Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Ghulam Sarwar Sindhu vs The Chairman, National Accountability Bureau2019 IHC 176 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-04-11Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi Sheikh and another vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan and another2019 IHC 24 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-14
  deputationrepatriationOffice Management Groupvested rightcivil servantstransfer and posting
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves a batch of writ petitions filed by civil servants and employees challenging a notification issued by the Establishment Division whereby they were repatriated to their parent departments from their deputation posts as Section Officers in the Federal Secretariat. The core legal questions pertained to whether deputationists have a vested right to complete their deputation tenure, remain on deputation indefinitely, or continue serving until they are considered for absorption or induction into the Office Management Group (OMG) against the reserved quota. Dismissing the petitions, the Islamabad High Court held that a deputationist has no vested right, legal basis, or enforceable claim to serve for a stipulated period or remain in the borrowing department indefinitely, and competent authorities possess the discretionary power to repatriate them at any time. The court laid down that prior to absorption or induction into the OMG, statutory criteria, including selection through the Federal Public Service Commission and consent from the parent department, must be strictly fulfilled, and completion of a three-year deputation does not bar immediate repatriation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a deputationist has a vested right to complete his full term of deputation in the borrowing department?
  • Can a civil servant on deputation challenge an order of repatriation before the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does serving for a minimum period of three years on deputation automatically entitle an officer to be considered for absorption or induction into the Office Management Group?
  • Whether the competent authority has the power to repatriate a deputationist to his parent department without assigning any reason?
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• Gemalto Middle East FZ-LLC vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division and others2019 IHC 154 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-09-27Read full judgment →
• Flight Lieutenant Riffat Ullah Khan vs Federal Public Service Commission of Pakistan and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 955 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-19
  civil service inductionarmed forces quotaprovincial quotamerit determinationFPSCpolice service of pakistanservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This statutory appeal was filed under Section 7(3)(d) of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977, challenging the Federal Public Service Commission's (FPSC) refusal to allocate a civil service post to the appellant, a Pakistan Air Force officer, in the CSS-2015 batch. The core legal question was whether the FPSC could lawfully apply an unapproved inter-service sub-allocation formula (allocating specific ratios to the Army, Navy, and Air Force) to induct Armed Forces officers into civil services, or whether such induction must be governed strictly by merit and regional/provincial quotas under the Office Memorandum dated 09.09.1991. Relying on a Supreme Court precedent, the Islamabad High Court held that the sub-allocation formula was illegal as it was never formally approved or incorporated into the relevant rules. The Court ruled that the Armed Forces must be treated as a single institution for civil service induction. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, declaring the appellant's entitlement to induction into the Police Service of Pakistan based on his merit and provincial quota.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unapproved sub-allocation formula can be used to distribute civil service quotas among different branches of the Armed Forces?
  • Are Armed Forces officers seeking civil service induction to be treated as belonging to a single institution or separate service branches for quota purposes?
  • Can administrative decisions regarding civil service allocation bypass the statutory criteria of merit and regional quota in the absence of a formally approved amendment?
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• Fizza Mai vs Shahbaz Hassan Khan and others2019 MLD 1772, 2019 IHC 74 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-06-13Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Prime Minister and another vs Aftab Ahmad2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 115 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-06Read full judgment →
• Federal Government Employees' Housing Foundation and others vs Malik Ghulam Mustafa and others2019 [M] C.L.R. 338, 2019 PLD Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-25
  land acquisitionpublic purposespecial lawgeneral lawCDA OrdinanceLand Acquisition Actconstitutional rightsregulatory capturehousing schemeIslamabad Capital Territory
  Summary & questions settled

  The Islamabad High Court, through a common judgment on several intra-court appeals, affirmed the decision of a Single Judge in Chambers, declaring the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Land Acquisition Collector for the Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation (FGEHF) in Sectors F-14 and F-15 of Islamabad as illegal, void, and without jurisdiction. The core legal question revolved around the applicability of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (general law) versus the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960 (special law) for land acquisition in the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), and whether providing housing exclusively for Federal Government employees constituted a 'public purpose'. The Court held that the CDA Ordinance, 1960, being a special law, exclusively governs land acquisition in specified areas of the ICT, overriding the general Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was further ruled that a housing scheme for a limited class of Federal Government employees, funded by prospective allottees, does not qualify as a 'public purpose' under the CDA Ordinance or constitutional provisions, particularly Article 24 and 173 of the Constitution. The Court found evidence of regulatory capture, conflict of interest among public officials, and violations of constitutional rights, directing the return of payments to affectees and allottees, and prohibiting FGEHF from future acquisition proceedings in ICT.

