Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Rab Nawaz and others vs Rusmat Ali2019 IHC 198 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-11-12Read full judgment →
• Prof. Dr. Abdul Waheed vs Rector, Comsats Institute of Information2019 [M] C.L.R. 595 · Islamabad High Court
  contractual employmentmaster and servantwrongful terminationdisciplinary inquirystigmawrit jurisdictionmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenges the termination of the petitioner’s employment contract with the COMSATS Institute of Information Technology (CIIT) and the subsequent dismissal of his departmental appeal. The core legal question concerns whether a contractual employee can be terminated on grounds of misconduct without a formal inquiry, and whether such termination, if stigmatizing, is sustainable without adhering to the CIIT Employees' Efficiency and Discipline Statutes, 2006. The Court held that while contractual employment is generally governed by the master-servant doctrine, a distinction exists between simpliciter termination and termination based on misconduct. The Court ruled that where termination is predicated on allegations of misconduct, it stigmatizes the employee, thereby necessitating a regular inquiry in accordance with the relevant disciplinary statutes. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned termination and appellate orders, emphasizing that even contractual employees are entitled to a fair opportunity to defend themselves against allegations of misconduct before being condemned. The employer remains at liberty to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contractual employee be terminated for misconduct without a regular inquiry?
  • Does a termination order based on allegations of misconduct carry a stigma that requires a formal disciplinary inquiry?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against the termination of a contractual employee when the termination order is stigmatizing?
  • Does contractual employment automatically convert to regular employment by the mere efflux of time?
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• Petroleum Exploration (Private) Limited vs Federal Government of Pakistan2019 IHC 168 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-04Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Mobile Communication Limited vs Full Bench NIRC and others2019 IHC 12, 2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 77 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-08
  termination of serviceworkmanStanding Orders Ordinancemisconduct inquiryreinstatementback benefitsNIRC jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged concurrent orders by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which set aside the termination of the respondent's employment and ordered his reinstatement with back benefits. The core legal questions were whether the termination of a permanent employee stating only that "services are no longer required" satisfies the statutory requirements of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and whether an employer can rely on allegations of misconduct in pleadings when the termination letter itself did not cite such grounds. The Court held that the termination was unlawful because the employer failed to explicitly state valid reasons in writing as mandated by Standing Order 12(3) of the 1968 Ordinance. Furthermore, because the employer's own pleadings revealed the true reason for termination was alleged misconduct, the failure to conduct an inquiry under Standing Order 15 rendered the dismissal void. The Court affirmed that beneficial labor legislation cannot be overridden by private employment contracts and that the nature of duties, not designation, determines "workman" status.

  Questions settled

  • Does a termination letter stating only that 'services are no longer required' satisfy the requirements of Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can an employer terminate a permanent employee for misconduct without conducting an inquiry as prescribed by Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Does the designation of an employee determine their status as a 'workman' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can parties contract out of the beneficial provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
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• Pak Gulf Construction Private Limited and another vs Abdul Hamid Baig2019 KLR Civil Cases 197 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ovex Technologies (Private) Limited vs PCM PK (Private) Limited and others2019 IHC 150 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-27Read full judgment →
• Overseas Pakistanis Foundation, Islamabad vs Joint. Management (Pvt.)2019 CLC 497, 2019 KLR Civil Cases 13 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-19Read full judgment →
• Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority, Islamabad vs The Commissioner2019 PTD 587 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-14
  income tax exemptionstatutory bodieslocal authorityretrospective effectFederal Governmenttax liabilityregulatory authoritiesIncome Tax Ordinance 2001
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns income tax references filed by various statutory bodies seeking exemption from income tax under Section 49 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal questions were whether these entities, established under specific statutes, qualify as the Federal, Provincial, or Local Government for tax exemption purposes, and whether Section 49(4) of the Ordinance, inserted via the Finance Act, 2007, possesses retrospective effect. The Court held that statutory bodies, such as regulatory authorities, are distinct legal entities and do not fall within the definition of "Federal Government," "Provincial Government," or "Local Government" (formerly "local authority") under Section 49(1) to (3). Consequently, they are not entitled to the claimed tax exemptions. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Article 165-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 renders the income of such corporations and bodies liable to tax regardless of the ultimate destination of such income. While the Court noted that Section 49(4) does not have retrospective effect, this determination was academic as these entities were never exempt from taxation under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Are statutory bodies established under federal or provincial laws entitled to income tax exemption under Section 49(1) to (3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does Section 49(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, have retrospective effect?
  • Do statutory regulatory authorities qualify as local authorities or local government for the purpose of tax exemption under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is the income of a corporation or body established by or under a Federal or Provincial law liable to tax under Article 165-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Noor Hassan alias Noora vs The State2019 MLD 1671, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1152, 2019 IHC 62 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-06-12
  benefit of doubtdefective investigationidentification paradedacoity with murdercriminal appealmurder referencefalse evidence by police
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment convicting the appellants, Noor Hassan alias Noora and Syed Naseer Ahmed Hashmi, under section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and sentencing them to death for dacoity and murder. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt, given the flawed and suspicious police investigations, lack of identification of the source of light during an early morning occurrence, contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, and questionable identification parades. The Islamabad High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the appellants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to untrustworthy investigative testimony, delayed identifications without role attribution, and material contradictions on record. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and sentences, acquitted both appellants, answered the murder reference in the negative, and initiated proceedings against the investigating officers for fabricating evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution relies on dubious identification parades conducted long after the occurrence without role attribution?
  • Whether the failure of investigating officers to conduct fair and honest investigations entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Does contradictory medical and ocular evidence regarding the crime scene and injuries warrant the acquittal of the accused?
  • Can courts initiate proceedings against investigating officers for giving false evidence when their testimonies are found to be fabricated?
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• Nauman Azhar vs Celvas Private Limited and others2019 IHC 186 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-16Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority vs Lilley International (Private) Limited and another2019 IHC 202 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-29Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan vs The Sacked Employees Review Board2019 PLC (C.S.) 1516 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-27
  sacked employeesreinstatementjurisdictionlimitation periodspecial statutewrit of certiorari
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple writ petitions filed by the National Bank of Pakistan challenging orders passed by the Sacked Employees Review Board, which had reinstated several terminated private respondents into service and granted them consequential pensionary benefits. The core legal question is whether the Sacked Employees Review Board had the jurisdiction under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 to entertain and allow reinstatement applications of employees whose dates of appointment and termination fell outside the strict temporal criteria defined in the 2010 Act, and whether such petitions were barred by limitation. The Islamabad High Court held that the Review Board acted without jurisdiction and committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record, as the private respondents did not satisfy the mandatory prerequisites of a "sacked employee" under the 2010 Act and their petitions were filed well beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The court laid down that special statutes of limitation must be strictly complied with and that courts or tribunals cannot assume jurisdiction without fulfilling mandatory statutory conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Sacked Employees Review Board has the jurisdiction to reinstate employees who do not fall within the specific temporal definitions of a 'sacked employee' under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010?
  • Can the limitation period prescribed under Section 13 of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 be extended or condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Does the transmission of a writ petition by a High Court to the Sacked Employees Review Board absolve the petitioner from complying with the statutory limitation period?
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• Nasrullah vs The Federation through Secretary, Ministry of Narcotics2019 IHC 92 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-06-03Read full judgment →
• Nasir Saeed Akhtar Warriach vs Shafique-ur-Rehman etc2019 IHC 212 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-12-11Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Mumtaz Qureshi vs Pakistan Petroleum Limited and others2019 IHC 144 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-26Read full judgment →
• M/s. The Attock Oil Co. Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2019 PCRLJ 615, 2019 PTD 934, PTCL 2019 CL. 42 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-16
  super taxmoney billexploration and productionconcession agreementsvires of statuteincome tax ordinancerehabilitation of displaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses a constitutional petition filed by juridical persons engaged in the exploration and production of petroleum products, challenging the vires of Section 4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which was inserted via the Finance Act of 2015 and amended by the Finance Act of 2016 to levy super tax for the rehabilitation of temporarily displaced persons. The core legal questions revolved around whether the levy under Section 4B constitutes a fee rather than a tax and thus could not be validly enacted through a Money Bill, and whether the Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act, 1948 overrides the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The court held that the levy falls within the definition of 'tax' under Section 2(63) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and that its enactment through a Money Bill by the National Assembly was constitutionally competent and valid. The court established that the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 acts as a special law regarding income taxation with overriding effect, and disposed of the petitions with directions for the petitioners to approach the tax commissioner for computing specific tax liabilities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the levy of super tax under Section 4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is in the nature of a fee or a tax?
  • Can Section 4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 be validly introduced through a Money Bill passed by the National Assembly?
  • Does the Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act, 1948 override the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 regarding tax liability?
  • Can the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 undertake an exercise to compute the tax liability of the petitioner companies?
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• M/s. Pakistan Oilfields Limited through General Manager vs Federation2019 PLJ Islamabad 199, 2020 PCTLR 226, 2020 PTD 110, PTCL 2022 CL.450 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-16Read full judgment →
• M/s Tamour Ishraq & Company vs Federation of Pakistan, through2020 PLD Islamabad 15, 2019 IHC 172 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-31Read full judgment →
• M/s K & N International vs M/s Motorway Operations and Rehabilitation2019 IHC 46 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-04-02Read full judgment →
• M/s Hongkong Huihua Global Technology Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan2019 IHC 142 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-27
  tax exemptionpermanent establishmentPakistan-source incomewithholding taxcomposite contractoffshore supplyIncome Tax Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition filed by a non-resident company challenges orders passed by tax authorities rejecting its application for tax exemption under Section 152(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, concerning payments for the offshore supply component of an Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Commissioning contract. The core legal question is whether payments made to a non-resident for offshore supplies under an indivisible composite E.P.C.C. contract involving a permanent establishment in Pakistan constitute Pakistan-source income subject to withholding tax under Section 152(2A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the contract was a single composite undertaking and that the petitioner maintained a permanent establishment in Pakistan due to construction and installation activities exceeding the statutory threshold. The court laid down the principle that offshore supply components that form part of an overall arrangement for the supply, installation, and commissioning of a project involving a permanent establishment do not qualify for tax exemption and are taxable as Pakistan-source business income under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.

