directing the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust to calculate and pay the arrears.

  Questions settled

  • Are transferred employees of the former Telegraph and Telephone Department entitled to the same pension increases as those announced by the Federal Government for civil servants?
  • Does the statutory protection of terms and conditions of service under the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act, 1991, and the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, depend on the employment status of the transferred employees as civil servants?
  • Can the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust vary the pensionary benefits of transferred employees to their disadvantage?
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• Khalid Iqbal and others vs Shahid Iqbal and others2021 CLC 1880 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-16Read full judgment →
• Kamran Afridi vs StatePLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 66 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-01
  transfer of criminal casejudicial biasnarcotics trialfrivolous allegationssupervisory jurisdictionfair trialSpecial Court (CNS)
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged an order passed by the Special Court (CNS), Islamabad, which dismissed the appellant's application seeking the transfer of his narcotics case. The appellant, facing charges under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, alleged that his tribal opponents had a nexus with the presiding judge, thereby creating an apprehension of bias and an unfair trial. The core legal question was whether the appellant established sufficient grounds to warrant the transfer of his case from the Special Court to another jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, holding that the appellant's allegations were unsubstantiated, frivolous, and lacked any evidentiary basis. The Court emphasized that judicial officers must be protected from baseless allegations intended to exert pressure or frustrate the performance of their duties. Furthermore, the Court noted that the case involved a prosecution by the Anti-Narcotics Force, rather than a private dispute, and that transfer requests cannot be granted based on the mere whims or subjective apprehensions of an accused, especially when no material demonstrates actual bias.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal case be transferred from a Special Court based solely on the accused's unsubstantiated apprehension of bias?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to transfer a case from a Special Court under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Is an accused entitled to the transfer of a trial on the basis of alleged links between the presiding judge and the accused's tribal opponents without supporting evidence?
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• Kabir vs The State2021 P Cr. L J 513 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-03-24
  bailunder-trial prisonersright to lifeCOVID-19prison overcrowdingprohibitory clausefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns 270 consolidated petitions for bail filed by under-trial prisoners incarcerated in Central Prison, Rawalpindi, during the COVID-19 pandemic. The core legal question was whether prisoners accused of offences falling within the prohibitory clause could be granted bail due to the health risks and overcrowding in prisons during the pandemic. The Islamabad High Court allowed the petitions and admitted the prisoners to bail, subject to the constitution of a joint committee to scrutinize each case, ensure public safety, and verify that release would not pose a threat. The court held that the State has a non-delegable duty of care to safeguard the fundamental right to life of prisoners who are entirely dependent on prison authorities. Given the impossibility of social distancing in overcrowded prisons, the risk of a COVID-19 outbreak constitutes a fresh ground for bail, even for offences otherwise falling under the prohibitory clause, as the State must prioritize the preservation of life over continued incarceration during a public health emergency.

  Questions settled

  • Does the risk of a COVID-19 outbreak in overcrowded prisons constitute a valid ground for granting bail to under-trial prisoners?
  • Does the State have a duty of care to protect the fundamental right to life of incarcerated prisoners?
  • Can bail be granted to prisoners accused of offences falling within the prohibitory clause during a public health emergency?
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• Jubilee Life Insurance Company Limited vs The Federal Government2021 IHC 134, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 1563, 2022 PCTLR 526 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-26
  workplace harassmentFederal Ombudsmanterritorial jurisdictionEighteenth Constitutional Amendmentsexual harassmentservice matterreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an order of the Federal Ombudsman for Protection Against Harassment of Women at Workplace reinstating respondent No.3 into the petitioner's employment. The core legal questions involved whether the Federal Ombudsman possessed territorial jurisdiction over an occurrence originating in the Province of Punjab following the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, and whether a service dispute devoid of any sexual undertone fell within the definition of harassment under the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010. The Islamabad High Court held that the Federal Ombudsman lacked territorial jurisdiction in relation to matters transpiring within Punjab under the Punjab Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2012, and further held that complaints must involve conduct of a sexual nature to satisfy the statutory definition of harassment. The petition was allowed, and the impugned order of the Federal Ombudsman was set aside as void ab initio.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Ombudsman have territorial jurisdiction to entertain complaints regarding workplace harassment arising within the Province of Punjab post-Eighteenth Amendment?
  • Must the conduct complained of under the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 possess a sexual nature to fall within the definition of harassment?
  • Can the Federal Ombudsman order the reinstatement of an employee as a penalty under the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010?
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• JS Global Capital Limited vs Mrs. Raheela Yahya2022 [M] CLR 1357, 2021 CLC 1414, 2022 PCTLR 1076, 2021 PLJ Islamabad 307 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-26Read full judgment →
• Jeva vs The State2021 IHC 176 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-12
  post-arrest bailjuvenile offendernarcotics recoveryossification testbail as punishmentfirst offender
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in respect of a case registered under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, concerning the alleged recovery of 1650 grams of heroin. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, claiming to be a juvenile at the time of the alleged offence and being a first offender with a completed investigation, was entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail. The Islamabad High Court held that based on the medical ossification test report, the petitioner appeared to be a juvenile, the investigation was complete, he had no prior criminal record, and further incarceration would serve no useful purpose as bail cannot be withheld as a punishment. The petition was consequently allowed and post-arrest bail was granted to the petitioner, establishing that the combined factors of juvenile status, completion of investigation, clean antecedents, and the prohibition against withholding bail as punishment warrant relief even when the recovered narcotic quantity is near the borderline criteria.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner claiming minority is entitled to post-arrest bail when an ossification test prima facie establishes juvenile status?
  • Can bail be withheld as a punishment when the investigation is complete and the accused is no longer required for further probe?
  • Whether the recovery of a narcotics quantity slightly above the borderline criteria bars the grant of bail to a juvenile first offender?
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• Javid Khalid Mughal Accounts Officer, Pakistan Brodcasting Corporation2021 PLJ Islamabad 325 · Islamabad High Court
  audit and accounts allowancepakistan broadcasting corporationvested rightdiscriminatory treatmentsame work same payconstitutional petitionintra court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal challenged a judgment dismissing writ petitions that assailed the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation's order holding in abeyance its earlier provisional grant of a 20% Audit and Accounts Allowance to its audit and accounts officers and staff. The core legal questions involved whether employees of an autonomous statutory body possess a vested right to an allowance granted to civil servants or employees of other organizations, and whether the non-payment of such an allowance constitutes discrimination violating fundamental rights. The court held that the Finance Division's letter granting the allowance applied solely to specific offices and did not automatically extend to the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation without explicit approval from its competent Board, which was never obtained. Furthermore, the grant of an allowance does not constitute a vested right, and parity with employees of other organizations cannot be claimed to issue a writ of mandamus. The court laid down the principle that allowances are distinct from basic pay and are subject to the discretion of the competent authority and budgetary concurrence, and parity with other statutory bodies does not ipso faktor create an enforceable right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the grant of an allowance by the Finance Division to specific government departments applies of its own force to employees of autonomous bodies like the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation?
  • Can an employee claim an allowance as a vested right merely because similarly placed employees in other autonomous or public sector organizations are receiving it?
  • Does the non-payment of an audit and accounts allowance by an autonomous body to its staff constitute a violation of the principle of non-discrimination under the Constitution?
  • Whether a provisional order issued for the grant of an allowance without the approval of the competent board can be enforced through a writ of mandamus?