  Questions settled

  • Which law governs land acquisition in the specified areas of the Islamabad Capital Territory, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or the CDA Ordinance, 1960?
  • Does a housing scheme exclusively for Federal Government employees constitute a 'public purpose' for compulsory land acquisition under the CDA Ordinance, 1960 and the Constitution?
  • Can the Capital Development Authority (CDA) delegate its statutory functions or approve schemes that are inconsistent with its own regulations and the CDA Ordinance, 1960?
  • Is the transfer of acquired land directly to a company, rather than vesting it in the Federal Government, a violation of Article 173 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can a private company, even if controlled by the Federal Government, initiate land acquisition proceedings in the Islamabad Capital Territory for the benefit of a specific class of individuals?
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• Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation vs Javaid Iqbal and others2019 IHC 152 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-03Read full judgment →
• Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation through Director2019 [M] C.L.R. 1207, 2019 MLD 34 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-10-10Read full judgment →
• Excel Techno Solutions Fze, UAE and another vs Mls. Oil & Gas Development2019 KLR Civil Cases 1, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 1 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dr. Syed Iqbal Raza vs Justice of Peace, Islamabad etc2019 IHC 126 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-21Read full judgment →
• Dr. Syed Iqbal Raza vs Justice of Peace, etc2019 CLD 881, 2019 IHC 78 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-30Read full judgment →
• Dr. Syed Iqbal Raza and others vs Justice of Peace, Islamabad and others2019 CLD 642, 2019 P Cr. L J 1059 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-21
  FIA jurisdictioncopyright infringementprivate disputewrit petitionintellectual property tribunalSection 22-A Cr.P.C.statutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two consolidated writ petitions challenging the jurisdiction of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to investigate a private copyright dispute and the dismissal of an application under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. by the Justice of Peace. The core legal question was whether the FIA possesses the authority to investigate copyright infringement disputes between private parties, and whether the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 grants exclusive jurisdiction to its tribunals. The Court held that the FIA lacks jurisdiction in this matter. It ruled that while the FIA Act, 1974 includes copyright offences in its schedule, the agency's mandate is limited to matters concerning the Federal Government. It cannot intervene in private civil disputes or copyright infringements between private parties. Furthermore, the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 confers exclusive jurisdiction to its tribunals for such offences. The Court affirmed the principle that for the FIA to exercise jurisdiction, there must be a clear nexus between the offence and the Federal Government; otherwise, the FIA's investigation is without lawful authority and mala fide.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Investigation Agency have the jurisdiction to investigate copyright infringement disputes between private parties?
  • Is there a requirement for a nexus between an offence and the Federal Government for the Federal Investigation Agency to exercise its investigative powers?
  • Does the Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 grant exclusive jurisdiction to its tribunals over offences related to the Copy Right Ordinance, 1962?
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• Dr. Saif-Ud-Din and another vs The State, etc2019 KLR Criminal Cases 142, 2019 YLR 1321, 2019 IHC 44 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-08
  criminal appealmurdertest identification paradebenefit of doubtmedical evidencesite planforensic mismatchcriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Sections 302, 324, 148, 149, and 337-L of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in sentences of life imprisonment. The prosecution's case originated from an incident involving an altercation over playing loud music in a car, leading to firing and the subsequent death of one person and injury to another. The core legal questions involved the reliability of test identification parades without prior physical descriptions in the FIR, the evidentiary value of site plans, the credibility of recoveries and forensic mismatch, and the benefit of doubt in criminal convictions. The Islamabad High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt due to delayed and flawed identification proceedings, lack of specific role attribution, forensic mismatch of recovered weapons, and material discrepancies in ocular and medical evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentences were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of a test identification parade where the accused's physical features were not mentioned in the FIR or initial statements?
  • Can a site plan serve as a substantive piece of evidence to prove the guilt of an accused in a criminal trial?
  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution's case when a firearm recovered from an accused does not match the crime empties according to the forensic report?
  • Does the absence of specific role attribution in ocular accounts vitiate the conviction of accused persons in a murder case?
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• Dr. Numan Muhammad Khan vs Ca&DD through Secretary and others2019 MLD 97 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-05-27
  constitutional petitioneducational admissionmerit listfundamental rightsright to educationequal treatmentselection committee
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by Dr. Numan Muhammad Khan seeking a direction against the respondents to grant him admission in the MDS (Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery) Course on the ground of merit, alleging that he was wrongfully ignored and placed on the waiting list while candidates with inferior academic records and lower test scores were selected through arbitrary action. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was unlawfully deprived of admission due to the non-consideration of his credentials and distinction certificates, violating his fundamental rights to equality and education. The Islamabad High Court held that the petitioner possessed superior marks and qualifications which were improperly omitted from evaluation due to an untenable excuse by the respondents. The Court decided that the petitioner was entitled to admission and directed the respondents to accommodate him in the MDS course without disturbing the candidates already selected.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an educational institution can deny admission to a candidate by failing to consider their distinction certificates and academic credentials?
  • Does the arbitrary omission of a qualified candidate's marks violate the fundamental right to equality under the Constitution?
  • Can the High Court direct admission for an aggrieved candidate in a constitutional petition without disturbing already selected candidates?
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• Dr. Muhammad Babar Chohan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Federal Education and Techinical Training and 2 others2019 PLC (C.S.) 1268 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-30
  writ petitionconstitutional jurisdictionforeign appointmentmerit listweightage formulapromotion zone
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this writ petition, the petitioner challenged the notification whereby respondent No.3 was appointed as Deputy Permanent Delegate at the Permanent Delegation of Pakistan to UNESCO, Paris. The core legal questions involved whether the appointment procedure followed policy guidelines, how marks from the written test and interview were to be weighted, and whether respondent No.3 was ineligible due to being in the promotion zone. The Islamabad High Court held that the selection process was conducted transparently in accordance with the prescribed policy guidelines, the cumulative merit calculation correctly placed respondent No.3 first and the petitioner fourth, and factual controversies regarding interview performance could not be resolved in constitutional jurisdiction. Furthermore, respondent No.3 was not in the promotion zone at the relevant time. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that clearance of a written test creates no vested right to appointment when an interview is also part of the criteria, and evaluation weightages applied correctly do not warrant interference under writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the clearance of a written test by itself create any vested right in a candidate's favour for appointment when the test is not the sole criterion?
  • Can a factual controversy regarding the comparative performance of candidates in an interview be resolved within the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Whether an appointment to a post in a foreign mission under policy guidelines is vitiated if the calculation of cumulative marks from a written test and interview is properly made?
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• Dr. Ali Bat Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through secretary, Establishment Division and others2019 PLJ Islamabad 186 · Islamabad High Court
  contractual appointmentproject postre-employment after superannuationRules of Businessevaluation committeeextension of contractpublic sector employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenges the contractual appointment and successive extensions of Respondent No. 2 as Advisor/Consultant on Development Budget (Operation) in a public sector project after his retirement from government service. The core legal questions involve whether a retired civil servant's contractual appointment through a competitive process constitutes unlawful re-employment, whether an initial two-year contract deviating from a one-year advertisement is valid, and whether subsequent contract extensions granted by the Ministry Secretary rather than the mandated Evaluation Committee are lawful under applicable Office Memoranda and the Rules of Business, 1973. The Islamabad High Court held that while the initial appointment through open competition was valid and not barred by superannuation laws, the deviation from the advertised one-year tenure was improper. Furthermore, the court held that extensions granted without the approval of the Evaluation Committee and the Prime Minister violated established policy and the Rules of Business, 1973. The court declared the unauthorized extensions unlawful, directed the post to be re-advertised, but protected past salaries received by Respondent No. 2.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appointment of a retired civil servant on a project contract through an open competitive process amount to re-employment under Section 14(1) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Can a contractual appointment to a project post be made for a duration longer than what was specified in the initial public advertisement?
  • Whether an Office Memorandum altering the prescribed authority for granting contract extensions requires the approval of the Prime Minister pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Rules of Business, 1973?
  • Are successive yearly extensions of a project contract granted by a Ministry Secretary without the recommendation of the Evaluation Committee legally sustainable?
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• Dr. Ali Bat Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through its Secretary, Establishment Division and others2021 [M] C L R 834, 2019 PLC (C.S) 1391, 2019 IHC 54 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-28
  contractual appointmentproject postsRules of Business 1973re-employmentadministrative policysuperannuationwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the appointment and repeated contract extensions of a retired civil servant as an Advisor/Consultant for a government development project. The core legal questions were whether the extensions granted without the recommendation of the Evaluation Committee were lawful, and whether the Establishment Division’s Office Memorandum (O.M.) dated 17.08.2010, which bypassed this committee, was valid. The Court held that the extensions granted without the Evaluation Committee's recommendation, as mandated by the Finance Division’s O.M. dated 11.04.2007, were unlawful. It further held that the Establishment Division’s O.M. dated 17.08.2010, which departed from established policy without the Prime Minister's approval, violated Rule 15(a) of the Rules of Business, 1973, and was thus of no legal effect. The key principle laid down is that policy decisions made with the Prime Minister's approval cannot be amended or nullified by subordinate authorities without similar approval, and that strict adherence to the Rules of Business is mandatory for valid governmental action. The appointment itself was upheld as a competitive contract engagement, not prohibited re-employment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative department amend a policy approved by the Prime Minister without obtaining fresh approval from the Prime Minister?
  • Does the age limit for re-employment of retired civil servants apply to contractual appointments made through a competitive process for project posts?
  • Are extensions of contract appointments granted in violation of the prescribed Evaluation Committee procedure legally valid?
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• Dr Omar Masood & another vs Syed Amir Hussain Naqvi & another2019 CLD 931, 2019 PCTLR 731, 2019 IHC 114 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-07-05
  ouster of jurisdictiontransfer of sharescompany benchcivil court jurisdictionrejection of plaintinjunctioncompromise deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from an order passed by the Civil Judge Islamabad (West) in cross-suits concerning the enforcement and cancellation of a compromise deed involving the transfer of company shares. The core legal questions relate to whether the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred under the Companies Act 2017 regarding matters of share transfers and internal corporate disputes, and whether the trial court correctly granted an injunction. The Islamabad High Court held that Section 5(2) of the Companies Act 2017 explicitly ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of any matter the designated Company Bench is empowered to determine, including the transfer of shares and rectification of registers. The ratio decidendi is that where a statute contains a clear and unequivocal ouster clause, civil courts lack jurisdiction to entertain proceedings regarding matters entrusted to a specialized statutory tribunal. The court laid down principles on the strict interpretation of ouster clauses, holding that provisions denying access to ordinary courts must be construed narrowly unless the legislative intent is unmistakable, and exercised its revisional powers under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to reject the barred plaint under Order VII Rule 11.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred under the Companies Act 2017 to entertain suits regarding the transfer of shares and matters covered under the Act?
  • What are the established principles of interpretation when construing a statutory ouster clause that excludes the jurisdiction of ordinary courts?
  • Can a High Court exercise revisional powers under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside the dismissal of an application under Order VII Rule 11?
  • Whether a dispute concerning the performance of a compromise agreement relating to the transfer of company shares falls within the exclusive domain of the Company Bench?
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• Dilshad Bibi vs The State & 2 others2020 [M] C L R 183, 2019 PLD Islamabad 476, 2019 IHC 104 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-19Read full judgment →
• Dewan Petroleum (Pvt.) Ltd vs Oil and Gas Investment Ltd2019 [M] C.L.R. 1251, 2019 IHC 38 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-22Read full judgment →
• Dewan Petroleum (Pvt) Ltd. vs Oil and Gas Investment Ltd.2019 KLR Civil Cases 392, 2020 PLJ Islamabad 41, 2019 CLC 1486 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-26Read full judgment →
• Defence Housing Authority, Islamabad vs Multi-National Venture2019 CLD 566 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-03Read full judgment →
• Dan Gunnar Bjarne Anderson vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior & 3 others2019 IHC 106 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-04-22Read full judgment →
• Dan Gunna R Bajrne Anderson vs Federation of Pakistan through2020 KLR Criminal Cases 53, 2019 PLD Islamabad 566 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-07-09Read full judgment →
• Daily Khabrain and others vs Iqbal Mustafa and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 541 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-08-19
  Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper EmployeesWage Board Awardrecovery of wageslimitation periodex-employeesnewspaper employeesindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves intra-court appeals and a writ petition arising from orders passed by the Chairman, Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees, and a learned Judge-in-Chambers regarding the recovery of wages and arrears by employees and ex-employees of various newspaper establishments under the 7th Wage Board Award. The core legal questions addressed are whether an ex-employee can invoke the jurisdiction of the Implementation Tribunal to recover wages, and whether the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to proceedings before the Tribunal. The Islamabad High Court held that ex-employees remain eligible to file applications for the recovery of wages for the period they were employed, as the statutory definition of newspaper employee is inclusionary. Furthermore, the Court held that since the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 and its rules prescribe no period of limitation, the Limitation Act, 1908 applies as a procedural law, specifically attracting Article 181 of the First Schedule, providing a three-year limitation period from the date the cause of action accrues, with recurring defaults giving rise to fresh limitation periods. Claims filed beyond three years were thus set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ex-employee of a newspaper establishment invoke the jurisdiction of the Implementation Tribunal to recover wages and arrears for the period of their employment?
  • Is the Limitation Act, 1908 applicable to proceedings before the Implementation Tribunal established under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
  • What article of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to applications filed before the Implementation Tribunal for the recovery of wages?
  • Does the Implementation Tribunal possess the power to review its own orders under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax, Ibd vs Messrs Hi-Tech Plastic2019 PTD 878 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-11-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Islamabad vs Messrs Wise2020 P C T L R 974, 2019 PTD 2313 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-07
  sales tax referencefederal excise dutyapportionment of input taxexcisable servicestelecommunication servicesretrospective operationvested rightsprocedural amendment
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses a set of Sales Tax References (including S.T.R. No. 06 of 2012) concerning the applicability of the concept of apportionment of input tax under the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, and section 7 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, to telecommunication services for tax periods in the year 2005. The core legal question was whether taxpayers providing excisable services were obliged to apportion excisable from non-excisable services when claiming input tax adjustments during a period when specific statutory provisions and rules regarding apportionment and recovery in the sales tax mode were not yet enacted. The Court held that statutory provisions and rules introducing apportionment and recovery mechanisms cannot be applied retrospectively to impair or affect vested rights of assessees regarding refunds already claimed for 2005. The ratio laid down is that even procedural amendments or subordinate legislation, such as notifications and rules governing tax apportionment and recovery modes, operate prospectively if their retrospective application adversely affects accrued substantive rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the concept of apportionment of input tax under the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 is applicable to Federal Excise Duty on services for tax periods prior to their enactment?