  Questions settled

  • Whether payments for offshore supplies under an E.P.C.C. contract are exempt from tax deduction under Section 152(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does an E.P.C.C. contract involving installation and commissioning activities constitute a permanent establishment under Section 2(41)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Are payments received by a non-resident under an indivisible composite contract taxable as Pakistan-source income under Section 101(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhera vs President of Pakistan through Secretary to the President, etc2020 PLD Islamabad 1, 2019 IHC 134 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-19
  Federal Tax Ombudsmanpersona designatapresidential adviceparliamentary democracylocus poenitentiaeremoval from officeconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhera, challenging a notification dated 12-06-2019 whereby the President of Pakistan withdrew his appointment as Federal Tax Ombudsman ab initio. The Federal Government contended that the appointment, made on the advice of the Prime Minister, was void because the President acts as persona designata under Section 3(1) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance 2000, and thus must act independently of executive advice. The High Court analyzed the constitutional scheme of parliamentary democracy under Article 48, distinguishing between administrative functions and adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The Court held that since appointing the Federal Tax Ombudsman is an administrative function conferred on the President qua President, the President is constitutionally mandated to act on the advice of the Prime Minister. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned notification, restoring the petitioner to his office, and emphasized that statutory independence of such offices must be protected from arbitrary executive withdrawal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the President of Pakistan acts as persona designata or in his constitutional capacity when appointing the Federal Tax Ombudsman under Section 3(1) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance 2000?
  • Is the President of Pakistan bound by the advice of the Prime Minister when performing administrative statutory functions as opposed to quasi-judicial functions?
  • Can an appointment to a statutory office with a guaranteed tenure be withdrawn ab initio by the executive after it has been acted upon and vested rights have been created?
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• Muhammad Zubair, Principal Engineer, Pak. N.R.A. and 4 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and 3 others2019 PLJ Islamabad 45 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaryab Ali vs Ministry of Religious Affairs, through its2021 [M] C L R 489, 2019 PLJ Islamabad 175, 2019 PLC (C.S) 1361, KLR 2021 Civil · Islamabad High Court · 2019-04-24
  recruitment policylocal basis appointmentICT domicilecivil service rulesBPS-1 appointmentconstitutional interpretationadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the recruitment process for the post of Naib Qasids (BPS-1) in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, arguing that the department violated the advertisement's terms by appointing candidates from outside the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) despite a requirement for local candidates. The core legal question was whether government departments with jurisdiction restricted to the ICT are mandated to fill BPS-1 to BPS-15 posts primarily with local residents holding ICT domiciles. The Court held that under Rule 16 of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, and the constitutional framework, such posts must be filled on a local basis. It emphasized that the "preference" for local candidates in the advertisement was not merely directory but mandatory, intended to ensure economic feasibility and administrative efficiency. The Court directed the Ministry to reconsider the hiring process within three months to prioritize local candidates with ICT domiciles, while refraining from immediately setting aside the existing appointments to allow for administrative correction.