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• Javed Khan vs The State2021 IHC 36 · Islamabad High Court
  narcoticscriminal appealsentencing leniencyfirst-time offendercharas recoveryquantum of sentencerehabilitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal appeals filed by appellants Javed Khan and Aziz Ahmad against their conviction and sentencing by the Special Court (CNS), Islamabad, for the possession of narcotics under Section 9(C) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997. The appellants were sentenced to imprisonment and fines following the recovery of charas from their possession. During the appellate proceedings, the appellants opted not to contest the conviction on merits, focusing instead on a plea for leniency regarding the quantum of sentence, citing their status as first-time offenders and the significant portion of the sentence already served. The Court, upon reviewing the evidence, found the prosecution's case consistent and upheld the conviction. However, relying on established precedents regarding first-time offenders, the Court held that the purpose of sentencing should account for the potential for rehabilitation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals on merits but modified the sentences to the period already undergone by the appellants, emphasizing that first-time offenders with no criminal record deserve a lenient approach to facilitate their reintegration into society.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court reduce a sentence to the period already undergone for a first-time narcotics offender?
  • Does the failure to record spy information in a daily diary under Section 21(2) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997 automatically vitiate a conviction?
  • Is a first-time offender entitled to a more lenient sentencing yardstick compared to a habitual offender?
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• Islamabad Wildlife Management Board vs Metropolitan Corporation, Islamabad and others2021 PLD Islamabad 102 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-14Read full judgment →
• Islamabad Wildlife Management Board Through Chairman vs Metropolitan2021 CLC 262 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-07-18Read full judgment →
• Islamabad Marquees, Catering And Banquet Hall Association (Imcba)2021 MLD 235 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-11-18Read full judgment →
• Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited vs National Electric Power2021 IHC 256, 2021 PLD Islamabad 221, 2022 KLR Civil Cases 318, 2022 [M] CLR · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-08Read full judgment →
• Irfan ul Haq vs Mian Rashid Arsahd, etc2021 IHC 162 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-15Read full judgment →
• Irfan Afridee vs StatePLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 50 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-26
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlprohibitory clausemedical grounds bailepidermal cystchemical examiner report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition was filed by the petitioner, Irfan Afridee, seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 9(c), 14, 15, and 16 of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of a huge quantity of opium and charas from vehicles, including 39.6 kilograms of opium from the vehicle he was travelling in. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail on merits and on medical grounds due to an alleged neck tumor diagnosed as cancer. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the bail petition, holding that the recovered contraband fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and that the medical board report confirmed the ailment was a suspected epidermal cyst rather than an incurable or life-threatening cancer untreatable in prison. The court laid down the principle that not every ailment entitles an accused to bail unless the disease is life-threatening or incapable of being treated within prison premises, while directing jail authorities to ensure proper medical care.

  Questions settled

  • Does recovery of a huge quantity of narcotics falling within the prohibitory clause disentitle an accused to post-arrest bail?
  • What level of illness is required for an accused to be released on bail on medical grounds?
  • Whether a suspected epidermal cyst constitutes a life-threatening disease warranting release on bail from prison?
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• Intizar Hussain vs The State and another2022 MLD 103 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-22
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryvicarious liabilitycommon intentionforensic evidencecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail in a case involving charges under Sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner was accused of participating in an attack on the complainant's house, resulting in the death of the deceased, Rashid, who was shot by a co-accused. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was not attributed with causing any specific injury to the deceased and whose father was declared innocent during the investigation, was entitled to bail under the principle of further inquiry. The Court held that because the petitioner was not alleged to have caused any specific injury and because forensic reports indicated that multiple weapons were involved, the case fell within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court emphasized that vicarious liability is a matter for trial, and the mere heinousness of an offense is insufficient to deny bail when reasonable doubt exists regarding the specific role of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a specific injury attributed to an accused in a murder case entitle them to bail under the principle of further inquiry?
  • Can bail be granted when forensic evidence suggests the use of multiple weapons not fully accounted for in the investigation?
  • Is the heinousness of an offense a sufficient ground to refuse bail when the case falls under the category of further inquiry?
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• Inam-Ul-Haq vs Capital Development Authority, Islamabad through Chairman and another2021 CLC 2072 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-09-13Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Ahmed Ghulam Rasool Janvery vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others2021 IHC 298 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-12-16Read full judgment →
• Ibadullah vs The State, etcPLJ 2021 Cr.C. 1120, 2021 IHC 184 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-26
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsconscious possessionfurther inquirycriminal procedurerecovery of contraband
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding an offense under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997. The petitioner was alleged to have facilitated the recovery of narcotics from a vehicle while in police custody for a separate offense. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established sufficient grounds to connect the petitioner to the contraband, specifically regarding the element of conscious possession. The Court observed that the Investigating Officer failed to establish any nexus between the petitioner and the vehicle, noting that no personal items of the petitioner were recovered from the car and the petitioner did not own the vehicle. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to demonstrate conscious possession, making the case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Emphasizing that bail should not be withheld as punishment, the Court granted the petition, ruling that the lack of evidence connecting the accused to the contraband warranted the concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of evidence connecting an accused to a vehicle from which narcotics were recovered constitute a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is conscious possession of narcotics a necessary element to be established by the prosecution to deny bail in narcotics cases?
  • Can bail be withheld as a form of punishment for an accused?
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• Humayun Gulzar vs Muhammad Asif, etc2021 IHC 246 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-06Read full judgment →
• Higher Education Commission through its Executive Director, Islamabad vs Ms. Zia Batool2021 IHC 48 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Hassan Khan vs Director General Radio Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation2021 PLJ Islamabad 288 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Hassan Jilani vs Full Bench National Industrial Relations Commission, Islamabad and 4 others2021 PLC 153 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-15
  writ jurisdictioncertiorarigrievance petitionlimitationNIRCconcurrent findingssupervisory jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged concurrent orders passed by the Single Bench and Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), which dismissed the petitioner's grievance petition against his dismissal from service as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, should interfere with these concurrent findings regarding limitation and the merits of the dismissal. The Court held that the petition was meritless. It affirmed that the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is supervisory, not appellate. Consequently, the Court will not review findings of fact or re-evaluate evidence unless a patent legal defect, material irregularity, or jurisdictional error is demonstrated. Since the petitioner failed to establish that the NIRC acted without jurisdiction or committed an error of law in determining the limitation issue, the High Court declined to interfere. The principle laid down is that the High Court will not exercise its writ jurisdiction to act as an appellate court to re-examine factual determinations made by competent tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 appellate in nature?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact reached by a tribunal in the absence of a patent legal defect or jurisdictional error?
  • Does the withdrawal of a grievance petition with permission to file a fresh one affect the limitation period for the subsequent petition under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
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• Haseeb Iftikhar Ahmad vs The Secretary, Law And Justice Division, Government Of Pakistan and another2021 PLC (C.S.) 280 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-14
  quo warrantopublic appointmentcivil servicerecruitment rulesappointment by transfercondition precedentCustoms Appellate Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two writ petitions seeking a writ of quo warranto challenging the appointment of respondent No. 2 as Assistant Registrar (BPS-16) in the Customs Appellate Tribunal. The core legal question was whether the appointment by transfer was valid under the rules prescribed by Notification S.R.O. 747(I)/98, dated 01.07.1998. The notification mandates that the post be filled by initial appointment, and only "failing that" by transfer. The court held that the appointment was unlawful because the Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights failed to initiate any process for initial appointment, thereby violating the mandatory recruitment procedure. The court emphasized that the phrase "failing that" creates a condition precedent, requiring an unsuccessful attempt at initial recruitment before resorting to transfer. Consequently, the court declared the appointment of respondent No. 2 unlawful and directed the Ministry to initiate the recruitment process for the post of Assistant Registrar through initial appointment in strict compliance with the applicable notification. The judgment reinforces the principle that public appointments must strictly adhere to codal formalities and established rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase 'failing that' in a recruitment notification create a condition precedent that must be satisfied before an appointment by transfer can be made?