  • Do procedural amendments or notifications that affect substantive rights of taxpayers operate retrospectively or prospectively?
  • Were telecommunication service providers legally obligated to apportion excisable services from non-excisable services while claiming input tax refunds for the year 2005?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal) vs Messrs Pakistan2019 PTD 1668 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-30Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Wajid Ayub and another vs Malik Rizwan Ahmed and others2019 IHC 182 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-22Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Jamil vs Chaudhary Muhammad Ramzan and others2019 YLR 825 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-14Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority through Chairman vs Mrs. Ameer Fatima2019 YLR 1188 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-24Read full judgment →
• Brig. (Retd.) Syed Ali Mohsin vs Fazal Inam Sabir alias Saaien Inam and others2019 P Cr. L J 563 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-15
  Criminal RevisionIllegal Dispossession ActAcquittalLeave to AppealNon-cognizable offenceMaintainabilityCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Revision petition challenged an order of acquittal passed by the trial court in a private complaint filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The core legal question was whether a revision petition is maintainable against an order of acquittal passed under Section 247, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, or if the petitioner was required to file an application for leave to appeal under Section 417(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that since the offence under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is non-cognizable, the trial court correctly applied Section 247, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, resulting in the acquittal of the respondents. Consequently, the proper remedy was an application for leave to appeal. Relying on Section 439(5), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Court ruled that where an appeal lies and is not filed, a revision petition is barred. As the petitioner failed to file the appeal or request conversion of the petition, the revision was dismissed as not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a revision petition maintainable against an order of acquittal passed under Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the offence under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 constitute a non-cognizable offence?
  • Can a High Court entertain a revision petition under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when an appeal lies but was not filed?
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• Asif Majeed Paul vs Ministry of Finance and another2020 [M] C L R 268, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 907 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-15
  writ jurisdictionmaintainabilitymaster and servantpension benefitsnon-statutory rulesconstitutional petitionprivatized bankservice matters
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed by retired employees of Habib Bank Limited (HBL) seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Ministry of Finance and HBL to enhance their pensionary benefits in accordance with a 1977 Finance Division circular, aligning them with civil servants. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition is maintainable for employees of a privatized bank to enforce pension claims when the governing service rules are non-statutory. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, including Muhammad Zaman v. Government of Pakistan, the Court determined that the Habib Bank Limited (Staff) Service Rules, 1981, are non-statutory. Consequently, the relationship between HBL and its employees is governed by the principle of master and servant, precluding the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 for service-related grievances. The Court distinguished this matter from cases involving statutory entities and dismissed the petition, granting the petitioners liberty to approach the appropriate forum for redress.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable by employees of a privatized bank whose service rules are non-statutory?
  • Does the principle of master and servant apply to employees of Habib Bank Limited?
  • Are the Habib Bank Limited (Staff) Service Rules, 1981, considered statutory rules for the purpose of invoking Article 199 of the Constitution?
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• Asif Majeed Paul and another vs Ministry of Finance and another2019 KLR Labour & Services Cases 65, 2019 IHC 18 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-14Read full judgment →
• Asif Hameed vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment2019 PLJ Islamabad 184 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Asif Ali Zardari vs The State through Chairman, National Accountability2019 PLD Islamabad 538 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-06-10Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali Zardari vs State through Chairman, National Accountability2019 PLJ Islamabad 168 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ashfaq Ahmed, etc vs C.D.A., etc2019 PLD ISB 299, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 147 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-04Read full judgment →
• Asad Amin vs Noor Hussain2019 YLR 902 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-29Read full judgment →
• Arif-uz-Zaman vs Mst. Sabir Jan and others2019 IHC 8 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-25Read full judgment →
• Arif-Uz-Zaman vs Mst. Sabir Jan and 8 others2019 [M] C.L.R. 1100, 2019 PLD Islamabad 406, 2019 PLJ Islamabad 81 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-28Read full judgment →
• Amna Imran vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 134 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-30
  civil servantspromotionCentral Selection Boardfitness for promotionjurisdiction of High CourtService Tribunal barsupersession and deferment
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment decides a batch of constitutional petitions filed by civil servants in scales BS-19 and BS-20 challenging their deferment or supersession for promotion by the Central Selection Board (CSB). The core legal questions involve the maintainability of writ petitions regarding the fitness of civil servants for promotion in light of the constitutional bar under Article 212 and Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, and the lawfulness of the promotion criteria applied by the CSB. The court held that petitions concerning the fitness of a civil servant for promotion are maintainable and not barred by Article 212 of the Constitution, as fitness is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. Furthermore, the court held that the CSB's exercise of discretion to defer or supersede the petitioners based on subjective personal knowledge without tangible adverse material was arbitrary and contrary to established legal principles. The petitions were consequently allowed, setting aside the impugned recommendations and directing fresh consideration of the petitioners based on the new criteria devised pursuant to Supreme Court directives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 is barred by Article 212 of the Constitution in matters relating to the fitness of a civil servant for promotion?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the question of fitness of a civil servant for promotion under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Can the Central Selection Board defer or supersede a civil servant for promotion based on subjective personal knowledge without supporting tangible adverse material?
  • Are recommendations of the Central Selection Board regarding promotion justiciable when the discretion is exercised in an arbitrary and whimsical manner?
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• Amjid Ali Abbasi vs Muhammad Buksh Jumani and others2019 IHC 34 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-18Read full judgment →
• Amjad Ali, etc vs Shakeel Ahmed Sajjad2019 IHC 90 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-06-11Read full judgment →
• Amjad Ali Abbasi vs Muhammad Buksh Jumani and others2019 CLC 1275 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-07Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain vs Federal Public Service Commission through its Chairman2019 IHC 96 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-07-04
  time-barred appealcondonation of delaylimitation periodspecial lawFederal Public Service CommissionSection Officers' Promotional Examinationcivil servantstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the Federal Public Service Commission's (F.P.S.C.) 2011 decision rejecting his candidature for the Section Officers' Promotional Examination-2010, citing his employment in a subordinate office. The appeal was filed in 2018, six years after the rejection, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The core legal question was whether the court could condone a six-year delay in filing an appeal under the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977, given that the special statute does not incorporate Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court held that the appeal was time-barred. It established that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, does not apply to special laws unless explicitly incorporated by the legislature, which the 1977 Ordinance does not do. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is inapplicable to appeals, as it is restricted to suits and applications. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, apply to appeals filed under the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977?
  • Can the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, be extended to exclude time consumed in prosecuting an appeal before a wrong forum?
  • Does the definition of 'suit' in Section 2(10) of the Limitation Act, 1908, exclude appeals from the purview of Section 14 of the same Act?
  • Is a court empowered to condone delay in filing an appeal under a special law that does not explicitly incorporate the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908?
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• Allied Bank Ltd vs Messrs Fazal Vegetable Ghee Mills and others2019 CLD 441, 2019 MLD 708 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-17
  Executing First Appealexecuting court jurisdictiongoing behind decreeSection 47 CPCliquidator feeEOBI claimslabor claimswinding up proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This Executing First Appeal before the High Court arose from execution proceedings in respect of a decree for recovery granted in favour of the Appellant Bank. In those execution proceedings, the Executing Court passed orders disposing of applications filed by third parties (the workers' representative, liquidator, and EOBI), directing the determination and payment of claims and liquidator fees out of the decree amount, effectively treating the decree as a company asset and exercising winding-up powers. The Appellant challenged these directions on the ground that an executing court cannot look behind or go beyond the decree. The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order, reiterating that under Section 47 of the C.P.C., an executing court's jurisdiction is strictly confined to executing the decree as drawn up. It held that the executing court could not entertain claims of third parties not covered by the decree nor exercise powers under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 within execution proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executing court go beyond or behind the terms of a decree as drawn up?
  • Can an executing court exercise jurisdiction under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 to adjust third-party liabilities against a decree-holder's recovery amount?
  • Under what exceptional circumstances may an executing court look into the judgment behind a decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Rizwan Raja vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 PLD ISB 273, 2019 KLR Criminal Cases 37 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-15
  habeas corpusmilitary custodycourt martialofficial secretsconstitutional jurisdictiondetentionarmed forces
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant petition is a habeas corpus petition filed seeking the production of the petitioner's father, a retired military officer, who was allegedly missing and subsequently confirmed to be in military custody under investigation for offences under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The core legal question was whether the detention of a retired officer under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, read with the Official Secrets Act, 1923, is lawful, and whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, to issue production orders in matters relating to persons subject to the Army Act. The Islamabad High Court held that civilians or persons accused of offences related to defence or the Official Secrets Act, 1923, fall within the ambit of Section 2(1)(d) of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, and can be lawfully detained and investigated by military authorities. The court laid down the principle that matters relating to persons subject to the Pakistan Army Act are immune from high court scrutiny under Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, absent mala fides, and dismissed the habeas corpus petition as the detainee's whereabouts were known and lawful.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person not otherwise subject to the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, can be lawfully detained and investigated by military authorities under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, to issue production orders for individuals held in military custody under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952?
  • What is the combined legal effect of Sections 73, 74, and 75 of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 regarding the detention and custody of offenders?
  • Whether the bar contained in Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters relating to persons in military custody?
  Read full judgment →
• Alam Dad Laleka vs Election Commission of Pakistan2020 PLD Islamabad 20, 2019 IHC 118 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-08-06Read full judgment →
• Aehsun M.H. Shaikh and others vs Appellate Bench No.IV, Securities &2019 IHC 190 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-22Read full judgment →
• Administrator Islamabad Club through Secretary Islamabad Club, Islamabad vs Mrs. B. Ayisha Mustafa and another2019 PLD Islamabad 331, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 197 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-17Read full judgment →
• Additional Collector, Model Customs, Collectorate of Customs, Islamabad2019 P.C.T.L.R. 287, 2019 PTD 565, 2019 IHC 10 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-23Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qadar Ahsan vs Additional Deputy Commissioner (G), Islamabad2019 PLD Islamabad 434 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-15
  extraditionnon-treaty statefugitive offendermagisterial inquirydue processpost-arrest bailforeign documents authentication
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a writ petition and a criminal miscellaneous bail petition filed by a dual Pakistani-British national challenging an inquiry magistrate's order recommending his extradition to the United Kingdom for a murder investigation, alongside his post-arrest bail plea. The core legal question concerned the mandatory procedural and evidentiary requirements under the Extradition Act, 1972, particularly regarding non-treaty states, the proper authentication of foreign documents, and the necessity of examining the foreign investigating officer. The Islamabad High Court held that magisterial inquiries under Section 8 of the Extradition Act, 1972 must be conducted like a Court of Session trial, requiring proper authentication of foreign documents through notified government channels and the production of the foreign investigating officer either in person or via video link to satisfy the prima facie standard. The Court set aside the impugned extradition order and remanded the matter for de novo proceedings, while dismissing the post-arrest bail petition due to the petitioner's conduct as an absconder from foreign jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inquiry under the Extradition Act, 1972 must be conducted in the same manner as a trial before a Court of Session?
  • Is the personal appearance or video-link examination of the foreign investigating officer a mandatory requirement to establish a prima facie case in an extradition inquiry?
  • How must documents from a foreign requesting state be authenticated and submitted before the Inquiry Magistrate in Pakistan?
  • Can a fugitive offender who absconded from a foreign jurisdiction be granted post-arrest bail during pending extradition proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Jabbar Bhatti vs Oil and Gas Development Company Limited and others2019 IHC 196 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-11-06
  pensionary benefitsbogus educational certificateswrit jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefclean hands doctrinesuperannuationcorporation servantdisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired employee of the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (O.G.D.C.L.), filed a writ petition seeking the release of his pensionary benefits, which were withheld following allegations that his educational certificates were bogus. The core legal questions were whether O.G.D.C.L. could initiate disciplinary proceedings or withhold pension benefits after the petitioner's retirement, and whether the petitioner was entitled to discretionary relief given his conduct regarding the verification of his credentials. The Court held that while disciplinary proceedings under the 1994 Regulations cannot be initiated against an individual after they cease to be a 'corporation servant' upon retirement, the petitioner was not entitled to relief. The Court reasoned that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and requires the petitioner to approach the court with clean hands. Since the petitioner failed to challenge the finding that his certificate was bogus and refused to provide his matriculation certificate for verification, the Court declined to exercise its discretion to grant the requested relief, dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can disciplinary proceedings be initiated against an employee of the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited after their retirement?
  • Does the 'clean hands' doctrine apply to a petitioner seeking the release of pensionary benefits through a writ petition?
  • Are the Civil Service Regulations and Fundamental Rules automatically applicable to employees of statutory bodies like the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited?
  • Can a corporation withhold pensionary benefits of a retired employee based on allegations of bogus educational certificates without having initiated prior disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• (M/s.) Sui Southern Gas Company Limited vs Ghulam Nabi Deeshak,2019 PLC 130, 2019 P.S.C. 34, 2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-07
  Industrial Relations Act 2012Trade Union ReferendumContract LabourVoter ListEmployer-Employee RelationshipWrit of CertiorariCollective Bargaining Agent
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order by the Registrar of Trade Unions permitting contract employees to be included in the voter's list for a trade union referendum at M/s. Sui Southern Gas Company Limited. The petitioner contended that these workers were employees of independent third-party service providers, lacking privity of contract with the company, and thus ineligible for inclusion. The core legal question was whether workers engaged through contractors, but performing permanent duties at the establishment, qualify as "workmen" under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, and are entitled to voting rights. The High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Registrar’s decision. The Court held that the definition of "workman" under the Act explicitly includes persons employed through contractors. Applying the "integration" and "control" tests, the Court ruled that where workers perform essential functions, work on company premises, and are subject to the company's supervision, they are deemed employees of the company. The Court further observed that outsourcing agreements are often shams designed to deprive workers of their legitimate rights, and thus, such workers must be included in the voter's list.