  Questions settled

  • Are government departments with jurisdiction restricted to the Islamabad Capital Territory required to fill BPS-1 to BPS-15 posts on a local basis?
  • Does the term 'local basis' in the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973 mandate the recruitment of candidates holding an Islamabad Capital Territory domicile?
  • Can a government department disregard a requirement for local preference in recruitment advertisements for lower-grade posts?
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• Muhammad Zakir Bandhani vs Muhammad Amir Bandhani and 14 others2019 MLD 1861 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tahir Khan vs Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources2019 KLR Civil Cases 451 · Islamabad High Court
  misconductembezzlementremoval from servicedisciplinary proceedingswrit jurisdictionrestitution of fundspublic servantservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the imposition of the major penalty of "removal from service" and a demand for mark-up on embezzled funds against the petitioner, a former Chief Accounts Officer. The petitioner, having embezzled public funds and subsequently returned the principal amount, sought the conversion of his removal into "compulsory retirement" to secure pensionary benefits and contested the liability for mark-up. The core legal questions were whether the penalty was disproportionate given the restitution of funds and whether the court could interfere with the disciplinary authority's decision. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the restitution of embezzled funds does not mitigate the gravity of the misconduct or invalidate the penalty of removal. The court affirmed that it cannot substitute its findings for those of the competent authority under its writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, it held that disputes regarding the calculation of mark-up on embezzled funds are matters for a civil court to determine, not the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the restitution of embezzled funds by a public servant mitigate the penalty of removal from service for misconduct?
  • Can a High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, substitute the penalty imposed by a competent disciplinary authority?
  • Is a dispute regarding the calculation of mark-up on embezzled funds by a government department justiciable in a writ petition?
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• Muhammad Sikandar vs The State2019 PLD Islamabad 527, 2019 IHC 66 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-06-11
  Jail AppealTerrorismAnti-Terrorism Act, 1997Mens ReaActus ReusConvictionSentencePublic FearFirearm WeaponsCriminal Procedure Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This Jail Appeal challenged the appellant's conviction and sentence by the trial court. The core legal question revolved around whether the appellant's actions constituted "terrorism" under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, specifically requiring the coexistence of mens rea and actus reus. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution had proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found that the appellant's actions, including blocking a main avenue, firing weapons, and making political demands, demonstrated the requisite design to create fear and insecurity among the public, thereby fulfilling the elements of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Court reiterated that for an act to be terrorism, the mens rea (design to intimidate/create fear) and actus reus (specified actions) must coincide and coexist, and it is sufficient if the intended act was likely to create terror, irrespective of actual harm caused.

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• Muhammad Siddique Khokhar and another vs Capital Development2019 [M] C.L.R. 46 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Shoaib Razzaq vs Federation of Pakistan through the President & 5 others2021 [M] C L R 825, 2019 PLD Islamabad 339, 2019 IHC 30 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafeeq vs Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others2019 IHC 32 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-01
  quo warrantopublic officerecruitment advertisementcontractual appointmentsalary approvaljudicial reviewstatutory interpretationapprobate and reprobate
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the appointment of the Director General of the Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (H.D.I.P.), specifically contesting the three-year tenure and the salary package determined by the Board of Governors. The core legal questions concerned whether the appointment term could exceed the period specified in the original advertisement and whether the salary package required Federal Government approval under the H.D.I.P. Act, 2006. The Court held that an appointment term cannot deviate from the terms explicitly stated in the recruitment advertisement; thus, the three-year appointment was declared unlawful and deemed to be for two years. Furthermore, the Court ruled that while the Board of Governors may determine pay scales, such packages remain subject to mandatory Federal Government approval under Section 8(1) of the H.D.I.P. Act, 2006. The judgment affirmed that conditions of employment set in an advertisement cannot be altered post-facto. Additionally, the Court clarified that a candidate participating in a selection process is not barred from challenging the appointment of a successful candidate, provided the challenge is not mala fide.

  Questions settled

  • Can the terms of employment, such as the duration of a contract, be altered after the advertisement for a public post has been issued?
  • Is the salary package determined by the Board of Governors of the Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan subject to the approval of the Federal Government?
  • Does a candidate who participated in a competitive selection process have the standing to challenge the appointment of the successful candidate?
  • Can a court in its judicial review jurisdiction substitute its findings for those of a selection authority regarding the comparative credentials of candidates?
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• Muhammad Rahan Khan vs Federal Government and 2 others2019 IHC 136 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-13
  Federal Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act 1969insurance premiumretirement benefitsvires of statutepresumption of constitutionalitycivil servantstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, retired government employees, challenged the vires of Section 19 of the Federal Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act, 1969, contending that the failure to refund insurance premiums upon retirement, while only providing benefits upon death during service, was discriminatory and amounted to extortion. They sought to align the federal law with provincial amendments in KPK and Balochistan. The core legal question was whether Section 19 violated the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, by failing to provide insurance benefits to retired employees. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the Act of 1969 is a valid legislative enactment and that the insurance scheme is specifically designed for death benefits rather than retirement savings. The Court affirmed that there is a strong presumption of constitutionality in favor of statutes, and courts cannot strike down legislation merely based on perceived lack of wisdom or policy preferences. Consequently, the Court held that the legislature has the exclusive prerogative to amend the law to include retirement benefits, and no constitutional violation was established.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 19 of the Federal Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act 1969 violate the Constitution by failing to provide insurance benefits to retired employees?
  • Is the Federal Employees Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance Act 1969 unconstitutional for not providing for the return of insurance premiums upon retirement?
  • What are the established principles for determining the constitutionality of a statute in Pakistan?
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• Muhammad Qasim and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resources Development and another2019 PLC (C.S.) 1491 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-14
  contractual employeesregularization of servicesequal opportunitypublic employmentintra court appealmerit-based appointmentconstitutional mandate
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenged a judgment dismissing a writ petition filed by contractual Data Entry Operators seeking regularization of their services. The appellants, initially appointed on a temporary basis for six months with periodic extensions, contended they were entitled to permanent status due to their length of service and the regularization of similarly placed individuals. The core legal question was whether contractual employees, appointed without a transparent competitive process for permanent posts, could claim regularization as a matter of right. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to demonstrate they were appointed through an open, competitive process. The Court emphasized that converting temporary employment into permanent status without such a process violates the constitutional mandate of equal opportunity enshrined in Articles 3 and 9 of the Constitution. It further ruled that courts cannot rewrite employment contracts or grant regularization in the absence of a specific enabling statute. The judgment affirmed that public sector employment must be merit-based, and granting regularization to contractual employees without competition would undermine the rights of other qualified candidates.