  • Can a government department bypass the mandatory requirement of initial appointment to fill a post by transfer?
  • Is an appointment to a public office unlawful if it is made in violation of the prescribed recruitment rules?
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• Haseeb Hashmi vs The State, etc2021 IHC 188 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-29
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausecriminal breach of trustcivil disputebail as rulepunitive detention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the accused, Haseeb Hashmi, in a case involving an alleged offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from the dishonour of a cheque issued in a property transaction. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the offence and the completion of the investigation. The Court held that the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail. The ratio of the decision rests on the principle that the offence under Section 489-F carries a maximum punishment of three years, which does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. The Court further emphasized that bail cannot be withheld as a measure of punishment, that Section 489-F is not a tool for monetary recovery, and that mere involvement in other cases without conviction does not bar the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be withheld as a measure of punishment for an accused?
  • Is the provision of Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 intended to be used for the recovery of money?
  • Does the mere involvement of an accused in other cases without conviction serve as a bar to the grant of bail?
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• Haseeb Hashmi vs State etcPLJ 2021 Cr.C. 1029 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-29
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausefurther inquirycriminal liabilitycivil nature of dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition filed by the accused, Haseeb Hashmi, in connection with an F.I.R. registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning the alleged dishonour of a cheque issued for the purchase of a residential flat. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail given the nature of the offence and the duration of his detention. The court held that the offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 carries a maximum punishment of three years, thereby falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the court granted bail, establishing that in such cases, bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. The court further emphasized that bail should not be withheld as a measure of punishment, that Section 489-F is not a tool for recovery, and that mere involvement in other cases without conviction does not bar the grant of bail when a case for further inquiry is made out.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be withheld as a measure of punishment for an accused?
  • Is the mere involvement of an accused in other cases, without conviction, a sufficient ground to deny bail?
  • Is Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 intended to be used as a mechanism for the recovery of money?
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• Hamza Afsar vs The State and another2021 MLD 1961 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-04-01
  post-arrest bailabductionfurther probesupplementary statementpre-trial incarcerationtentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, who was implicated in an FIR registered under Section 365-B/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, regarding an alleged abduction. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was not nominated in the initial FIR and was implicated only through a belated supplementary statement, was entitled to the grant of bail pending trial. The Court observed that the petitioner was not named in the FIR, the investigation against him was complete with no incriminating material recovered during physical remand, and the prosecution's case relied on a supplementary statement based on mere apprehensions. Holding that the petitioner's involvement and the applicability of the charged offence required further probe, the Court granted bail. The key principle laid down is that where the case against an accused is one of further inquiry and no incriminating material is recovered, continued incarceration serves no useful purpose and would amount to punishment before trial, as the ultimate acquittal of an innocent person cannot compensate for unjustified pre-trial detention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the implication of an accused in a belated supplementary statement, without other incriminating evidence, constitute grounds for further probe in a bail application?
  • Is the absence of incriminating material recovered during physical remand a relevant factor for the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Can bail be granted when the report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 has not yet been submitted to the trial court?
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• Hammad Hussain & another vs Federation of Pakistan and 2 others2021 IHC 238 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-01Read full judgment →
• Haider vs The State2021 IHC 178 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-12
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsborderline criteriachemical analysis delayfirst offenderfurther inquirypunitive detention
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from an F.I.R. registered under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, involving the recovery of 1,164 grams of heroin from the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the quantity of narcotics recovered, the delay in chemical analysis, and the petitioner's status as a first-time offender. The court held that the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail. The ratio of the decision rests on the 'borderline criteria' doctrine, where recoveries marginally exceeding one kilogram often warrant further inquiry. Additionally, the court emphasized that the five-day delay in sending the sample for chemical analysis—exceeding the 72-hour requirement—constituted a lapse making the case one of further inquiry. The court further established that bail should not be withheld as a punitive measure, particularly when the investigation is complete, the accused is a first-time offender, and there is no immediate prospect of trial conclusion. Consequently, the bail petition was allowed subject to the furnishing of bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in sending a narcotic sample for chemical analysis beyond 72 hours entitle an accused to further inquiry?
  • Is the recovery of narcotics marginally exceeding one kilogram considered a borderline case for the purpose of bail?
  • Can bail be withheld as a form of punishment when the investigation is complete?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Muhammad Abdullah Ex-Assistant Director Nab Peshwar vs Chairman National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad etc2021 P Cr. L J 669, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 906, 2021 PLJ Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High Court
  resignation from servicewrit jurisdictiondisputed questions of factcoercion and duressNAB employeestermination of employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the acceptance of the petitioner's resignation from his position as an Assistant Director at the National Accountability Bureau. The petitioner contended that his resignation was submitted under duress and coercion due to personal circumstances and an unwanted transfer. The core legal questions were whether the resignation was validly accepted and whether the court could adjudicate claims of duress within its writ jurisdiction. The court held that the resignation was voluntary and became effective upon its acceptance by the competent authority, thereby terminating the employment relationship. Consequently, the petitioner had no vested right to withdraw the resignation post-acceptance. Furthermore, the court established the principle that allegations of duress and coercion involve disputed questions of fact that cannot be resolved while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed, affirming that once a resignation is accepted, the employer-employee relationship ceases to exist.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court resolve disputed questions of fact regarding duress and coercion in a resignation under writ jurisdiction?
  • Does an employee have a right to withdraw a resignation after it has been accepted by the competent authority?
  • When does a resignation from service become effective for a government employee?
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• Hafiz Hamdullah Saboor vs Government Of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Imterior, Pak Secretariat, Constitutional Avenue, Islamabad and 2 others2021 PLJ Islamabad 354 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Hafiz Hamdullah Saboor vs Government Of Pakistan through Secretary2021 PLD Islamabad 305 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-05-19
  citizenshipstatelessnessCNIC cancellationNADRA jurisdictionfundamental rightsdue processbirthright citizenship
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions challenging the arbitrary cancellation or blocking of Computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs) by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) based on allegations of non-citizenship. The core legal question is whether NADRA possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate citizenship status or cancel CNICs on the basis of intelligence reports. The Court held that NADRA is a registration authority and lacks the jurisdiction to determine or adjudicate citizenship, which is a matter exclusively governed by the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951. The Court ruled that NADRA cannot unilaterally cancel or block a CNIC on grounds of citizenship eligibility without a prior, final determination by the competent authority under the Citizenship Act. The judgment establishes that citizenship is a fundamental right and that the state cannot render a person stateless through perfunctory or arbitrary administrative actions. Consequently, the Court ordered the restoration of the petitioners' CNICs, affirming that any deprivation of citizenship must strictly adhere to the statutory safeguards and due process requirements prescribed by law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Database and Registration Authority have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the citizenship status of a person?