  Questions settled

  • Are workers engaged through third-party contractors entitled to be included in a trade union's voter list for a referendum?
  • Does the definition of 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, include persons employed through a contractor?
  • What criteria determine whether a contract employee should be deemed an employee of the principal company for labour law purposes?
  • Does a company have locus standi to challenge the Registrar of Trade Unions' verification of a voter list?
  Read full judgment →
• Zaver Petroleum Corporation Limited vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others2018 CLC 1542, 2018 IHC 18 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-15Read full judgment →
• Zaver Petroleum Corporation Limited through Company Secretary vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others2018 CLC 1542 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-15Read full judgment →
• Zafar Iqbal vs The President, United Bank Limited and 4 others2018 PLC 176 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-31
  Industrial Relations Acttrade union referendumunfair labour practicedismissal from servicecollective bargaining agentwrit of certiorarisuspension of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged orders passed by the Registrar/Joint Registrar Trade Unions and the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which effectively denied the petitioner relief against his dismissal from service by the management of United Bank Limited. The core legal question was whether the statutory protection against the dismissal of trade union officers during referendum proceedings, as provided under Section 19(13) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, remains operative when those referendum proceedings have been suspended. The court held that the protection under Section 19(13) does not apply when referendum proceedings are suspended, as the embargo on termination is tied to the active pendency of the referendum process. Furthermore, the court noted that the petitioner had already initiated a grievance petition before the NIRC regarding his dismissal, rendering it inappropriate for the High Court to interfere or adjudicate on the validity of the dismissal order. The petition was dismissed, affirming that the suspension of referendum proceedings lifts the statutory prohibition on the termination of trade union officers.