  Questions settled

  • Can contractual employees claim regularization as a matter of right without having undergone an open and transparent competitive process?
  • Does the conversion of temporary or contractual employment into permanent employment without a competitive process violate the constitutional mandate of equal opportunity?
  • Can a court rewrite the terms of an employment contract to grant regularization where no statutory provision for such regularization exists?
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• Muhammad Lahrasib vs Ghulam Ahmed Chaudhry, etc2019 PLD Islamabad 544, 2019 IHC 68 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Javed and another vs Syed Aftab Ali Naqvi and others2021 [M] C L R 828, 2019 CLC 1678 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-05-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Syed Muhammad Tahir Zahoor and others2019 IHC 170 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Imran Bashir Malik vs Amera Khan and others2020 CLC 574, 2019 IHC 148 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrar Khan and another vs Capital Development Authority2019 [M] C.L.R. 657, 2019 MLD 276 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-10-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat Khan vs The State and another2019 P Cr. L J 472 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-25
  post-arrest bailcyber terrorismfurther inquirysocial mediaanti-state activitiesExit Control ListPrevention of Electronic Crimes Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case involving allegations of disseminating anti-State material on social media, charged under sections 9 and 10 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, and sections 500 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given that the investigation was concluded and the identity of the user behind the social media accounts remained a matter of evidentiary proof. The Court held that while the alleged material was derogatory, the actual usage of the social media accounts by the petitioner required corroboration through independent evidence during trial. Consequently, the Court determined that the case fell within the scope of 'further inquiry.' Emphasizing the principle that for bail purposes, the lesser sentence is considered, and noting that the petitioner was no longer required for investigation, the Court granted post-arrest bail, subject to the surrender of the petitioner's passport and placement on the Exit Control List to prevent flight risk.

  Questions settled

  • Is the question of whether a specific individual operated a social media account used for posting derogatory content a matter of further inquiry at the bail stage?
  • Should the lesser sentence be taken into account for the purposes of granting bail?
  • Can a court impose conditions such as the surrender of a passport and placement on the Exit Control List when granting bail in cybercrime cases?
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• Muhammad Azam Khan Niazi vs General Manager, SNGPL, Islamabad2019 CLC 1998 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-24
  civil court jurisdictionimplied bar of jurisdictionOGRA Ordinance 2002rejection of plaintconsumer grievance redressalgas meter disconnectionalternative remedystatutory forum
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular Second Appeal challenges the concurrent dismissal of a civil suit by the lower courts, which rejected the appellant's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The appellant had sought a declaration and permanent injunction against the respondent, Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited, regarding the potential disconnection of a gas meter. The core legal question was whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted by the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, and the associated 2003 Regulations, which provide a specific mechanism for consumer complaints. The Court held that the suit was not maintainable in a civil court because the OGRA Ordinance, 2002, and the Complaint Resolution Procedure Regulations, 2003, establish a comprehensive, efficacious, and mandatory forum for resolving disputes between consumers and licensees. The ratio confirms that where a statute creates a special forum for addressing specific grievances, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming that consumers must exhaust the statutory remedies provided under the OGRA framework before seeking judicial intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, impliedly bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in disputes between gas consumers and licensees?
  • Can a trial court reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. if a specific statutory forum for the grievance exists?
  • Is a gas consumer required to exhaust the complaint resolution mechanism under the 2003 Regulations before approaching a civil court?
  • Does the power of the High Court to review OGRA decisions under the OGRA Ordinance, 2002, preclude the filing of a civil suit for the same grievance?
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• Muhammad Ayub vs Muzaffar Khan (Deceased) and others2019 IHC 206 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-11-07Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet2019 PLC (C.S.) 652, 2019 PLJ Islamabad 74 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-10-31
  medical reimbursementwrit petitionadministrative discretionequality before lawgovernment servantmedical treatment abroadarbitrary exercise of power
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by a government servant seeking reimbursement for medical expenses incurred during a liver transplant in India. The petitioner failed to obtain prior approval from the Ministry of Health, which was a mandatory requirement under the prevailing policy guidelines. The court held that the petition must be dismissed due to the petitioner's failure to secure prior sanction and the inordinate delay in filing the petition. However, the court critically observed that the executive's practice of granting medical treatment funds abroad on an ad hoc basis, despite the formal revocation of the policy, constitutes an exercise of unstructured, unbridled, and unfettered discretion. The court held that such unchecked discretion violates the principle of equality before the law as enshrined in Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, the court directed the relevant Ministry to frame clear and definite rules to govern the exercise of such discretion to prevent arbitrariness and discrimination in the future.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exercise of executive discretion without defined criteria or guidelines violate the principle of equality before the law?
  • Is a government servant entitled to reimbursement for medical treatment abroad if they failed to obtain prior approval from the competent authority?
  • Can a court grant relief in a writ petition where there has been an inordinate delay in approaching the court?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs The State and 2 others2019 KLR Criminal Cases 150, 2019 PCRLJ 1244, 2019 IHC 36 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-28
  dishonoured chequemens readishonestycriminal revisionlimitation periodacquittalbusiness transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses an appeal and two criminal revisions arising from matters involving dishonoured cheques under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned whether an appeal filed before a wrong forum could be condoned under the Limitation Act 1908, and whether the essential ingredients of mens rea, specifically dishonesty, were established by the prosecution for an offence under Section 489-F. The Islamabad High Court held that the appeal against acquittal was barred by limitation and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 was inapplicable in light of Section 29 thereof, and institution in the wrong forum did not justify condonation. Regarding the convictions, the Court held that the prosecution must prove both actus reus (issuance and dishonour of a cheque) and mens rea (dishonesty) beyond reasonable doubt. As the transaction was a business settlement and the prosecution failed to prove dishonesty, the convictions were unsustainable. The key principle laid down is that mere issuance and dishonour of a cheque without proof of dishonest intent (mens rea) does not attract penal liability under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed within a wrong forum can serve as a ground for condonation of delay under the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply where a special statute provides its own period of limitation?
  • Is mere issuance and dishonour of a cheque sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 without proof of mens rea?
  • What constitutes dishonesty as mens rea under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in commercial transactions?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tahira Noor and others vs Shahid Humayun and others2020 CLC 427, 2020 [M] C L R 357, 2019 IHC 140 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-07-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saman Naz vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 IHC 184 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-23
  deputationrepatriationwedlock policycivil servicevested rightabsorptionwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenge the repatriation orders issued by the Federal Directorate of Education (F.D.E.) to the petitioners' respective parent departments. The core legal questions concern whether a deputationist possesses a vested right to complete a specific deputation tenure, whether they can claim permanent absorption into the borrowing department, and whether the "wedlock policy" grants a right to remain at a specific station indefinitely. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that repatriation is a discretionary administrative power exercised by the competent authority. It was determined that a deputationist has no vested right to continue in a borrowing department or to be absorbed therein, particularly when the parent department refuses to issue a No Objection Certificate for extension. The Court established that deputation is a contractual arrangement subject to the exigencies of service. Furthermore, the "wedlock policy" does not confer an indefinite right to remain on deputation or override the necessity of formal concurrence for absorption. Consequently, the petitioners, having no legal entitlement to remain in the borrowing department, were lawfully repatriated to their parent departments.