  • Can a Computerized National Identity Card be cancelled or blocked on the ground of citizenship eligibility without a prior determination by the competent authority under the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951?
  • Is the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 a self-contained statute for determining citizenship status?
  • Does the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority have the power to restrain media channels from projecting a person without legal justification?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Firoz, Member, Nominee Of Pakistan Tanners Association, Karachi vs Director General Of Trade Organizations and others2021 PLJ Islamabad 90 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Gulraiz vs The State and another2021 P Cr. L J 145 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-04-21
  dishonour of chequesecondary evidenceprimary evidencecriminal revisionadmissibility of documentsQanun-e-Shahadat Orderremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges the conviction and sentence of the petitioner under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regarding the dishonor of a cheque. The core legal question concerns whether a conviction can be legally sustained when the prosecution relies solely on photocopies of the cheque and dishonor slip, without producing the original documents or satisfying the statutory requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence. The Islamabad High Court held that the trial court improperly admitted these photocopies into evidence without the original documents being tendered or the conditions for secondary evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 being met. Consequently, the court set aside the impugned judgments and remanded the matter to the trial court for a fresh decision after excluding the inadmissible evidence. The judgment affirms the principle that primary evidence is mandatory for proof, and the mere failure of the defense to object to the admission of inadmissible secondary evidence does not cure the defect if the evidence is crucial to the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on photocopies of documents when the original documents were never produced in evidence?
  • Does the failure of the defense to object to the admission of secondary evidence validate its use if the evidence is otherwise inadmissible?
  • What are the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can a document not supplied to the accused under Section 241A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used as evidence against them?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul-e-Nargis vs Principal Secretary to Prime Minister, etc2021 IHC 216 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-17Read full judgment →
• Gul Nazir vs Riasat alias Saeen and 6 others2022 MLD 13, 2022 KLR Criminal Cases 292 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-09-14
  appeal against acquittaljoint recoveryinadmissible evidenceconfession before policedouble presumption of innocencerobberycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed under Section 417(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging the acquittal of respondents by the trial court in a robbery case. The core legal question was whether the acquittal could be set aside based on the evidence presented, specifically extra-judicial confessions made to police and joint recoveries of stolen property. The Islamabad High Court held that the appeal must be dismissed. The Court reasoned that confessions made to police while in custody are inadmissible in evidence. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that joint recoveries of stolen items are legally inadmissible and insufficient to connect an accused to a crime. Emphasizing that an acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence, the Court held that such a judgment can only be reversed if it is found to be perverse, arbitrary, or shocking, which was not the case here. The principle laid down is that in the absence of independent, cogent evidence—such as identification parades or forensic reports—joint recoveries and police-recorded confessions are insufficient to warrant setting aside an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a confession made by an accused person before the police in its custody admissible in evidence?
  • Is a joint recovery of stolen property admissible in evidence to prove the guilt of an accused?
  • What are the legal parameters for setting aside an order of acquittal in a criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Nazar vs The State2021 IHC 182 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-15
  post-arrest bailborderline criterianarcotics recoverycontrol of narcotics substancesfirst offenderstatutory threshold
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in respect of an offense under Section 9-C and Section 15 of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question revolves around whether post-arrest bail can be granted to an accused where the recovered narcotic substance marginally exceeds the threshold of one kilogram, falling within the borderline criteria. The Islamabad High Court accepted the petition and held that since the recovered quantity of 1260 grams of Charas marginally exceeded the borderline limit, the accused was a first offender, the investigation was complete, and further incarceration would serve no useful purpose, the case was fit for grant of bail. The key principle laid down is that where a recovered narcotic substance marginally exceeds the statutory threshold and falls within borderline criteria, and the accused is a first offender with completed investigation, the concession of post-arrest bail should be extended, as bail is not to be withheld as a punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted where the recovered quantity of narcotics marginally exceeds one kilogram?
  • Does the recovery of 1260 grams of Charas bring the case within the borderline criteria for the grant of bail?
  • Can bail be withheld as a punishment when investigation against the accused is complete and he is a first offender?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Muhammad vs Chairman, Federal Board Of Revenue / Secretary2021 PLJ Islamabad 152, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 513 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-25
  medical treatment abroadreimbursement of medical expensesunbridled discretionfundamental rightsequality before lawgovernment servantsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired Commissioner Income Tax, sought a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to reimburse the expenses incurred on his liver transplant in China. The core legal questions involved whether a government servant could claim reimbursement for medical treatment abroad without prior governmental approval, and how the executive discretion exercised in granting funds for medical treatment abroad should be regulated in the absence of a formal policy. The court held that since the petitioner failed to obtain prior sanction from the competent authority before proceeding abroad for medical treatment, his claim for reimbursement could not be processed or allowed. However, the court also held that where the formal policy regarding medical treatment abroad had been revoked, leaving unbridled and unstructured discretion with the executive, the defunct policy guidelines must serve as a guiding framework to ensure non-discriminatory treatment until a fresh policy is formulated by the government. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant claim reimbursement for medical treatment abroad without obtaining prior approval from the competent authority?
  • Does the exercise of unbridled and unstructured discretion by the executive in granting funds for medical treatment abroad violate the right to equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What guidelines must the Prime Minister follow when deciding applications of government servants for medical treatment abroad in the absence of a formalized current policy?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Yaseen Jalbani vs Secretary Ministry Of Science And Technology, Islamabad and 3 others2021 PLC (C.S.) 951 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-03
  writ petitionlachesfactual controversyconstitutional jurisdictionrelease of salaryextension of judgment benefit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking directions against the respondents to release his outstanding salary from 01.07.2006 to 30.01.2007 along with associated benefits by extending the ratio of a prior judgment dated 06.02.2013 passed in an identical matter. The respondents resisted the petition on grounds of unexcused long absence during the stated period and raised preliminary objections regarding laches and disputed facts. The High Court observed that the petitioner was not a party to the earlier writ petition and invoked constitutional jurisdiction after an unexplained delay of over nine years from the cause of action and three years from the prior judgment. Furthermore, whether the petitioner actually performed his duties during the disputed period constituted a serious factual controversy. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that relief under constitutional jurisdiction is barred by laches when a party fails to act vigilantly, and disputed questions of fact requiring evidence cannot be adjudicated in a writ petition under Article 199.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner can claim the benefit of a previous High Court judgment in an identical matter if they were not a party to the original proceeding and filed their writ petition after an inordinate delay?
  • Whether an unexplained delay of nine years in invoking constitutional jurisdiction for the release of salary attracts the principle of laches?
  • Can a disputed question of fact regarding attendance and performance of duties be adjudicated under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa vs State & anotherPLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 236 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-06
  post-arrest bailkidnappingfurther inquiryminor abducteeNikkah validitySection 164 statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from FIR No. 74/19 registered under Section 364/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning the alleged kidnapping of a 12-year-old girl. The petitioner contended that the alleged abductee had contracted a valid Nikkah with his son, negating the abduction charge, and that the investigation was complete. Conversely, the State and complainant argued that the abductee was a minor, rendering the Nikkah a violation of the Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929. The Court observed that while the abductee had sworn an affidavit claiming a voluntary marriage, her B-form indicated she was approximately 12 years old, and she had subsequently provided a statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 alleging coercion. Finding that these conflicting facts rendered the case one of further inquiry, the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail. The principle established is that where material contradictions exist regarding the age and consent of an alleged abductee, the case warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of conflicting evidence regarding the age and consent of an alleged abductee constitute a case of further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Can a petitioner be granted post-arrest bail when the investigation is complete and the case requires further inquiry?