  Questions settled

  • Does the protection against dismissal under Section 19(13) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, apply when referendum proceedings are suspended?
  • Can a High Court interfere with a dismissal order when a grievance petition regarding the same dismissal is already pending before the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  • Does the suspension of referendum proceedings lift the statutory embargo on the termination of trade union officers?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafar Iqbal vs Raja Asim Rizwan and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 648, 2018 MLD 1374 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-02
  bail cancellationpre-arrest bailunnatural deathsupplementary challanmisuse of bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed by the petitioner seeking the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to respondent No. 1 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Islamabad, in a case registered under sections 302, 342, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in respect of an unnatural death. The core legal question was whether the pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent should be cancelled based on his alleged involvement and the testimonies of subsequent witnesses, given that considerations for bail cancellation differ from those for grant of bail. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that bail once granted by a competent court will not be cancelled unless the bail-granting order is perverse or there is an allegation that the accused has misused the concession of bail, neither of which was established. The key principle laid down is that the considerations for granting bail and cancelling bail are entirely different, and bail ought not to be cancelled merely to wreak vengeance or when no useful purpose would be served by sending the accused behind bars, especially after the submission of the challan.

  Questions settled

  • What are the distinct considerations for the grant of bail versus the cancellation of bail?
  • Under what circumstances can pre-arrest bail granted by a competent court be cancelled?
  • Does the submission of a challan affect the court's inclination to cancel bail?
  • Can bail be cancelled merely to satisfy the vengeance of the complainant party?
  Read full judgment →
• Yasir Khan and others vs The State and another2018 MLD 176 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-31
  post-arrest bailgang rapeidentification paradeprohibitory clausedelay in FIRcriminal investigationZina-bil-Jabr
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought post-arrest bail for the petitioners accused of offences under sections 394, 376(2), 377, and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving gang rape, unnatural offences, and dacoity. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail despite being identified during an identification parade and implicated by the victims' statements recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court declined the bail application, holding that the victims' statements, supported by medical evidence and the identification parade, provided reasonable grounds to believe the accused committed the offences. The court emphasized that in cases of sexual assault, victims are unlikely to falsely implicate others at the cost of their own honor. Furthermore, the court held that a delay in lodging an FIR is not fatal when adequately explained by the fear of blackmail or social stigma. The court also criticized the investigation's negligence, directing the Inspector-General of Police to review the conduct of the investigating officer. The principle established is that bail is not to be granted when reasonable grounds exist to connect the accused to heinous offences falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay in lodging an FIR is fatal to the prosecution's case in sexual assault matters?
  • Does the identification of accused persons by victims in an identification parade constitute reasonable grounds to deny bail?
  • Can bail be granted for offences falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when there is prima facie evidence connecting the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Wi-Tribe Pakistan Ltd. vs Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue and others2020 PCTLR 134, 2018 PTD 654 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-30Read full judgment →
• Waseem Haroon and 2 others vs State, etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 83 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-14
  armed robberydacoityidentification paradedefective chargeplanted recoverysecondary evidencecriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Sections 395 and 412 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for armed robbery at a bank. The core legal questions involved the legality of the conviction in the absence of a properly framed charge, the admissibility and evidentiary value of secondary identification parade documents without satisfying the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and the reliability of highly contradictory and delayed recovery evidence. The Islamabad High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to prove its case as no substantive charge for the offences was ever framed, key identification witnesses were abandoned, the identification parade suffered from incurable legal flaws, and the alleged recoveries were fake, planted, and uncorroborated. The court laid down key principles regarding the mandatory requirement of specific and clear framing of charges by transferee courts, the strict adherence to primary documentary evidence rules under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and the strict conditions governing legally valid identification parades. The appeal was allowed and the appellants were acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction can be sustained when no specific charge for the alleged offence was ever framed or read out to the accused during trial?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an identification parade report tendered merely as an attested photocopy without examining its author or fulfilling the requirements of primary evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Does the recovery of alleged looted property and a motorcycle from the same place on two different dates after a considerable delay render the recovery proceedings doubtful and inadmissible?
  • Whether an appellate court should remand a matter for retrial when the prosecution's foundational evidence, including eyewitness identification and identification parade witnesses, has completely collapsed?
  Read full judgment →
• Wahaj Zulfiqar and others. vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 1284, 2018 KLR Civil Cases 95 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-24
  contractual employmentmaster and servantregularizationtermination of serviceproject employeeswrit jurisdictioncivil servantsFederal Public Service Commissiondamages
  Summary & questions settled

  Multiple writ petitions were filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by contractual employees of the National TB Control Programme, a foreign-funded project. The petitioners challenged their service termination notices and sought judicial directions for the regularization of their contractual employment with back benefits, claiming parity with other previously regularized employees and asserting status as civil servants.