  Questions settled

  • Does a deputationist have a vested right to complete the entire period of their deputation?
  • Can a deputationist claim permanent absorption into a borrowing department as a matter of right?
  • Does the wedlock policy entitle a civil servant to remain on deputation indefinitely at the station where their spouse is employed?
  • Is the consent of the parent department required for the permanent absorption of a deputationist into a borrowing department?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saadia Andaleeb vs Mst. Farzana Zia and 5 others2019 PLD ISB 280, 2019 PLJ Islamabad 22 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-06-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Riffat Shamim vs Mehmood Hussain and 3 others2019 YLR 634 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Parveen Akhtar vs Mian Salah-Ud-Din and 3 others2019 MLD 1630 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ashi Munir vs National Accountability Bureau, Rawalpindi, etc.2019 PLJ Islamabad 121 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ashi Munir vs National Accountability Bureau, Rawalpindi and others2019 P Cr. L J 997 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-10
  National Accountability Bureautransfer of propertysection 23bona fide purchaserpenal statuteaccused personconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges a letter issued by the National Accountability Bureau refusing to permit the transfer of the petitioner's plot, which had been subjected to caution under section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question is whether section 23 of the Ordinance applies to properties owned by persons who are neither accused persons nor relatives, associates, or agents of accused persons in ongoing accountability proceedings. The court held that the provisions of section 23 are strictly restricted to properties owned by or in possession of an accused person, their relatives, associates, or those acting on their behalf. Since the petitioner was a bona fide purchaser and neither she nor the previous owners were arrayed as accused in the pending reference, section 23 was not attracted. The court laid down the principle that the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 being a penal statute must be construed strictly, and its restraint provisions regarding property transfer do not extend to persons who do not fall within the definition of an accused or their associates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 applies to property owned by a person who is not an accused in pending accountability proceedings?
  • Does the National Accountability Bureau have the jurisdiction to restrain a bona fide purchaser from transferring property when no inquiry or investigation is pending against them?
  • How should penal statutes such as the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 be interpreted regarding restrictions on property rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms Naheed Khan vs Election Commission of Pakistan and others2019 CLC 938 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-06Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Hanya Usman vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Interior2019 IHC 116 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-06-18Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Miskeen vs The State and others2020 KLR Criminal Cases 42, 2019 P Cr. L J 1423 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-13
  qatl-i-amddeath sentencemitigating circumstancesinfluence of eldersocular evidencemurder referencejail appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment of the Islamabad High Court addresses Murder Reference No. 11 of 2011 and Jail Appeal No. 29 of 2011 arising from a trial court judgment convicting the appellant, Muhammad Miskeen, under sections 302(b), 324, and 337-F(iii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for double murder and causing injuries. The core legal question revolved around whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and whether mitigating circumstances, specifically the alleged influence of the appellant's father upon an accused over fifty years of age, warranted a reduction of the death sentence. The court held that the prosecution successfully established guilt through unimpeachable ocular and medical evidence, and that the principle of influence by elders is strictly confined to offenders of impressionable ages and cannot be extended to mature adults committing brutal acts. The court confirmed the death sentences by answering the murder reference in the affirmative and dismissing the jail appeal, laying down the principle that mitigation of sentence cannot be claimed on unproved facts or generalized pleas of elder influence for mature offenders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of influence of elders can be invoked as a mitigating circumstance to reduce the death sentence of a mature and elderly offender?
  • Can a court decide a question of law or grant mitigation of sentence on the basis of facts that have not been proved during the trial?
  • Whether ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence and recovery of crime weapons is sufficient to prove a charge of qatl-i-amd beyond a reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Nasser Hayat Maggo vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and others2019 IHC 3 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-17Read full judgment →
• Mian Nasser Hayat Maggo through Attorney vs Federation of Pakistan2019 PLJ Islamabad 97, 2019 CLD 267 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-25Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif vs The State, etc2019 IHC 164 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-26Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif and another vs The State through Chairman NAB and 4 others2020 PCr. L J 213, 2020 PLJ Islamabad 51, 2019 IHC 166 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-29
  suspension of sentencepost-arrest bailmedical groundsaccountabilitycorruption reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Islamabad High Court through a criminal petition seeking suspension of sentence and grant of post-arrest bail. The core legal question concerns the suspension of sentence and release on bail of Petitioner No.2, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, who was convicted and sentenced by an Accountability Court under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, specifically for offences under Section 9(a)(v) read with Section 14(c). The court allowed the petition, suspending the sentence and granting bail for a period of eight weeks on medical grounds, subject to furnishing surety bonds. The court further held that the petitioner may approach the Provincial Government under Section 401(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for extension or relief prior to the expiry of the bail period, failing which the bail shall automatically stand revoked upon the lapse of the stipulated time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sentence handed down by an Accountability Court can be suspended and the convict released on bail on medical grounds?
  • Can a convicted person approach the Provincial Government under Section 401(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 during the period of suspended sentence and bail?
  • What is the legal consequence if a petitioner fails to approach the Provincial Government for relief within the granted period of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs The State through Chairman, National2019 PLD Islamabad 343, 2019 PLJ Islamabad 158, 2019 PLJ Karachi 163, 2019 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-20Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs The State and another2019 P Cr. L J 389 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-08-07
  transfer of caseaccountability referencejudicial recusalfair trialbiaspre-judged mindNational Accountability Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves transfer applications filed by the applicant seeking the transfer of two accountability references from Accountability Court No.1, Islamabad, to another court, following his conviction in a related reference by the same presiding officer. The core legal question was whether findings rendered in one reference and the judge's subsequent self-expressed discomfort warranted transferring the remaining pending references to ensure a fair trial and impartial adjudication. The Islamabad High Court allowed the applications and transferred the references to Accountability Court No.II, Islamabad. The court held that where the presiding judge himself had requested a transfer reflecting discomfort in continuing the trials, and in light of overlapping facts and previous findings, it would not be just and appropriate to thrust the cases upon an unwilling judge, thereby safeguarding the principles of fair trial and an independent application of judicial mind.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conviction of an accused in one accountability reference disqualify the trial judge from hearing remaining references involving overlapping facts?
  • Can a case be transferred when the presiding judge himself requests a transfer due to expressed discomfort in continuing the trial?
  • Whether the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution is violated when a judge who has rendered findings on common facts continues to hear subsequent references?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Khaliq-ur-Rehman vs Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA)2019 IHC 42 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-11Read full judgment →
• Mian Khaliq Ur Rehman vs PTA and others2021 KLR Civil Cases 82, 2019 CLC 555 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Alishba Bibi vs The State etc2019 IHC 76, 2020 PLD Islamabad 28 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-06-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Saadullah Khan and Brothers (SKB) vs Appellate Tribunal of Inland Revenue and others2019 PTD 776 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Labbaik (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorised Officer vs Pakistan2019 [M] C.L.R. 240, 2018 YLR 2350 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs K&N International vs Messrs Motorway Operations and Rehabilitation Engineering (Private) Limited2019 CLC 1613 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-04-16
  arbitration agreementlocus standires judicatacontractual rightcivil revisionarbitration clauseenforceability of arbitration
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged the dismissal of an application filed under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which sought to refer a dispute to arbitration. The petitioner, a sole proprietorship, had previously filed an identical application that was dismissed for lack of authorization, which the trial court subsequently cited as res judicata. The appellate court upheld the dismissal, though on the basis that the petitioner was not a party to the Memorandum of Understanding (M.O.U.) containing the arbitration clause. The High Court held that while the trial court erred in applying res judicata because the prior dismissal was not on the merits, the appellate court's decision was correct on the merits. The Court affirmed that the right to arbitrate is a contractual right, and only parties to an arbitration agreement can enforce it under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Since the M.O.U. was executed between the respondent and a private limited company, rather than the petitioner, the petitioner lacked the locus standi to invoke the arbitration clause.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who is not a party to an arbitration agreement enforce it by filing an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to an application dismissed on procedural grounds without an adjudication on the merits?
  • Does an appellate court have the authority to dismiss an appeal on grounds different from those relied upon by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Exceed Private Limited vs Pakistan Housing Authority2019 YLR 427 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-07
  stay of legal proceedingsarbitration agreementready and willingstep in the proceedingsdispute resolution mechanismcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an order passed by the Civil Judge, Islamabad, whereby an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 filed by the respondent was accepted and proceedings in the appellant's civil suit for declaration, recovery, and injunction were stayed pursuant to an arbitration agreement. The core legal questions involved whether a defendant's mere silence or failure to respond to pre-suit demands constitutes a lack of readiness and willingness to arbitrate, whether seeking an adjournment for a written statement amounts to taking a step in the proceedings, and whether a suit can be stayed when the contractual pre-condition of referring disputes to the engineer had not been met by the plaintiff. The Islamabad High Court held that mere inaction or failure to reply to demands for money does not establish unwillingness to arbitrate, that routine adjournment for a written statement without a specific request by the defendant does not constitute a step in the proceedings, and that a plaintiff who bypasses the contractual dispute resolution mechanism cannot defeat the defendant's right to seek a stay under Section 34. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a defendant's failure to respond to pre-suit letters and demands for money constitute a lack of readiness and willingness to arbitrate under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Whether an adjournment granted in routine by the court for filing a written statement amounts to taking a step in the proceedings so as to disentitle a party from seeking a stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Can a plaintiff who initiates a civil suit in disregard of a contractual dispute resolution mechanism successfully object to the staying of the suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Attock Gen Ltd vs Additional Commissioner (Audit), Large2019 MLD 870 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Al-Muiz-1 CNG, Fateh Jang vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 CLC 851 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-07-07Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Munir vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Housing &2019 MLD 1026 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-05Read full judgment →
• Masood Ahmad Bhatti vs Raja Imran Yaqoob and others2019 PLD Islamabad 577 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-28Read full judgment →
• Mashkoor Ahmed Khokhar vs The Family Judge (East), Islamabad and others2019 CLC 1635, 2020 [M] C L R 72 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-18Read full judgment →
• Mari Petroleum Company Limited through General Manager Finance, Islamabad vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue, Islamabad and 3 others2019 PTD 1774 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-27Read full judgment →
• Managing Director, Public Procurement Regulatory Authority2019 PLC (C.S.) 1348 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-09
  intra-court appealvested rightspublic procurementprocedural lapseappointment processservice regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  These intra-court appeals were filed by the Managing Director of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (P.P.R.A.) to challenge a judgment that allowed writ petitions filed by successfully appointed candidates and declared that their concluded appointment process could not be recalled. The core legal question centered on whether candidates who emerged successful in a competitive recruitment process could be deprived of their appointments due to procedural lapses, specifically the non-confirmation of meeting minutes and failure of the Managing Director to sign them under Section 7(6) of the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002. The Islamabad High Court held that once the Board of Directors approved the recommendations of the Human Resource Committee in its meeting, strong vested rights were created for the candidates, and the authority could not penalize candidates for its own procedural omissions or lapses. The court laid down the principle that an employer or statutory authority cannot take advantage of its own procedural irregularities or internal faults to deny vested rights to successfully selected employees.