  • Does a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 alleging coercion override a prior affidavit of voluntary marriage in bail proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa and another vs The State and 2 others2021 P Cr. L J 417 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-11-05
  summoning of material witnessestransposition of evidenceseparate trialsanti-terrorism courtcriminal revisionexpert opinionburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal revisions arose from orders passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court dismissing applications under sections 94 and 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for summoning court witnesses and relevant records in two separate criminal trials involving the same accused and weapons. The core legal questions pertained to whether evidence from one criminal case can be transmitted or transposed into another separate criminal case through certified copies without examining the witnesses, and whether the trial court is bound to summon material witnesses for a just decision under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Islamabad High Court held that each criminal case must be decided solely on evidence recorded within its own proceedings, and testimony or depositions from one case cannot be adopted or transferred into another without examining the witnesses in court. The Court set aside the impugned orders, ruled that the trial court must independently summon and examine the necessary witnesses in each case separately, and laid down the principle that the prosecution and complainant should not suffer prejudice due to defective investigation or negligent omissions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the evidence or depositions recorded in one criminal case be legally transmitted, transposed, or used in another separate criminal case without calling the witnesses?
  • Whether a trial court is under a legal obligation under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon material witnesses essential for the just decision of the case?
  • Does the adoption of evidence from a separate proceeding without examination and cross-examination vitiate the trial?
  • Can expert reports exhibited in one criminal case be utilized in a second trial without invoking the provisions governing expert testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ahmad Qureshi through Special Power of Attorney vs Commissioner CDA, Islamabad and another2021 PLJ Islamabad 195, 2021 CLC 1014 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-29Read full judgment →
• Getz Pharma (Pvt.) Limited through Duly Authorized Representative vs Muhammad Nafees, etc2021 PLC 79, 2021 PLJ Islamabad 40 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-11-20
  payment of wagesgratuity claimwrit of certioraricommercial establishmentsupervisory jurisdictionperson employedlabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a private limited company, challenged an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner/Magistrate 1st Class under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, directing the payment of gratuity and outstanding dues to former employees. The core legal questions concerned whether the claimants, as former Senior Sales Managers, qualified as "workmen" entitled to relief under the Act, and whether the authority possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate gratuity claims. The Court held that the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, does not require a claimant to be a "workman" as defined in other labor legislation; rather, it applies to any "person employed" in a commercial establishment. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the authority has jurisdiction to adjudicate gratuity claims following legislative amendments. Dismissing the petitions, the Court ruled that its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 199 is limited to correcting jurisdictional defects or manifest errors of law and does not extend to reappraising factual findings or evidence. The impugned order was upheld as the petitioner failed to demonstrate any illegality or jurisdictional excess.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 require a claimant to be a 'workman' to seek relief for unpaid wages or gratuity?
  • Does the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims regarding gratuity?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 199 when reviewing factual findings of an inferior tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through its National Programme Manager, Epi. vs Customs Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad & 03 others2021 IHC 86 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-17Read full judgment →
• Farrukh Nawaz Bhatti vs Prime Minister Of Pakistan, Islamabad and 182021 PLD Islamabad 123 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-07Read full judgment →
• Farrukh Imtiaz Khokhar vs Government Of Pakistan through Secretary2021 MLD 40 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-04
  Fourth ScheduleAnti-Terrorism Actproscriptionmens reaterrorismfundamental rightscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the notification issued by the Chief Commissioner, Islamabad Capital Territory, placing the appellant's name in the Fourth Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and the subsequent rejection of his review petition. The core legal question revolves around whether ordinary criminal cases or unsubstantiated allegations can legally justify the proscription of an individual and the inclusion of their name in the Fourth Schedule under Section 11-EE of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, without proof of involvement in terrorism or sectarianism. The Islamabad High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the notification, holding that ordinary crimes committed out of personal enmity or vendetta do not constitute terrorism, and that the state must demonstrate proper grounds and mens rea regarding acts of terrorism. The key principle laid down is that public functionaries must exercise statutory powers reasonably and in good faith under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and that mere registration of criminal cases wherein an accused stands acquitted or unconvicted cannot form the basis for proscription under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, thus safeguarding fundamental liberties enshrined in Articles 4 and 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person be placed in the Fourth Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 on the basis of ordinary criminal cases where they have not been convicted?
  • Does the commission of ordinary crimes due to personal enmity fall within the scope of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • What are the mandatory pre-requisites for placing an individual's name in the Fourth Schedule as a proscribed person?
  • Are public functionaries bound by Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to exercise powers reasonably and in good faith while issuing notifications?
  Read full judgment →
• Farman Ullah vs The State and another2022 YLR 144 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-11
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausefurther inquirytheft of motorcyclerecoverystatutory concession
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition arising out of case FIR No. 729/20 registered under sections 381-A and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Koral, Islamabad, concerning the alleged theft and recovery of a motorcycle. The core legal question before the Islamabad High Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail when the charged offense fell outside the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the case warranted further inquiry. The Court held that since the offense under section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code carried a maximum punishment of three years and did not fall within the prohibitory clause, and because the circumstances presented a case for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the grant of bail was the rule and refusal the exception. The key principle laid down is that in non-bailable offenses not falling within the prohibitory clause, bail should be granted liberally as a rule, and denial is restricted to extraordinary or exceptional circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted as a rule when an offense falls outside the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Under what exceptional circumstances can bail be refused in cases not falling within the prohibitory limb of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does an offense punishable under section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Faiz Muhammad vs The ANF2021 IHC 156 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-08
  post-arrest bailstatement of co-accusedconfession to policenarcotics controlincomplete investigationevidentiary value
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition arises from a bail application filed by the petitioner, Faiz Muhammad, seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of narcotics from a co-accused. The core legal question addressed is whether an accused can be kept in custody solely on the basis of an uncorroborated statement of a co-accused made to the police. The Islamabad High Court held that the confession or admission of an accused made to a police officer has no evidentiary value against a co-accused under Article 38 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and where no other incriminating material or evidence links the petitioner to the alleged crime, further detention is unwarranted. The court established the principle that an accused cannot be incarcerated indefinitely based solely on a co-accused's statement, particularly when the investigative chain of transmission is incomplete and the petitioner has no prior criminal record, thereby entitling him to post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be denied bail solely on the basis of a disclosure statement made by a co-accused to the police?
  • Whether a confession made to a police officer is admissible against a co-accused under Article 38 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Does the absence of corroborative material and an incomplete investigative chain regarding the transmission of narcotics make a case for further inquiry under post-arrest bail considerations?
  Read full judgment →
• Faisal Sultan vs The State, etc2021 IHC 168 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-21
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausestatutory punishmentrecovery of amounthabitual offender
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition arising out of F.I.R. No. 331 dated 08.09.2020 registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Sihala, Islamabad, concerning the alleged dishonour of a surety cheque given for an outstanding business amount. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail when the offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, investigation was complete, and bail could not be used as a punishment. The Islamabad High Court held that since the maximum punishment for the offence is three years, it falls outside the prohibitory clause, the petitioner was no longer required for investigation, and bail ought to be granted as a rule rather than withheld as a punitive measure. The key principles laid down are that Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is designed to determine guilt rather than effect monetary recovery (which is the domain of civil action under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908), that mere involvement in other cases without conviction is no bar to bail, and that bail cannot be withheld as a strategy for punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can post-arrest bail be withheld as a measure of punishment for an accused person?