  The High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the relationship between the petitioners and their employer is governed by master and servant principles and non-statutory contractual terms, with funding contingent on donor grants. In the absence of statutory service rules, contractual employees cannot invoke writ jurisdiction to restrain termination, seek reinstatement, or bypass statutory recruitment mechanisms under the Civil Servants Act 1973 and Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973 for posts in BPS-16 and above. The Court reiterated that competitive processes for temporary and permanent appointments differ, and an aggrieved contractual employee's remedy for wrongful termination lies in a suit for damages.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contractual employee maintain a constitutional writ petition under Article 199 to challenge termination of contract or seek reinstatement in the absence of statutory rules?
  • Whether the High Court can direct the regularization of contractual project employees into civil service posts without fulfilling statutory recruitment requirements through the Federal Public Service Commission?
  • Does contractual employment in a foreign donor-funded project confer a vested right to permanent absorption or regularization in the Federal Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Wahaj Zulfiqar and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division, and others2018 KLR Civil Cases 95, 2018 IHC 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-23
  contractual employmentregularization of serviceswrit jurisdictionmaster and servantproject employeesconstitutional petitionpublic employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple writ petitions filed by contract employees of the National TB Control Programme, a project funded by an international donor, seeking regularization of their services and challenging termination notices. The core legal questions were whether contractual employees of a project not governed by statutory rules can invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction for reinstatement or regularization, and whether the court can compel the regularization of such employees. The Court held that in the absence of statutory rules, the relationship between the petitioners and the project is governed by the principle of master and servant, rendering the petitioners ineligible for reinstatement via writ jurisdiction; their remedy lies in a suit for damages for any unexpired contract term. Furthermore, the Court held that it cannot direct regularization, as doing so without a competitive process violates the constitutional mandate of equal opportunity in public employment. The key principle laid down is that contractual employees cannot bypass competitive recruitment processes, and courts cannot regularize project employees who lack statutory protection, as such actions would undermine the competitive merit-based recruitment system required for public sector appointments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contractual employee of a project not governed by statutory rules invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court for reinstatement?
  • Does the regularization of contractual employees without a competitive process violate the constitutional principle of equal opportunity in public employment?
  • Is a contractual employee entitled to seek regularization of services through a court order in the absence of statutory service rules?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a contractual employee whose services have been terminated in accordance with the terms of their contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Tufail Ahmed Khan and others vs The State and another2018 KLR Criminal Cases 182 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-22
  pre-arrest bailad-interim bailbail bondssuretyoperative bailarrest by policeinfructuous petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for pre-arrest bail filed before the Islamabad High Court, wherein ad-interim bail was initially granted subject to furnishing bail bonds and sureties. However, the petitioners failed to furnish the required bail bonds and sureties within the stipulated period, leading to their subsequent arrest by the police. The core legal question revolved around whether an ad-interim bail order becomes operative without the actual execution and furnishing of bail bonds and sureties, and whether the police are justified in arresting an accused who has failed to comply with bail conditions. The Court held that a bail order does not become operative until the requisite bail bonds and sureties are duly furnished as mandated by law, and since the petitioners failed to comply, the ad-interim bail was not in the field, making their arrest lawful. The key principle laid down is that the concept of bail requires the delivery of an accused into the custody of sureties who undertake to secure their attendance, and a bail granting order remains inoperative until such bonds and sureties are formally executed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ad-interim bail order become operative without furnishing the required bail bonds and sureties?
  • Can the police lawfully arrest an accused who has been granted ad-interim bail but failed to comply with the surety conditions?
  • Does a pre-arrest bail petition become infructuous once the petitioner is arrested due to non-compliance with bail conditions?
  Read full judgment →
• Tufail Ahmed Khan and 4 others vs State and another2018 KLR Criminal Cases 182, 2018 YLR 1450, PLJ 2018 Cr.C. 806 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-22
  pre-arrest bailbail bondsinfructuous petitionnon-compliance with court ordersuretyoperative bail order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed an application for pre-arrest bail, which was granted on an ad-interim basis subject to the condition of furnishing bail bonds and surety. Despite multiple adjournments and a failed attempt to reduce the surety amount, the petitioners failed to comply with the court's conditional order for nearly two weeks. Consequently, the police arrested the petitioners on the grounds that the bail order had not become operative due to non-compliance. The petitioners challenged the arrest as mala fide, arguing that the court should protect their liberty. The court examined the legal nature of bail, emphasizing that it is not a static concept but a mechanism to secure an accused's attendance through sureties, as mandated by Section 499 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court held that because the petitioners failed to furnish the required bail bonds and surety, the ad-interim bail order never became operative. Therefore, the petition for pre-arrest bail became infructuous upon the petitioners' arrest, necessitating that they seek bail after arrest through the appropriate legal channels.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ad-interim bail order become operative before the accused furnishes the required bail bonds and surety?
  • Does a petition for pre-arrest bail become infructuous once the petitioner is arrested due to failure to comply with bail conditions?
  • What is the legal purpose of requiring sureties under Section 499 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Trek Technologies Limited vs Icondor Telecom (Private) Limited and another2018 CLD 668 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-17
  winding up petitionforeign companylocus standicorporate insolvencystatutory compliancemaintainability of petitionCompanies Ordinance 1984
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, seeking the winding up of Icondor Telecom (Private) Limited on grounds of commercial insolvency and loss of substratum. The core legal question was whether a foreign company, which has not complied with the statutory requirements for registration and filing of documents with the registrar in Pakistan, possesses the locus standi to initiate legal proceedings in a Pakistani court. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable and dismissed it. The ratio decidendi is that a foreign company is statutorily mandated to deliver specific documents to the registrar to establish its legal presence in Pakistan. Failure to comply with these requirements, as stipulated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, and the successor Companies Act, 2017, explicitly debars such a foreign entity from instituting any suit, claim, or legal proceeding. Consequently, the appointment of an attorney by a non-compliant foreign company cannot cure this fundamental legal disability, rendering the petition incompetent and legally unsustainable before the court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a foreign company have the locus standi to initiate legal proceedings in Pakistan without complying with registration requirements?
  • What is the legal consequence for a foreign company that fails to deliver required documents to the registrar under the Companies Ordinance 1984?
  • Can a foreign company cure its inability to sue by appointing an attorney if it has not complied with statutory registration requirements?
  Read full judgment →
• The State, through D.G. FIA, Islamabad vs Shoaib Ahmed Shaikh and 262018 PCRLJ 1264, 2018 IHC 42 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-25
  judicial biaspecuniary interestacquittal appealillegal gratificationvitiated judgmentfair trialremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, challenged an acquittal judgment passed by an Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerned the validity of a judgment rendered by a presiding judge who was subsequently dismissed from service for accepting illegal gratification in the very case he decided. The High Court held that the judgment was vitiated due to the presiding judge's direct pecuniary interest. Relying on established precedent, the Court affirmed that any pecuniary interest, however small, disqualifies a judge from adjudicating a matter, as justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done. The Court ruled that such bias renders the proceedings void on grounds of public policy, irrespective of the correctness of the decision. Consequently, the acquittal was set aside, and the matter was remanded for a fresh decision by the Sessions Judge, with the prosecution's evidence preserved as requested. The respondents were ordered to surrender and furnish fresh bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judge's direct pecuniary interest in a case, however small, disqualify them from adjudicating it?
  • Can a judgment be set aside solely on the ground that the presiding judge accepted illegal gratification?
  • Does the existence of pecuniary bias in a judge vitiate the entire judicial proceeding irrespective of the correctness of the final decision?
  • Is a judge who has accepted illegal gratification disqualified from acting as a judge on grounds of public policy?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Shahid Azeem2018 IHC 87 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-11
  retracted confessionjudicial confessioncapital punishmentmurder referencerape and murdercircumstantial evidenceconfessional statementcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a murder reference and a criminal appeal arising from the conviction and sentencing of the appellant for the kidnapping, rape, murder, and subsequent concealment of the dead body of a seven-year-old girl. The core legal questions addressed by the court concern whether the judicial confessional statement of the appellant was made voluntarily despite its subsequent retraction, whether delay in recording it is fatal, and whether sufficient corroborative evidence exists to sustain a conviction for capital offences. The Islamabad High Court held that a retracted judicial confession can legally form the basis of a conviction if the court is satisfied that it was voluntary and true, and that the prosecution successfully corroborated the confession through medical evidence, pointations, and recoveries. The court laid down principles regarding the evidentiary value of retracted judicial confessions, the necessity of corroboration in material particulars as a rule of prudence, and the non-fatal nature of administrative lapses or delays where voluntariness remains established.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession alone form the basis of a conviction in a capital case?
  • Whether delay in recording a confessional statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is invariably fatal to its admissibility?
  • Does the alteration or reframing of a charge automatically necessitate a de novo trial in every instance?
  • What are the essential pre-requisites for accepting a judicial confession as true and voluntary?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Maheen Zafar and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 664, 2018 IHC 33 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-17
  child abusewillful neglectFIR validityprocedural irregularitySection 328-A PPCres gestaecriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the trial of two accused persons, Maheen Zafar and Raja Khurram Ali Khan, charged with multiple offences, including wrongful confinement, assault, and willful neglect of a minor maid servant, Tayyaba Bibi, under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions addressed whether the failure of the complainant to sign the First Information Report (FIR) vitiated the proceedings and whether the prosecution successfully proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the absence of a signature on an FIR is a procedural irregularity that does not invalidate the trial, as the FIR merely sets the criminal law in motion. Regarding the merits, the Court acquitted the accused of charges involving assault and wrongful confinement due to insufficient evidence. However, the Court convicted both accused under Section 328-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for willful neglect and ill-treatment of a child, establishing the principle that custodians are legally responsible for the welfare of minors in their care, and failure to provide necessary care constitutes a punishable offence under the statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a complainant to sign an FIR render the criminal proceedings illegal?
  • Can a conviction be sustained under Section 328-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the neglect of a child maid servant?
  • Is the absence of a signature on an FIR a fatal procedural defect?
  • Does medical evidence alone suffice for conviction in the absence of ocular testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through DG FIA Islamabad vs Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh and 262018 P Cr. L J 1264 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-25
  pecuniary interestjudicial biasvitiation of judgmentcriminal appealacquittaljudicial misconductfair trialremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, preferred under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenged an acquittal judgment rendered by an Additional Sessions Judge. The State contended that the presiding judge had been dismissed from service following disciplinary proceedings where he admitted to accepting illegal gratification to secure the respondents' acquittal. The core legal question was whether a judgment rendered by a judge with a proven pecuniary interest in the outcome is vitiated, and if so, what the appropriate remedy is. The Court held that any direct pecuniary interest, however slight, disqualifies a judge and vitiates the resulting judgment, as it violates the fundamental principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned acquittal judgment. Applying established precedent, the Court remanded the matter to the trial court for a fresh decision, while preserving the evidence already recorded, as the prosecution conceded that the proceedings prior to the judgment were not tainted by bias.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judge's pecuniary interest in a case, however small, disqualify them from adjudicating the matter?
  • Does a judgment rendered by a judge who has accepted illegal gratification stand vitiated regardless of the correctness of the decision?
  • Can a case be remanded for a fresh decision while preserving evidence recorded prior to the discovery of judicial bias?
  Read full judgment →
• The National Highway Authority through Director (Legal) vs Lilley2018 CLC 627 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-12Read full judgment →
• The Chairperson, National Commission for Human Development, etc. vs Abdul Jabbar Memon, etc2018 [M] C.L.R. 1089 · Islamabad High Court
  Intra-Court AppealConstitutional jurisdictionStatutory rulesMaster and servantAggrieved personService regulationsAdditional charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal challenged a Single Judge's decision that set aside a notification granting additional charge to certain officials of the National Commission for Human Development. The core legal questions were whether the Commission's service rules were statutory in nature and whether the respondents had standing under Article 199 of the Constitution to challenge the notification. The Court held that the Rules of 2006 are non-statutory because the National Commission for Human Development Ordinance, 2002, does not reserve control for the Federal Government, nor does it fetter the Commission's discretion in framing rules. Consequently, the relationship between the Commission and its employees is governed by the principle of master and servant. Furthermore, the Court found the respondents were not aggrieved persons under Article 199, as the impugned notification did not prejudice their seniority or promotion prospects. The key principle laid down is that for service rules to be statutory, the parent statute must either require Government approval for rule-making or demonstrate that the rule-making authority is under Government control, with rules having an effect broader than internal management.