  Questions settled

  • Whether candidates who successfully pass a competitive recruitment process acquire a vested right to be appointed?
  • Can a statutory authority refuse to issue appointment letters based on its own procedural lapses and failure to sign meeting minutes?
  • Whether an autonomous body can take advantage of its internal omissions to deprive employees of their lawful appointments?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Tariq Ayub and another vs State and 6 others2019 PLJ Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-12Read full judgment →
• Malik Sajjad vs Shafqat Zama N and 2 others2019 CLC 284 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-09Read full judgment →
• Major Raja Zahid Mahmood vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government2019 IHC 162 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-01Read full judgment →
• Major Muhammad Nouman vs Usman Habib and another2020 [M] C L R 1455, 2020 [M] C L R 1501, 2019 PLD Islamabad 255 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-24Read full judgment →
• M.D. Ppra, Islamabad and another vs Muhammad Zubair and others2019 IHC 86 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-09Read full judgment →
• Lt. Col. (Retd.) Irfan Pirzada vs The State and others2019 KLR Criminal Cases 86, 2019 P Cr. L J 194 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-27
  criminal appealacquittallimitation periodcondonation of delayspecial statutewrong forumSection 417 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal appeals filed by the appellant challenging orders of acquittal passed by the trial court in a private complaint and a Qalandra. The core legal question was whether the appeals, filed beyond the statutory period, could be entertained and whether the delay could be condoned due to the appellant having initially approached the wrong forum. The Court held that the appeals were time-barred and dismissed them. The Court determined that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which allows for the condonation of delay, is inapplicable to appeals against acquittal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as the latter is a special statute governing the limitation period. Furthermore, the Court established that the negligence of counsel in pursuing a remedy before a wrong forum does not constitute a valid ground for condonation of delay. It emphasized that statutes of limitation are strict, inflexible, and designed to quieten disputes, and the Court possesses no inherent equity jurisdiction to override these statutory requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 apply to appeals against acquittal filed under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Can the delay in filing an appeal be condoned on the ground that the appellant mistakenly approached the wrong forum due to the negligence of counsel?
  • Is the Court empowered to exercise inherent equity jurisdiction to bypass statutory limitation periods in criminal appeals?
  Read full judgment →
• Kissan Support Services Pvt. Ltd vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Ltu, Islamabad and another2019 PTD 1694, 2019 IHC 70 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-06-03Read full judgment →
• Khan Afsar vs Muhammad Akhtar2019 CLC 2033 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-05Read full judgment →
• Khamas Saeed vs Director General of Trade Organization etc2019 IHC 174 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-09Read full judgment →
• Khalida Bibi vs Mst. Shabnam un Nisa and others2019 IHC 94 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-06-17Read full judgment →
• Kamil Rehman and others vs Haji Rehman Bangash and another2019 IHC 180 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-21Read full judgment →
• Kaloo Khan and others vs OGDCL and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 519 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-26
  fake degreesbogus educational testimonialsdismissal from servicemisconductservice benefitsdepartmental inquiryalternative remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Islamabad High Court addressed multiple writ petitions filed by employees of the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) impugning office memoranda whereby they were dismissed from service after being found guilty of misconduct for submitting bogus educational testimonials during their employment. The core legal questions involved whether the submission of fake educational certificates constituted misconduct warranting dismissal, whether the penalty of dismissal was excessively harsh, and whether the petitions were maintainable in the face of an alternate remedy of appeal. The Court held that submitting bogus educational testimonials constitutes a grave fraud not only against the employer organization but also against deserving candidates, amounting to a 'cardinal sin', and that the penalty of dismissal is fully justified even if the certificate was not strictly required for initial appointment. Furthermore, the petitions were barred due to failure to exhaust departmental remedies. The key principles laid down are that use of forged academic documents to secure employment or service benefits disentitles an employee from equitable relief, and public sector corporations are expected to take strict disciplinary and criminal action against such fraud.