  • Is Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 intended to be used as a mechanism for the recovery of outstanding financial amounts?
  • Does the mere involvement of an accused in other cases of a similar nature, without a conviction, serve as an absolute bar to the grant of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Faisal Shahzad vs The State, etc2021 IHC 170 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-23
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausecivil disputebail as rule refusal as exception
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition filed by the accused-petitioner in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dishonouring a cheque. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail when the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, investigation is complete, and the dispute also has a civil background. The Islamabad High Court accepted the petition and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner. The ratio decidendi is that where an offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause, pre-trial incarceration cannot be used as a punishment or a strategy for recovery, grant of bail is the general rule with refusal as an exception, and Section 489-F is meant to determine guilt rather than act as a tool for financial recovery.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be withheld as a measure of punishment or used as a mechanism for the recovery of civil amounts?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when investigation is complete and the trial is not likely to conclude soon in a non-prohibitory offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Faisal Shahzad vs State etcPLJ 2021 Cr.C. 1033 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-04-23
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausecivil recoverycriminal liabilitySection 489-F PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail petition filed by an accused charged under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding a dishonoured cheque. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given that the investigation was complete, the offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the complainant had already initiated civil proceedings for recovery. The court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, observing that the offence carries a maximum punishment of three years and does not attract the statutory bar against bail. The court affirmed the principle that in non-prohibitory offences, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. Furthermore, it established that criminal provisions like Section 489-F are intended to determine guilt and award sentences, not to serve as a tool for civil recovery, which is the province of civil courts. Consequently, the court ruled that detention should not be used as a punitive measure prior to the conclusion of the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can criminal proceedings under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be utilized as a mechanism for civil recovery?
  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception for offences that do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Faisal Rafique vs Saeed Mumtaz Durrani, etc2021 [M] C L R 882 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-28Read full judgment →
• Faisal Rafique vs Saeed Mumtaz Durrani and 2 others2021 P Cr. L J 1558 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-28
  recall of witnesscross-examinationcode of criminal procedurefill lacunaefair trialrevisional jurisdictiondiscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal writ petition arises from a trial under sections 324, 452, and 337-F(D) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, wherein the accused filed an application under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to recall prosecution witnesses for further cross-examination after a delay of ten months. The trial court dismissed the application, but the revisional court allowed it. The core legal question is whether a witness can be recalled for further cross-examination under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to fill in lacunae or merely because a new counsel has been engaged. The Islamabad High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the revisional court's order and upholding the trial court's dismissal. The court held that section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not permit recalling a witness for further cross-examination to fill gaps or when the accused was already afforded a proper opportunity to cross-examine, and that the discretionary power must be exercised strictly for the just decision of the case without allowing misuse of the right of cross-examination.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused recall prosecution witnesses for further cross-examination under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 merely on the ground that a new counsel has been engaged?
  • Whether section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 allows a party to recall a witness for cross-examination to fill gaps or lacunae in its case?
  • Is recalling a witness for further cross-examination permissible under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the accused was already provided a full opportunity to cross-examine?
  Read full judgment →
• Faisal Durrani vs National University of Modern Languages (Numl), etc2021 IHC 146 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-26Read full judgment →
• Durdana Bibi & 10 others vs Capital Development Authority through its2021 IHC 38 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dragon Security Services (Private) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan and others2021 IHC 316 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-09-29Read full judgment →
• Dr. Sheikh Akhtar Hussain vs Federation Of Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of National Health Services, Regulation and Coordination and others2021 PLC (C.S.) 1071 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-13
  writ petitionmaintainabilitypremature petitionrecommendation versus decisionservice terminationdrug regulatory authorityjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by Dr. Sheikh Akhtar Hussain impugning the recommendations of the Policy Board of the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (D.R.A.P.) to terminate his services as Chief Executive Officer on the ground that his Ph.D. degree was not recognized by the Higher Education Commission, and without affording him a show-cause notice or an opportunity of a hearing under the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Employees' Service Regulations, 2015. The core legal question was whether a writ petition is maintainable against mere recommendations of a recommending body when the competent authority (the Federal Government) has not yet made a final decision upon them. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that recommendations are merely advisory, inchoate, and not binding on the competent authority, and therefore do not furnish a cause of action for judicial review until a final decision is taken by the Government. The court established that a challenge against a recommendation rather than a binding decision is premature.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition is maintainable against recommendations made by a policy board before the competent authority takes a final decision thereon?
  • Do recommendations made by a recommending body give rise to a cause of action for judicial review?
  • Whether recommendations of the Policy Board of the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan are binding on the Federal Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Sheikh Akhtar Hussain vs Federation Of Pakistan and others2021 PLC (C.S.) 79 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-17
  public appointmentunrecognized degreeHigher Education Commissionlocus poenitentiaeDRAPmerit-based selectionstatutory bodyad hoc appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order by the Ministry of National Health Services, Regulations and Coordination, which effectively removed the petitioner from his position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (DRAP). The removal was predicated on the petitioner’s Ph.D. degree being unrecognized by the Higher Education Commission (HEC). The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s appointment, which relied on marks awarded for this unrecognized degree, was valid and whether his subsequent removal was lawful. The court held that the petition was misconceived. It determined that the HEC is the sole authority for recognizing foreign degrees and that an unrecognized degree is legally worthless for public appointment purposes. Because the petitioner’s merit-based selection was contingent upon marks awarded for an invalid degree, his appointment was fundamentally flawed. The court affirmed that the principle of locus poenitentiae cannot be invoked to protect rights derived from an illegal order. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition, emphasizing that public appointments must strictly adhere to valid qualifications and that ad hoc arrangements should not persist indefinitely.

  Questions settled

  • Can a degree not recognized by the Higher Education Commission be considered a valid qualification for a public appointment?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae protect rights acquired through an illegal appointment order?
  • Can an officer holding a 'look after' charge exercise full administrative and policy-making powers?
  • Is a candidate's merit position in a competitive selection process vitiated if it is based on marks awarded for an unrecognized academic degree?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Anwar Hussain Siddiqui vs Additional District Judge, Islamabad-West2021 CLC 2005 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-18Read full judgment →
• Dr. Anwar Hussain Siddiqui Ex-Vice Chancellor Allama Iqbal Open2021 PLJ Islamabad 147 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dr. Ali Muhammad vs Additional District Judge Islamabad-West and others2021 IHC 278 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-05Read full judgment →
• Dr. Aleem Akhter vs Muhammad Athar Shaheen and others2021 MLD 1930 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-03Read full judgment →
• Dr. Aamna Saleem Khan vs National University Of Sciences And Technology (NUST), Islamabad through Rector and 4 others2021 PLC (C.S.) 212 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-23
  maternity leavewrongful terminationfundamental rightscontractual employmentconstitutional petitiongender discriminationservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the termination of an Associate Professor by the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST) while she was on sanctioned maternity leave. The core legal question was whether an employer can terminate a female employee’s services during her maternity leave, particularly when the employee is on a contract. The Court held that the termination was illegal, arbitrary, and violative of fundamental rights. It ordered the petitioner's reinstatement with full back benefits. The Court established that maternity leave is a fundamental right and a facet of equality and non-discrimination. It laid down that all female employees, regardless of their employment status—whether permanent, contract, ad-hoc, or daily wage—are entitled to maternity leave with pay and job protection. Furthermore, the Court ruled that no notice of termination or dismissal is valid during pregnancy or maternity leave, as such actions force women to choose between motherhood and employment, which contravenes constitutional guarantees and international obligations regarding the protection of women, family, and the right to dignity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a female employee be terminated from service while on maternity leave?