  Questions settled

  • Are the service rules of the National Commission for Human Development statutory in nature?
  • What is the test for determining whether service rules of a statutory body are statutory or non-statutory?
  • Can an employee challenge an order of additional charge granted to other officials under Article 199 of the Constitution if it does not affect their seniority or promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chairperson, National Commission for Human Development and others vs Abdul Jabbar Memon and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 1089, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 73 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-13
  Intra Court Appealstatutory rulesnon-statutory rulesmaster and servantaggrieved personadditional chargeconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges a judgment passed by a learned Single Judge in Chambers that had set aside a notification granting an additional charge of various posts to five officials of the National Commission for Human Development. The core legal questions involved whether the service rules of the Commission are statutory or non-statutory, whether the rule enunciated in Pakistan Red Crescent Society v. Syed Nazir Gillani was overruled by Shafique Ahmed Khan v. NESCOM, and whether the respondents qualified as aggrieved persons under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Islamabad High Court held that the service rules of the Commission are non-statutory because the legislature intended to establish an independent and autonomous body without reserving control or rule-making approval powers to the Federal Government, and that the judgment in Shafique Ahmed Khan did not overrule the established test requiring governmental approval or implicit control. Furthermore, the court held that the respondents were not aggrieved persons as the mere issuance of an additional charge did not affect their seniority or promotion prospects. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the single bench judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the service rules framed by the National Commission for Human Development under the National Commission for Human Development Ordinance, 2002 are statutory or non-statutory in nature?
  • Did the judgment in Shafique Ahmed Khan v. NESCOM overrule the principle established in Pakistan Red Crescent Society v. Syed Nazir Gillani regarding government approval as a condition precedent for statutory rules?
  • Does the notification of an additional charge to certain employees give rise to a cause of action for other employees to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution as aggrieved persons?
  • What is the governing legal test for determining whether service regulations of a statutory corporation possess statutory force?
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• Syeda Mehwish through Mother/Attorney and another vs Additional2018 CLC 1337 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-23Read full judgment →
• Syed Munir Syed vs Sardar Muhammad Kamal Khan and others2018 IHC 117 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-19Read full judgment →
• Syed Mazhar Hussain and others vs President of the Islamic Republic2018 MLD 327 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-02
  workplace harassmentex-employeejurisdiction of Ombudsmanconstitutional petitionremand orderstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition before the Islamabad High Court arose from a service dispute where a terminated employee of Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Limited filed a complaint of sexual harassment against an official after her contract was terminated. The Ombudsman initially dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and finding it retaliatory, but the President of Pakistan remanded the matter for a fresh decision. The core legal question was whether the Protection Against Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2010 applies to ex-employees or is restricted only to current employees. The court held that the statute applies exclusively to persons currently in employment, as evidenced by the definitions and preamble, and that an ex-employee cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman or inquiry committee under the Act. The petition was consequently allowed, setting aside the remand order and upholding the dismissal of the complaint, establishing the principle that workplace harassment remedies under the 2010 Act are not available to former employees after termination of their employment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Protection Against Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2010 is applicable to ex-employees?
  • Can a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be maintained against a remand order passed by a quasi-judicial authority?
  • Does a statutory bar of jurisdiction prevent the High Court from exercising judicial review over orders passed without jurisdiction?
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• Sunbiz Private Limited (7 News TV Pakistan) vs Federation of Pakistan2018 IHC 40 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-20Read full judgment →
• Sunbiz Private Limited (7 News TV Pakistan) through Abbas Ali Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Information and 3 others2018 YLR 1785 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-24
  licence suspensionregulatory authoritysubordinate legislationultra viresnatural justiceimposition of fineadjournment penaltystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals before the Islamabad High Court challenged two orders passed by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). The first order approved a Council of Complaints (COC) recommendation to fine the appellant Rs. 5,00,000 for seeking an adjournment. The second order suspended the appellant's broadcast licence for seven days and demanded an apology for airing an unverified news item regarding college students. The High Court examined whether the COC had the statutory authority to recommend a fine for an adjournment and whether it could recommend licence suspension under Rule 8(5) of the PEMRA (Council of Complaints) Rules, 2010, given that Section 26(5) of the parent PEMRA Ordinance, 2002, only permits recommendations of censure or fine. The Court held that a tribunal has no inherent power to fine for adjournments and that rules cannot expand the penal scope of a parent statute. Consequently, the Court set aside both orders, ruling that the COC's recommendatory powers are strictly limited by the parent statute.

  Questions settled

  • Can a regulatory body or its council recommend or impose a fine on a licensee for seeking an adjournment in the absence of explicit statutory authorization?
  • Whether rules framed under a parent statute can expand or enhance the scope of penal provisions beyond what is specifically provided in the parent statute?
  • Can PEMRA suspend a broadcast licence under Section 30 of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002, without providing the licensee with reasonable notice to show cause and a personal hearing?
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• Sumaira Malik and another vs Election Commission of Pakistan2018 PLJ Islamabad 216, 2018 YLR 104 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-07Read full judgment →
• Suleman Khan vs The State2018 IHC 154 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-06
  narcotic substancesrepresentative samplecriminal appealrecovery of narcoticsburden of proofsentencing guidelineschemical examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a jail appeal and a criminal appeal challenging a conviction under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, for the possession of 285 kilograms of charas. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established the quantity of narcotics recovered when samples were taken from packets but not from every individual slab contained within those packets, and whether the trial court could estimate the weight of the narcotics based on mathematical hypotheses. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the recovery of the full quantity, as the failure to take samples from each individual slab violated the mandatory guidelines established in Ameer Zeb vs The State. The Court ruled that in cases involving narcotics in separate forms, a representative sample must be taken from every individual unit; otherwise, the accused can only be held liable for the quantity from which samples were actually taken and tested. Consequently, the conviction was reduced to the quantity proven by the samples (2,260 grams), and the sentence was modified to the period already undergone.

  Questions settled

  • Is it legally permissible for a trial court to estimate the weight of recovered narcotics based on mathematical hypotheses rather than actual weighing?
  • Does the failure to take a sample from every individual slab of a recovered narcotic substance invalidate the prosecution's claim regarding the total quantity?
  • What is the consequence under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, when the prosecution fails to take representative samples from each separate packet or slab?
  • Can an accused be convicted for the full quantity of recovered narcotics if samples were only taken from a portion of the recovered slabs?
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• Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited, (SNGPL) through General Manager vs Director (Legal), President Secretariat (Public), Aiwan-E-Sadar Islamabad and 2 others2018 PLD Islamabad 51 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-30
  writ petitiongas utility courtbilling disputejurisdictionFederal Ombudsmanrepresentation to Presidentspecial lawcoram non judicemaladministration
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited (SNGPL) challenging an order passed by the President of Pakistan, which had accepted a representation by a consumer (International Islamic University) and set aside the findings of the Federal Ombudsman regarding a gas billing dispute. The core legal question was whether the Federal Ombudsman and the President of Pakistan retain jurisdiction over gas billing and recovery disputes following the enactment of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016. The Islamabad High Court accepted the petition, declaring the President's order coram non judice. The Court held that the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 is a special law establishing exclusive jurisdiction in Gas Utility Courts for resolving disputes concerning "sums due", billing, and metering. The Court laid down the principle that a later special statute dealing with a specific subject-matter overrides prior general or special laws with conflicting provisions. Furthermore, because billing disputes involve factual controversies requiring the recording of evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, such matters must be adjudicated exclusively by the Gas Utility Courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Ombudsman and the President of Pakistan have jurisdiction to adjudicate gas billing and recovery disputes after the enactment of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016?
  • Which statute prevails when there is a conflict between two special laws containing overriding clauses?
  • Can the Federal Ombudsman entertain disputes that involve complex factual controversies requiring the recording of pro and contra evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
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• State through Advocate-General of Islamabad vs Mati Ullah Jan and 4PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 120, 2018 P Cr. L J 899 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-21
  contempt of courtfreedom of speechmedia ethicsunconditional apologyconstitutional interpretationPEMRA regulationjudicial dignity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves contempt of court proceedings initiated against journalists and media personnel for broadcasting a program that allegedly maligned the judiciary. The core legal question concerned whether the respondents' conduct constituted contempt of court and if their subsequent unconditional apology warranted the discharge of proceedings. The court held that while freedom of speech is a fundamental right, it is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, particularly regarding the dignity of institutions and contempt of court. Finding that the respondents admitted the allegations and tendered an unconditional apology, the court exercised judicial grace and dropped the proceedings. The court emphasized that media organizations must verify facts before airing content and that regulatory bodies like PEMRA have a statutory duty to monitor compliance with the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 and the Electronic Media (Programmes and Advertisement) Code of Conduct 2015. It established that freedom of expression does not grant impunity to disgrace constitutional institutions or individuals.