  Questions settled

  • Does the submission of a bogus educational certificate by an employee during service constitute misconduct warranting dismissal?
  • Can an employee who submitted a fake educational certificate invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Is an employee who failed to avail the departmental remedy of an appeal under the service rules entitled to maintain a writ petition?
  • Does the submission of fake educational testimonials amount to fraud against the organization and competing candidates?
  Read full judgment →
• Kabir Khan vs The State2019 P Cr. LJ 1464 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-04-08
  circumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtforensic delaymurder convictionrecovery of weaponhearsay evidencejail appealcriminal acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the murder of his wife and causing the death of a fetus under Sections 302 and 338C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the reliability of the weapon recovery, and the impact of unexplained delays in forensic testing and FIR registration. The Islamabad High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence. Specifically, the court found that the alleged motive remained unproven, the recovery of the weapon from an accessible public place was unreliable, and the significant, unexplained delays in transmitting forensic evidence to the laboratory rendered the forensic report inconsequential. Furthermore, the court rejected hearsay evidence presented by witnesses. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, ruling that the prosecution's case was riddled with discrepancies and lacunae, thereby entitling the appellant to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove an alleged motive in a murder case necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained delay in sending crime empties and the weapon of offence to the Forensic Science Laboratory?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on circumstantial evidence when the recovery of the weapon of offence is found to be unreliable?
  • Is testimony based on information received from an accused person admissible as evidence against that accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Jahangir Hussain vs Neghat Rehmat and others2020 CLC 249, 2019 IHC 158 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-08Read full judgment →
• Islamabad Club, Islamabad through its Secretary vs Appellate Tribunal2019 PCRLJ 491, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 1014 · Islamabad High Court
  Special Excise DutyFederal Excise DutyManufacturing vs ServiceTaxation of ClubsFiscal Statute InterpretationBinding Nature of FBR CircularsTax Reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference concerns whether the Islamabad Club is liable to pay Special Excise Duty (SED) on the supply of food and beverages to its members. The core legal question is whether the preparation and serving of food by a club constitutes 'manufacturing' or 'production' of goods under the Federal Excise Act, 2005, thereby attracting SED. The Court held that the activities of the club do not amount to manufacturing or production, as the food served is not a distinct commercial commodity produced for the open market, but rather an incidental service provided to members. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Federal Board of Revenue's circular, issued pursuant to a Ministry of Law opinion, was binding on subordinate officers under Section 42 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005. The key principle laid down is that fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly in favor of the taxpayer, and the preparation of food in a service-oriented context, such as a club or hotel, is essentially a service rather than a manufacturing process, thus exempting it from excise duties applicable to goods.

  Questions settled

  • Does the preparation and supply of food and beverages by a club constitute 'manufacturing' or 'production' of goods for the purposes of Special Excise Duty?
  • Are circulars and instructions issued by the Federal Board of Revenue binding on subordinate officers under the Federal Excise Act 2005?
  • Does the supply of food and beverages by a club to its members constitute a sale of goods or the provision of a service?
  • Is a club's supply of food and beverages to its members liable to Special Excise Duty under the Federal Excise Act 2005?
  Read full judgment →
• Ishtiaq Ur Rehman vs Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court-I Islamabad2019 PLJ Islamabad 126, 2019 P Cr. L J 800 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-03
  cognizanceanti-terrorism courttransfer of casespre-arrest bailinvestigation stage
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court dismissing the petitioner's application under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question revolves around whether an Anti-Terrorism Court can transfer a case to a regular court under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, prior to the submission of a police report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and merely upon the pendency of a pre-arrest bail application. The Islamabad High Court held that taking cognizance of an offence by a court is distinct from police investigation or proceedings such as pre-arrest bail, and an application under section 23 for transfer of a case is premature before the court has formally taken cognizance upon completion of the investigation report. The court affirmed the impugned order, ruling that entertaining such an application during the investigation stage would amount to unwarranted interference in the police investigation. The key principle laid down is that the power of an Anti-Terrorism Court to transfer a case under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, arises only after cognizance of the offence has been taken, which cannot be equated with the mere pendency of a bail application or pre-trial steps prior to the submission of the challan.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a pre-arrest bail application before an Anti-Terrorism Court amount to taking cognizance of the offence for the purpose of transferring the case under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Can an application under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for the transfer of a case to a regular court be maintained before a report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 has been submitted?
  • Does taking cognizance by a court under criminal law differ from the registration of an FIR and police investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Iroko Mercy Chimizie alias Jeff Jack More and others vs The State and another2019 P Cr. L J 489 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-22
  electronic fraudcheatingpre-sentence detentionSection 382-B Cr.P.C.unauthorized accesscriminal appealimpersonationElectronic Transactions Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against a conviction by the Prevention of Electronic Crime Court, Islamabad, for offences under the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002 and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The appellants were convicted of defrauding the complainant of 4.3 million rupees through a sophisticated email scam involving impersonation and false promises of a legacy transfer. The core legal question was whether the appellants' actions constituted a violation of privacy of information under Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, and whether the trial court correctly denied the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court held that the appellants' actions did not satisfy the elements of Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, as they did not gain unauthorized access to an information system. Consequently, the conviction under that section was set aside. However, the conviction under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, was upheld, with the sentence modified. The Court affirmed that the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is mandatory for pre-sentence detention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of sending a fraudulent email constitute a violation of privacy of information under Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002?
  • Is the grant of the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, regarding pre-sentence detention, mandatory for the court?
  • Can a trial court deny the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, without recording cogent and convincing reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Infospan (Private) Limited vs M/s Shaheen Foundation and another2019 CLC 750 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-13Read full judgment →
• Imran Khan vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Chairman, Election Commission Secretariat, Islamabad and another2019 PLJ Islamabad 142 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Iftikhar Hussain Shah Kazmi vs Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 1149 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-20
  dismissal from servicedepartmental inquirywillful absenceex-Pakistan leavewrit of certiorarimaster and servantprinciples of natural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, impugning the office memoranda whereby the petitioner, a bank manager, was dismissed from service following disciplinary proceedings and his departmental appeal was dismissed. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was denied a fair hearing by the conduct of inquiry proceedings in his absence during alleged ex-Pakistan leave, and whether the High Court could interfere with concurrent factual findings in its constitutional writ jurisdiction. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to establish that ex-Pakistan leave was lawfully granted in accordance with mandatory bank regulations, that he willfully absented himself from duly notified inquiry proceedings despite having notice, and that disputed questions of fact cannot be resolved in writ jurisdiction. The court laid down the principle that willful non-participation in domestic inquiry proceedings precludes an employee from claiming a violation of natural justice, and that a writ of certiorari is discretionary and does not permit the High Court to act as an appellate court re-evaluating factual determinations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who willfully stays away from inquiry proceedings can subsequently claim that he was condemned unheard in violation of the principles of natural justice?
  • Can the High Court resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the grant of ex-Pakistan leave while exercising its constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • What are the supervisory limits of the High Court when issuing a writ of certiorari against departmental tribunals in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Ahmad Abbasi vs National Industrial Relations Commission2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 33 · Islamabad High Court
  trade union electionstenure of office bearersindustrial relationsusurpermembership terminationcollective bargaining agentoutsider quota
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) regarding the eligibility of certain candidates to contest trade union elections. The core legal question was whether office bearers of a trade union, whose two-year statutory term had expired, retained the authority to terminate the membership of other union members, and whether such termination orders were legally valid. The High Court dismissed the petition, affirming the NIRC's finding that the petitioner’s term as General Secretary had expired on 10.11.2014, two years after the last internal elections. Consequently, the petitioner’s subsequent actions, specifically the termination of respondents' membership in 2015, were declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The court established that trade union office bearers cannot extend their tenure beyond the constitutional limit of two years, and any actions taken by them after the expiry of this term are deemed acts of usurpation. Furthermore, the statutory tenure is not tolled by court injunctions or the date of Collective Bargaining Agent certification.