  • Does the status of employment (contractual vs. permanent) affect a female employee's right to maternity leave?
  • Is a termination notice issued during a woman's pregnancy or maternity leave legally valid?
  • Are the statutes of the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST) considered statutory in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr Muhammad Tahir Khan vs The Secretary of Aviation Division, etc2021 IHC 244 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-06
  civil servanteligibility vs fitnessservice tribunal jurisdictionconstitutional barpromotion disputeterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, challenged an office memorandum regarding his eligibility for promotion, arguing he was not considered by the competent forum. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute concerning a civil servant's eligibility for promotion, or if such matters fall exclusively within the domain of the Federal Service Tribunal. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the Court distinguished between 'fitness' and 'eligibility' for a post. It held that while 'fitness' involves subjective evaluation by a competent authority, 'eligibility' relates to terms and conditions of service. The Court affirmed that under Article 212 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred in matters relating to the terms and conditions of service, even if allegations of mala fide or lack of jurisdiction are raised. Consequently, the Court ruled that the petitioner's grievance regarding eligibility must be adjudicated by the Federal Service Tribunal, and thus, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute regarding a civil servant's eligibility for promotion?
  • Is the determination of a civil servant's eligibility for promotion a matter relating to the terms and conditions of service?
  • Can a High Court exercise jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution if an order is alleged to be mala fide or without jurisdiction?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the authority to determine the vires of an order affecting a civil servant's rights?
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• Director (I&I) (Inland Revenue), Islamabad and others vs Naeem SiddiquePTCL 2021 CL. 746, 2021 PTD 1047 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-11
  sales tax fraudcriminal prosecutiontax liability determinationdue processvalidation clauseultra viresSales Tax Act 1990
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an order by the Special Court (Customs, Taxation and Anti-Smuggling) discharging the respondent from a criminal case involving alleged sales tax fraud. The core legal questions were whether criminal prosecution for tax fraud could be initiated before the underlying tax liability was formally determined by the relevant tax authorities, and whether the validation provided by Section 74A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, retrospectively authorized criminal proceedings initiated under an SRO previously declared ultra vires. The Court upheld the discharge order, ruling that criminal prosecution for tax fraud cannot proceed until the tax liability is definitively determined through the departmental hierarchy. The Court affirmed that criminal proceedings under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, require a prior, credible determination of tax liability to satisfy due process and fair trial requirements under the Constitution. Furthermore, validation provisions cannot be stretched to retrospectively authorize criminal prosecutions that were invalidly initiated at the time, as this would infringe upon fundamental rights, and the authorities may only agitate the matter afresh after the tax liability is settled.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal prosecution for tax fraud be initiated under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, before the underlying tax liability has been determined by the competent tax authorities?
  • Does the validation provision in Section 74A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, retrospectively authorize criminal proceedings that were invalidly initiated prior to its enactment?
  • Is a determination of tax liability under Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, a prerequisite for initiating criminal prosecution for tax fraud?
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• Dilshad vs International Islamic University through its Rector, Islamabad2021 IHC 312, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 939 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-09
  date of birth correctionlocus poenitentiaeservice recordintra-court appealnon-statutory ruleswrit jurisdictionestoppel by conduct
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an employee of the International Islamic University, Islamabad, challenged the withdrawal of an order that had previously permitted the correction of her date of birth in her service record. Having initially recorded her date of birth as 1961 upon appointment, she sought to change it to 1967 near her retirement, relying on a civil court decree obtained without impleading her employer. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the Intra-Court Appeal, affirming the Single Judge's decision. The Court held that the principle of locus poenitentiae cannot be invoked to protect an order based on incorrect facts or to perpetuate an illegality. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the date of birth recorded at the time of joining service is final, and attempts to alter it belatedly, particularly near retirement, are to be discouraged. Additionally, the Court noted that the University's rules are non-statutory, rendering the constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 incompetent regarding service matters not governed by statutory rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can the principle of locus poenitentiae be invoked to protect an order obtained on the basis of incorrect facts?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 maintainable against an organization whose rules and regulations are non-statutory?
  • Can a civil servant seek the correction of their date of birth in their service record after a long period of service?
  • Does a civil court decree regarding a date of birth change bind an employer who was not impleaded as a party in the suit?
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• Dilshad Khan vs The State and another2022 YLR 831 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-08
  pre-arrest bailbail before arrestQatl-i-Amdprohibitory clauseplea of alibimala fidecriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition filed by the petitioner seeking pre-arrest bail in case FIR No. 22/21 registered under sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code at Police Station Shams Colony, Islamabad, for the murder of his ex-wife. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner has made out a case for the extraordinary remedy of pre-arrest bail, particularly in view of his direct nomination in the FIR with a specific role, eyewitness testimony, and the absence of established mala fide or a valid plea of alibi at the investigative stage. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that pre-arrest bail cannot be granted to hamper investigation or as a substitute for post-arrest bail without demonstrating exceptional circumstances or mala fide, and recalled the ad-interim bail previously granted. The key principle laid down is that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy requiring clear proof of mala fide to divert the ordinary course of criminal investigation and arrest in heinous offenses.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted in a case involving an offense falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without establishing mala fide?
  • Can a plea of alibi be considered for the grant of pre-arrest bail without recording evidence before the trial court?
  • Whether anticipatory bail can be used as a substitute for post-arrest bail to hamper the investigative process and recovery of weapons?
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• Dawa Jan vs The State, etc2021 IHC 142 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-03-29
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayhabitual offenderprohibitory clauserobberytrial expeditious disposal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition filed by the accused-petitioner, Dawa Jan, facing trial under Sections 392 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in F.I.R. No. 02 dated 01.01.2019 registered at Police Station Sehala, Islamabad, on allegations of armed robbery. The core legal question revolved around whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of statutory delay in the conclusion of the trial, and whether his criminal antecedents and status as a hardened or desperate criminal brought his case within the exceptions of the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the bail petition, holding that the petitioner was a habitual offender involved in multiple similar cases with a prior conviction, was positively identified in an identification parade, and had incriminating recoveries effected from him, thus hitting the prohibitory clause of the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that the benefit of statutory delay in the conclusion of trial cannot be extended to an accused who falls within the category of a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal, or who is a previous convict, and that courts should generally avoid granting or canceling bail when the trial is at an advanced stage, instead directing the trial court to conclude the proceedings expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial when his case falls within the exceptions of the fourth proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a court take into consideration materials outside the immediate case under trial, including previous convictions and involvement in other criminal cases, to determine if an accused is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should bail be granted or cancelled by an appellate or constitutional court while the trial of the case is already in progress?