  Questions settled

  • Does the freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 include the right to malign the judiciary?
  • Can contempt of court proceedings be dropped upon the tender of an unconditional apology by the contemnors?
  • Is the freedom of the press subject to reasonable restrictions regarding the dignity of constitutional institutions?
  • What is the responsibility of PEMRA in monitoring talk shows to ensure compliance with the Electronic Media (Programmes and Advertisement) Code of Conduct 2015?
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• Sports Star International (Pvt.) Ltd. (" Ssi") through Chief Executive2018 CLC 1892 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-24Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed Jan vs Siraj Ahmed Jan and others2018 PLJ Islamabad 143 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-02Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed Jan vs Siraj Ahmed Jan and 9 others2018 PLJ Islamabad 143, 2018 CLC 919 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-02Read full judgment →
• Sofia Ashfaq vs Haseeb Ashfaq Bhatti and others2018 IHC 141 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-28Read full judgment →
• Shoaib-ur-Rehman vs The M.D., Telephone Industries of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.2018 [M] C.L.R. 908 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Shoaib ur Rehman vs The M.D., Telephone Industries of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.2018 IHC 6 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-23Read full judgment →
• Shifa International Hospitals Ltd., etc vs Mst. Hajira Bibi, etc2018 IHC 57 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-24
  medical negligenceconsumer protectionmaintainability of appealinterlocutory orderjurisdiction of consumer courtspecial law interpretationcompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Consumer Court dismissing the appellants' objection regarding the maintainability of a consumer complaint alleging medical negligence. The core legal questions were whether medical negligence claims fall exclusively under the jurisdiction of the PMDC Ordinance, 1962, and whether an appeal lies against an interlocutory order of the Consumer Court. The Court held that the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995, is a beneficial legislation providing for compensation and damages—remedies absent in the PMDC Ordinance—and thus, the Consumer Court retains jurisdiction. However, the Court directed that in such cases, the Consumer Court should seek expert opinions from PMDC authorities. Furthermore, the Court held that Section 10 of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995, only permits appeals against final orders, such as convictions or acquittals, and does not extend to interlocutory or interim orders. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. The judgment establishes that special laws must be interpreted to fulfill their legislative intent, particularly regarding consumer rights and the availability of compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995, provide jurisdiction for consumer courts to hear medical negligence claims despite the existence of the PMDC Ordinance, 1962?
  • Are interlocutory or interim orders passed by a Consumer Court appealable under the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995?
  • What is the procedure for a Consumer Court when determining medical negligence claims involving professional medical practitioners?
  • Does the PMDC Ordinance, 1962, provide a mechanism for awarding damages or compensation to a consumer?
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• Shifa International Hospitals Ltd. and others vs Mst. Hajira Bibi and others2018 IHC 57, 2018 PLD Islamabad 372 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-20
  medical negligenceconsumer complaintmaintainabilityjurisdictioninterlocutory ordersspecial laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was preferred against an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-VII (West) Islamabad, which dismissed the appellants' objection regarding the maintainability of a consumer complaint filed by respondent No. 1 under the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995 concerning alleged medical negligence. The core legal questions involved whether a consumer complaint regarding medical negligence is maintainable before a Consumer Court in the presence of the PMDC Ordinance, 1962, and whether an appeal against an interlocutory order is maintainable under section 10 of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995. The Islamabad High Court held that the Consumer Court has jurisdiction to entertain consumer complaints regarding medical negligence for the purpose of granting compensation, a remedy absent under the PMDC framework, while establishing that the Consumer Court should seek an expert opinion from PMDC authorities before finalizing the matter. Furthermore, the court held that appeals under section 10 of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995 lie only against final orders of conviction or acquittal and that interlocutory orders are not appealable. The key principles laid down include the harmonious application of overlapping special laws and the non-appealability of interim orders under consumer legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a consumer complaint regarding medical negligence is maintainable before a Consumer Court in the presence of the PMDC Ordinance, 1962?
  • Does the PMDC Ordinance, 1962 provide for the award of damages and compensation to a consumer?
  • Are interlocutory orders passed by a Consumer Court appealable under section 10 of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995?
  • What is the procedure when two special laws seemingly overlap regarding medical negligence claims?
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• Sheikh Ghulam Farooq and others vs Muslim Commercial Bank, Islamabad and others2018 CLD 567 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-14Read full judgment →
• Shahzada Sikandar ul Mulk & 4 others vs The Capital Development2019 KLR Civil Cases 220, 2019 PLD Islamabad 365, 2018 IHC 80 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-09Read full judgment →
• Shahid Azeem vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 1653 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-11
  retracted confessionjudicial confessioncapital punishmentcorroborationrape and murdercriminal appealmurder referenceevidentiary value
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted for the rape and murder of a seven-year-old girl and sentenced to death. The core legal questions concerned the admissibility and evidentiary value of a retracted judicial confession recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the reframing of charges necessitated a retrial. The Islamabad High Court upheld the conviction and death sentence, concluding that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that a retracted judicial confession can legally sustain a conviction if the court is satisfied it was made voluntarily and is true. While corroboration is a rule of prudence to ensure reliability, it is not an absolute requirement if the confession is inherently credible. Furthermore, the Court determined that procedural lapses in recording a confession are not fatal if they do not undermine its voluntariness, and that the reframing of charges did not cause prejudice requiring a retrial. The confession was corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of items linked to the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession form the sole basis for a capital conviction?
  • Does a procedural lapse in recording a confession under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically render it inadmissible?
  • Is corroboration of a retracted judicial confession a mandatory legal requirement or a rule of prudence?
  • Does the reframing of a charge during trial necessitate a de novo trial if no prejudice is shown to the accused?
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• Shahid Aslam vs The State and another2019 KLR Criminal Cases 1, 2018 IHC 156 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-13
  post-arrest bailfraudulent sale deedprohibitory clauseinvestigation lapseproperty disputecriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail by the petitioner, who was charged under Sections 420, 448, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, regarding the alleged fraudulent sale of property. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the ongoing investigation, the nature of the alleged offences, and the delay in the investigation process. The Court held that the petitioner should be granted bail, noting that the offences charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and that the petitioner had already been incarcerated for over three months. Furthermore, the Court expressed significant dissatisfaction with the police investigation, specifically the failure to question the Sub-Registrar involved in the fraudulent sale deed. The principle laid down is that where an investigation is ongoing and lacks diligence—particularly regarding the involvement of public officials in property fraud—an accused cannot be kept incarcerated indefinitely, especially when the alleged offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause of the relevant bail statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offence of forgery under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an accused be kept in indefinite incarceration when the investigation into the alleged offence is ongoing and incomplete?
  • Is the failure of the police to investigate the role of public officials in a property fraud case a relevant factor for the grant of bail?
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• Shafique Ahmed vs State, etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. 634 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-09
  inherent powers of High Courtcancellation reportexecutive orderSection 561-A Cr.P.C.judicial proceedingsMagistrate's administrative functions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging an order passed by an Illaqa Judicial Magistrate (FIA) that granted concurrence to a police cancellation report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner sought to challenge the Magistrate's decision to accept the cancellation of an FIR registered under Section 6 of the Passport Act 1974. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses the inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to interfere with an executive or administrative order passed by a Magistrate in the context of a cancellation report. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable, ruling that the Magistrate’s concurrence with a cancellation report is an executive or administrative function, not a judicial proceeding. Consequently, the High Court’s inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 cannot be invoked to challenge such non-judicial actions, as these powers are strictly limited to judicial proceedings and orders of a court.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Magistrate's order granting concurrence to a police cancellation report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a judicial or an executive order?
  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to challenge an executive or administrative order passed by a Magistrate?
  • Does the definition of 'Court of Justice' under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply to a Magistrate discharging administrative duties under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Senator Taj Haider and others vs Government of Pakistan, through Secretary, Finance Division and others2019 [M] C.L.R. 69, 2019 PLJ Islamabad 55, 2018 CLC 1910 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-17Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Establishment Division Government of Pakistan vs Dr.2017 PLC (C.S.) 907 · Islamabad High Court
  civil servants promotionCentral Selection Boarddiscretionary marksintegrity and general reputationsupersession and defermentwrit jurisdictionnatural justiceobjective criteria
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment by the Islamabad High Court disposed of a series of Intra-Court Appeals arising from a composite judgment of a learned Single Bench, which had allowed several writ petitions filed by civil servants aspiring for promotion from Basic Pay Scale-20 (BPS-20) to BPS-21. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of writ petitions against mere recommendations of the Central Selection Board (CSB) to the Prime Minister, and the vires and legality of the Office Memoranda and Objective Assessment Forms—specifically the allocation of fifteen discretionary marks by the CSB, including five overriding marks for 'Integrity/General Reputation/Perception'—under which the petitioners were deferred or superseded. The Court held that writ petitions challenging the recommendations simpliciter of the CSB to the Prime Minister are not justiciable under Article 199 of the Constitution as such recommendations are advisory and inchoate until approved by the competent authority. However, the Court upheld the challenge against the Office Memorandum and Objective Assessment Form, ruling that granting the CSB unguided and unfettered discretion with overriding effect for integrity marks without objective criteria, tangible material, or prior confrontation violates the principles of natural justice, statutory mandates, and dictum laid down by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable against recommendations simpliciter made by the Central Selection Board to the Prime Minister?
  • Does the allocation of discretionary marks by the Central Selection Board with an overriding effect for integrity and general reputation violate established legal principles and judgments of the superior courts?
  • Is it mandatory to confront a civil servant with tangible adverse material regarding their integrity before denying them promotion or deferring their case?
  • Whether Office Memoranda issued by the Establishment Division prescribing minimum qualifications and promotion policies constitute statutory rules under Section 25 of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
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• Sayed Zulfikar Abbas Bukhari vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2018 [M] C.L.R. 1670 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-03Read full judgment →