  Questions settled

  • Does the two-year tenure of trade union office bearers get extended by court injunctions or the date of Collective Bargaining Agent certification?
  • Can trade union office bearers whose constitutional term has expired validly terminate the membership of other union members?
  • What is the legal status of actions taken by trade union office bearers after the expiry of their two-year term?
  Read full judgment →
• Hub Power Co. Limited vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Islamabad2019 PTD 1187 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-06-14
  income tax referencetax exemptionterm depositsbank depositsWorkers Welfare Fundstatutory interpretationdisjunctive or conjunctiveFinance Act 2006Finance Act 2008money bill
  Summary & questions settled

  The Islamabad High Court decided a set of consolidated Income Tax References filed by the applicant company regarding tax exemptions on profit on debt and liability under the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971. The core legal issues involved: (i) whether term deposits fall within the tax exemption under Clause 74, Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001; and (ii) whether amendments made to the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 via the Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008 through Money Bills were constitutionally valid. The Court held that statutory tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the claimant. In Clause 74, the word "or" between "bank deposits" and "accounts with financial institutions" must be read conjunctively as "and" to prevent redundancy and absurd results. Consequently, term deposits do not qualify for tax exemption unless directly connected with financial transactions relating to project operations. On the second question, agreeing with the Lahore and Peshawar High Courts, the Court held that the amendments made via the Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008 were unconstitutional, so Workers' Welfare Fund liability remains assessable under the pre-amendment statutory rates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether term deposits qualify for tax exemption under Clause 74, Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Whether the word 'or' between 'bank deposits' and 'accounts with financial institutions' in Clause 74, Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 is to be read conjunctively as 'and'?
  • Whether the amendments made to the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance 1971 through the Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008 via Money Bills are constitutionally valid?
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• Homoeopathic Dr. Faisal Saleem vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 [M] C.L.R. 1215, 2019 YLR 361 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-16Read full judgment →
• Homeopathic Doctor Mehmood-Ul-Haq Abbasi vs H/Dr. Muhammad Irfan2019 PLC (C.S.) 874 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-14
  National Council for Homeopathystatutory interpretationdisqualification of memberremoval from registerpower of reviewadministrative lawUnani, Ayurvedic and Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged a judgment declaring his restoration as a Member of the National Council for Homeopathy illegal. The core legal questions concerned whether the Federal Government possessed the power to review its prior disqualification order under the Unani, Ayurvedic and Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965, and whether disqualification as a Council member under Section 13(2) automatically necessitated the removal of the practitioner's name from the register under Section 28. The Court held that the Federal Government lacked statutory authority to review or recall the initial disqualification notification. However, it clarified that proceedings under Section 13(2) and Section 28 are distinct and separate. Disqualification as a member does not ipso facto trigger the removal of a practitioner's name from the register; such removal requires independent proceedings and adherence to due process. The Court further ruled that the original disqualification notification became infructuous upon the expiration of the appellant's term. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, establishing that regulatory disqualification and professional registration removal are separate legal processes requiring distinct procedural compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have the inherent power to review or recall a notification issued under Section 13(2) of the Unani, Ayurvedic and Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965?
  • Are the proceedings for disqualification of a member under Section 13(2) and the removal of a practitioner's name from the register under Section 28 of the Unani, Ayurvedic and Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965 distinct and separate?
  • Does disqualification as a member of the Council under Section 13(2) of the Unani, Ayurvedic and Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965 automatically render the removal of a practitioner's name from the register a ministerial act under Section 28?
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• Hashmat Medical & Dental Council vs Pakistan Medical & Dental2019 PLJ Islamabad 150 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-21Read full judgment →
• Haroon Rashid & another vs Fop through Secretary, Ministry of Interior &2019 PLD Islamabad 453, 2019 IHC 50 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-03Read full judgment →
• Haji Raja Mubarak Hussain vs Masood Alam2019 MLD 61, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 215, 2019 KLR Civil Cases 52 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-26Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited vs Abdul Sattar Siddiqui and others2019 IHC 20 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-14Read full judgment →
• Gohar Ullah vs The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and others2019 PLJ Islamabad 103, 2019 YLR 781, 2019 IHC 5 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-15Read full judgment →