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• Farhan Mustafa vs The State and others2020 IHC 174, 2022 YLR 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-07Read full judgment →
• Crescent Star Insurance Limited through Official Representative vs Securities And Exchange Commission Of Pakistan and another2021 CLD 1304, 2022 PCTLR 809, 2022 [M] CLR 730 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-03Read full judgment →
• Creative Electronics (Pvt.) Limited vs Government of Pakistan through Prime Minister and others2020 PLD Islamabad 319, 2020 PLJ Islamabad 151, 2022 [M] CLR 1230 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-03-16Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Income Tax/Wealth Tax, Companies Zone, Islamabad vs2021 PTD 359 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-30Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Zone, Large Taxpayers Office vs M/s.2021 PCTLR 1486, 2021 PTD 1827, 2022 [M] CLR 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Zone, Large Taxpayers Office vs Messrs Wateen Telecom Limited and others2021 PTD 1827 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-12Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, MCC, Islamabad, etc vs Israr and others2021 IHC 8, 2021 KLR Civil Cases 402, 2021 PCTLR 1369, 2021 [M] CLR 1428, 2021 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-12Read full judgment →
• Chaudhari Khadim Hussain and another vs Securities And Exchange2021 CLD 663 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-01-29Read full judgment →
• Ch. Aamir Shahzad vs Muhammad Makki and 5 others2021 YLR 1641 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-07-07
  abduction for ransomacquittal appealspecial leave to appealfugitive offenderactus curiae neminem gravabitpress clippings evidencepointation recoveryalteration of charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the appellant/abductee against the judgment of the Special Court (Anti-Terrorism Court-I), Rawalpindi, which acquitted the respondents in a private complaint under Sections 365-A, 149, 109, 34 PPC read with Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The respondents raised preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the appeal on grounds of the appellant's subsequent abscondance in an unrelated case and the non-filing of a petition for special leave to appeal. The High Court rejected the first objection, holding that a fugitive offender's representation through counsel in a pre-existing appeal is not automatically barred where personal appearance is not required. Applying the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit and Section 561-A Cr.P.C., the Court condoned the procedural defect of direct appeal without leave. On merits, evaluating the evidence under Articles 40 and 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, the High Court found that the abductee was recovered upon the pointation and exclusive knowledge of accused Aamir Rehman, corroborated by official witnesses and medical/physical evidence. The Court held that newspaper reports cannot be relied upon in criminal cases unless their authors are examined. Finding insufficient evidence of general public terror under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 or proof of ransom demand, the Court altered the charge from Section 365-A PPC to Section 365 PPC, set aside the acquittal of three respondents, convicted them, and sentenced them to seven years' rigorous imprisonment with fine.

  Questions settled

  • Does a party lose their right of representation through counsel in a pending criminal appeal if they subsequently become an absconder in an unrelated criminal case?
  • Can the High Court invoke Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to convert or treat a direct appeal against acquittal as an application for special leave to appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C.?
  • Are press clippings and newspaper reports admissible as substantive evidence in a criminal trial without examining the author, editor, or reporter as a witness?
  • Can an offence charged under Section 365-A PPC be converted to Section 365 PPC if the element of ransom or terrorism is not satisfactorily proved?
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• Captain (Rtd.) Muhammad Ali Zulqarnain Kiani vs Islamabad Electric2021 PLJ Islamabad 299, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 909 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-23
  Intra Court Appealwrit petitionmaintainabilitymaster and servantstatutory rulesdemotiontransferservice grievance
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal was filed against the order of a Single Judge-in-Chambers dismissing a writ petition. The appellant, an employee of the Islamabad Electric Supply Company (IESCO), challenged the withdrawal of his promotions (demoting him from BPS-19 to BPS-17) and his subsequent transfer, alleging violations of the principle of natural justice and Article 10-A of the Constitution. The core legal question was whether a writ petition under Article 199 is maintainable against IESCO by its employees for the redressal of individual service grievances. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, holding that IESCO is a non-statutory entity whose employees are not governed by statutory rules. Consequently, the relationship between IESCO and its employees is governed by the principle of master and servant, which precludes the invocation of constitutional writ jurisdiction for individual service grievances. The Court also reaffirmed that transfer is an exigency of service and does not constitute a violation of any fundamental right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable against a non-statutory entity like IESCO by its employees for individual service grievances?
  • Does the absence of statutory service rules in an organization render the relationship between the employer and its employees as that of master and servant?
  • Can an employee claim a fundamental right to be posted at a particular station or challenge a transfer as a violation of such rights?
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• Capt. (Retd.) George Inayat vs Additional District Judge-III, West, Islamabad and 2 others2021 PLJ Islamabad 57 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-10-14Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority through its Chairman vs Shaikh2021 IHC 66 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority through its Chairman vs Muhammad2021 IHC 80 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority through Chairman vs Sajjad Ghani and 232021 PLJ Islamabad 215, 2021 CLC 662 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-12-21Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority through Chairman vs Messrs Signage2021 YLR 194 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-02Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority through Chairman and another vs Liaqat2021 MLD 663 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-07Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority and another vs Ocean Pakistan Limited2021 IHC 40 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-02-02Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority (CDA), Islamabad through Chairman and 32021 MLD 1894, 2022 [M] CLR 826, 2022 PCTLR 884 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-21Read full judgment →
• Bushra Zia vs Mansoor Nawab and another2021 IHC 284 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-08-02Read full judgment →
• Bukhari Gas And Oil (Pvt.) Ltd vs Government Holding (Pvt.) Ltd. and another2021 CLC 1992 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-06Read full judgment →
• Brig. (Retd.) Kamal Rasool vs James Rollins, Nigerian National and 3 others2021 PCRLJ 382, 2022 KLR Criminal Cases 344 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-09-16
  acquittal appealbenefit of doubtburden of proofcheating and forgerycriminal investigationdouble presumption of innocenceelectronic transactions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of respondents by the Additional Sessions Judge in a case involving allegations of cheating, forgery, and impersonation under the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002 and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The complainant alleged that the respondents defrauded him of a significant sum through an elaborate scam involving fake investment schemes and chemical currency cleaning. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt to warrant overturning the acquittal. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution’s case was fraught with inconsistencies, improvements, and a lack of direct evidence connecting the respondents to the alleged offences. The investigation was deemed poor, and the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court reaffirmed the principle that the burden of proof remains strictly on the prosecution and that the benefit of any reasonable doubt must be extended to the accused. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that in appeals against acquittal, the presumption of innocence is doubled, and interference is only justified if the trial court's judgment is perverse or suffers from grave misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of appellate interference in a judgment of acquittal?
  • Does the burden of proof shift from the prosecution if the accused takes a specific plea?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution evidence is based on hearsay and improvements?
  • Must the benefit of doubt be extended to the accused as a matter of right when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Bashir Ahmed vs Muhammad Isa and others2021 MLD 698, 2021 PLJ Islamabad 165, 2021 IHC 44 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-11-05Read full judgment →
• Azhar Ali and another vs Secretary, Ministry of Interior and others2021 IHC 328 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-11-12Read full judgment →
• Asim Ahmed Afzal vs National Accountability Bureau through Chairman2021 PLD Islamabad 323 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-06-03Read full judgment →
• Asif Raza and others vs National Police Foundation (Security Services), Islamabad and another2021 IHC 306 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-11-23Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain vs Central Depository Company (CDC), etc2021 [M] C L R 1480 · Islamabad High Court · 2020-06-26Read full judgment →